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Thesis summary 
This thesis explores the desirability and viability of a function-based as opposed to a form-based 
approach to adult relationship recognition in law. It explores the benefits and difficulties with both 
form-based and function-based approaches to determine whether either has any significant 
advantage over the other, both in relation to a need to provide a system of relationship recognition 
that is inclusive of the diversity of family relationships formed today, and in relation to the protective 
and symbolic functions of family law. To do this, the thesis will compare the English and Welsh 
approach to relationship recognition with that adopted in Australia. 
The thesis will show that form- and function-based approaches share many of the same benefits and 
both can be flexible because they can be used in ways that are inclusive of a variety of relationship 
types and both approaches have their disadvantages. On balance, function-based systems appear 
more principled than form-based systems because they focus on the quality of the relationship and 
not merely on its structure and function-based systems are better placed to protect the vulnerable 
partner in a relationship because there is no need to opt-in for legal recognition. But, form-based 
systems should not be abandoned because they have the benefit of being administratively efficient, 
and are better placed to serve family law’s symbolic function. Both form- and function-based 
approaches have the potential to be used in radical ways to respond to the needs of real families, but 
social reality and political will limits the development of both approaches to relationship recognition.
4 
 
Acknowledgments 
I have to start by thanking the Coleg Cymraeg Cenedlaethol, especially Dr Dylan Phillips, for funding 
the research project and supporting me throughout my time as a postgraduate student at Cardiff 
University. This thesis would not have been possible without the Coleg, and Dylan’s unwavering 
support. Diolch yn fawr am fy mherswadio i ail-gychwyn, Dylan! 
I’d like to thank my fellow PhD candidates, especially my fellow troglodytes (Chen, Alison, Steffan, 
Derek, Katie and Alan), for the support (counselling?!) and laughter throughout my time at 69 Park 
Place.  
I’d also like to thank my parents, for helping me pay the rent and ensuring I didn’t starve when things 
got tough. And thanks goes especially to Kris, for putting up with me over the past few months. I owe 
you a bottle of Dom (or 3). 
Most of all, I’d like to thank my supervisors, Dr Leanne Smith and Professor Gillian Douglas, for their 
invaluable support, encouragement, inspiration and never-ending patience throughout this process. 
Without your insight, feedback and generosity I’m not sure that I’d ever have submitted. 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ 12 
Table of cases ........................................................................................................................................ 13 
England and Wales ............................................................................................................................ 13 
Australia ............................................................................................................................................ 15 
European Court of Human Rights ..................................................................................................... 18 
Table of legislation ................................................................................................................................ 19 
England and Wales ............................................................................................................................ 19 
Australia ............................................................................................................................................ 20 
A note on terminology .......................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 1 ................................................................................................................................... 23 
Table 2 ................................................................................................................................... 24 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 25 
Aims of the thesis .............................................................................................................................. 28 
Structure of the thesis ...................................................................................................................... 30 
Chapter 1 – Changing relationship practices ........................................................................................ 32 
1.1 The changing demographic picture ................................................................................................ 32 
1.1.1 Formalised relationships .......................................................................................................... 32 
1.1.1.1 Marriage and divorce ........................................................................................................ 32 
1.1.1.2 Civil partnerships, the Australian registered relationships and dissolution ..................... 35 
1.1.2 Informal relationships .............................................................................................................. 36 
1.1.2.1 Cohabitants ....................................................................................................................... 36 
1.1.2.2 Other living arrangements ................................................................................................ 38 
1.1.2.2a LATs: Living-Apart-Together ........................................................................................ 39 
1.2 Changing social attitudes ................................................................................................................ 41 
1.2.1 Views on marriage and cohabitation ....................................................................................... 41 
1.2.2 Attitudes towards other relationships ..................................................................................... 43 
6 
 
1.3 The meaning and significance of ‘family’ ........................................................................................ 44 
1.3.1 The changing nature of personal relationships ....................................................................... 44 
1.3.2 The concept of ‘family’............................................................................................................. 47 
1.3.2.1 The family we live by ......................................................................................................... 48 
1.3.2.1a The traditional family .................................................................................................. 48 
1.3.2.1b The modern family ...................................................................................................... 49 
1.3.2.2 The family we live with ..................................................................................................... 50 
1.3.2.2a Thinking of family in a fluid way: the family practices approach ................................ 50 
1.3.2.2b Defining family by its functions? ................................................................................. 53 
1.3.2.2c Displaying our family practices ................................................................................... 56 
1.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 57 
Chapter 2 – Exploring the potential of ‘form’ and function ................................................................. 59 
2.1 Considering the functions of family law ......................................................................................... 59 
2.1.1 The protective function of family law .................................................................................. 60 
2.1.2 The symbolic function of legal recognition .......................................................................... 62 
2.2 Focussing on ‘form’ ......................................................................................................................... 64 
2.2.1 ‘Form’ in the first sense: formalised relationships .................................................................. 64 
2.2.1.1 Administrative efficiency .................................................................................................. 65 
2.2.1.2 Respect for choice and individual autonomy.................................................................... 66 
2.2.1.3 Status and formalised relationships ................................................................................. 67 
2.2.2 Form in the second sense: relationship type ........................................................................... 68 
2.2.2.1 The potential of formalised relationships to provide for family diversity ........................ 69 
2.3 Focussing on ‘function’ ................................................................................................................... 70 
2.3.1 What is ‘function’? ................................................................................................................... 70 
2.3.2 The difficulties with function-based recognition ..................................................................... 72 
2.3.2.1 Practical difficulties: the uncertainty of function-based recognition ............................... 73 
2.3.2.2 Difficulties of principle: the ideology of families .............................................................. 73 
2.3.2.3 ‘Imposing’ rights and responsibilities?.............................................................................. 75 
7 
 
2.3.3 How might function work in practice? ..................................................................................... 78 
2.3.3.1 Moderate function-based recognition .............................................................................. 79 
2.3.3.2 Radical function-based recognition .................................................................................. 82 
2.4 Conclusion: the thesis contribution ................................................................................................ 86 
Figure 1 ................................................................................................................................. 87 
Figure 2 ................................................................................................................................. 88 
Chapter 3 – Marriage: the “traditional” approach to relationship recognition ................................... 90 
3.1 The concept of the ‘marriage model’ ............................................................................................. 90 
3.2 The legal structure of marriage....................................................................................................... 92 
3.2.1 The legal structure of marriage: forming a valid marriage ...................................................... 92 
3.2.1.1 Dyadic relationships .......................................................................................................... 94 
3.2.1.2 Lack of consent ................................................................................................................. 94 
3.2.1.2a What does ‘consent’ mean? ....................................................................................... 95 
3.2.1.3 Age requirements ............................................................................................................. 99 
3.2.1.4 Prohibited degrees .......................................................................................................... 100 
3.2.1.4a A sexual relationship? ............................................................................................... 101 
3.2.1.5 Same-sex marriage .......................................................................................................... 102 
3.2.2 Ending a marriage .................................................................................................................. 104 
3.3 The legal consequences of marriage ............................................................................................ 108 
3.3.1 The development of financial remedies ................................................................................ 110 
3.3.2 Recognising pre-nuptial agreements ..................................................................................... 115 
3.4 The ideologies of marriage ........................................................................................................... 118 
3.4.1 Policymakers .......................................................................................................................... 119 
3.4.2 Judicial comments .................................................................................................................. 122 
3.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter 4 – Extending ‘form’ beyond marriage: registered couple relationships ............................. 127 
4.1 The development of the registered couple relationships............................................................. 127 
4.1.1 Why introduce the registered couple relationships? ............................................................ 128 
8 
 
4.1.2 What are the registered couple relationships? ..................................................................... 129 
4.1.2.1 Relationship type: the legal structure ............................................................................. 129 
4.1.2.2 Ending a registered relationship: the legal structure ..................................................... 132 
4.1.2.3 The legal consequences .................................................................................................. 134 
4.1.2.3a The problematic influence of the marriage model ................................................... 135 
4.2 Shared benefits of formalised relationships ................................................................................. 137 
4.2.1 Practical benefits: administrative efficiency .......................................................................... 137 
4.2.2 Respect for choice and autonomy ......................................................................................... 139 
4.2.3 The symbolic importance of ‘recognition’ ............................................................................. 140 
4.3 Distinguishing features: symbolism and social status .................................................................. 141 
4.3.1 A symbolic intent: equal, but distinct? .................................................................................. 141 
4.3.1.1 The symbolism of a ceremony ........................................................................................ 143 
4.3.2 A different social status?........................................................................................................ 147 
4.3.2.1 An inferior status? ........................................................................................................... 147 
4.3.2.2 A valuable status? ........................................................................................................... 151 
4.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 155 
Chapter 5 – Extending ‘form’ beyond couples: registered caring relationships................................. 157 
5.1 Calls for reform in England and Wales .......................................................................................... 157 
5.1.1 Civil partnerships for (some) relations of consanguinity ....................................................... 158 
5.1.1.1 The difficulties with the amendment.............................................................................. 159 
5.1.2 The Burden sisters’ case......................................................................................................... 162 
5.1.2.1 The Lower Chamber’s decision: an objectively justifiable difference of treatment ....... 164 
5.1.2.2 The Grand Chamber’s decision: a qualitative difference between couples and siblings 165 
5.2 The Australian experience: ‘caring relationships’ ......................................................................... 168 
5.2.1 Why were registered caring relationships introduced? ........................................................ 168 
5.2.1.1 The generous interpretation: recognising diversity and valuing care ............................ 169 
5.2.1.2 A cynical interpretation: mitigating the significance of equality for same-sex couples?171 
5.2.2 Australia’s registered caring relationships ............................................................................. 173 
9 
 
5.2.2.1 Relationship type – the legal structure of the caring relationships ................................ 173 
5.2.2.2 Exit requirements ............................................................................................................ 174 
5.2.2.3 Legal consequences of a registered caring relationship ................................................. 175 
5.2.2.3a Financial and property orders on relationship breakdown ...................................... 177 
5.2.3 Shared and distinctive features of formalised relationships ................................................. 179 
5.2.3.1 Shared elements ............................................................................................................. 179 
5.2.3.2 Distinguishing features ................................................................................................... 180 
5.2.3.2a The independent legal advice requirement and the respect for choice ................... 180 
5.2.3.2b The issue of social status? ......................................................................................... 181 
5.3 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 182 
Chapter 6 – Informal couple relationships: the moderate function-based approach ........................ 183 
6.1 What is a ‘cohabiting’ or a ‘de facto’ relationship? ...................................................................... 183 
6.1.1 Difficulties of definition ......................................................................................................... 184 
6.1.2 The current definitions .......................................................................................................... 186 
6.1.2.1 A requirement of ‘living together’? ................................................................................ 190 
6.1.2.2 Confined to sexual relationships? ................................................................................... 192 
6.1.2.3 Day-to-day sharing of life ................................................................................................ 192 
6.1.2.4 Commitment and intention towards the relationship .................................................... 194 
6.1.2.5 Third party perceptions of the relationship .................................................................... 196 
6.1.3 The challenges of a function-based approach ....................................................................... 197 
6.2 Rationales for the moderate function-based approach ............................................................... 199 
6.2.1 Functional arguments: protecting the vulnerable ................................................................. 200 
6.2.2 Function as a ‘safety net’ ....................................................................................................... 202 
6.3 The consequences of a moderate function-based reform ........................................................... 203 
6.3.1 General legal consequences .................................................................................................. 203 
6.3.2 Relationship breakdown provisions for informal couple relationships ................................. 205 
6.3.2.1 Relationship breakdown in England and Wales .............................................................. 205 
6.3.2.1a Developing trusts law ................................................................................................ 205 
10 
 
6.3.2.1b The limitations of property law and the case for statutory reform.......................... 207 
6.3.2.1c The Law Commission proposals ................................................................................ 209 
6.3.2.2 Financial and property provisions on the breakdown of de facto relationships ............ 211 
6.3.2.2a Recognising the deficiencies of property law ........................................................... 211 
6.3.2.2b The preliminary requirements .................................................................................. 212 
6.3.2.2c Property and maintenance orders ............................................................................ 214 
6.3.3 A social status for informal couple relationships? ................................................................. 216 
6.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 217 
Chapter 7 – Informal caring relationships: the “radical” function-based approach........................... 218 
7.1 What are the ‘caring relationships’? ............................................................................................. 218 
7.1.1 The difficulties of definition ................................................................................................... 219 
7.1.2 The legal structure of the caring relationships ...................................................................... 221 
Table 3 – .............................................................................................................................. 222 
7.1.3 An overview of the caring relationships ................................................................................ 223 
7.1.3.1 NSW’s ‘close personal relationships’ .............................................................................. 226 
7.1.3.1a The first case: Dridi v Fillmore ................................................................................... 227 
7.1.3.1b Living together in the same household .................................................................... 227 
7.1.3.1c Domestic support and personal care ........................................................................ 229 
7.1.3.1d The uncertainty of the boundaries of a CPR ............................................................. 230 
7.1.4 Caring relationships – increasing litigation? .......................................................................... 231 
7.2 The rationale behind the reforms ................................................................................................. 232 
7.2.1 The functional arguments: treating like (family) relationships alike ..................................... 233 
7.2.2 Disingenuous reasoning? ....................................................................................................... 236 
7.3 The effect of legal recognition of caring relationships ................................................................. 238 
7.3.1 The legal consequences ......................................................................................................... 239 
7.3.2 A lack of a social status .......................................................................................................... 242 
7.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 243 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 245 
11 
 
Research question 1: the similarities and differences between form-based and function-based 
recognition ...................................................................................................................................... 245 
Figure 1 ............................................................................................................................... 246 
Figure 2 ............................................................................................................................... 246 
Similarities between form-based and function-based recognition ............................................ 247 
Differences between form- and function-based recognition ..................................................... 247 
Social status and symbolism ................................................................................................... 248 
The relationship between ‘form’ and function ....................................................................... 250 
Figure 3 ............................................................................................................................... 251 
Figure 4 ............................................................................................................................... 251 
Research question 2: factors which affect the development of relationship recognition systems 252 
Competing effects: administrative efficiency vs safety-net provision ........................................ 252 
The significance of functional arguments and family law’s protective function ........................ 253 
The influence of the marriage model ......................................................................................... 254 
The implications of the research for policymaking ......................................................................... 255 
Concluding comments ................................................................................................................ 257 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 259 
 
12 
 
Abbreviations 
ABS – Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACT – Australian Capital Territory 
Cth – Commonwealth  
BSA – British Social Attitudes Survey 
NSW – New South Wales 
NT – Northern Territory  
ONS – Office for National Statistics 
SA – South Australia 
Tas – Tasmania 
Qld – Queensland 
Vic – Victoria 
WA – Western Australia 
13 
 
Table of cases 
England and Wales 
Amicus Horizon Ltd v Estate of Judy Mabbott and Brand [2012] HLR 42 
Ampthill Peerage Case, The (1977) AC 547 
Baynes v Hedger [2008] EWHC 1587 (Ch) 
Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21; [2003] 2 AC 467 
Brown v Brown (1982) 8 Fam LR 1 
Cartwright v Cartwright (1853) 3 de GM & G 982 
Clear v Clear [1958] 1 WLR 467 
Cocksedge v Cocksedge (1844) 14 Sim 244 
Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 
Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission; Butterworth v Supplementary Benefits Commission 
[1982] 1 All ER 498 
Dennis v Dennis and Spillett [1955] P 153 
Dix (Deceased), Re [2004] 1 WLR 1399 
Durham v Durham (1885) 10 PD 80 
G v F (Non-molestation Order: Jurisdiction) [2000] Fam 186 
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 
Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 
Gow v Grant [2012] UKSC 29; 2013 SC (UKSC) 1 
Hirani v Hirani (1983) 4 FLR 232 
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1865-69) L R 1 P & D 130 
J (Income Support: Cohabitation), Re [1995] 1 FLR 660 
Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 
Kimber v Kimber [2000] 1 FLR 383 
14 
 
Kotke v Sarrafini [2005] EWCA Civ 221 
Kremen v Agrest (Financial Remedy: Non-Disclosure: Post-Nuptial Agreement) [2012] EWHC 45 (Fam) 
Lawrence v Gallagher [2012] EWCA Civ 394 
Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1990] 1 AC 107 
Luton BC v B [2015] EWHC 3534 (Fam) 
M v M [1962] 1 WLR 845 
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 2 AC 618 
Morgan v Hill [2006] 3 FCR 620 
Nutting v Southern Housing Group [2005] HLR 25 
Owens v Owens [2017] 4 WLR 74 
Park, In the Estate of [1954] P 89 
Pettit v Pettit [1970] AC 777 
R v Clarke (James) (1949) 33 Cr App R 216 
R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 
R (on the Application of Baiai and Others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others 
[2009] 1 AC 287 
R (Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin) 
Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 
Roberts (Deceased), Re [1978] 1 WLR 653 
Sheffield City Council v E and another [2005] Fam 326 
Stack v Dowden [2007] AC 432 
Sydenham v Sydenham and Illingworth [1949] 2 All ER 196 
Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81 
Sutton v Mischon de Reya and Gawor & Co [2004] 1 FLR 837 
Szechter v Szechter [1971] P 286 
15 
 
V v V (Prenuptial Agreement) [2011] EWHC 3230 (Fam) 
Vervaeke (formerly Messina) v Smith and others [1983] 1 AC 145 
Watson, Re [1999] 1 FLR 878 
White v White [2001] 1 AC 596 
Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam) 
Australia 
AK v NC [2003] FamCA 1006 
Ak-Tankiz v Ak [2014] NSWSC 1044 
Aldridge v Delamarre [2013] FamCA 214 
Attorney-General (Victoria) v Commonwealth [1962] HCA 37 
Baker v Landon [2010] FMCAfam 280 
Balzia v Covich [2009] FamCA 1357 
Barlevy v Nadolski [2011] NSWSC 129 
Barry v Dalrymple [2009] FamCA 1271 
Bevan v Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 
Blyth v Spencer; Spencer v Neville [2005] NSWSC 653 
Bogan v Macorig [2004] NSWSC 993 
Brady v Harris [2012] FamCA 420 
Bullivant v Holt [2012] FamCA 134 
C, K v O, J [2014] SADC 87 
Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55 
D v McA (1986) 11 Fam LR 214 
Dakin v Sansbury [2010] FMCAfam 628 
Dave v Karia [2016] FamCA 414 
Delamarre v Aldridge [2014] FamCAFC 218 
16 
 
Dion v Reiser [2010] NSWSC 50 
Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319 
Drury v Smith [2012] NSWSC 1067 
Eliades and Eliades (1980) 6 Fam LR 916 
FO v HAF [2006] QCA 555 
Ford v Ford (1947) 73 CLR 524 
Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 1440 
Gissing v Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 628 
Greenwood v Merkel [2004] NSWSC 43 
Hamblin v Dahl [2010] FMCAfam 514 
Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10 
Hibberson v George (1989) 12 Fam LR 725 
Houston v Butler [2007] QSC 284 
Hughes v Charlton [2008] NSWSC 467 
In the Marriage of Caretti (1977) 30 FLR 257 
In the Marriage of Falk (1977) 15 ALR 189 
In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259 
In the Marriage of S (1980) 5 Fam LR 831 
Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221 
Jonah v White [2012] FamCAFC 200 
Jurd v Public Trustee [2001] NSWSC 632 
Keaton v Aldridge [2009] FMCAfam 92 
Kevin: Validity of Marriage of Transsexual, Re [2001] FamCA 1074 
Lipman v Lipman (1989) 13 Fam LR 1 
Locke v Norton [2014] FamCa 811 
17 
 
Magill v Magill [2006] HCA 51 
Mallett v Mallett [1984] HCA 21 
Marsh-Johnson v Hillcoat [2008] NSWSC 1337 
McCarthy v Tye [2015] NSWSC 1947 
McKenzie v Storer [2007] ACTSC 88 
McMaster v Wyhler [2013] FamCA 989 
Moby v Schulter [2010] FamCA 748 
Muschinski v Dodds (1982) 8 Fam LR 622 
Nagri v Chapal [2012] FamCA 464 
Nedijokovic v Orozovic [2005] NSWSC 755 
Pilch v Pilch [2016] FamCA 740 
Popescu v Borun [2011] NSWSC 1532 
Price v Underwood [2008] FamCAFC 46 
Przewoznik v Scott [2005] NSWSC 74 
PY v CY [2005] QCA 247 
Radtke v Pagano [2016] FamCA 784 
Ricci v Jones [2010] FMCAfam 1425 
Richardson v Kidd [2002] NSWSC 306 
Rolfe [1977] 34 FLR 518 
S v B [2004] QSC 80 
S v B (No2) [2004] QCA 449 
Saravinosvka v Saravinovski [2016] NSWSC 964 
Sharpless v McKibbin [2007] NSWSC 1498 
Skarika v Toska [2014] NSWSC 34 
Smyth v Pappas [2011] FamCA 434 
18 
 
Spencer v Speight [2014] FamCA 436 
Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52 
Sullman v Sullman [2002] NSWSC 169 
Taddeo v Taddeo [2010] SADC 61 
Thompson v The Public Trustee of New South Wales [2010] NSSC 1137 
Todd’s Case (No 2) (1976) 9 ALR 401 
Vine v Carey [2009] FMCAfam 1017 
Wardman v Hudson (1978) FLC90-466 
Willis, Ex Parte (1997) 21 Fam LR 479 
Ye v Fung [2006] NSWSC 243 
European Court of Human Rights 
B v United Kingdom (2006) 42 EHRR 11 
Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 51 
Burden v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38 
Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18
19 
 
Table of legislation 
England and Wales 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 
Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2014 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 
Equality Act 2010 
Family Law Act 1996 
Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 
Housing Act 1985 
Housing Act 1988 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 
Law Reform (Succession) Act 1995 
Marriage Act 1929 
Marriage Act 1949 
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
Marriage of Same Sex Couples (Conversion of Civil Partnership) Regulations 2014/3181 
Married Women and Property Act 1870 
Married Women and Property Act 1882 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1884 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 
20 
 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970 
Offences against the Person Act 1861 
Rent Act 1977 
Australia 
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) 
Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) 
Administration and Probate Act 1929 (ACT) 
Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth) 
Australian Soldiers’ Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth) 
Burial and Cremation Regulations 2015 (Tas) 
Civil Partnership Act 2011 (Qld) 
Civil Partnerships and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Qld) 
Civil Unions Act 2006 (ACT) 
Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT) 
Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) 
Coroners Act 1995 (Tas) 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
Crimes Legislation Amendment (Slavery, Slavery-like Conditions and People Trafficking) Act 2013 (Cth) 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) 
Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA) 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) 
21 
 
Duties Act 2000 (Vic) 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
Family Law Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) 
Family Law Legislation Amendment (Superannuation) Act 2001 (Cth) 
Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) 
Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) 
Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) 
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) 
Intestacy Act 2010 (Tas) 
Land Tax Act 2000 (Tas) 
Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) 
Marriage Act 1942 (Tas) 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) 
Marriage Act Amendment Act 1956 (WA) 
Marriage Act Amendment Act 1957 (SA) 
Marriage Amendment Act 1976 (Cth) 
Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) 
Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) 
Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) 
Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW) 
Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) 
Relationships Act 2008 (Vic) 
Relationships Amendment (Caring Relationships) Act 2009 (Vic) 
22 
 
Relationships (Civil Partnerships) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2015 (Qld) 
Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW) 
Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) 
Stamp Duties Act 1923 (SA) 
Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006 (SA) 
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas) 
Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) 
Wills Act 2008 (Tas) 
Witness Protection Act 2000 (Tas) 
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) 
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA)
23 
 
A note on terminology 
Throughout the thesis various “catch-all” terms will be used to describe different types 
of relationship. The ambit of these terms will be explained in the relevant chapters, but it is 
helpful at the outset to outline what the various terms mean. The term ‘couple’ is used to denote 
that a relationship is romantic, and perhaps sexual, in nature. The term ‘registered couple 
relationship’ is used to describe the formalised relationships of couples. The term ‘informal 
couple relationship’ is used in contrast to ‘registered’ and ‘formalised’, to describe an informal 
relationship between couples. These catch-all terms are used where possible for the sake of 
convenience and clarity because different terminology is used to describe these relationships in 
the different jurisdictions explored in the thesis. The following table summarises the different 
terminology in relation to couple relationships: 
Table 1 
Jurisdiction Registered couple 
relationship 
Informal couple relationship 
England and Wales Civil partnership Cohabitant 
Australian Federal law n/a De facto relationship 
New South Wales Registered relationship De facto relationship 
Tasmania Significant relationship Significant relationship 
Victoria Domestic relationship Domestic relationship 
Queensland Civil partnership De facto relationship 
Australian Capital Territory Civil union 
Civil partnership 
Domestic partnership 
South Australia n/a Domestic partnership 
Northern Territory n/a De facto relationship 
Western Australia n/a De facto relationship 
 
Similarly, the term ‘caring’ is used in contrast to ‘couple’, to show that these 
relationships are not necessarily romantic or sexual and are open to all family relatives. 
‘Registered caring relationship’ is used to describe the formalised relationships available for 
those in caring relationships. The term ‘informal caring relationship’ is used in contrast to 
‘registered’ to denote the informal nature of the relationship. For the purposes of clarity, the 
following table outlines the terminology used in the Australian states that recognise caring 
relationships in law: 
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Table 2 
Jurisdiction Registered caring 
relationship 
Informal caring relationship 
Tasmania Caring relationship Caring relationship 
Victoria Caring relationship n/a 
New South Wales n/a Close personal relationship 
Australian Capital Territory n/a Domestic relationship 
South Australia n/a Domestic partners 
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Introduction  
Traditionally marriage has been, and arguably continues to be, at the centre of family law 
in England and Wales.1 George notes that marriage enjoys a privileged legal position at the ‘top 
of the hierarchy of relationships’2 and Glennon recognises that ‘marriage remains the central 
adult relationship to which obligations legitimately attach’.3 But, the privileging of marriage is 
not accepted by everyone as the correct approach towards adult relationship recognition, and 
there have been calls for consideration of the legal position of unmarried people who live in 
other types of relationship. 
Brenda Hoggett, as she was then known, writing in 1980, questioned the different 
treatment of married and unmarried relationships in law in light of the fact that the legal 
consequences of marriage had changed so drastically. She explained that, historically, marriage 
was used as a means to promote stable families: marriage was a life-long relationship based on 
the concept of unity, with no possibility of divorce, and the law set out the ‘package deal’ of 
legal consequences that attached to the relationship.4 But, gradually, the legal consequences of 
marriage changed in such a way as to better protect the ‘weaker’ partner, usually the wife. For 
example, reforms such as separate property for husbands and wives; the ability of spouses to 
enter contracts with each other and to sue each other in tort; and improved remedies for 
domestic violence, all served to better protect the ‘weaker’ spouse.5 These changes ‘narrowed 
the gap between marital and non-marital relationships’ and, consequently, Hoggett believed 
that the position of unmarried couples should be considered because,  
Any person who compromises his or her breadwinning capacity in order to cater without 
reward at market value for the domestic needs of others should be entitled to some 
compensation for that loss… Family law no longer makes any attempt to buttress the 
stability of marriage or any other union. It has adopted principles for the protection of 
                                                          
1 Herring notes that although unmarried sexual relationships are now also recognised in varying degrees 
by the law, and that parenthood is an important focus of family law, ‘marriage is still of considerable 
significance’: J Herring Caring and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2013), 188. 
2 R George Ideas and Debates in Family Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 57. 
3 L Glennon ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) 22(1) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22, 25-6. 
4 B Hoggett ‘Ends and Means: The Utility of Marriage as a Legal Institution’ in J Eekelaar and S Katz 
Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies: Areas of Legal, Social and Ethical Change 
(Butterworths, 1980), 94-5. 
5 ibid 97. 
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children and dependent spouses which could be made equally applicable to the 
unmarried.6 
Essentially, Hoggett’s argument is that, if the legal consequences of marriage are there to 
protect the economically weaker partner both during and after the relationship, then the same 
considerations should also apply to unmarried relationships where the same compromises are 
made. For Hoggett, the question was not only whether marriage-like remedies should be 
extended to unmarried couples, but ‘whether the legal institution of marriage continues to serve 
any useful purposes.’7 
Similarly, Eric Clive, also writing in 1980, argued that marriage was unnecessary as a legal 
concept and that married couples could be dealt with in the same way as the unmarried in 
different areas of law. For example, he argued that, at least in a ‘theoretical sense’, ‘marriage is 
obviously not a necessary legal concept in relation to finance and property’. Instead of having a 
statutory system of financial remedies for spouses that provides the opportunity for an award 
of maintenance on the basis that the parties were married, the ‘state could base a private law 
right to maintenance on factual criteria such as the existence of dependent children or the 
length of the relationship’.8 For Clive, the fact of marriage would be irrelevant to deciding 
maintenance claims, because the important factor would be whether there were dependent 
children or the presence of some other factors that caused a loss to one partner.9  
More recently, in 2002, the Law Commission issued a discussion paper on the property 
rights of people who live together in informal relationships. The scope of the discussion included 
not only unmarried couples, but also relationships between ‘friends, relatives and others who 
may be living together for reasons of companionship and care and support.’10 The Commission 
did not make any proposals for reform because they were unable ‘to devise a statutory scheme 
for the determination of shares in the shared home which can operate fairly and evenly across 
all the diverse circumstances which are now to be encountered.’11 Rather, the Commission 
noted that the ‘purpose of the paper’ was ‘to provide a framework for future public debate’. 
They noted, 
                                                          
6 ibid 100-1. 
7 ibid 101. 
8 E Clive ‘Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal Concept?’ in J Eekelaar and S Katz Marriage and Cohabitation 
in Contemporary Societies: Areas of Legal, Social and Ethical Change (Butterworths, 1980), 73. 
9 ibid 74. It is worth noting that Clive does not explain what these ‘other factors’ that may cause a loss to 
one partner may be. 
10 Law Commission Sharing Homes: A Discussion Paper (July 2002), i. 
11 ibid iv. 
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We accept that marriage is a status deserving of special treatment. However, we have 
identified… a wider need for the law to recognise and to respond to the increasing diversity 
of living arrangements in this country. We believe that further consideration should be 
given to the adoption… of broader based approaches to personal relationships, such as 
the registration of certain civil partnerships and/or the imposition of legal rights and 
obligations on individuals who are or have been involved in a relationship outside 
marriage.12 
The Commission did not challenge the ‘special treatment’ of marriage, but, significantly, did 
acknowledge that due to the increasing variety of home sharing arrangements that are now 
commonplace, where people care for and support one another, it is time to consider reform.  
Since the Law Commission made this point almost fifteen years ago, civil partnerships 
were introduced as a registration option for same-sex couples in 2004,13 and legislation was 
passed to enable same-sex couples to marry in 2013.14 But, despite Law Commission proposals 
in 2007 for a framework for dealing with the financial consequences of the breakdown of 
unmarried cohabiting couple relationships, and the introduction of several private members’ 
Bills proposing similar reforms to those recommended by the Law Commission in 2007,15 no 
other reforms have been forthcoming.  
Hoggett, Clive and the Law Commission’s suggestions for reform are similar because they 
are united by a concern over what can be described as a focus on ‘function’ instead of ‘form’; 
they all look at the functions performed within a relationship, and the relationship generated 
need that can arise as a result of the performance of these functions, rather than focus only on 
whether two people are married. The current approach to the legal recognition of adult 
relationships in England and Wales can be, and often is, described as ‘form-based’.16 Form-based 
recognition can be a reference to a mechanism of relationship recognition that recognises 
relationships on the basis of their formalised nature; steps are taken to register the relationship 
and make that relationship formal.17 ‘Function-based’ recognition is different; this is where the 
                                                          
12 ibid iv. 
13 Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
14 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
15 For example, Cohabitation Rights Bill 2016; Cohabitation Rights Bill 2015; Cohabitation Rights Bill 2014; 
Cohabitation Rights Bill 2013; Inheritance (Cohabitants) Bill 2012; Cohabitation Bill 2009; Cohabitation Bill 
2008. 
16 See for example, A Barlow and G James ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’ 
(2004) 67(2) Modern Law Review 143; A Barlow and others Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: Social 
Change and Legal Reform in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2005); Glennon (n3).  
17 For detailed discussion on the meaning of ‘form’, see Chapter 2, 2.2. 
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performance of particular functions triggers legal recognition of a relationship.18 In recent years, 
many authors have written on how a function-based approach to relationship recognition 
should be introduced either in place of, or alongside, the current form-based system. For 
example, Barlow and James believe that the law relating to unmarried cohabiting couple 
relationships is ‘complex, inconsistent and confusing’ and in need of reform because the 
functions of married and unmarried couple relationships ‘are broadly the same’19 and so these 
couples should be treated in the same way on relationship breakdown and death.20 They 
advocate a plurality of approaches to relationship recognition, combining form-based and 
function-based systems, where unmarried couples are recognised alongside married couples.21 
Fineman goes further and looks beyond the sexual relationships of marriage and unmarried 
cohabitants, and suggests that relationships between caretakers and dependants should be the 
law’s focus.22 This is a call for a function-based approach to recognition with relationships of 
caretaking being at the centre of law rather than the continuing focus on marriage. 
Aims of the thesis 
In light of the calls for the introduction of function-based systems of recognition, this 
thesis will explore the desirability and viability of a function-based as opposed to a form-based 
approach to adult relationship recognition in law. To do this, the thesis will examine both form-
based and function-based frameworks of relationship recognition to explore the similarities and 
distinctions between them, and explore whether either approach has any significant advantage 
over the other. The thesis will explore the following research questions: 
1. How do the theoretical similarities and differences between form-based and function-
based approaches to relationship recognition play out in practice? 
2. What factors have supported and constrained the development of form-based and 
function-based approaches to relationship recognition? 
The focus of the thesis is adult relationships.  The thesis explores existing analysis of family 
relationship recognition frameworks in the context of the results of a comparative study of 
developments in adult relationship recognition in England and Wales and Australia. The 
                                                          
18 For further discussion on the meaning of ‘function-based’ recognition as used in the thesis, see Chapter 
2, 2.3.1. 
19 Barlow and James (n16) 152-3. 
20 ibid 172. For discussion of the treatment of unmarried cohabiting couples in England and Wales, see 
Chapter 6, 6.3. 
21 ibid 175-6. 
22 M Fineman The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New Press, 2004), 123. For a discussion of a 
radical approach to reform, see Chapter 2, 2.3.3.2. 
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comparative study utilises Hansard, Law Commission reports and other relevant policy 
documents to examine the rationales behind developments in relationship recognition in the 
two jurisdictions. It also makes use of some case law to explore how different frameworks of 
relationship recognition work in practice. This enables form-based and function-based 
approaches to relationship recognition to be viewed and evaluated in a new light.  
Australia has been chosen as a comparative jurisdiction for three reasons. Firstly, in 
Australia, form-based and function-based approaches are currently used alongside each other 
which, prima facie, provides a stark contrast to the marriage-centric approach in England and 
Wales. Australia recognises the formalised relationships of marriage, registered couple 
relationships and registered caring relationships as well as recognising informal relationships 
between ‘de facto’ (marriage-like) couples and caring relationships under a function-based 
system. The analysis of the function-based reforms in Australia, specifically the reforms to 
recognise relationships beyond marriage-like couples, is particularly important because, to date, 
there has been only limited commentary available on this type of relationship recognition.23 
Secondly, both Australia and England and Wales are common law jurisdictions that share a 
history.24 Prior to the federation of Australia on January 1st 1901, the separate self-governing 
Australian colonies were part of the British Empire and were subject to British authority.25 For 
example, prior to Federation in 1901, most of the Australian colonies ‘adopted the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857’, with divorce law provisions later developing to be different in the 
colonies.26 Thirdly, as will be made clear in chapter one,27 Australia and England and Wales have 
both witnessed a general decline in the marriage rate and an increase in alternative living 
                                                          
23 See for example, J Millbank ‘Domestic Rifts: Who is using the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT)?’ 
(2000) 14(3) Australian Journal of Family Law 163; J Millbank and K Sant ‘A Bride in her Every-Day Clothes: 
Same-Sex Relationship Recognition in NSW’ (2000) 22(2) Sydney Law Review 181; R Graycar and J Millbank 
‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to Relationship Recognition’ (2007) 
25 Washington University’s Journal of Law and Policy 121; A Head ‘The Legal Recognition of Close Personal 
Relationships in New South Wales’ (2011) 13 Flinders Law Journal 53; B Sloan Informal Carers and the Law 
(Hart Publishing 2013).  
24 This was noted by, for example, E Nash and A Parker ‘No-Fault Divorce: The Australian Experience’ 
(2016) 46(3) Family Law 261, 262. 
25 N Aroney and others The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia: History, Principle and 
Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 2015), vi, 2. 
26 M Harrison ‘Australia’s Family Law Act: The First Twenty-Five Years’ (2002) 16(1) International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 1, 3. See also G Barwick ‘The Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961’ (1962) 3 
Melbourne University Law Review 277, 279-80, where the section entitled ‘history of marriage law’ 
explains that English statutes were applied in most of Australia prior to Federation, with these provisions 
later being adapted in the different states. See also P Parkinson ‘The Yardstick of Equality: Assessing 
Contributions in Australia and England’ (2005) 19(2) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 
163, 163, where Parkinson explains that there are many connections between Australian and English 
family law because both jurisdictions sometimes borrow ideas from each other. 
27 See Chapter 1, 1.1. 
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arrangements. In this way, Australia is a useful comparator because while the jurisdictions share 
a history, and have experienced similar demographic changes with a decrease in the marriage 
rates, the Australian approach has developed in a strikingly different way to that in England and 
Wales. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into four sections. The first section comprises two chapters. As a 
prelude to examining what type of framework of relationship recognition is most appropriate, 
the first chapter will discuss demographic data relating to relationships and living arrangements, 
social attitude survey results and sociological accounts of family life. This will show that one 
rationale for considering reform of the marriage-centric, form-based approach to relationship 
recognition is that the current framework does not correspond well with modern relationship 
practices or attitudes towards those practices. The second chapter will introduce a second 
rationale for reform by considering the different functions of family law. It will be argued that 
while the functions of family law are debatable, family law performs both a protective and a 
symbolic function. This chapter will also explore the theoretical advantages and disadvantages 
of ‘form-based’ and function-based recognition systems as identified in some of the existing 
literature on relationship recognition, and will suggest that both have the potential to provide 
for diverse family relationships.  
The second section of the thesis comprises three chapters with a focus on the advantages 
and limitations of form-based relationships. It will begin by discussing marriage before moving 
on to explore the other form-based recognition models, such as England and Wales’ ‘civil 
partnerships’ and Australia’s ‘registered couple relationships’ and ‘registered caring 
relationships’. The discussion will highlight the fact that form-based systems are flexible enough 
to provide for a diverse range of relationship types, and that some benefits are common to all 
form-based systems, with the most significant difference between them being social rather than 
legal. The third section consists of two chapters exploring the development of function-based 
approaches to relationship recognition. The chapters will look at the way ‘cohabiting’ 
relationships are recognised on a functional basis in England and Wales (insofar as they are 
recognised at all), and examine Australia’s ‘de facto’ and ‘caring’ relationships. This will show 
that function-based recognition is also flexible enough to provide for family diversity, and that 
form-based and function-based recognition are similar in many ways but there are differences 
between them.  
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The final section will bring together the main findings of the thesis and consider the 
implications of these findings. The conclusion will explain that form-based and function-based 
mechanisms of relationship recognition share many of the same effects, and both can be used 
in innovative ways to recognise diverse family relationships, but only where there is a call for, 
and the political will for, such recognition. The conclusion will suggest that, on balance, function-
based recognition provides a more principled way forward because the quality of a relationship 
is of fundamental importance and function-based recognition is best placed to protect 
vulnerable partners. But this does not mean that form-based systems should be abandoned 
altogether, because they are better placed to fulfil family law’s symbolic function. Taken 
together, the findings of this thesis suggest that Hoggett and Clive were right to question the 
legal privileging of marriage and to explore options for reforms that would protect the weaker 
partner in a relationship, regardless of whether that partner was married. 
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Chapter 1 – Changing relationship practices 
This chapter explains the context in which the research has been carried out and explores 
existing literature to identify what type of family life is important to people and why, before the 
thesis moves on to consider possible reforms to the current framework of relationship 
recognition. The chapter will begin by discussing demographic data relating to family 
relationships and living arrangements to demonstrate that relationships are changing: not 
everyone marries, and many people are forming alternative relationships. While the 
demographic data shows that something has changed, it does not give any indication as to why 
relationship practices are changing. To shed some light on this, the chapter will discuss public 
opinion survey data to show that these different living arrangements are becoming increasingly 
acceptable and valuable. Next, sociological accounts of family life will be explored to show that 
the declining marriage rate should not be taken as an indication that family is becoming any less 
important. ‘Family’ is a term that can capture a broad range of relationships beyond marriage, 
and, arguably, what we value most about our families are the functions they perform rather 
than the ‘form’ that they take. The conclusion will argue that if we want the English and Welsh 
system of relationship recognition to be more inclusive of a diversity of relationships and to 
provide for ‘real’ families, it is time to consider different ways of recognising relationships.  
1.1 The changing demographic picture 
Relationship practices have changed dramatically, and to understand the full extent of 
this change it is necessary to examine how people use both formalised and informal 
relationships. The term ‘formalised relationships’ is used here to refer to relationships that are 
legally recognised because of their formal nature: this means that eligible people have taken 
steps to register, or formalise, their relationship.1 ‘Informal relationships’ is used in contrast to 
formalised relationships and signifies that no steps have been taken to formalise the 
relationship. This section will discuss statistics from both England and Wales and Australia to 
show that both jurisdictions have experienced similar changes, but, as will become clear later in 
the thesis, they have taken very different attitudes towards responding to these demographic 
changes. 
1.1.1 Formalised relationships 
1.1.1.1 Marriage and divorce 
The change in marriage statistics is striking: at one point, most people would have 
married, they would have married young and it is likely that their relationship would have lasted 
                                                          
1 For further discussion of the meaning of ‘formalised relationship’ see Chapter 2, 2.2.1. 
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a lifetime. But, this is no longer the case: fewer people are marrying; those who do marry do so 
later in life; many marriages end in divorce; and some people will choose to re-marry following 
divorce. This is important because it suggests that a framework of relationship recognition that 
prioritises life-long marriage does not correspond well with the reality of how people actually 
utilize marriage. 
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 161,030 marriages were formed in 
England and Wales in 1862, with the general marriage rate, or the number of men and women 
marrying per thousand unmarried men or women, being 58.7 for men and 50.0 for women.2 The 
number of marriages gradually rose, and by 1972, 426,241 marriages were formed, with a 
marriage rate of 78.4 for men and 60.5 for women.3 There has been a ‘long-term decline in the 
marriage rates between 1972 and 2009’4 and the general marriage rate in 2014 was 23.0 for 
men and 20.9 for women.5. In addition to the declining marriage rate, most people now marry 
older. In 1970, the average age at first marriage was 24.4 for men6 and 22.4 for women.7 These 
figures have gradually increased, and in 2013 average age at first marriage was 32.5 for men and 
30.6 for women.8 Of those marrying in 2013, 67% were first-time marriages for both partners, 
15% were re-marriages for both partners, and the remaining 18% were re-marriages for one 
partner.9 
The Australian statistics are not always directly comparable with those for England and 
Wales, because the general marriage rate in England and Wales is defined by the ONS as how 
many people per 1000 unmarried people over 16 marry, whereas the crude marriage rate in 
Australia is defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) as how many people per 1000 of 
the entire population marry in a year. The data is still valuable however because it shows that 
                                                          
2 Office for National Statistics ‘Marriage Summary Statistics 2012 (Provisional)’ (Dataset, 2012), Table 2b, 
available from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabit
ationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/marriagesummarystatisticsprovisional> accessed 11/01/2017. 
3 ibid. 
4 Office for National Statistics ‘Marriages in England and Wales: 2013’ (Statistical Bulletin, 2016), 3. 
5 Office for National Statistics ‘Marriages in England and Wales, 2014’ (Dataset, 2017), Table 8, available 
from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabit
ationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/marriagesinenglandandwales2013> accessed 21/03/2017. 
6 Office for National Statistics ‘Marriages in England and Wales, 2013’ (Dataset, 2012), Table 6, available 
from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabit
ationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/marriagesinenglandandwales2013> accessed 11/01/2017. 
7 ibid Table 7. 
8 Office for National Statistics ‘Marriages in England and Wales: 2013’ (n4) 6. 
9 ibid 4. 
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there has been a decline in marriage rates in Australia. According to the ABS, Australia has 
witnessed a general decline in the marriage rate since the 1970s,10 and in 2015, the crude 
marriage rate was 4.8, a decrease from 6.1 in 1995.11 The median age for marriage in 2015 was 
31.8 years for males, and 29.8 years for females,12 an increase from the 1995 figures which were 
27.3 for males and 28.5 for females.13 In 2015, 71.9% of marriages were first marriages for both 
parties, 16.4% were re-marriages for one partner, and 11.7% were re-marriages for both 
parties.14  
In 1858,15 only 24 divorces were granted in England and Wales, and this steadily increased 
to 512 by 1900.16 This number continued to increase, and in 2003 153,065 divorces were 
granted.17 The number of divorces has been reducing since 2003, which is consistent with the 
declining number of marriages,18 and the number of divorces granted in England and Wales in 
2014 was 111,169.19 Likewise, the crude divorce rate in Australia, the number of divorces in a 
year per 1000 of the population, has increased from 0.1 between 1901-1910, to 0.8 between 
1961 and 1970, and has remained between 2.2-2.9 divorces since 1976.20 The median duration 
of marriages in England and Wales, that is the number of years a marriage persists prior to 
divorce, has fluctuated between 8.9 and 12.2 years over the last 50 years, and the median 
duration of a marriage for divorces granted in 2014 was 11.7 years.21 In Australia, the average 
                                                          
10 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Year Book Australia: 2012’ (2012), available from 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~M
arriages,%20de%20facto%20relationships%20and%20divorces~55> accessed 02/02/2017. 
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Marriages and Divorces, Australia, 2015’ (2016), available from 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3310.0Main%20Features112015?opendocu
ment&tabname=Summary&prodno=3310.0&issue=2015&num=&view=> accessed 02/02/2017. 
12 ibid. 
13 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Marriages and Divorces, Australia, 2015: The Changing Nature of 
Marriage in Australia (feature article)’ (2016), available from Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Marriages 
and Divorces, Australia, 2015’ (n11). 
14 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Marriages and Divorces, Australia, 2015’ (n11). 
15 1858 was the year when divorce via court order was first available in England and Wales: Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857. For a history, see S Cretney Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 161-195. For discussion of divorce, see Chapter 3, 3.2.2. 
16 Office for National Statistics ‘Divorces in England and Wales: 2014’ (Dataset, 2014), Table 1, available 
from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/divorce/datasets
/divorcesinenglandandwales> accessed 11/01/2017. 
17 ibid Table 1. 
18 Office for National Statistics ‘Divorces in England and Wales 2014’ (Statistical Bulletin, 2016), 3. 
19 ibid 2. 
20 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Year Book Australia: 2012’ (n10). 
21 Office for National Statistics ‘Divorces in England and Wales 2014’ (n18) 8. 
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length of marriages before divorce has increased, with the median duration to divorce being 
11.3 years in 1999 and 12.3 years in 2009.22  
The general decline in marriage, and increase in divorce, begs the question as to what 
other relationships and living arrangements people form during their lifetime. Barlow and others 
suggested in the 18th British Social Attitudes (BSA) Report, that the changing demographic 
picture is not indicative of a ‘simple “decline” in marriage’, but rather, ‘there appears to be a far 
more complex picture of sequential cohabitations, separations, marriages and divorces.’ They 
explain that ‘[m]any of us will experience some or all of these family types at one period or 
another in our lives.’23 The authors are correct in their assertion that people live in different 
types of relationship, but, as the discussion will show, the real picture of relationship practices 
is more complex still than involving only marriage and cohabitation.  
1.1.1.2 Civil partnerships, the Australian registered relationships and dissolution 
Civil partnerships have been an option for same-sex couples in England and Wales to 
register their relationships since late 2005.24 While initially popular, the number of new civil 
partnership formations has decreased, especially following the introduction of same-sex 
marriage in 2013.25 1,857 civil partnerships were registered during the 11 days in 2005 where 
this was possible, and a further 14,493 were formed during 2006.26 The number of civil 
partnerships formed in 2007 was almost half the 2006 figure at 7,929,27 which equates with a 
rate of 0.8 civil partnerships formed per 1,000 of the unmarried population.28 Following the 2013 
reforms allowing same-sex couples to marry,29 the number of civil partnerships formed has 
decreased rapidly and in 2015, only 861 civil partnerships were registered.30 The average age of 
civil partners is higher than the average age for marriage. In 2006, the average age was 40.1, 
which later increased to 48.7 in 2015,31 with 48% of those registering a civil partnership in 2015 
                                                          
22 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Year Book Australia: 2012’ (n10). 
23 A Barlow and others ‘Just a Piece of Paper? Marriage and Cohabitation’ in A Park and others (eds) British 
Social Attitudes: Public Policy, Social Ties (18th Report, 2001), 29. 
24 Civil Partnership Act 2004. For discussion of civil partnerships, see Chapter 4. 
25 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
26 Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnership Formations’ (Dataset, 2016), Table 2, available from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabit
ationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/civilpartnershipstatisticsunitedkingdomcivilpartnershipformations> 
accessed 11/01/2017. 
27 ibid Table 1. 
28 ibid Table 2. 
29 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. For discussion of same-sex marriage see Chapter 3, 3.2.1.5. 
30 Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnerships in England and Wales: 2015’ (Statistical Bulletin, 2016), 
4; Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnership Formations’ (n26) Table 1. 
31 Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnership Formations’ (n26) Table 4. 
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aged over 50.32 The majority, or 84%, of people who entered a civil partnership in 2015 had 
never previously been parties to a marriage or a civil partnership.33 As the number of civil 
partnerships has increased, so has the number of dissolutions. 40 dissolutions were granted in 
2007, and this figure increased to 329 in 2009, and 1,211 in 2015.34  
Australia has provided options for registration of both couple relationships,35 which are 
akin to England and Wales’ civil partnerships (although most of the Australian registration 
options are available for both same- and opposite-sex couples), and to register caring 
relationships.36 The data from Australia is not as easily available as that for England and Wales, 
but Rundle has provided data in a 2011 article that gives indications as to the number of people 
who are formalising their relationships by means other than marriage.37 For example, Rundle 
notes that between 2008 and 2011, 194 registered relationships were formed in the Australian 
Capital Territory, and only four relationships dissolved, and similarly in New South Wales, 847 
registered relationships were formed, and two were dissolved. In Tasmania, 214 relationships 
were registered between 2004 and 2011 and twelve were dissolved, and similarly in Victoria 
between 2008 and 2011, 541 relationships were registered and two dissolved.38 Taken together, 
the data on civil partnerships and the registration options is important because it shows that 
people do make use of formalised relationships other than marriage, and suggests that any 
discussion of reforming the current framework of relationship recognition should explore the 
potential of formalised relationships to recognise family diversity. 
1.1.2 Informal relationships 
1.1.2.1 Cohabitants 
Alongside the changing marriage rates, the other substantial change in the demographic 
picture is the increase in the number of couples who cohabit in informal relationships, or as 
Barlow and others noted, who experience ‘sequential cohabitations’. The ONS note that 
cohabitants, whom they define as living with a partner without being married or in a civil 
                                                          
32 Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnerships in England and Wales: 2015’ (n30) 6. 
33 ibid 9. 
34 Office for National Statistics ‘Civil Partnership Dissolutions’ (Dataset, 2016), Table 1, available from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabit
ationandcivilpartnerships/datasets/civilpartnershipstatisticsunitedkingdomcivilpartnershipdissolutions> 
accessed 11/01/2017. 
35 For detailed discussion on the Australian registered couple relationships, see Chapter 4. 
36 For detailed discussion on the Australian registered caring relationships, see Chapter 5. 
37 This data will be further discussed in Chapters 4, 4.3.2.2 and 5, 5.2.3.2b. 
38 See O Rundle ‘An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 121, 145. 
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partnership,39 are the fastest growing family type in the UK. In 2016, there were 3.3 million 
cohabiting couple families in the UK, over double the 1.5 million figures for 1996.40 Roughly 25% 
of couples cohabited prior to marriage in the 1970s, which increased to almost 50% in the late 
1980s.41 By 2012, approximately 80% of married couples were cohabiting prior to marriage,42 
which means that not cohabiting prior to marriage is as uncommon today as was pre-marital 
cohabitation in the 1970s.43  
Younger people are most likely to cohabit, with 27% of those aged 25-34 cohabiting in 
2012, an increase from 15% in 1996.44 The over 65s had the largest percentage increase in the 
number of cohabitants, with a fourfold increase from 0.2% in 1996 to 2.2% in 2012.45 
Consequently, the median age of the cohabiting population in 2012 was 34.3, an increase of 3.8 
years since 1996.46 The number of cohabitants who have never married or registered a civil 
partnership has increased from 6.8% of the population in 2002, to 9.5% in 2015.47 Barlow and 
others note that in 2006, 36% of cohabitants had been married before, which suggests that 
cohabitation is used ‘as a refuge for those disillusioned by marriage’.48 Barlow and others noted 
that in 2006 the average length of a cohabiting relationship was 6.9 years, which increases to 
8.5 years for cohabitants with children.49  
The picture is similar in Australia, where there has also been an increase in the number of 
couples who cohabit without marriage. In 2006, couples living in marriage-like informal 
relationships comprised 7% of the adult population, an increase from 5% in 1996. In 2006, 70% 
of unmarried couples had never married, and 27% were separated or divorced.50 81% of couples 
marrying in 2015 had cohabited with their partner prior to marrying,51 an increase from 70% in 
                                                          
39 Office for National Statistics ‘Short Report: Cohabitation in the UK 2012’ (Short Report, 2012), 1.  
40 Office for National Statistics ‘Families and Households: 2016’ (Statistical Bulletin, 2016), 3-4. 
41 É Beaujouan and M Ní Bhrolcháin ‘Cohabitation and Marriage in Britain since the 1970s’ (2011) 145 
Population Trends 35, 42. Note that these figures only include those who married when aged under 50. 
42 Office for National Statistics ‘Short Report: Cohabitation in the UK, 2012’ (n39) 3. 
43 Beaujouan and Bhrolcháin (n41) 43. 
44 Office for National Statistics ‘Short Report: Cohabitation in the UK, 2012’ (n39) 3-4. 
45 ibid 3-4. 
46 ibid 3. 
47 Office for National Statistics ‘Population Estimates by Marital Status and Living Arrangements, England 
and Wales: 2002 to 2015’ (Statistical Bulletin, 2016), 9. 
48 Barlow and others ‘Just a Piece of Paper?’ (n23) 42. Similarly, Beaujouan and Bhrolcháin (n41) 47, note 
that in 1980-84, most cohabiting relationships lasted for around two years, whereas by 2000-04 this had 
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49 A Barlow and others ‘Cohabitation and the Law: Myths, Money and the Media’ in A Park and others 
(eds) British Social Attitudes (24th Report, 2008), 33. 
50 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Year Book Australia: 2012’ (n10). 
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1995.52 This all shows that cohabitation, or living with a partner without marriage, is an 
increasingly common prelude, or alternative, to marriage and shows how people experience a 
combination of marriage and cohabitation in a lifetime.  
1.1.2.2 Other living arrangements 
Alongside formalised relationships and informal cohabitation, people also form other 
types of informal relationship and it is necessary to explore how many people live in other types 
of relationship to show the complete picture of contemporary living arrangements. The ONS 
note that in England and Wales in 2015, 28.4 million people, or 60.5% of the population aged 16 
and over, were living in a couple relationship, be they married, civil partners or cohabitants.53 
But, there is a substantial minority of 39.5% of adults who are forming other relationships and 
living arrangements. Of the 18.9 million families in the UK in 2016, 2.9 million were lone parent 
families, an increase from 2.4 million in 1996.54 There has also been an increase in the number 
of adults who live alone, from around 17% of households in 1971 to 28% in 2016.55 Additionally, 
households containing more than one family have increased from 0.2 million in 1996 to 0.3 
million, or 1.2%, in 2016:56 this category includes unrelated families sharing accommodation, or 
families who ‘may be related in some way, for example, a married couple and their son and his 
girlfriend.’57 The ONS also mention an additional category of household that consists of ‘two or 
more unrelated adults’ who may be a group of friends, students or adult siblings.58 This group 
has also increased from 0.7 million in 1996 to 0.9 million, or 3.3% of all households, in 2016.59 
Similarly, in Australia, of the 8.9 million households in 2012-13, 74% were ‘family’ 
households, which the ABS defines as including a married or cohabiting couple and lone 
parents,60 and 26% of the population had formed alternative relationships and living 
                                                          
52 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Marriages and Divorces, Australia, 2015: The Changing Nature of 
Marriage in Australia (feature article)’ (n13). 
53 Office for National Statistics ‘Population Estimates by Marital Status and Living Arrangements’ (n47) 3. 
54 Office for National Statistics ‘Families and Households: 2016’ (n40) 4. 
55 ibid 9: the ONS note that these figures are not directly comparable as the 1971 figures come from the 
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56 ibid 10. 
57 ibid 10; see also 2: the ONS define ‘family’ as relationships between married couples, civil partners, 
cohabiting couples, with or without children, or a lone parent. 
58 Office for National Statistics ‘Families and Households’ (Dataset, 2016), Table 7 n8 and Table 8 n8, 
available from 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/dataset
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59 Office for National Statistics ‘Families and Households: 2016’ (n40) 10. 
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available from - 
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arrangements. In Australia, the ABS note that in 2011, 45% of Australians were living in couple 
relationships61 and 2.4% of the population lived in ‘other related persons’ households, which 
usually comprised of elderly parents living with adult children or adult siblings living together.62 
The ABS further noted in 2012-3 that 23% of households contained a person living alone, and 
3% of households were ‘group households’.63 
These figures are indicative of a broad variety of living arrangements, but they do not 
provide any detail relating to the nature of these relationships. For example, the ‘two or more 
unrelated adult’ category by the ONS does not give any indication as to why these adults are 
choosing to live together, be it a temporary house-sharing arrangement to save money or if they 
are long-term relationships between friends or siblings. It is safe to assume that many of these 
people will be in relationships of some sort with other adults because significant relationships 
can exist when partners do not cohabit. There is a growing body of literature on a particular type 
of relationship, called living-apart-together (LAT) relationships. LAT relationships are 
relationships between two people who consider themselves to be a couple, but, for whatever 
reason, do not live together.  
1.1.2.2a LATs: Living-Apart-Together 
Estimating the number of LATs is difficult because there is no formal record of the 
existence of the relationship,64 and it is difficult to discern where the line is drawn between a 
temporary boyfriend-girlfriend type relationship and a more permanent relationship with a 
partner who lives elsewhere.65 Duncan and Phillips argue that some LAT relationships are a 
‘stage’ in a relationship, which may or may not progress into cohabitation or marriage, or they 
may alternatively be seen as an opportunity to allow flexibility for people in how they conduct 
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61 Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘Household and Family Projections, Australia, 2011-2036’ (2015), 
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62 ibid. 
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64 S Duncan and M Phillips ‘People who Live Apart Together (LATs) – How Different are they?’ (2010) 58(1) 
Sociological Review 112, 117. See also J Haskey ‘Living Arrangements in Contemporary Britain: Having a 
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their relationships.66 Levin suggests that to be in a LAT relationship, three conditions must be 
fulfilled: 1) both parties must agree that they are in a couple relationship; 2) other people must 
view them as a couple, and; 3) they must live in separate homes.67 
Duncan and Phillips, by defining LATs as those ‘who have an intimate relationship with a 
partner who lives elsewhere’, 68 estimate that roughly around 10% of the adult population in 
England and Wales could be categorised as being in LAT relationships, and that this ‘equates to 
over a quarter of all those not married or cohabiting’.69 Haskey tentatively suggests that 
somewhere between 1.7 and 2.1 million men, and 1.8 and 2.3 million women in England and 
Wales have partners who live elsewhere; but, after discounting those who may be in casual 
relationships such as those whose LAT partner lives with their parents, the numbers are nearer 
0.9 million men and 1.2 million women.70 Similarly in Australia, Reimondos, Evans and Gray 
report that around 7-9% of the adult population in Australia are in a romantic relationship with 
a partner who lives elsewhere.71 Haskey estimates that around 50% of LATs are under 5072 and 
Duncan and Phillips’ findings support this as they found that LAT relationships are most 
prominent among 18-24 year olds.73 Reimondos and others also found that in Australia, most 
LATs tend to be in the 18-24 age group, with 44% of their sample belonging to this age bracket.74 
LAT relationships are not all short term, and Duncan and others found in their research that of 
those they interviewed who identified themselves as LATs, 19% had been together for less than 
6 months; 24% had been together for up to 1 year; 17% for 2 years; 22% for 3-5 years and 19% 
for over 6 years.75 Likewise, Reimondos and others found that in Australia although many of the 
LAT partners in their sample had only been in the LAT relationship for less than 12 months, 28% 
had been in a LAT relationship for 3 years or more.76  
This shows that not only do people experience a series of cohabitations and marriages, 
but additionally they may also experience other types of relationships, such as a LAT 
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relationship. This all suggests that a system of relationship recognition that prioritises life-long 
marriage over other relationships is inadequate because it not only fails to acknowledge and 
provide for the diversity of relationships that are formed today, but fails to acknowledge that 
people are likely to experience a series of different types of relationships during their lifetime. 
1.2 Changing social attitudes 
To reinforce the suggestion that a system of relationship recognition that prioritises 
marriage is inappropriate in light of the changing demographic picture, it is necessary to explore 
sources that help us to understand what people value about their relationships. This will provide 
some explanation as to why the demographic picture has changed, as well as further build the 
case that the current marriage-centric approach in England and Wales needs re-thinking. The 
findings of BSA surveys that explore people’s attitudes towards family and relationships show 
that the changing demographic picture has been accompanied by a change in attitudes towards 
relationships outside marriage.77 There is no comparable data available from Australia, so 
Australia will not be discussed in this section.   
1.2.1 Views on marriage and cohabitation 
The 18th BSA Report found that most people idealised marriage. 59% of people in 2000 
felt that ‘even though it may not work out for some people, marriage is still the best kind of 
relationship’, with only 20% disagreeing, and only 9% felt that marriage was ‘only a piece of 
paper’.78 But, further BSA results show that people’s views on marriage and cohabitation are far 
more complex than this would suggest and this helps explain the changing demographic picture; 
while people view marriage as an ideal, cohabitation is also viewed as an acceptable and 
valuable choice. The 18th BSA Report found that in 1994, 64% of people thought it was ‘all right 
for a couple to live together without intending to get married’ and 58% felt that pre-marital 
cohabitation was ‘a good idea’. They found that these numbers were similar in 2000 where they 
were 67% and 56% respectively.79 The 24th BSA report found that 66% of people in 2006 felt that 
‘there is little difference socially between being married and living together’,80 and that 48% of 
                                                          
77 The British Social Attitudes Survey is an annual survey by NatCen that asks a sample of people what it 
is like to live in Britain. The focus of every survey is different, and the same questions are not asked every 
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79 ibid 32, Table 2.2. 
80 S Duncan and M Phillips ‘New Families? Tradition and Change in Modern Relationships’ in A Park and 
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people felt that ‘living with a partner shows just as much commitment as getting married’, while 
35% disagreed.81 
Barlow and others found that the majority of people in 2006 believed in the ‘common law 
marriage myth’, that unmarried couples who live together for a specific period of time have the 
same legal rights as married couples. 51% of people incorrectly believed that common law 
marriage ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ exists, while 38% of people correctly believed that common 
law marriage ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ does not exist. A further 10% of people were uncertain 
about the legal position of the unmarried cohabitant.82 Interestingly, the same survey found that 
the majority felt that married couples and cohabiting partners should have the same rights upon 
relationship breakdown.83 This all suggests that cohabitation and marriage are viewed as similar 
relationships that should be treated similarly by the law by most people, even though the law 
treats these relationship types very differently in England and Wales. 
The changing attitudes towards marriage and cohabitation have practical implications. As 
Barlow and others note in their discussion of the 18th BSA report findings, 
…overall, marriage is still widely valued as an ideal but… it is regarded with much more 
ambivalence when it comes to everyday partnering and (especially) parenting. Meanwhile, 
cohabitation is widely accepted both as a prelude to marriage and as an alternative, even 
when there are children involved… This conclusion has important policy implications, 
suggesting that supporting marriage above and beyond other arrangements does not 
chime with people’s opinions about the practicalities of everyday life as a partner and a 
parent.84 
There is a contrast between what people think of marriage, and how they make use of that 
formalised relationship: marriage is an aspiration for many, but it is not viewed as particularly 
necessary for the business of everyday living because cohabitation is seen by many as a social 
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equivalent to marriage. The law’s attitude towards cohabitants85 does not correspond with 
popular views about the acceptability and role of that relationship type. 
1.2.2 Attitudes towards other relationships  
It is not just cohabitation that is increasingly seen as an acceptable way of conducting a 
couple relationship. The 24th BSA Report asked questions to, and about, partners in LAT 
relationships. Duncan and Phillips suggested in this Report that living apart from a partner was 
merely a stage in the relationship, and it appears that mixed reasons were responsible for why 
partners lived apart. Around 1/2 of the people in LAT relationships in the sample stated that 
there were external constraints that prevented them from living with their partner, such as 
financial concerns or their partner working or studying elsewhere. Around 1/3 of LATs lived apart 
because that was their preference.86 The Report found that in a normative sense, LAT 
relationships are viewed as valuable with 54% of people agreeing that ‘a couple do not need to 
live together to have a strong relationship’, and only 25% disagreeing.87 Taken together with the 
demographic data indicating that LAT relationships can be fairly long-term, there is an argument 
to be made that the position of couples in LAT relationships should be considered alongside 
informal cohabiting relationships, considering that some LATs would live together if they could, 
and most people feel that living apart is not an indication of a “weak” relationship.88 
Alongside the couple relationships, some BSA surveys have asked people how they feel 
about their friends. Duncan and Phillips in the 24th Report note that they found evidence ‘for the 
idea that friends can act like family’, with 75% of people stating they had ‘at least one close 
friend’ whom they can share their ‘private feelings and concerns with’, and 84% had received 
‘help and support’ from their close friend(s) when ‘facing a difficult problem’.89  They also found 
that 71% of people disagreed with the statement that ‘friends are for fun, not for discussing 
personal problems with’, and only 12% agreeing with the statement. Additionally, when people 
were asked to place themselves on a scale of 1-5, 1 meaning close ties with friends was more 
important than close ties with family, and 5 meaning that close ties with family were most 
important, 39% placed themselves in the middle of the scale; 48% of people felt that 
‘maintaining close ties with family is more important than having close friends’; and 13% stated 
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that close friends were more important. Duncan and Phillips note that the fact that so many 
people placed themselves in the middle of the scale is significant because it lends support to the 
‘idea that friends are becoming more like family and vice versa.’90 This indicates that although 
the majority of people are in couple relationships, whether formal or informal, cohabiting or 
living apart, other people may also form significant relationships based on friendship and that 
the position of these relationships may need to be considered in any relationship recognition 
reform. 
The findings of the 24th Report however also suggest that while friends may be important 
to some, the majority still feel that ‘family’ is most significant. Duncan and Phillips suggest that 
‘given the persistence of norms about given obligations to family’, it is not surprising that the 
majority of people feel that family members should make an effort to stay in contact with each 
other, ‘even if they don’t have anything in common’.91 Does this mean that there is something 
special, or unique, about ‘family’ relationships, which distinguishes them from ‘friends’, or is it 
more the case that there is something that makes some of our relationships more significant 
than others? 
1.3 The meaning and significance of ‘family’ 
To explore what we mean by ‘family’, it is necessary to delve deeper into what makes 
some relationships more significant than others and consider what characterises relationships 
as ‘family’. This adds insight into why relationship practices are changing and is important for 
this thesis because the way we view family is relevant to the question of reforming the current 
relationship recognition framework; we must understand which relationships are significant to 
people, and why they are significant, to consider what framework of recognition would best 
serve the diversity of family relationships that are formed today. 
1.3.1 The changing nature of personal relationships 
Some sociologists believe that the nature of contemporary relationships is so different 
from those of the past that there has been an inevitable change in modern relationship 
practices, which explains why people experience multiple types of relationships. Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim explain that in the past, ‘human lives used to be determined by a multitude of 
traditional ties’ that could be problematic because ‘they rigorously restrict[ed] the individual’s 
choices’; but, they were also valued because they offered ‘familiarity and protection, a stable 
                                                          
90 Duncan and Phillips ‘New Families?’ (n80) 24. See also the discussion below at 1.3.2.2b about literature 
on ‘families of choice’ and how friends are family for some people. 
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footing and certain identity.’92 Similarly to the BSA findings discussed above where the majority 
of people idealise marriage,93 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim note that ‘stable partnership[s]’ 
continue to be seen as the ‘ideal and aim’,94 but our expectations for our relationships are 
changing. They argue that ‘the nuclear family, built around gender and status, is falling apart on 
the issues of emancipation and equal rights, which no longer conveniently come to a halt outside 
our private lives.’95 Modern relationships are affected by external factors, where the labour 
market demands that workers are mobile and able to pursue employment opportunities even if 
this is ‘at the cost of their commitments to family, relations and friends.’ In today’s increasingly 
individualistic society where ‘biographies are removed from the traditional precepts and 
certainties’, and individuals can choose their own path rather than follow a pre-determined 
(gendered) one,96 
…it is no longer possible to pronounce in some binding way what family, marriage, 
parenthood, sexuality or love mean, what they should or could be; rather these vary in 
substance, exceptions, norms and morality from individual to individual and from 
relationship to relationship. Increasingly, the individuals who want to live together are, or 
more precisely are becoming, the legislators of their own way of life…97 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim conclude that the changes we are seeing in relationship behaviour 
are not about family becoming any less important. Rather, family ‘is simultaneously 
disintegrating and being put on a pedestal.’98 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s work suggests that the changing demographic picture, and 
the way we experience many different types of relationship in a lifetime, can be explained by 
our obsession with love, where, 
…people marry for the sake of love and get divorced for the sake of love. Relationships are 
lived as it they were interchangeable, not because we cast off our burden of love but 
because the law of true love demands it.99  
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For Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, love has become the new religion.100 This change in expectations 
of relationships suggests that the current framework of recognition that focuses on promoting 
life-long marriage is outdated because it corresponds only with the ideal for relationships and 
not the reality. Similarly, Giddens also sees a change in the nature and expectations of our 
relationships. He claims that romantic love became the foundation for all marriages during the 
nineteenth century, and ‘the spread of ideals of romantic love was one factor tending to 
disentangle the marital bond from wider kinship ties and gave it an especial significance.’ 
Spouses were increasingly seen as ‘collaborators in a joint emotional enterprise’ with the home 
becoming ‘a distinct environment set off from work’.101 Romantic love ‘introduced the idea of a 
narrative into an individual’s life’. In this way, romantic love was associated with a sense of 
freedom102 because it allowed people to make choices about who to marry on the basis of 
love,103 although this freedom was limited to a choice of who to marry and not whether to 
marry.104 The ‘for-ever’, ‘one and only qualities of the romantic love complex’105 can be 
contrasted with what Giddens calls ‘pure relationships’, which are rooted in ‘confluent love’, 
…where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each 
person from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as 
it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within 
it.106 
Confluent love is an active concept that centres on the ‘special relationship’, whereas romantic 
love is static and is expected to be an exclusive, life-long relationship with a ‘special person’.107 
Confluent love is about reciprocity: it is about ‘emotional give and take’, a relationship between 
two equals, regardless of the sex of the couple.108 This change in the nature of relationships 
suggests a rejection of life-long marriages as the norm and an acceptance that relationships 
should not continue if they are no longer fulfilling, and helps to explain why people experience 
a series of different relationship types over a lifetime. 
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It is possible to criticise the work of Giddens and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim for their 
disregard of the reality of ‘choice’:109 not everyone will be free and unencumbered and easily 
able to leave an unsatisfactory relationship. Diduck for example criticises Giddens’ failure to 
realise the gendered implications of the pure relationships, where ‘the free-moving autonomous 
individual resembles more closely the lived realities of men, who more easily than women are 
able to move from one pure relationship to the next in search of self-fulfilment.’110 Similarly, 
Duncan and Phillips note in the 24th BSA Report that 75% of people felt that ‘many couples stay 
in unhappy relationships because of money or children’, which suggests ‘that most people see 
the world of families and relationships as potentially involving severe structural constraints to 
personal choice.’111 Even bearing in mind the criticisms of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim and 
Giddens’ work, the theories they put forward remain significant because of the insight they give 
on our expectations for family life. 
1.3.2 The concept of ‘family’ 
There is a difference between our expectations of what family should mean, and our 
actual experience of family life. As Bittman and Pixley succinctly put it, family life tends to be 
thought about ‘with some combination of hope and experience.’ They suggest that using ‘a 
phrase such as the double life of the family’ illustrates that ‘there are endless inconsistencies 
between ‘the family’ that most people hope for and how they experience it.’112 Gillis has 
expressed similar ideas relating to the complexity and significance of ‘family’ as a concept and 
notes that, 
…we all have two families, one that we live with and another we live by. Too often the 
families we live with exhibit the kind of self-interested, competitive, divisive behaviour that 
we have come to associate with the market economy and public sphere. Often fragmented 
and impermanent, they are much less reliable than the imagined families we live by. The 
latter are never allowed to let us down. Constituted through myth, ritual and image, they 
must be forever nurturing and protective, and we will go to any lengths to ensure that they 
are so, even if it means mystifying the realities of family life.113 
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The ‘family we live with’ refers to the reality of family life whereas the ‘family we live by’ refers 
to an imagined ideal that helps us make sense of the (often) disappointing reality of family life. 
1.3.2.1 The family we live by 
Diduck has built on Gillis’ conceptualization of our dual family membership and identified 
the presence of ‘contrasting narratives’ within the family we live by: it is comprised of the 
competing ideals of the traditional and modern family.114 Diduck explains ‘that law’s ideal family 
shares this successfully contradictory framework and that this family has attained normative 
status in contemporary Britain.’115 The conflicting values of the mythical traditional and modern 
families sheds light on why the demographic picture has changed because they help explain why 
many people experience a series of relationships, and why people idealise marriage and yet 
divorce or never marry; our hopes and expectations for our families are so high that no real 
relationship can live up to them. 
1.3.2.1a The traditional family  
As Diduck notes, there is a ‘popular perception’ that family life ‘is not like it used to be’, 
but precisely what has been lost is up for debate: the traditional family is an ‘elusive concept’ 
because both its meaning and ‘location in time’ are subject to change.116 As Diduck puts it, 
That [the traditional family] may exist only on an ideal or mythical level is not important… 
we continue to idealise [it] as historical truth rather than acknowledge the possibility that 
the ‘traditional family’ never existed as a lived reality, but rather was always imaginary 
and is forever lost.117 
Diduck explains that the traditional family promotes particular values that are upheld as 
aspirational such as stability, loyalty and unity, but there are also negative characteristics that 
cannot be forgotten, such as patriarchy, heterosexism and race and class hierarchy.118 All of the 
different characteristics ascribed to the traditional family, even the negative ones, are significant 
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because of the role this myth plays in offering family ‘members a clear sense of their place’ 
within the family, as well as ‘their place in the world.’119 
The ‘traditional family’ myth explains why many continue to idealise marriage. Diduck 
suggests that the poignancy associated with the supposed loss of the traditional family may 
partly be due to the ‘loss of the certainty of the traditional identities and connections which, 
arguably, are rooted in the narrative of romantic love.’120 Similarly to Giddens’ view of ‘romantic 
love’,121 Diduck explains that this type of love creates ‘cultural understandings of how one 
behaves and what it means to be ‘in love’’. Romantic love is a private matter as it is ‘not 
contaminated by grubby material and social matters like money, employment, or other worldly 
conditions’. Romantic love lasts forever and creates a family that looks like the lost ‘traditional 
family’.122 
1.3.2.1b The modern family 
If the traditional family with its roots in romantic love explains the appeal of marriage to 
many, then the modern family myth explains why many marriages end in divorce and why 
people experience a series of relationships. The modern family is based on qualities of choice, 
equality and negotiation. Diduck notes that in the modern family, family members relate to each 
other ‘as equal individuals, continually making and remaking… individual and joint biographies 
and obligations according to individualised and personalised moral economies’ that would be 
inconceivable in the ‘romantic discourse’ of the traditional family.123 In the same way that the 
traditional family is rooted in the narrative of romantic love, the modern could be said to be 
rooted in Giddens’ ‘confluent love’ because, as Diduck explains, ‘modern intimacy need not be 
either forever or exclusive; it is sustained only so long as it is mutually satisfying to the lovers’.124 
The values of the modern family do not correspond well with a system of relationship 
recognition that prioritises life-long marriage because the modern family is a work in progress. 
As Diduck explains, ‘the relationship [the modern family] creates is not an ideal; it is open to 
change and its terms are therefore in our control.’125  
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1.3.2.2 The family we live with 
The incompatibility of the values that inform the traditional and modern family myths are 
irrelevant to their significance as aspirational signposts of what we expect from our families. 
Diduck explains that the ‘family we live with’ embodies ‘the social, material and emotional 
‘messiness’ that results from our experienced reality of trying to reconcile’ the ‘essentially 
irreconcilable’ traditional and modern family ideals. She notes that our lived experience of family 
life is characterised by contradiction, as we ‘attempt to find ways of living with fluidity, 
insecurity, conflict and individualism, and with loyalty, altruism, stability and forever 
romanticism.’ Unlike the family we live by, our real relationships are not able to reconcile these 
irreconcilable characteristics.126 But, the characteristics mentioned by Diduck, such as loyalty, 
altruism and stability associated with marriage and the traditional family are all functions that 
continue to be valued within relationships, alongside the modern family’s focus on fluidity and 
individualism. People want relationships to perform similar functions to those once (supposedly) 
performed by marriage, but it is not only permanent marriage relationships that can perform 
these functions. For the family we live with, ‘family’ is not confined to marriage and blood 
relationships and the functions that relationships perform are often the reference point 
according to which an individual will determine whether a relationship is familial in nature. This 
supports the argument that the current framework of relationship recognition needs reforming 
because a marriage-centric approach does not correspond well with the reality of family life for 
real families. 
1.3.2.2a Thinking of family in a fluid way: the family practices approach 
The term ‘family’ carries particular connotations and this makes some authors cautious of 
the term. Morgan, for example, has concerns that ‘the family’ evokes images of the ‘cornflakes 
packet’ family, or in other words the heterosexual nuclear family, with all other families judged 
‘according to the extent to which they conformed to or departed from’ this image.127 For 
Morgan, talking about ‘the family’ may also ‘lend support to right-wing political agendas’ and 
obscure the ‘rich diversity’ of families.128 Similarly, Smart argues that ‘family’ prioritizes 
‘biological connectedness and/or physical place’ because it ‘generally conjures up an image of 
degrees of biological relatedness combined with degrees of co-residence.’129 They both conclude 
however that family is a significant term and cannot always be avoided. Morgan notes that 
family is an ‘emotionally charged… term’ and sometimes, no other word will do. For example, a 
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‘family event’ is distinct from other events involving similar activities,130 presumably because of 
the special relationship between the people involved. Smart states that it is not possible to stop 
using the term altogether because the idea of family ‘resonate[s] with a host of cultural and 
personal meanings’ and ‘[f]amilies do matter, whether real or imagined’.131  
Defining family is a difficult task because many different types of relationship can be 
considered family by different people. Morgan believes that the term ‘family’ suggests ‘a kind 
of misplaced concreteness’ and gives ‘the family’ ‘a thing-like quality’. He recognises that 
‘individuals do not start from scratch as they go about family living’ because there is already a 
set of cultural, legal and economic constraints that set a framework for how to behave.132 He 
recognises that we are all simultaneously a part of ‘the families we live with and the families we 
live by’, as articulated by Gillis, as they ‘are mutually implicated in each other’. The ideals of the 
family we live by have not been ‘produced in a vacuum’; ideas surrounding what family should 
be have ‘themselves drawn upon practices’, thus illustrating how both the ideal and the actual 
everyday practices of families are ‘intimately related’.133 To capture the complexity of the lived 
family experience, Morgan avoids the term ‘family’ and instead has developed the ‘family 
practices’ approach. ‘Family practices’ focuses on the everyday qualities of family relationships, 
or the functions that families perform, rather than on the ‘form’ that they take. It is a focus on 
the ‘links’ between particular (family) units, regardless of the fact that ‘some of these links may 
be dormant or unrecognised and certainly not all of them will be active all the time.’134  
A family practices approach has the potential to include several different types of 
relationship beyond that of the nuclear family. For example, Morgan emphasises that ‘family’ is 
not the same as ‘household’ because family networks may exist regardless of geographical 
proximity.135 Family practices could potentially include LATs, couples who live apart together, 
because the focus of the approach is on how people relate to each other rather than whether 
they conform to a particular image of the (nuclear) cohabiting ‘family’. The family practices 
approach as envisaged by Morgan does not take a particularly broad view of ‘family’ however, 
and relationships such as friendships are not included within the approach. Morgan 
acknowledges that friendships may be equally, or even more, significant than ‘family’ for some 
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people, but treats them as distinct.136 Morgan distinguishes between ‘friends’ and ‘family’ on 
the basis that ‘there is a taken-for-granted, given quality of family relationships which seems to 
rule out choice in the matter.’137 This does not mean that Morgan is attempting to establish a 
hierarchy of significant personal relationships, rather he argues that there is a case to be made 
that family practices should be studied as a distinct set of practices as ‘long as some people 
continue to think that… family life is in some ways distinct’.138 
Smart has developed the family practices approach with her concept of ‘personal life’. 
Smart’s approach reflects the fluidity of personal relationships by conveying ‘a sense of 
motion’139 without retaining traditional ideas of ‘the white, middle-class, heterosexual’ family at 
its core.140 ‘Personal life’ is a way of examining personal relationships without prioritising one 
type of relationship over another,141 and so in this way it includes relationships such as 
friendships that would not be considered at all under Morgan’s family practices approach. 
Relationality is an important concept for personal life because it allows for recognition of the 
fact ‘that people relate to others who are not necessarily kin by ‘blood’ or marriage, thus 
allowing for considerable flexibility in approach.’142  
The concepts of ‘family practices’ and ‘personal life’ are valuable because the authors 
suggest that there needs to be a move away from focussing on the ‘family’ as a static institution 
with a new focus on an active, fluid concept of significant relationships, but there is a subtle 
difference between the approaches. Morgan focusses on the performance of functions within a 
particular group of relationships that he views as ‘family’, which appears to be limited to 
relationships like marriage and blood ties. Smart focusses on the performance of functions 
within several different types of significant relationship, including but not limited to ‘family’ 
relationships, and so would include friendships. Perhaps Smart’s deliberate inclusion of a 
diversity of relationship types better reflects the complexity of lived relationships than Morgan’s 
narrower focus, but her preference for the ‘personal’ as opposed to ‘family’ may not reflect how 
people feel about the different significant relationships that they form. By extending the notion 
of ‘family’ in Morgan’s family practices approach in a way that is akin to Smart’s broad range of 
relationships in the personal life approach, we may have a clearer picture of the diversity of 
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relationships that constitute the family we live with and so have a better understanding of the 
diverse relationship types that should be considered in any reforms of the current framework of 
relationship recognition.  
1.3.2.2b Defining family by its functions? 
It was noted above that ‘family’ is a term that carries heterosexual connotations. Many 
authors have written about the ‘families of choice’ formed by gay men and lesbians who, until 
fairly recently, could not marry in England and Wales, and still cannot marry in Australia. Families 
of choice, as Smart argues, are fluid in the sense that ‘such families are made rather than 
given’.143 An examination of the literature about these families of choice shows that they are 
characterised by the caring and supportive functions they perform rather than by reference to 
relationship type. For example, Weston’s work on gay men and lesbians forming ‘families of 
choice’ is significant because it suggests that family is a fluid concept that can be applied to many 
different types of relationship, whether the familial tie is created by blood, law or choice. 
Similarly to Morgan’s acknowledgement that the link between families may remain dormant, 
Weston’s work highlights that relationships between blood relatives can cease, such as when a 
family member comes out as gay or lesbian; although the blood tie, or the ‘link’, remains, the 
functioning relationship has come to an end.144 This adds a further layer of complexity to the 
term ‘family’ because being related by blood is not necessarily how everyone defines who 
counts as members of their family.145 ‘Families of choice’ is an inclusive concept and it can 
include the more traditional family relationships of sexual partners and blood relatives, as well 
as ex-lovers, friends and people that once lived together.146 Weston’s families of choice were 
characterised by ‘symbolic demonstrations of love, shared history, material or emotional 
assistance’147 and ‘closely associated with the experience of love were the practices through 
which people established and confirmed mutual, enduring solidarity.’148 This suggests that what 
characterised any relationship as ‘family’ was the performance of particular functions and the 
quality of the relationship rather than a focus on a legal or biological tie. 
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Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan made similar findings to Weston. They showed that non-
heterosexuals149 form ‘families of choice’, that are often, but not always, distinct from their 
‘families of origin’, or their biological relatives. Similarly to Morgan, they note that ‘family’ ‘is a 
powerful and pervasive word in our culture’ and has come to be ‘deployed to denote something 
broader than the traditional relationships based on lineage, alliance and marriage, referring 
instead to kin-like networks of relationships, based on friendship and commitments ‘beyond 
blood’.’150 They argue that the increasing diversity of families is not an indication that there has 
been a decline in the value of responsibility and commitment between family members, rather, 
responsibility and commitment are to be found in a broad variety of relationships that may be 
considered family by those involved.151 They found Morgan’s family practices approach useful 
in understanding the relationships and living arrangements of non-heterosexuals, because 
family practices allows for family to be thought of in a fluid way. Adopting a family practices 
approach shows that ‘many non-heterosexuals “do family” in ways that parallel heterosexual 
patterns.’152 They explain that ‘families of choice’ are diverse in terms of relationship types, but 
that there are common expectations as to the nature of these relationships often based on ideas 
of care and support: 
These everyday experiments range across a variety of patterns, from couple relationships 
to what we call ‘families of choice’: flexible and informal and varied, but strong and 
supportive networks of friends and lovers, often including members of families of origin. 
They provide the framework for the development of mutual care, responsibility and 
commitment for many non-heterosexual people – and indeed for many heterosexuals as 
well.153 
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Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan cautioned that ‘friend’ is a word that can encompass a 
variety of relationships from acquaintances to those which ‘form part of an intimate circle’,154 
but nevertheless found that friendships formed a central part of the ‘families of choice’ of many 
non-heterosexuals, with friends being ‘like family’, or sometimes replacing families of origin 
altogether.155 Similarly, Roseneil and Budgeon found that friends can occupy ‘a central place in 
the personal life’ for some people who demonstrated a ‘high degree of reliance on friends, as 
opposed to biological kin and sexual partners, particularly for the provision of care and support 
in everyday life’.156 Their research suggested that for some people at least, there has been a 
‘blurring of the category of ‘friend’ and ‘family’ with friends performing the roles expected of 
‘family’.157 This suggests that what categorises some relationships as family, and thus distinct, 
are the functions of care and support that they perform. 
Spencer and Pahl also found that friends are important for many people, and they also 
point out that ‘friend’ is a term that has broad meaning. They explain that ‘friend’ could describe 
relationships between acquaintances, neighbours, or life-long relationships with an unrelated 
person, or even describe a relationship between partners, spouses or siblings: there is no 
agreement over the exact ambit of the term.158 They found that for many people, ‘it is not the 
case that… family members have actually become friends, or friends have become family, but 
that there has been some blurring of boundaries’.159 They note that we all form ‘personal 
communities’ that are a mixture of given and chosen relationships, or in other words a mixture 
of ‘family’ and ‘friends’, and that both types of relationship can be as important as each other. 
They argue that friendship takes many forms, but essentially provides support and ‘at its 
strongest, it is based on trust, commitment and loyalty’.160 For Spencer and Pahl, within our 
personal communities, ‘where friends and family play varied and overlapping roles’, it is not 
possible to claim that ‘people nowadays have abandoned traditional ‘families of fate’ for 
‘families of choice’ based on friends, since the truth… is far more complex.’161 This suggests that 
it is the functions that a relationship performs that makes it significant, not necessarily whether 
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the relationship would be categorised as ‘friend’ or ‘family’. Taken together, the insights of these 
different authors suggest that any relationship recognition reforms should consider the diversity 
of contemporary relationships practices because it is not necessarily the case that blood and 
legal ties take precedence over other relationships for everyone. 
1.3.2.2c Displaying our family practices 
Thinking of ‘family’ in terms of the functions it performs is useful as a way of explaining 
the diversity of relationship types that comprise the family we live with, and Finch agrees that 
we ought to think about family practices in a fluid way.162 But, Finch builds on Morgan’s ‘family 
practices’ approach and asserts that simply ‘doing’ family is not enough, because we also need 
to be seen to be ‘displaying’ our family practices. By ‘display’, Finch means, 
…to emphasize the fundamentally social nature of family practices, where the meaning of 
one’s actions has to be both conveyed to and understood by relevant others if those 
actions are to be effective as constituting ‘family’ practices.163 
Families must ‘be ‘displayed’ as well as ‘done’ because their contours and character are not 
obvious in an environment where relationships and living arrangements’ are so diverse. Finch 
notes that ‘family relationships have always been subject to change over time’, which is why 
family display is so important,  
… the more extensive volatility of contemporary relationships means that for many people, 
family relationships will need to be redefined and positively established on a more regular 
basis as new sexual partnerships are formed, as cohabitation gets reconstituted as legal 
marriage, as children leave (or do not leave) their parents’ home in different ways and at 
different stages, and as more people experience periods of living alone. All of these 
phenomena are both more common and their duration less predictable than in the past, 
leading not only to a much greater diversity of family relationships but also to the need to 
reassess what ‘family’ and family practices mean on a fairly regular basis.164 
Additionally, Finch recognises the work of Giddens and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim for the way 
they highlight the link ‘between relationships and social processes’: in a world full of choices 
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where relationships last as long as they are fulfilling, and we move from one relationship to the 
next, the need for display of our family practices is reinforced.165 
The idea of ‘displaying family’ is important for the family we live with, because individuals 
actively display family to gain recognition of the familial nature of the relationship from others. 
Finch notes that this could be from another family member, or from a source external to the 
family such as colleagues, employers or public agencies.166 This suggests that recognition from 
external sources legitimises the familial nature of a relationship in the sense that it “proves” that 
the practices are related to a family relationship and that this is valuable for individuals. One 
example of family display may be the focus on the ‘proper wedding’, as identified by Barlow and 
others, as one reason why people value marriage, ‘either as a vague expectation or as a practical 
plan.’ They identified that many cohabitants viewed a wedding as an (expensive) public display 
of their commitment, even when they felt that they were ‘as good as married’.167 This suggests 
that reforming the current approach to relationship recognition in a way that is more inclusive 
of the diversity of family relationships that are formed today could be valuable to all family 
relationships, but especially to those in non-traditional family relationships because this would 
be an acknowledgement by the state that their relationships are ‘family’.  
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has showed that the demographic picture has changed considerably with 
marriage rates declining and rates of informal unmarried cohabitation increasing rapidly, as well 
as an increase in the number of adults living by themselves, living with unrelated adults or 
forming LAT relationships. These changing living arrangements have been accompanied by 
changes in social attitudes, and although many idealise marriage, other types of relationship 
such as cohabitation, LATs and friendships are also viewed as valuable relationships. The 
sociological literature suggests that ‘family’ is difficult to define, but, it appears that family 
should not be defined exclusively by reference to relationship type, rather it is the functions 
performed by a relationship that often characterises it as familial in nature. This is important 
because it shows that a framework of relationship recognition that prioritises life-long marriage 
above all other relationship types is incompatible with contemporary relationship practices and 
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attitudes behind those practices. The next chapter will build on these findings by exploring the 
theoretical differences and similarities between ‘form’-based and ‘function’-based approaches 
of relationship recognition in light of a discussion about the functions of family law, and will 
discuss whether either approach could offer a system that is more inclusive of the diversity of 
family relationships that are formed today and better corresponds with the way that people 
view these significant relationships.
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Chapter 2 – Exploring the potential of ‘form’ and function 
This chapter explores some of the existing literature to determine the potential of both 
‘form’-based and function-based frameworks of relationship recognition to respond to today’s 
increasingly diverse relationship practices. The chapter will begin by identifying some possible 
functions of family law. This is necessary because identifying a purpose of family law gives an 
indication as to what the law is, or should be, trying to achieve by recognising relationships and 
offers a yardstick against which to measure the merits and difficulties of form-based and 
function-based approaches. Next, it will be argued that ‘form’-based recognition is a term that 
has two distinct meanings, namely ‘formalised’ relationship and relationship ‘type’, and that 
formalised relationships have the potential to be used in ways that recognise family diversity. 
Following this, it will be argued that while function-based recognition has its advantages, it is 
potentially problematic because it comes with its own set of challenges. The chapter will 
conclude by summarising the findings from the literature and highlight the advantages and 
deficiencies of both approaches to suggest that they appear to be similar but there are some 
important differences between them. 
2.1 Considering the functions of family law 
Identifying the functions of family law, or identifying what family law is supposed to 
achieve, is not without difficulty. Herring warns that ‘it is easy to assume there is agreement 
over the functions of family law and that typically involves assuming a particular image of the 
family,’ presumably as a married or cohabiting couple and their children.1 In this way, identifying 
the functions of family law is challenging because it may lead to prioritising one type of family 
relationship above others. Dewar argues that family law is uncertain of its role or purpose 
because it is characterised by chaos, or a ‘sense of disorder’. This chaos is understandable, and 
acceptable, however, because ‘family law engages with areas of social life and feeling – namely 
love, passion, intimacy, commitment and betrayal – that are themselves riven with contradiction 
and paradox.’2 This suggests that the inherent chaos of family law makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to ascertain the functions of family law with certainty. 
Regardless of the difficulties with identifying the functions of family law, it is helpful to 
have an idea of what family law is trying to achieve so that we can consider whether form-based 
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or function-based approaches are best placed to achieve these functions. As Herring notes, ‘it is 
helpful to identify what family law is trying to do, as long as one acknowledges that these 
[functions] are open to debate and are not givens.’3 Different authors may focus on different 
functions of family law, but, it seems that two espoused functions are particularly important for 
the purposes of this thesis. Firstly, there is consensus that protecting family members, both 
during a relationship and following relationship breakdown, is an accepted function of family 
law. This will be referred to as the ‘protective function’. Secondly, family law performs the 
function of identifying who is related to whom, and so in this way has a symbolic role to play in 
helping people form their identities by recognising a relationship as being familial in nature. In 
this way, legal recognition of a relationship as being a family relationship is symbolically 
significant. This will be referred to as the ‘symbolic function’. 
2.1.1 The protective function of family law 
Herring adopts Eekelaar’s identification of three ‘primary functions’ of family law as a 
starting point for making the argument that relationships of caregiving should be at the centre 
of law rather than sexual relationships.4 These are the adjustive, protective and supportive 
functions, 
The first is to provide mechanisms and rules for adjusting the relationships between family 
members when family units break down. The second is to provide protection for 
individuals from possible harms suffered within the family. The third is to support the 
maintenance of family relationships.5  
Both the adjustive and protective functions identified by Eekelaar are essentially about 
protecting a family member who may be vulnerable in economic terms on relationship 
breakdown and may be in need of protection from other family members during the 
relationship. Similarly, Bailey-Harris argues that the law has a ‘maternalistic role’ to play because 
‘family relationships are commonly not equal’ and are often ‘characterised by a power 
imbalance – physical emotional or financial – which the law must redress in order to ensure 
fairness.’6 The law has three roles or functions to fulfil when regulating families. The first is 
‘remedial’ which, like Eekelaar’s adjustive function, relates to regulating ‘the consequences of 
family breakdown in a way that achieves a fair result between the parties’. This is ‘of particular 
                                                          
3 Herring Caring and the Law (n1) 190. 
4 ibid. 
5 J Eekelaar Family Law and Social Policy (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1984), 25 (emphasis in original text).  
6 R Bailey-Harris ‘Law and the Unmarried Couple: Oppression or Liberation?’ (1996) 8(2) Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 137, 140. 
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importance in respect of the financial consequences of relationship breakdown.’7 This function 
is essentially about protecting the economically weaker partner. Similarly to Eekelaar, Bailey-
Harris also identifies a ‘protective’ role, which means that family law should ‘protect family 
members from abuse and exploitation by others, in the situation where the family is 
dysfunctional.’ Bailey-Harris suggests that violence is the ‘most serious form of exploitation 
within a family’, but exploitation can take other forms such as ‘financial exploitation of one adult 
by another’.8 The third role is ‘the promotion and welfare of children’.9 This third function is less 
directly relevant here because the focus of the thesis is relationships between adults, but is still 
of importance because many couples, be they married or cohabiting, will have children, and 
caregiving responsibilities often lead to economic vulnerability for the primary caregiver,10 and 
this gives rise to the need for the protective function of the law. 
Similarly, Schneider has identified five functions of family law. The first three are similar 
to those advanced by Bailey-Harris and Eekelaar, and are based on popular expectations of the 
law’s role: ‘there are people… the law is widely expected to protect, contracts it is widely 
expected to facilitate, and disputes it is widely expected to arbitrate’.11 In the same way as 
Eekelaar and Bailey-Harris, Schneider identifies a ‘protective’ function, by which he means that 
the law should protect family members from physical and non-physical harm such as ‘economic 
wrongs’. The second function is ‘facilitative’, which refers to the way in which the law allows 
people to enter contracts to ‘give effect to their private arrangements’. Helping family members 
resolve disputes such as upon divorce is the third function, referred to as the ‘arbitral’ function,12 
which like Bailey-Harris’ remedial function or Eekelaar’s adjustive function, could be described 
as protective in that it relates to protection of vulnerable partners on relationship breakdown. 
Taken together, the work of these authors suggests that there is broad consensus over one 
function of family law, namely that it should protect a vulnerable partner from harm, be that 
from physical or emotional abuse or financial exploitation, both when the relationship is 
continuing and following relationship breakdown. 
                                                          
7 ibid 140. 
8 ibid 142. 
9 ibid 142. 
10 L Glennon ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) 22(1) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22, 44-5.  
11 CE Schneider ‘The Channelling Function in Family Law’ (1992) 20(3) Hofstra Law Review 495, 497. 
12 ibid 497. 
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2.1.2 The symbolic function of legal recognition 
While the first three of Schneider’s functions of family law are about protection, the final 
two functions are different. These are the ‘expressive’ and ‘channelling’ functions. The 
expressive function is about ‘deploying the law’s power to impart ideas through words and 
symbols’, and this can alter behaviour, whilst the channelling function is a means by which the 
law guides people into particular types of relationship, such as marriage, either through 
incentives or disincentives. While the channelling function is about legal recognition being used 
as a means to encourage a particular type of family living, the expressive function can be used 
as a way to ‘provide a voice in which citizens may speak’, and is therefore indicative of family 
law’s symbolic function.13 
While chapter one identified that family relationships are created and sustained through 
everyday family practices, it was also suggested that legal recognition of a relationship is 
important because it validates the relationship as being familial in nature, that is legal 
recognition is a means of family display.14 Additionally, the fact that people will use the term 
‘family’ to describe their significant relationships even when they are of a relationship type that 
would not traditionally be regarded as family, such as friendships,15 is significant because it 
suggests that people need to ascribe a label to their relationships to signify their importance. 
What is apparent from much of the existing literature is that the symbolic significance of the 
legal recognition of a family relationship is twofold; firstly, it is an acceptance by the state that 
a relationship is familial in nature, and secondly, it attaches a label to the relationship that lets 
other people understand that it is a family relationship. The symbolic significance of recognition 
is especially prevalent in the literature looking at the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, 
and this suggests that the symbolic function has already proved influential in developing form-
based recognition of same-sex couples in England and Wales. 
In a study on same-sex couples (who had all either gone through a commitment ceremony 
or were planning to enter a civil partnership), Smart found that legal recognition of a relationship 
as being a family relationship is important. She argued that many see civil partnerships as 
‘protective of same-sex relationships’ because ‘the law provides safeguards for the more 
vulnerable partners’ as well as the fact that legal recognition ‘protects the relationship from 
incursions from other kin or even some aspects of bureaucracy and officialdom.’16 In this way, 
                                                          
13 ibid 498. 
14 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2c. 
15 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2b. 
16 Smart ‘Making Kin’ (n2) 18. 
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legal recognition not only protects a vulnerable partner, but also protects the relationship itself 
by giving it shape and definition that can be displayed by the couple and recognised by others. 
The relationship is given a label of ‘family’ so that third parties understand the significance and 
nature of the relationship to the partners, and legal recognition makes it difficult to deny or 
ignore the existence of a relationship. The earlier findings of Smart, writing with Shipman, 
confirm that recognition from family is as important as recognition of the relationship by the 
state. They found that ‘many couples wanted the kind of respect and acknowledgment given 
automatically to their heterosexual brothers and/or sisters who either married or made a 
commitment. Recognition allowed these couples to be treated as both “adults” (i.e. becoming 
fully fledged citizens), but also as part of the family.’17 As Smart goes on to explain in her later 
work, gaining legal recognition of a relationship through a civil partnership means that partners 
are connected ‘in a socially recognised way’.18 This leads Smart to suggest that ‘the construction 
of legally recognised bonds of kinship may be emerging as one of the most critical functions of 
family law’.19  
Similarly, in the context of same-sex marriage debates, Barker acknowledges that one 
reason why same-sex marriage is considered necessary by some people is that,20 
A state’s recognition of same-sex relationships signals to wider society not only that same-
sex relationships are no longer to be denigrated but also that they must be positively 
recognized and respected. Recognition from the state is, then, both an end in itself and a 
means to an end in that those who seek same-sex marriage not only seek recognition from 
the state, but also from members of birth families, religious institutions and employers.21 
Barker goes on to explain that the ‘social recognition’ that flows from legal recognition of same-
sex relationships was ‘found to be one of the key reasons for lesbians and gay men’ to support 
the introduction of civil partnerships in England and Wales.22 This all suggests that family law 
has a symbolic function to perform: legal recognition of a relationship by the state validates that 
relationship as being familial in nature. This is important for the thesis because it suggests that 
                                                          
17 B Shipman and C Smart ‘’It’s made a huge Difference’: Recognition, Rights and the Personal Significance 
of Civil Partnership’ (2007) 12(1) Sociological Research Online, [4.8], see also [5.1] – 
<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/12/1/shipman.html>.  
18 Smart ‘Making Kin’ (n2) 18. 
19 ibid 23. 
20 See also R Auchmuty ‘Same-Sex Marriage Revived: Feminist Critiques and Legal Strategy’ (2004) 14(1) 
Feminism and Psychology 101, 106: Auchmuty says that the arguments in favour of same-sex marriage 
can be divided into two categories: the practical (relating to actual legal consequences) and the symbolic. 
21 N Barker Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
3. 
22 ibid 107. Barker refers here to the work of Shipman and Smart (n17).  
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recognising a broader variety of relationships may be significant in a symbolic sense, as well as 
allowing more types of relationship to be subject to family law’s protective function. 
2.2 Focussing on ‘form’ 
There is not much literature looking specifically at ‘form’-based recognition, and it is not 
always clear what exactly ‘form’ means in the literature that advocates reforms of the current 
framework of relationship recognition. It is submitted that ‘form’ is a term that can be used to 
refer to two distinct concepts: either ‘formalised’ relationships, or a reference to relationship 
‘type’. For example, Barlow and James in their paper calling for the introduction of function-
based reforms sometimes use ‘form’ to refer to formalised relationships and at other times use 
‘form’ when they are referring to relationship type. ‘Form’ is used to refer to formalised 
relationships where they question whether marriage is recognised because of the ‘form of the 
relationship’ as a ‘state-endorsed contractual arrangement’,23 and also used to refer to 
relationship type when they say there are areas where the law ‘regards cohabitation as a clearly 
inferior family form to marriage’.24 It is necessary to consider the different meanings of ‘form’ 
further, because we need to know what ‘form’ really entails before we can consider whether an 
alternative approach offers something different. 
2.2.1 ‘Form’ in the first sense: formalised relationships 
‘Form’ in the first sense refers to ‘formal’ or ‘formalised’ relationships. This simply means 
that eligible people take steps to register their relationship in a manner prescribed by the state,25 
which leads to legal recognition of that relationship. In this way, England and Wales takes a form-
based approach to the recognition of adult relationships because, despite the ad hoc legal 
recognition of some informal relationships,26 the formalised relationships of marriage and civil 
partnership are privileged by law. Once a marriage or civil partnership has been entered into, a 
package of legal consequences is bestowed on that relationship. In other words, it is legally 
recognised. It is the act of entering the marriage contract or registering a civil partnership that 
triggers legal recognition. 
                                                          
23 A Barlow and G James ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’ (2004) 67(2) 
Modern Law Review 143, 153 (emphasis in original text). 
24 ibid 147. This is also true of other authors. For example: Glennon (n10) where Glennon also uses ‘form’ 
ambiguously, e.g. at 39: ‘In other words, the centralisation of relationship form means that we engage in 
regime comparisons, in abstract terms, as opposed to recognizing that the varied relationship types within 
each category requires more than a categorical approach.’ 
25 Probert notes that ‘(s)ince 1753 it has been established that compliance with certain formal 
requirements is necessary to the validity of a marriage’: R Probert ‘When are we Married? Void, Non-
Existent and Presumed Marriages’ (2002) 22(3) Legal Studies 398, 398.  
26 See Chapter 6, 6.3 for details of the ad hoc legal recognition of informal cohabiting relationships. 
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The history and development of formalised relationships will be discussed in detail in the 
second section of this thesis27 and further references to ‘form-based’ systems of recognition 
throughout the thesis will be a reference to ‘form’ in the first sense of formalised relationship 
unless otherwise stated. At this point it is necessary to consider some of the benefits of 
formalised relationships to be clear what this mechanism of relationship recognition has to offer 
as a prelude to exploring the desirability of a different approach. 
2.2.1.1 Administrative efficiency 
One advantage of formalised relationships is that they are administratively efficient, or as 
Barlow and others note, they are an ‘administratively convenient approach’.28 A relationship 
between two eligible people is made formal upon registration of a marriage or civil partnership, 
and this relationship will only end via death or by a process prescribed by law.29 This provides 
an efficient system because the state knows who is in a formalised relationship with whom at 
any given time; this is important because of the legal consequences that flow from marriage and 
civil partnership. Administrative efficiency was referred to by the then government during the 
consultation process for civil partnerships as being a benefit of the new model of formalised 
relationships, 
There would be legal certainty about who had opted in and who had not, and when the 
legal relationship began and ended. This level of certainty would enable an accurate 
assessment of when liabilities began and ended.30 
Rundle makes the similar point that formalised relationships provide conclusive proof of the 
existence of a relationship.31 Systems of recognition based on formalised relationships provide 
a straightforward mechanism to attach legal consequences to relationships. It must be 
remembered, however, that administrative efficiency may come at a price: only those 
relationships that have been made formal will be subject to family law’s protective function. 
                                                          
27 See Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
28 A Barlow and others Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: Social Change and Legal Reform in the 21st 
Century (Hart Publishing, 2005), 107. 
29 Marriage may be ended via a formal divorce process, or can be annulled if particular circumstances are 
present: see the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The same is true of civil partnerships: Civil Partnership Act 
2004. For discussion, see Chapter 3, 3.2.2 and Chapter 4, 4.1.2.2. 
30 Women and Equality Unit ‘Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex 
Couples’ (2003), [2.3]. 
31 O Rundle ‘An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 121, 124. See also J Millbank ‘The Role of ‘Functional’ Family in Same-Sex Family 
Recognition Trends’ (2008) 20(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 155, 181. 
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2.2.1.2 Respect for choice and individual autonomy 
Formalised relationships can be described as ‘opt-in’32 or ‘choice-based models’33 because 
people must actively take steps to register the relationship, or the relationship will not be legally 
recognised. In this way, respect for choice and autonomy is seen by some as a benefit of 
formalised relationships. This was highlighted by the government during consultation for civil 
partnerships, 
An opt-in scheme would enable people to make their own choices about how best to 
organise their lives. Couples with committed same-sex relationships who want a formal 
legal status and the attached rights and responsibilities could choose to enter the 
scheme… The government recognises that some people deliberately choose not to make 
formal commitments to each other, and/or to limit their liabilities in respect of each other. 
An opt-in system would support individual choices, and would not impose responsibilities 
on those who do not want them.34 
This suggests that a model of recognition that is not ‘opt-in’, presumably a function-based 
system that recognises relationships when they perform particular functions,35 would ‘impose’ 
legal consequences on people who have not chosen them. Some authors agree with this 
viewpoint, and suggest that function-based models do not respect choice and autonomy. Scott, 
for instance, notes that an ‘autonomy-based framework’ where couples choose to be subject to 
legal recognition ‘is superior’ to an approach where ‘unchosen’ recognition is imposed on a 
couple.36 Kovacs similarly believes that opt-in approaches of recognition should be available 
instead of function-based approaches to protect people who have made a deliberate choice not 
to seek legal recognition of their relationship.37 
                                                          
32 Women and Equality Unit (n30) [2.3]. 
33 As noted by Glennon (n10) 29. 
34 Women and Equality Unit (n30) [2.2-2.3]. See also [4.25]: ‘The Government believes that couples should 
make a specific choice about entry into a new legal status.’  
35 For a detailed description of ‘function-based’ recognition, see below, 2.3.1. 
36 E Scott ‘Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency’ (2004) The University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 225, 230. 
37 D Kovacs ‘A Federal Law of De Facto Property Rights: the Dream and the Reality’ (2009) 23(2) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 104, 106, 109. See also: P Parkinson ‘Submission to the Senate Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs: Inquiry into the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters 
and Other Measures) Bill 2008’ (2008), 2, available from 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008
_10/family_law/submissions/sub6_pdf.ashx> accessed 23/01/2017.  
67 
 
2.2.1.3 Status and formalised relationships 
Another benefit of ‘form’ in the first sense could be the status generated by formalised 
relationships. Sometimes, authors conflate ‘form’ with ‘status’ in a manner that suggests that 
the terms are interchangeable.38 It is argued here that ‘form’ and status are distinct concepts, 
although the conflation of the terms is understandable considering that marriage, a form-based 
model, has historically been at the centre of family law and that a powerful status attaches to 
this relationship. For instance, in the often quoted so-called “definition” of marriage,39 Lord 
Penzance explains that marriage is more than a contract, 
Marriage has been well said to be something more than a contract, either religious or civil 
– to be an Institution. It creates mutual rights and obligations, as all contracts do, but 
beyond that it confers a status... the laws of all Christian nations throw about that status 
a variety of legal incidents…40 
Almost 150 years later, Baroness Hale expressed similar ideas about marriage being both a 
contract and a status, 
Marriage is, of course, a contract, in the sense that each party must agree to enter into it 
and once entered both are bound by its legal consequences. But it is also a status. This 
means two things. First, the parties are not entirely free to determine all its legal 
consequences for themselves. They contract into a package which the law of the land lays 
down. Secondly, their marriage also has legal consequences for other people and for the 
state.41 
While it has long been established that marriage has a status, it is submitted that what is 
not always clear is the fact that ‘status’ can be a reference to a ‘legal’ or ‘social’ status. Lord 
Simon’s description of “status” in the Ampthill Peerage Case could be taken as a description of 
a legal status: a ‘condition of belonging to a class in society to which the law ascribes peculiar 
rights and duties, capacities and incapacities. Such, for example, are the status of married 
persons’.42 Both marriage and civil partnership generate a legal status because the law treats 
                                                          
38 For example, see, Barlow and James (n23) 167; Barlow and others (n28) 107. 
39 Probert explains that this ‘definition’ was never intended to provide a definition of marriage, rather it 
was a defence of the institution, and that the words were shaped by their historical context: see R Probert 
‘Hyde v Hyde: Defining or Defending Marriage?’ (2007) 19(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 322, 322. 
The actual legal structure of marriage will be discussed in detail at Chapter 3, 3.2. 
40 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1865-69) L R 1 P & D 130, 133. 
41 Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [132]. 
42 The Ampthill Peerage Case (1977) AC 547, 577 (Lord Simon). See also in the Australian context, Ford v 
Ford (1947) 73 CLR 524, 529 (Latham CJ): ‘A person may be said to have a status in law when he belongs 
to a class of persons who, by reason only of their membership of that class, have rights or duties, capacities 
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these formalised relationships as a particular class and a package of legal consequences attaches 
to them. A social status is different because this refers to how society views the relationship. As 
Auchmuty notes, 
…marriage is more than simply a set of legal rules. It has symbolic significance that exists 
beyond, and sometimes in spite of, the legal and material reality. Marriage confers upon 
individuals the highest social status and approval.43 
Marriage provides a label, or a ‘stamp’,44 for a relationship, giving society a means of 
understanding the nature of that relationship, and so in this way marriage provides a means of 
fulfilling family law’s symbolic function. As Barker explains, ‘the status of marriage is a universally 
understood and powerful symbol in signifying the importance of the relationship.’45 Later 
chapters will discuss whether a social status akin to that attached to marriage attaches to all 
formalised relationships.46 For now it is sufficient to say that it is unclear whether a social status 
is automatically generated following the creation of a legal status. For example, some, such as 
Steinfeld and Keidan, who recently challenged (unsuccessfully) the ban on opposite-sex civil 
partnership in the Court of Appeal, believe that the civil partnership status is different and 
favourable to the marriage status.47 Others, such as Wilkinson and Kitzinger, viewed civil 
partnerships as an inferior status to marriage, a ‘consolation prize’ that is ‘offensive and 
demeaning’ to same-sex couples.48 Their view suggests that the social status of marriage is 
unique to marriage, and does not necessarily attach to all formalised relationships. 
2.2.2 Form in the second sense: relationship type 
The second sense in which ‘form’ is used to describe a mechanism of relationship 
recognition is a reference to relationship ‘type’. Many ‘types’ of relationship are formed by 
adults during their lifetime, as was shown in chapter one,49 such as sexual relationships with 
partners living elsewhere (LATs), unmarried cohabiting relationships, relationships between 
                                                          
or incapacities, specified by law which do not exist in the case of persons not included in the class and 
which, in most cases at least, could not be created by any agreement of such persons. An alien, for 
example, as distinct from a subject of the Crown, a married person as distinct from an unmarried person, 
a bankrupt as distinct from other persons generally, are all persons who have a particular status.’ 
43 Auchmuty ‘Same-Sex Marriage Revived’ (n20) 102. 
44 Lord Wilson ‘Marriage is made for Man, not Man for Marriage’ (Medico-Legal Society, Belfast, Northern 
Ireland, 18 February 2014), 3, available from <http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140218.pdf> 
accessed 23/01/2017. 
45 Barker (n21) 102. 
46 See Chapter 4, 4.3.2 and Chapter 5, 5.2.3.2b. 
47 See Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81; R (Steinfeld and Keidan) 
v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128 (Admin). For discussion see Chapter 4, 4.3.2.2.   
48 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [5].  
49 See Chapter 1, 1.1. 
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siblings or platonic friendships. This is by no means an exhaustive list and many of these 
relationships will be considered significant by those involved, regardless of whether the 
relationship is a ‘type’ recognised by the law.50 Arguably, England and Wales currently has a 
form-based approach in this second sense because it is a particular type of relationship, the 
sexual couple, that the law prioritises over others: not only does the law privilege the formalised 
relationships of marriage and civil partnership, but the law also legally recognises unmarried 
cohabiting couples in some instances.51  
Some commentators feel that this focus on a particular ‘type’ of relationship means that 
many other family relationships are ignored by the law. Westwood, for example, is concerned 
that legalising same-sex marriage may ‘entrench one relationship form whilst further 
marginalising others, and [this] would jeopardise wider reform of relationship recognition’.52 
Fineman shares the concern that privileging the sexual couple, married or otherwise, means the 
law is not focussing on other significant relationships such as those of caretaking.53 For Fineman, 
the focus of relationship recognition should not be on marriage, but instead on how to ‘support 
all individuals who create intimate family relationships, regardless of their form.’54 
2.2.2.1 The potential of formalised relationships to provide for family diversity 
Like Fineman who criticises the current framework of relationship recognition for being 
too exclusive, Brake believes that ‘the great social and legal importance accorded marriage and 
marriage-like relationships is unjustified’.55 For Brake, a focus on marriage and marriage-like 
relationships ‘devalues’ non-sexual relationships even when they perform similar ‘functions’ to 
‘traditional families’, including ‘material support, emotional security and frequent 
companionship.’56 Brake believes that it is relationships characterised by care that should be at 
the centre of law, and not sexual relationships. As will be made clear below, Fineman’s answer 
to the problem of prioritizing a particular relationship type over others is to suggest abolishing 
                                                          
50 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2b. 
51 For discussion, see Chapter 6, 6.3. 
52 S Westwood ‘’My Friends are my Family’: An Argument about the Limitations of Contemporary Law’s 
Recognition of Relationships in Later Life’ (2013) 35(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 347, 349. 
Similar points have also been made by other commentators. See, K Weston Families We Choose: Lesbians, 
Gays, Kinship (Columbia University Press, 1997); C Donovan ‘Why Reach for the Moon? Because the Stars 
aren’t enough’ (2004) 14(1) Feminism and Psychology 24; K Walker ‘The Same Sex Marriage Debate in 
Australia’ (2007) 11(1-2) The International Journal of Human Rights 109; R Auchmuty ‘What’s so special 
about Marriage? The Impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ (2008) 20(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 475. 
53 See M Fineman The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New Press, 2004). See also Herring Caring 
and the Law (n1) Chapter 6; J Herring ‘Making Family Law More Careful’ in J Wallbank and J Herring (eds) 
Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge, 2015). 
54 Fineman The Autonomy Myth (n53) 75. 
55 E Brake Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), 1. 
56 ibid 92. 
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marriage57 and instead recognising informal relationships that are characterised by caregiving.58 
Brake takes a different approach and argues that marriage can be adapted, or ‘minimized’, so 
that it provides a route to relationship recognition for any caring relationship, allowing 
‘friendships, urban tribes, and care networks as well as polyamorous or monogamous’ 
relationships to enter a “marriage” and thus gain a distinctive status.59 The proposal is about 
relaxing the terms of who can marry whom, so that any two or more people who are in a caring 
relationship can ‘marry’, whilst ensuring that marriage remains a distinctive status.60 
Brake’s work is not intended ‘to provide a detailed legal proposal but rather to give a 
philosophical justification for a more flexible law supporting a variety of relationships’.61 The 
proposal nevertheless remains interesting for the purposes of the thesis because it hints at the 
potential of formalised relationships to be used in different ways to better provide for different 
relationship types. The second section of this thesis will explore the potential of formalised 
relationships to be used in the way Brake suggests, as well as the factors affecting the potential 
flexibility of formalised relationships to provide for family diversity.  
2.3 Focussing on ‘function’ 
In contrast to the limited existing literature exploring what is meant by ‘form-based’ 
recognition, many commentators have written extensively on function-based recognition. The 
work of these commentators suggests that function-based recognition has the potential to be 
used in ways that are inclusive of a variety of relationship types. But this approach is not without 
practical difficulties and function-based systems can end up being just as exclusive as the current 
relationship recognition framework in England and Wales. Before exploring the difficulties with 
function-based recognition and examining a selection of suggestions for reform, however, it is 
necessary for the purposes of clarity to outline what is meant by ‘function-based’ recognition. 
2.3.1 What is ‘function’? 
References to a ‘function-based’ approach to recognition, as used in this thesis, must be 
distinguished from the established theoretical perspective known as ‘functionalism’ in sociology. 
Talcott Parsons believed that society was a social system and that every part of society had a 
                                                          
57 Fineman The Autonomy Myth (n53) 123. 
58 For discussion of Fineman’s proposal, see below, 2.3.3.2. 
59 Brake (n55) 156-8. 
60 ibid 162. 
61 ibid 164. 
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role to play. The nuclear family was an especially important part of society.62 As Chambers 
succinctly summarises it, 
[Parsons] argued that the extended family of pre-industrial society was no longer viable. 
The family was necessarily transformed by industrialization from an extended, economic 
unit of production in rural societies into a small, mobile nuclear unit of consumption in 
urban society. Industrialization demands greater geographical and social mobility from its 
workforces. So the family unit shrank in size to adapt to this new economy.63 
For Parsons, the nuclear family had two main functions: the primary socialization of children; 
and providing personality stabilization for family members by providing emotional support. The 
success of the nuclear family in performing these functions was based on the gendered roles of 
the husband and wife: the husband had the role of bread-winning, whilst the wife attended to 
the ‘emotional and domestic needs of the family.’64 
The ‘function-based’ or ‘functional’ approach considered in this thesis is different, and 
refers to a particular approach towards the legal recognition of relationships. Function-based 
recognition refers to the recognition of relationships on the basis of their functions or their 
characteristics. This is essentially a manifestation of the ‘family practices’ approach, discussed 
in chapter one,65 which recommends moving from a narrow focus on what family ‘is’, towards a 
wider and possibly more inclusive focus on what family ‘does’, by focussing on everyday family 
practices as a trigger for legal recognition of a relationship. Head sums up function-based 
recognition in this way, 
…in order to ascertain whether a particular non-marital relationship will fall under the 
cover of a particular legislative regime, the courts will conduct an objective review of that 
relationship, usually retrospectively, with a focus on particular relational characteristics. 
These characteristics are analysed against certain statutory criteria. If the relationship is 
found to meet a certain… threshold, then it is presumed to be one that is legally relevant.66 
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Similarly, Millbank has explained that, 
Functional family claims rest on a performative aspect, that is, the parties are granted 
legal rights because of what they do in relation to one another, not because of the status 
of who they are or what manner of legal formality they have undertaken.67 
A function-based approach is distinct from formalised relationships because the former focusses 
on the characteristics of a relationship to determine whether it is legally recognised whilst the 
latter focusses on whether the relationship is registered.  
2.3.2 The difficulties with function-based recognition 
Millbank has written about the potential of function-based approaches to recognise the 
diverse variety of relationships that make up the family we live with. She noted that, ‘functional 
family approaches accord with a core objective of feminist legal scholarship and law reform 
projects – to centre ‘lived lives’ rather than legal doctrine or formal legal categories.’68 This 
suggests that a function-based approach to family relationship recognition has the potential to 
be inclusive of the many different types of family relationship that are formed because the law’s 
focus would be shifted from privileging marriage towards a focus on the actual functions 
performed within family relationships.  
But, function-based approaches are not without their difficulties and some authors are 
concerned about the potential implications of introducing such a system of relationship 
recognition. There appear to be three main concerns over function-based systems. Firstly, there 
are concerns apparent from Millbank’s work about the practical difficulties relating to proving 
the existence of a relationship under function-based recognition: this directly contrasts with the 
administrative efficiency of formalised relationships. Secondly, Millbank also identifies concerns 
about the type of family relationship that may inform the development of a function-based 
system of recognition. There is a risk that function-based systems can be overly exclusive if they 
are informed by a particular vision of family relationships. Thirdly, other commentators are 
concerned that a function-based system may impose unwanted rights and responsibilities onto 
relationships that people have not chosen, and they believe that formalised relationships are 
better placed to respect people’s relationship choices. It will be shown that the first two 
difficulties identified are more significant than the third. 
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2.3.2.1 Practical difficulties: the uncertainty of function-based recognition 
Millbank, writing in an article about ‘lesbian and gay intra-family disputes’ found that 
while function-based recognition has the potential to be used in an ‘egalitarian, flexible and 
adaptive’ way, and ‘should work to resolve intra-lesbian and donor versus mother disputes, the 
case law demonstrates that it has not done so.’69 Millbank found that proving the existence of a 
relationship under a function-based approach can be onerous because it can take many years of 
litigation before a claim will be successful70 and it can be especially difficult to ascertain the 
nature of a relationship retrospectively, which suggests that function-based systems can be 
uncertain. Millbank explains that when a relationship breaks down, there is no longer a ‘united 
– functioning – functional family’ unit for the court to look at, and instead ‘the court is 
confronted with conflicted – dysfunctional – individuals with contradictory accounts of who 
their family is and was.’71 Functional family arguments were misused by birth mothers who 
would often claim that the co-mother may have functioned as a parent in the past, but following 
relationship breakdown, the co-mother had ‘ceased’ being a parent. Millbank found that it was 
a time-consuming and challenging task for the co-mother to establish her role as a parent 
following relationship breakdown.72  
The uncertainty and difficulties of proof identified by Millbank as being characteristic of 
function-based recognition stand in sharp contrast with the administrative efficiency of 
formalised relationships. As discussed above, the ‘legal certainty’ provided by civil partnerships, 
because partners had to opt-in for legal recognition, was seen as a benefit of introducing this 
new model of formalised relationship by the then government.73 The potential uncertainty and 
difficulty with establishing the existence of a relationship under function-based systems is 
something that needs to be considered carefully in the context of reforms of the current 
framework of relationship recognition to determine the extent to which these are issues in 
practice and whether there are steps that can be taken to either overcome or alleviate them. 
2.3.2.2 Difficulties of principle: the ideology of families 
The second difficulty with function-based recognition, which is reminiscent of Herring’s 
concerns about the risks of identifying the functions of family law discussed above, is the 
continuing influence of ideology about traditional families. Millbank, again in her work on 
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lesbian and gay intra-family disputes, found that where a child is conceived with a known sperm 
donor, in many instances the sperm donor, rather than the co-mother, will be recognised as ‘the 
child’s other parent’.74 This shows how the ‘ideological power of genetic connection’ can take 
precedence over a functional family relationship: due to the perceived need of a child for a 
father, the functioning same-sex headed family is ‘invisible’ because the ‘addition of a male 
parent is not seen to take away anything from the family… it only adds to it’.75 Similarly, writing 
elsewhere, Millbank argued that function-based systems modelled on marriage can perpetuate 
‘heterosexist model[s] of relationships which may not be appropriate’ because they ‘may not 
reflect the lived experience of couples in same sex relationships.’76 A function-based system of 
recognition that draws on heterosexist assumptions about the nature of relationships will fail to 
legally recognise relationships that do not conform to these assumptions. 
Milbank’s findings are important for the thesis because they suggest there is a danger that 
function-based recognition can be used to prioritise or privilege only a particular vision of family 
relationships that do not correspond with the complex reality of the variety of relationship types 
that make up the family we live with. Millbank’s work suggests that determining which family 
relationships are included, and importantly, which are excluded, from function-based 
recognition is a challenging task. One of the difficulties identified with the current framework of 
relationship recognition,77 is that the focus on a particular relationship type only is too exclusive 
and ignores many other family relationships. Millbank’s findings suggest that function-based 
recognition can be used in an exclusive way if traditional ideas about who is family continue to 
dominate.78 This suggests that function-based systems run the risk of being just as exclusive as 
the current form-based system and could exclude many significant family relationships, and so 
definitional issues are something that need to be considered for any reforms. 
This all hints at another difficulty: function-based recognition can also be too inclusive if 
the parameters of recognition are defined too broadly, a problem that is unlikely to apply for 
formalised relationships where only those relationships that are registered are legally 
recognised. For example, if caregiving were to be the recognised function, the law may wish to 
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recognise a relationship of care between an elderly parent and their adult child, but may not 
wish to recognise the relationship between an individual who as an act of kindness offers 
assistance to a neighbour. The former relationship would be considered as family by most, 
whereas the neighbour relationship would not,79 and legal recognition of the neighbour 
relationship runs the risk of being either useless or intrusive. There is something special about 
family relationships that differentiates them from non-family relationships and it is this context, 
the special family relationship, that gives meaning to the functions that are performed. As Smart 
has suggested, it is the motivation behind the performance of a function that makes it 
meaningful: everyday acts are meaningful in a family context because they are performed with 
love.80 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim assert that it is impossible to define what ‘love’ means today,81 
which suggests it is equally impossible to legislate for it. The challenge for a function-based 
system is that the parameters of recognition need to be drawn in such a way that not all 
relationships that perform a particular function could be legally recognised, but also that the 
parameters are not so narrowly drawn that any function-based reforms would be as exclusive 
as the current form-based approach that it would supplement or replace. These difficulties of 
definition under function-based recognition are important in relation to the identified functions 
of family law: the relationships excluded from recognition will not benefit from the protective 
or symbolic functions of the law and so definitional issues are a potential problem for function-
based recognition. 
2.3.2.3 ‘Imposing’ rights and responsibilities? 
The third difficulty with function-based recognition,82 is that some commentators feel that 
function-based systems impose unwanted rights and responsibilities onto relationships, 
whereas formalised relationships respect autonomy and choice because people must take steps 
to formalise and so could be said to accept the legal consequences of that choice. Choice and 
autonomy are powerful concepts that are difficult to argue against.83 Moreover, this focus on 
autonomy and choice is reminiscent of modern family values that often entail an expectation 
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that all family members are autonomous and equal and are in a position to negotiate the terms 
of their relationships.84 
But, it is argued here that the notion that formalised relationships respect choice and 
autonomy, whilst function-based systems do not, is too simplistic because it makes incorrect 
assumptions about the variable factors behind relationship practices, and does not question the 
meaning of autonomy or consider the complex reality of the idea of ‘choice’. While the idea of 
autonomy is powerful, Fineman has explained that autonomy is a myth because we are all 
dependent at some point in our lives,85 and that everyone is vulnerable because vulnerability is 
an inherent part of the human condition.86 Bailey-Harris has argued that ‘party autonomy 
arguments assume freedom of choice and informed choice, an assumption which is by no means 
universally justified in the formation of family relationships.’87 Chapter one explained that some 
people stay in unhappy relationships because of concerns over money or children, providing 
examples of external constraints that effect relationship practices.88 The idea of ‘choice’ is a 
complex one, as Fineman sums up,  
Choices are made in social relations that reflect long-standing cultural and social 
arrangements and dominant ideologies about gender and gender roles… When individuals 
act according to the scripts culturally crafted for these roles, consistent with prevailing 
ideology and institutional arrangements, we may say that they have chosen their own 
path. Choice is problematic in this regard. Ideology and beliefs limit and shape what are 
perceived as available and viable options for all individuals in society.89    
There are many factors at play regarding any individual’s relationship ‘choices’, including the 
powerful ideas of the traditional and modern family myths,90 and the extent to which people 
make ‘free’ and ‘informed’ choices is open to debate. 
Barlow and Duncan explain that the Labour Government in their 1998 Green Paper, 
‘Supporting Families’, made a ‘rationality mistake’ in their promotion of marriage as the 
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preferred family type. The rationality mistake refers to the incorrect and simplistic assumptions 
made by the government about how people make relationship decisions that can lead to 
legislation being ‘inefficient or even oppressive’.91 These mistaken assumptions lead the 
government to legislate for the ‘rational legal subject’ and make the assumption that, 
…people take individualistic, cost–benefit type decisions about how to maximize their own 
personal gain. Change the financial structure of costs and benefits, and the legal structure 
of rights and duties, in the appropriate way and people will modify their social behaviour 
in the desired direction. Alternatively, people may make suboptimal decisions where they 
lack information about this cost–benefit structure. In this case, simply providing better 
information, or educating people so that they can access it and act upon it more 
effectively, will have the desired social effects.92 
The ‘rational legal subject’ will understand that the legal recognition of partners in cohabiting 
relationships is inferior to that of spouses, and so cohabitants (and lone mothers) will realise 
that the only rational course of action is to marry. Alternatively, as pointed out by Barlow and 
Smithson, another legally rational option for cohabitants is to make their own legal 
arrangements, for example about ownership in the family home and making wills to protect 
themselves.93 
But, real people base their relationship choices on more complex reasoning than the 
‘rational legal subject’. Barlow and Duncan found that there are several reasons at play behind 
cohabitants’ relationship practices, including the view that marrying would not make their 
relationships any stronger and that while marriage is viewed as symbolically significant, ‘in terms 
of everyday moral adequacy few respondents saw marriage as a superior partnering or 
parenting form.’94 Additionally, they found that many people believe in the ‘common law 
marriage myth’ and so operate under the false assumption that they are already treated as if 
they are married.95 Barlow and Duncan conclude that people make relationship decisions,  
…with reference to moral and socially negotiated views about what behaviour is accepted 
or expected as right and proper and this negotiation, and the views  that result, varies in 
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particular social contexts. Thus people make decisions in a different and arguably more 
sophisticated way, giving different results to those anticipated by the purposive policy-
makers using conventional economic and legal models’.96  
Other researchers have also found that many factors influence a person’s relationship choices. 
Barlow and James,97 and Hibbs and others,98 show that decisions whether to marry are not 
usually made based on an awareness of the legal consequences of marriage. Eekelaar and 
Maclean make similar observations, finding that people have varied reasons for marrying 
ranging from a desire to comply with convention, such as following religious teachings or 
parental wishes, or a symbolic desire to show the commitment the partners have towards each 
other publicly. Only in a minority of cases did people marry for pragmatic reasons, such as to 
take advantage of immigration rules.99 This suggests that the notion of ‘choosing’ marriage is 
not straightforward because people take into account multiple factors, including external 
pressures, such as from family members, which may make marriage feel like the only acceptable 
relationship ‘choice’ for some.  
Placing all this in the context of an enquiry about the appropriateness of different 
recognition frameworks, it seems that Millbank’s concerns about the practical difficulties 
relating to function-based recognition, and the possibility of prioritising only a particular vision 
of family relationships and thus making recognition too exclusive, are important considerations 
to bear in mind when developing and introducing proposals for function-based recognition 
reforms. The concerns identified by other commentators about function-based recognition 
failing to protect individual autonomy and choice are of limited significance in so far as notions 
of autonomy and choice are complex, and the argument that form-based systems respect choice 
and autonomy is too simplistic. 
2.3.3 How might function work in practice? 
To begin to test out the difficulties with function-based recognition as identified in the 
existing literature, and to get an idea of how function-based recognition may work in practice, 
this section will look at some suggestions for function-based reforms from existing literature. It 
should be remembered that the aim of many of the works discussed here is to explain why 
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function-based recognition should be introduced, rather than to create blueprints for reform.100 
Suggestions for reform have been categorised into two groups, referred to here as ‘moderate’ 
and ‘radical’ function-based recognition. The categorisation is made to denote the relationship 
type that is the authors’ focus. Supporters of a moderate function-based reform focus on the 
most marriage-like of relationships, the unmarried cohabiting couple, while supporters of a 
radical reform call for a more dramatic change in relationship recognition and focus on the 
performance of a particular function, such as caregiving. The moderate function-based reforms 
remain exclusive in terms of relationship type, and so are limited in the extent they are able to 
remedy the exclusivity of the current framework of relationship recognition, while a radical 
function-based reform is potentially more inclusive because it looks at a more diverse range of 
relationship types. 
2.3.3.1 Moderate function-based recognition 
Glennon has suggested that rather than continue with the current form-based approach, 
which privileges the ‘marital partnership’ with financial remedies provision on relationship 
breakdown, family law should shift its focus onto the ‘parental partnership’. Glennon argues 
that it is the function of caring for a child that leads to economic vulnerabilities for the primary 
caregiver, and not the formal nature of the relationship, and so both married and unmarried 
parents should be treated in the same way by law,101  
Collapsing relationship categories, at a policy level, would create the discursive 
environment to consider these issues in a value-neutral way. As an approach it would lay 
the foundations for conventional distinctions between married and unmarried 
relationships to be superseded by functional indicators, thus allowing the factual reasons 
for relationship obligations to emerge. On this model, the fact of marriage would become 
little more than ‘one of the circumstances of the case’ and the functions of individual 
relationships would take precedence over their form.102 
The ‘collapsing’ of ‘relationship categories’ has the potential to allow a principled discussion to 
take place that would consider the package of legal consequences that should attach to a 
relationship by reference to the functions performed by that relationship, rather than by 
reference to relationship type. This suggests that prior to any reform, consideration needs to be 
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given to why some relationships are legally recognised while others are not. It appears that for 
Glennon, the protective function of family law justifies reforming the current relationship 
recognition framework, because having a child leads to economic difficulties for the primary 
caregiver whether they are married or otherwise. 
Similarly, Barlow, Duncan, James and Park support a similar reform but for a wider 
category of relationships. They support the introduction of a moderate function-based reform 
that would allow for the legal recognition of unmarried cohabiting couples alongside form-based 
recognition of married relationships. Their argument as to why this is necessary is essentially 
that unmarried cohabitants’ and married couples’ relationships function in a similar way and 
that relationship generated (economic) disadvantage can occur in both types of relationship and 
so they both require the same legal response. They argue that we are witnessing a ‘functional 
convergence’ between married and informal cohabitation, with unmarried cohabitation taking 
on some of the traditional functions of marriage such as ‘providing companionship, emotional 
support, sexual intimacy, financial interdependence and a site for homemaking and parenting’. 
Marriage has also evolved to be more akin to unmarried cohabitation, becoming an ‘increasingly 
negotiated partnership, not necessarily involving financial dependency, which may be 
terminated at will.’ Due to this functional convergence, they argue it is time for ‘legal policy 
makers’ to provide a ‘rationale for’ the ‘protection and privilege’ of marriage.103 They ask, is 
marriage privileged today because of the ‘form’ of the relationship, as a ‘state endorsed 
contractual-arrangement embodying a public commitment’? Or is it because of the ‘functions 
and effects of marriage’, 
…namely that is it a joint enterprise of sexual intimacy, companionship, emotional and 
financial support, homemaking, child bearing and child rearing, which is essential to 
society as a whole but which distorts the bargaining power, needs and resources of the 
individual parties who therefore should be legally protected?104 
For these authors, a form-based approach has the ‘fundamental problem of leaving large 
numbers of cohabitants unprotected by family law from the acknowledged risks of the functions 
and effects of family life’, because couples must opt-in, or register, to benefit under a form-
based system. They argue that form-based systems ‘do nothing to prevent exploitation in the 
situation where one partner refuses to marry or register’ the relationship.105 Barlow and others 
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note that this approach is ‘paternalistic’,106 but, because ‘the likely financial detriment – which 
we know is unequally borne in family relationships – cannot be accurately predicted in advance’, 
legal remedies protecting the vulnerable partner when things go wrong are necessary.107 Barlow 
and others suggest that a function-based system giving unmarried cohabiting couples the same 
rights as married couples on relationship breakdown and on death should be introduced into 
the law of England and Wales on the basis that this would better protect vulnerable cohabitants 
when the cohabitation relationship ends.108 Like Glennon, Barlow and others also feel that the 
protective function of family law is a primary concern.  
Barlow and others suggest that ‘cohabitants’ would only be recognised when the 
relationship was of a certain duration, most likely 2 years, or that there was a child of the 
relationship.109 Whether any additional criteria, such as sexual intimacy and emotional and 
financial support, would need to be proven to demonstrate that the relationship was 
functionally similar to a marriage is not made clear by the authors. It may be important to draw 
narrower parameters on a function-based approach than merely recognising a relationship 
between any two people who have cohabited for a certain period of time, because this could be 
overly inclusive and defeat the aim of protecting the economically vulnerable partner who is in 
the same position as the economically vulnerable spouse. 
 Barlow and others argue that cohabitants ought to be given a ‘formal status’, so that, 
consistently with the findings of chapter one about the increasing number of cohabitants, the 
increasing acceptability of cohabitation as a relationship choice and the prevalence of the 
common law marriage myth,110 ‘family law would be better aligned with both people’s 
expectations and their social practice.’111 Barlow and others argue that the objective of ensuring 
that the law corresponds with expectation and practice cannot be achieved ‘if a legal status 
providing similar but inferior family law regulation for cohabitants was introduced’.112 This 
suggests that a legal status can be generated by a function-based system in the same way as 
under the current framework by treating a relationship as a distinct category in law. But, it is 
unclear whether a social status already attaches to cohabiting relationships because of social 
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attitudes and practices towards cohabitation, or whether a social status akin to that of marriage 
would automatically follow from a legal status.  
In response to concerns that function-based recognition does not respect choice or 
autonomy, Barlow and others propose that there should be an opt-out provision allowing 
couples who do not want to be treated as if they were married to opt-out of legal recognition. 
The opt-out provision should include ‘some form of safety-net provision whereby children’s 
interests are safeguarded and both partners can obtain independent legal advice’.113 Barlow and 
others state that an opt-out provision ‘would minimise oppression of those who wish to remain 
legally uncommitted’ because they could avoid legal consequences that they do not wish to 
attach to their relationships. But, an opt-out provision is only effective in protecting choice and 
autonomy when people are aware of the legal consequences of their relationships and go ahead 
and take the practical step of creating an opt-out agreement.114  
These moderate function-based suggestions do not go far enough. The moderate 
proposals do little in response to the increasing diversity of family relationships and would only 
recognise those relationships between parents or those that are marriage-like. Barlow and 
others, for example, base their argument for similar treatment of married and unmarried 
cohabitants on the fact that these different relationships perform similar functions, such as 
‘companionship’ and ‘emotional and financial support’,115 and that the relationship should be 
legally recognised to protect the economically vulnerable partner on relationship breakdown. 
As suggested in chapter one, these functions are also performed in other types of relationships, 
such as friendships, and are just as valuable in those contexts for many people.116 Unless there 
is a justification for privileging only marriage-like relationships in law and ignoring other 
relationships, there is no reason to suppose that function-based systems must be limited to 
parents or unmarried cohabiting couples. 
2.3.3.2 Radical function-based recognition 
While Glennon supports equating the position of married and unmarried parents and 
Barlow and others advocate the same treatment for married couples and unmarried cohabitants 
on relationship breakdown, Fineman is one commentator who goes further and looks beyond 
marriage and unmarried cohabitants. Fineman believes that marriage should be abolished for 
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all legal purposes, because marriage should not ‘be the privileged mechanism whereby the state 
distributes certain social goods.’117 The law needs to respond to the changing ways in which we 
live and accept that ‘our expectations and aspirations for our families cannot be undone’. In line 
with Morgan’s family practices approach,118 Fineman argues that the law should be focussing on 
‘families as practising units’119 and the current ‘social and economic subsidies and privilege that 
marriage… receives’ would be transferred ‘to a new family core connection – that of caretaker-
dependent’.120 This is a function-based approach, with the function of caregiving acting as a 
trigger for legal recognition, and is reminiscent of the caring and supportive functions which 
some commentators identified as being characteristics of ‘families of choice’.121 
The rationale behind this move towards caregiving rather than sexual relationships as the 
focus of family law is that it would reflect the value of care work to society. Fineman explains 
that the historical treatment of the family as a private entity, free from the market and the state, 
has led to dependency being treated as a private family matter.122 Society however, reaps the 
benefits of this ‘essential and society-preserving’ care work but carries none of the burdens, 
because it is the family’s responsibility to undertake this essential work.123 Fineman explains that 
dependency is part of being human: we are all inevitably dependant due to age, illness or 
disability124 and are sometimes derivatively dependent when we care for others, and so are 
dependent on resources to undertake that care.125 This focus on lived family practices, focussing 
specifically on caregiving functions, appears to be a principled basis for reform because, as 
chapter one showed, often what we value most about family are the functions they perform, 
and caring and supportive functions are often at the centre of our family practices.  
Fineman’s caretaker-dependant dyad would transform relationship recognition because 
it would abolish marriage whilst focussing on care. But, the radical potential of the reform is 
limited by the fact the caretaker-dependant relationship is a dyadic relationship, most likely to 
be found between a parent and a dependent child, or otherwise between adults where one 
‘family member is incapable of caring for her- or himself.’126 This is not a purely functional 
approach because it continues to be limited by reference to relationship type in the sense that 
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only particular relationships will be recognised and so will limit the number of relationship that 
may be legally recognised under this approach. Additionally, Fineman’s idea that after abolishing 
legal marriage there would continue to be ‘protection for the economically weaker party’, 
because, for example, ‘default’ rules of equity, such as unjust enrichment and constructive trusts 
could offer a remedy where a cohabitant has contributed to the ‘accumulated wealth’ of their 
partner,127 can be criticised. As chapter six will explain, it is debatable whether trusts and 
property law can deal effectively and appropriately with disputes between family members.128  
Since suggesting the caretaker-dependant dyad as the new core family connection, 
Fineman has developed the vulnerability thesis. Essentially, Fineman argues that rather than 
being autonomous, we are all vulnerable because vulnerability is ‘a universal, inevitable, 
enduring aspect of the human condition’.129 Recognising that all humans are inherently 
vulnerable means that ‘politics, ethics and law’ need to ‘be fashioned around a complete, 
comprehensive vision of the human experience if they are to meet the needs of real-life 
subjects’.130 This means that law should centre on the vulnerable subject and not the 
autonomous liberal subject, because the latter is assumed to be self-sufficient, independent and 
always able to make rational choices.131 The vulnerability analysis challenges assumptions and 
questions why some people are privileged whilst others are left behind.132 Fineman’s concept of 
vulnerability is useful in that it reinforces the ideas of Barlow and Duncan that the law is making 
a ‘rationality mistake’ because of the incorrect assumptions made about the reasons behind 
people’s relationship practices, and additionally it challenges the notion that ‘autonomy’ needs 
protecting, because we are all vulnerable. The vulnerability analysis is not focussed specifically 
on relationship recognition however and so in that sense its usefulness for the thesis is limited.133 
Polikoff is another commentator whose work could be seen as adopting a radical function-
based approach, although in a different way to that advocated by Fineman. For Polikoff, laws 
that continue to treat married couples differently from everyone else must be re-evaluated 
because they are based in historical ideas of ensuring the continued gendered roles of husband 
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130 ibid 10. 
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132 ibid 15-9. 
133 The vulnerability thesis has been subject to criticism. For example, see C Bendall ‘Some are more ‘Equal’ 
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and wife, which no longer have a place in law.134 So, if the laws no longer serve their original 
purpose, they should be reconsidered. This is reminiscent of Glennon’s argument that there is a 
need to collapse relationship categories in order to have a principled discussion about the 
purpose of relationship recognition.135 For Polikoff, ‘a legal system in a pluralistic society that 
values all families should meld as closely as possible the purposes of a law with the relationships 
that law covers.’136 Additionally, moving towards function-based recognition rather than 
focussing on formalised relationships is important for Polikoff because she believes that the law 
should be ‘extending benefits’ to family relationships where they really are supporting each 
other, regardless of whether there is a legal duty to support.137 Polikoff argues that the 
administrative efficiency of formalised relationships like marriage is not a sufficient reason to 
ignore the rest of the population.138 She explains that ‘families’ in all their various ‘forms’ are 
significant,139 
Adults build relationships for purposes other than childrearing. Whether married or 
unmarried, sexual or platonic, connected through biology, adoption, extended family or 
choice, adults create relationships that contribute to their health, happiness, well-being, 
identity and security. A society that cares about the welfare of its people will make laws 
that value and support those relationships. Laws must also justly address the 
consequences of these relationships when they end through death or dissolution.140 
Polikoff proposes what she has entitled the ‘valuing all families’ approach. Unlike 
Fineman, Polikoff would not abolish marriage, and similarly to Barlow and others, Polikoff’s 
approach embraces both form-based and function-based approaches of relationship 
recognition. There would still be a legal status of marriage, although ‘marriage’ would be re-
named as ‘civil partnership’ to avoid ‘outmoded and undesirable meanings’,141 and would 
include both same- and opposite-sex couples. Specific legal consequences would attach to all 
civil partnerships to ‘[facilitate] straightforward treatment’,142 although some distinctions could 
be made depending on whether or not the couple had children.143 Additionally, there would be 
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a registration system of ‘designated family relationships’, whereby it would be possible to 
publicly declare that a relationship between two people should be considered a family 
relationship.144 This would be available for unmarried people so that they could nominate a 
person to act on their behalf were they incapable of acting for themselves in areas such as 
‘healthcare and disposition-of-remains decisions’.145 For all other situations, function-based 
recognition would apply and a relationship would only be legally recognised when that particular 
relationship would benefit from a particular legal provision. For example, ‘a law designed to 
account for economic and emotional interdependence would automatically include those who 
had lived together interdependently for a certain period.’146 Polikoff does not give an example 
of such a law, and importantly does not define ‘interdependency’, which would be necessary to 
help figure out how a decision would be made to determine whether a relationship was 
‘interdependent’. The value of Polikoff’s suggestion for reform lies in the way it advocates an 
inclusive system of relationship recognition which is principled because it attempts to match up 
the purpose of the law with the functions performed by a relationship. Her proposal shows that, 
theoretically at least, a combination of form-based and function-based approaches may work 
well to respond to the diverse family relationships that are formed today. 
2.4 Conclusion: the thesis contribution 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the differences and similarities between form-based 
and function-based approaches towards the legal recognition of adult relationships by 
comparing the English and Welsh approach with that in use in Australia. The remainder of the 
thesis begins by accepting the arguments presented in chapter one, i.e. that the current form-
based system in England and Wales does not correspond well with the way relationships are 
formed in contemporary society. Retaining the status quo that privileges married couples (and 
civil partners) above all other types of relationship is difficult to justify on the basis that ‘family’ 
is not synonymous with marriage (and civil partnership), and that ‘family’ is a term that can 
encompass many different types of relationship. The thesis also accepts that while the functions 
of family law are open to debate, there is consensus that family law has both a protective and a 
symbolic function, and so the potential of both form-based and function-based recognition to 
perform these functions will also be analysed. 
In light of this, the thesis will test the findings of this chapter relating to the theoretical 
similarities and differences between form-based and function-based approaches to determine 
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whether they are of practical concern. The first research question considered is how the 
theoretical similarities and differences between form-based and function-based approaches to 
relationship recognition play out in practice. This chapter has suggested that form- and function- 
can have similar effects, but that they are distinct in some ways. The sometimes overlapping 
effects of form-based, or formalised relationships, and function-based approaches are 
illustrated by the following figure: 
Figure 1 
 
The literature suggests that it is possible for both approaches to respect choice and 
autonomy because form-based recognition requires parties to opt-in to gain legal recognition, 
and function-based recognition can incorporate an opt-out option. But, it has also been shown 
that ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’ are complex concepts, and the efficacy of form-based and function-
based recognition to respect autonomy and choice is dependent on a person having knowledge 
of the legal consequences of their relationship choices.  Another similarity is that both systems 
appear to generate a status: the legal and social status of marriage is well-established, and 
Barlow and others’ work suggests that a function-based approach can generate a legal status, 
although it is unclear if a social status automatically flows from the creation of a new legal status. 
It also appears that both form- and function-based systems are similar in that they are both 
limited by reference to relationship type, and that both systems are flexible enough to provide 
legal recognition of different types of family relationship. 
The literature also suggests, however, that there are distinctions between form-based and 
function-based frameworks of relationship recognition. It seems that function-based 
recognition may be best placed to protect family members and fulfil family law’s protective 
function because there is no need to opt-in as there is with form-based recognition. But 
function-based systems are not unproblematic. The current form-based system has the 
advantage of being administratively efficient because there is an official record of the start (and 
end) date of a formalised relationship. This contrasts with Millbank’s findings that function-
Form Function
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based systems can be onerous because litigation to determine the existence of a relationship 
can be both time-consuming and challenging.  
The interaction between form- and function-based approaches is complex, especially 
considering that it has been argued that ‘form’ has two distinct meanings (‘formalised 
relationship’ and ‘relationship type’). Figure 2 illustrates the element of circularity of discussion 
about ‘form’-based and function-based approaches: 
Figure 2 
 
The exclusivity of the current form-based approach leads us to consider whether a function-
based approach would better respond to family diversity. But, an analysis of some function-
based approaches from the literature suggests that they continue to rely on a reference to 
relationship ‘form’, in the second sense of relationship type, to determine which relationships 
are included and excluded. In this way, function-based recognition leads back to a version of 
form-based recognition based on recognising some relationship types and not others. Another 
element of circularity lies in considering the benefits and difficulties of both mechanisms of 
relationship recognition. The administrative efficiency of form-based systems is attractive 
because of its simplicity and convenience, but to benefit under such a system a person must 
opt-in; function-based systems do not require opting-in, and so appear best placed to fulfil 
family law’s protective function. But function-based recognition appears to be more uncertain 
than form-based systems because the nature of the relationship will need to be established 
before a relationship can be legally recognised. In this way, a difficulty with one approach leads 
to a benefit of the other and so on.   
The second research question explored in the thesis is a consideration of what factors 
have supported and constrained the development of form-based and function-based 
approaches to relationship recognition. The discussion in this chapter has already hinted at some 
such factors. For example, the administrative efficiency and respect for choice offered by form-
based systems were reasons given by the then government in support of introducing civil 
FUNCTION 
FORM 
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partnerships,147 and could be viewed as factors that constrain the development of function-
based systems because they are not considered to share these benefits. It was also suggested 
that the symbolic function of family law has supported the development of some form-based 
frameworks, such as by creating civil partnership and introducing same-sex marriage. 
Additionally, the literature advocating function-based reforms often refers to the need to 
protect the vulnerable partner within a relationship. For example, Barlow and others 
emphasised that the functional similarities between married and unmarried couples means that 
the same relationship generated need arises on the breakdown of both types of relationship, 
and so partners in informal relationships should also be protected by the law.148 The value of 
care to society has also been advanced as rationales to support the introduction of radical 
function-based reforms by Fineman. The thesis will question how influential these factors have 
been in the development of form-based and function-based recognition as well as exploring 
whether there are any other influential factors that have also proved significant in practice. 
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Chapter 3 – Marriage: the “traditional” approach to relationship recognition 
This chapter draws on legislation, case law and Hansard debates to explore the concept 
of marriage, by discussing its meaning in legal and social terms. The chapter will be structured 
around the three elements of Barker’s ‘marriage model’: the legal structure, the legal 
consequences and the ideology of marriage. The discussion will show that marriage, as a form-
based system of relationship recognition, is inherently flexible, because both the legal structure 
and the legal consequences of marriage are adaptable when there is social and political will for 
change. But, it will be argued that this inherent flexibility is limited by the powerful marriage 
ideology which informs ideas of what marriage is expected to be and thereby shapes the 
development of the legal structure of marriage. The concluding section will suggest that, while 
inconsistencies between elements of the legal structure of marriage and the accompanying 
ideology may be unproblematic for the administratively efficient formalised relationship of 
marriage, they pose difficulties for the development of other models of relationship recognition. 
3.1 The concept of the ‘marriage model’  
Marriage is more than a contract or a legal arrangement because marriage has both a 
legal and a social status,1 and its significance varies from one person to the next.2 As Fineman 
explains, 
Marriage, to those involved in one, can mean a legal tie, a symbol of commitment, a 
privileged sexual affiliation, a relationship of hierarchy and subordination, a means of self-
fulfillment, a social construct, a cultural phenomenon, a religious mandate, an economic 
relationship, the preferred unit for reproduction, a way to ensure against poverty and 
dependence on the state, a way out of the birth family, the realization of a romantic ideal, 
a natural or divine connection, a commitment to traditional notions of morality, a desired 
status that communicates one’s sexual desirability to the world, or a purely contractual 
relationship in which each term is based on bargaining. Of course, this is not an exhaustive 
list…3 
Due to the varied meanings of marriage, this chapter will draw on Barker’s ‘marriage 
model’ framework, because it allows for discussion of marriage as an idea and a social status, as 
well as a legal arrangement. Barker uses the marriage model ‘to recognize that marriage is much 
                                                          
1 For discussion of the status of marriage, see Chapter 2, 2.2.1.3. 
2 For discussion of the negative connotations of marriage for some, and their reasons for preferring civil 
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3 M Fineman The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New Press, 2004), 99. 
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more of an ideology than a fixed definition’ and ‘to highlight the ways in which this ideology may 
be extended to forms of relationship that are not called marriage, such as… civil partnerships.’4 
For Barker, three elements make up the marriage model, and although these elements are 
connected and overlapping, dealing with them separately helps identify the ‘key features of 
marriage’.5 The first element is the ‘legal structure,’ which refers to the ‘entry and exit 
requirements’, or, ‘in other words, who may marry and dissolve a marriage, under what 
circumstances and according to what formalities.’ Barker feels this element is particularly 
significant because ‘these rules are often regarded as integral to, even definitional of,’ marriage.6 
The second element, the ‘legal consequences’, is significant because the state decides on the 
legal consequences of marriage, not the parties, and the ‘consequences that the state chooses 
to attach to marriage may provide an indication of the type of relationship it is intended to be.’7 
The third element identified by Barker is the marriage ideology. Barker acknowledges that there 
is ‘disagreement amongst theorists on the meaning of ‘ideology’ as a term and a concept, as well 
as with regard to its role in relation to law,’8 but explains that she uses the term in a particular 
way, 
…to refer to the beliefs and discourses that underpin judicial understandings of marriage 
as natural and universal. Ideology here is the manifestation of an ‘ideal’ image of 
marriage... The ideologies of marriage would be those pronouncements that tell us about 
the marriages we live by, our collective image of what marriage ought to be. This may 
bear little relation to the actual marriages that we live with but, through its incorporation 
into what have generally been accepted as judicial definitions… what marriage ‘ought to 
be’ becomes what marriage is. In this way, ideologies of marriage form part of its 
(perceived) essence.9  
In the same way that Gillis and Diduck explain that our ideas of what family is, and should be, 
are informed by the mythical families we live by,10 Barker explains that the marriage ideology 
refers to our imagined view of what marriage should be, rather than focusing on the reality of 
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8 ibid 23, where Barker notes that, for example, T Eagleton, in Ideology: An Introduction (Verso, 1991), 28, 
31, ‘outlines six possible definitions from a “general material process of production of ideas, beliefs and 
values in social life” to deceptive or false beliefs that arise from the material structure of society as a 
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actual marriages. Just as the mythical family we live by is an integral part of the concept of 
‘family’, the marriage ideology cannot be separated from the legal structure of marriage, 
because they inform each other, and so any discussion of the concept of marriage must also 
explore the ideology. The discussion that follows is therefore structured under Barker’s three 
headings. 
3.2 The legal structure of marriage 
Upon examination, it is clear that the entry and exit requirements for marriage have 
shifted over time in a way that reveals both continuity and change in the legal structure of 
marriage and shows that marriage, as a form-based method of recognition, is inherently flexible. 
This will be demonstrated here by exploring firstly the continuity and change in the capacity 
rules of marriage, and secondly by exploring the changing divorce provisions. Although forming 
a valid marriage involves complying with particular formalities prescribed by law,11 they will not 
be discussed here because they are procedural issues that do not contribute to an understanding 
of the type of relationship the legal structure of marriage provides for. 
3.2.1 The legal structure of marriage: forming a valid marriage 
The capacity requirements for a valid marriage in both England and Wales and Australia 
can be discerned by exploring the grounds on which a marriage may be annulled. In both 
jurisdictions, a failure to comply with particular capacity requirements means that the purported 
marriage is void,12 and additionally in England and Wales, a decree of nullity may be awarded 
where the marriage is voidable.13 A marriage is void in both jurisdictions where, 
 Either party is under the minimum marriageable age;  
 If the parties are within the prohibited degrees of family relationship; or,  
 If either party is already married.  
                                                          
11 For an account of the difficulties with the present law relating to the formality requirements of 
marriage, see Law Commission Getting Married: A Scoping Paper (2015), Chapter 2. 
12 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s11; Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s23B. 
13 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12. The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) repealed the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1959 (Cth), s21(1), which contained provision for voidable marriages that included matters such as ‘that 
either party to the marriage is incapable of consummating the marriage’; or that ‘either party to the 
marriage is suffering from a venereal disease in a communicable form’; or that ‘the wife is pregnant by a 
person other than the husband’. The second reading speech introducing the Family Law Bill 1974 into the 
Australian Senate did not explain why the concept of a voidable marriage was to be removed from the 
law, only that the purpose of the reforms was to replace the previous legislation ‘with an up-to-date, 
comprehensive set of provisions’: see Senate Deb 3 April 1974, 640 (Senator Murphy, NSW Attorney 
General and Minister for Custom and Excise). 
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Additionally, a marriage will be void in Australia if either party has not given real consent. A 
marriage may be voidable in England and Wales if, 
 The marriage has not been consummated because of incapacity or wilful refusal to 
consummate (for opposite-sex couples only);14 
 Consent was not validly given; 
 The respondent was suffering from venereal disease at the time of the marriage; 
 The respondent was pregnant by some person other than the petitioner; 
 An interim gender recognition certificate has been issued to either party after the 
commencement of the marriage; 
 The respondent acquired their gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004.15 
It is only the parties to the marriage who can petition for nullity on the grounds that the marriage 
is voidable, and this must be done while both parties are alive and within particular time limits.16 
These limitations help ensure the administrative efficiency of marriage in that they attempt to 
ensure certainty about who is married to whom at any given time. 
Probert has noted that, while the grounds that make a marriage void are ‘inimical’ to the 
concept of marriage, those which make it voidable are less fundamental.17 In Re Roberts 
(Deceased),18 Walton J explained how public policy concerns have influenced the grounds of 
nullity: 
If a marriage is declared void it is declared void on social and public policy grounds which 
must of necessity take priority over anything that the parties themselves wish; but where 
a marriage is voidable the matter is left entirely in the hands of the parties, and the parties 
may not wish to take advantage of their undoubted right to have the marriage declared 
void.19  
A different significance attaches to the grounds that make a marriage void and those that make 
it voidable. The parties to the marriage can decide for themselves whether to bring a voidable 
marriage to an end, but the grounds on which a purported marriage is void are so offensive on 
                                                          
14 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12(2). 
15 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12. 
16 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s13. 
17 R Probert ‘When are we Married? Void, Non-existent and Presumed Marriages’ (2002) 22(3) Legal 
Studies 398, 403. SH Blake Law of Marriage (Barry Rose Publishers, 1982), 3-4, makes a similar point, and 
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18 [1978] 1 WLR 653. 
19 ibid 656. 
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the grounds of public policy that it must be considered invalid from its inception. The main focus 
here is on the grounds for finding a marriage void because they illustrate the legal structure of 
marriage, or the type of relationship a marriage has to be according to law. 
3.2.1.1 Dyadic relationships 
One element of continuity in the capacity requirements is that marriage in England and 
Wales and Australia continues to be limited to dyadic relationships, which is in keeping with 
dominant cultural views of marriage as a monogamous union. It is not possible to be married to 
more than one person at a time and bigamy is a crime in both the jurisdictions under 
consideration, punishable by imprisonment for up to 7 years or a fine, or both, in England and 
Wales20 or 5 years imprisonment in Australia.21 Additionally, a person can only be in one 
formalised relationship at a time, so, for example, in England and Wales it is not possible to be 
both married and in a civil partnership simultaneously.22 There may be a practical reason for this 
limitation, which is administrative efficiency: a system where only one formalised dyadic 
relationship is recognised by law is easier to administer than a system where an individual may 
be in a series of formalised relationships simultaneously, and where these relationships may be 
between two or more people.23  
3.2.1.2 Lack of consent 
Consent has always been an important element of marriage and so shows an element of 
continuity in the capacity requirements. In Australia, a lack of ‘real consent’ by one or both 
parties means that the purported marriage is void. Factors which vitiate consent are that, 
 The consent was obtained by duress or fraud;  
 Either party was mistaken as to the identity of the other or the nature of the ceremony 
performed;  
 Or that either party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the 
ceremony.24  
                                                          
20 Offences against the Person Act 1861, s57. 
21 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s94. 
22 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s11(b); see also Civil Partnership Act 2004, s80. For the Australian 
provision: see Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s23B(1)(a). Additionally, marrying in Australia automatically 
terminates a registered relationship: see for example Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s11(b); Relationships 
Act 2003 (Tas), s15(1)(b). See discussion in Chapter 4, 4.1.2.2. 
23 For further discussion on the administrative efficiency of dyadic formalised relationships in the context 
of the registered couple relationships, see Chapter 4, 4.2.1. 
24 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s23B(1)(d). 
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Prior to 1971, lack of consent made a marriage void in England and Wales,25 and after 1971 a 
marriage will be voidable if consent was given because of ‘duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind 
or otherwise’, or that either party was suffering from a mental disorder that meant they were 
incapable of consenting to marriage.26  
One of the main arguments against function-based recognition is that it fails to respect 
individual autonomy and choice because it imposes unwanted legal consequences onto 
relationships,27 and some feel that formalised relationships are preferable because they better 
respect choice and autonomy due to the fact that couples choose to formalise their relationship 
and have it legally recognised.28 In light of this, it is necessary to explore what ‘consent’ to 
marriage means to understand what couples need to know in order to consent to marriage and 
so be said to be exercising their choice and autonomy. The discussion will show that while 
consent must be freely given, valid consent does not require an individual to appreciate the legal 
consequences of marriage in either England and Wales or Australia. This serves to undermine 
the idea that formalised relationships better respect choice and autonomy than function-based 
recognition. Consent to marriage merely requires a person to have the capacity to have some 
understanding of the social meaning of marriage, and not the legal consequences. As a person 
who has limited understanding of the legal consequences of marriage will still be forming a valid 
marriage, it is difficult to see how such a person would truly be ‘choosing’ those legal 
consequences, as opposed to having those consequences ‘imposed’ on them. 
3.2.1.2a What does ‘consent’ mean? 
The underlying aim of requiring a party to consent to a marriage is to protect vulnerable 
people from being forced into marriage, and so in this way these requirements may help family 
law fulfil its protective function.29 Forced marriage cases,30 where a young or vulnerable person 
                                                          
25 This change was made following a proposal by the Law Commission. See, Law Commission Family Law: 
Report on Nullity of Marriage (No 33, 1970), [11-2], where it is explained that under the previous law, the 
non-consenting party to a marriage could subsequently choose to ratify the marriage, and, because the 
party had a choice as to whether to accept the marriage, lack of consent was better suited as a means of 
finding a marriage voidable. 
26 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s12(c) and (d). S12(d) states: ‘that at the time of the marriage either 
party, though capable of giving a valid consent, was suffering (whether continuously or intermittently) 
from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983 of such a kind or to such an 
extent as to be unfitted for marriage’. 
27 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.3. 
28 See Chapter 2, 2.2.1.2. 
29 For discussion of family law’s protective function, see Chapter 2, 2.1.1. 
30 It is possible to obtain a forced marriage prevention order under the Family Law Act 1996, s63A, and 
breach of such an order is a criminal offence under the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2014, s121. For 
discussion of the effect of criminalizing the breach of forced marriage protection orders, see R Gaffney-
Rhys ‘The Criminalisation of Forced Marriage in England and Wales: One Year On’ (2015) 45(11) Family 
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from a minority ethnic community is compelled to enter a marriage, show that individuals should 
freely consent to marriage, or in other words, that they have not entered the marriage as a result 
of duress. Whether behaviour amounts to ‘duress’ is a matter of degree however, because there 
are several factors at play when making a decision to marry.31 As Simmons and Burn explain, 
‘forced marriage exists along a continuum of coercive practices where the pressure to fulfil 
expected gendered roles may, in some cases, deprive women and men of the opportunity to 
fully and freely consent to marriage.’32 Duress is not limited to physical threats of violence in 
either jurisdiction,33 but rather involves an assessment of whether the pressure on the victim is 
such that they could not be said to be consenting. 
In Hirani v Hirani,34 when the parents of the petitioner, of Hindu Indian origin, discovered 
that she had formed a relationship with a Muslim, they arranged for her to marry another man. 
The petitioner was told that if she refused the marriage, she should ‘pack up [her] belongings’ 
and leave the family home.35 She consequently married and later petitioned for nullity. Ormrod 
J explained that the ‘crucial question… is whether the threats, pressure, or whatever it is, is such 
as to destroy the reality of consent and overbears the will of the individual.’36 Similarly in In the 
Marriage of S,37 a case where a 16 year old girl felt compelled to marry under parental 
pressure,38 Watson SJ stressed that although third parties may encourage, persuade or arrange 
a marriage, the decision of whether and who to marry is solely down to the individual.39 The 
applicant’s consent was vitiated because she acted out of love, a sense of family loyalty, religious 
commitment and she belonged to a ‘culture that demanded filial obedience’. According to 
Watson SJ,  
                                                          
Law 1378. Similarly, in Australia legislation was passed in 2013 creating two new criminal offences, 1) 
causing a person to enter into a forced marriage and 2) being party to the forced marriage when that 
party is not a victim: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s270.7b. For discussion, see F Simmons and J Burn 
‘Without Consent: Forced Marriage in Australia’ (2013) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 970. 
31 See also Berman J in Dave v Karia [2016] FamCA 414, [38]: ‘I find that whilst the parties brought to 
account in their decision to marry a range of considerations, not just in respect of their own personal 
relationship but also in respect of the concerns expressed by the husband’s family, in doing so, they acted 
no differently than many people do in terms of the decisions that they bring to bear that finally determines 
that parties will marry.’ 
32 Simmons and Burn (n30) 973. 
33 It appears that this was once the position in English and Welsh law: Szechter v Szechter [1971] P 286, 
297-8 (Simon P). 
34 (1983) 4 FLR 232. 
35 ibid 233. 
36 ibid 234. 
37 (1980) 5 Fam LR 831. 
38 ibid 833-4. 
39 ibid 837. 
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…a sense of mental oppression can be generated by causes other than fear or terror. If 
there are circumstances which taken together lead to the conclusion that because of 
oppression a particular person has not exercised a voluntary consent to marriage, that 
consent is vitiated by duress and is not real consent.40  
Consent must be ‘freely’ given, and so in this sense people can be said to be exercising their 
autonomy by choosing to form a marriage and are to be protected from being coerced into 
marriage. 
While it is clear that consent must be freely given, this does not explain what is being 
consented to. In Vervaeke v Smith,41 which involved a sham marriage,42 the House of Lords 
approved Ormrod J’s first instance comments that knowledge of the consequences of marrying, 
or even whether parties intended to ‘live together as husband and wife’, were irrelevant when 
deciding whether the parties consented. All that is necessary is that they were aware that they 
were going through a marriage ceremony, and had some understanding of the effect of the 
ceremony, 
Where a man and a woman consent to marry one another in a formal ceremony, 
conducted in accordance with the formalities required by law, knowing that it is a 
marriage ceremony, it is immaterial that they do not intend to live together as man and 
wife… it is immaterial that they intend the marriage to take effect in some limited way or 
that one or both of them may have been mistaken about or unaware of some of the 
incidents of the status which they have created. To hold otherwise would impair the effect 
of the whole system of law regulating marriages in this country, and gravely diminish the 
value of the system of registration of marriages upon which so much depends in a modern 
community.43 
This leads to consideration of what is the bare minimum a person needs to understand in 
order to consent, and the capacity cases suggest that all that is necessary is some understanding 
                                                          
40 ibid 839. This decision was followed by Foster J in Radtke v Pagano [2016] FamCA 784 (who at [40] also 
approved of Ormrod J’s decision in Hirani v Hirani (n34)); see also Nagri v Chapal [2012] FamCA 464 
(Collier J). 
41 [1983] 1 AC 145. 
42 In this case, a Belgian prostitute married a UK national to gain British nationality and a passport. The 
marriage took place in 1954, and the parties only saw each other once after the wedding to ensure the 
petitioner got her passport. In 1970, the petitioner married a wealthy Italian man who died on their 
wedding day. He owned property in England, which the petitioner believed she should inherit, and so she 
needed to prove her first marriage was invalid. She argued that she was not aware of the nature of the 
1954 proceedings and so did not consent to the marriage. 
43 Vervaeke (formerly Messina) v Smith and others (n41) 151-1 (Lord Hailsham).  
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of the social meaning of marriage. McCall J in Brown v Brown44 explained that all that is necessary 
for capacity to consent is that an individual is ‘capable of understanding the nature of the 
contract into which he was entering’.45 This involves an understanding of the effect that 
marriage will have on the individual and their intended spouse. The court was satisfied in Brown 
that the husband, who was in ill health and suffering from dementia, understood he was getting 
married, and the fact that he was marrying his de facto partner46 of 15 years was an important 
factor in coming to the conclusion that he consented because the marriage was merely 
‘regularising [the] fact’ of their long-term informal relationship. McCall J suggested that had the 
husband been marrying someone else, he may not have had capacity to consent to that 
marriage.47 Similarly, in Sheffield City Council v E48 Munby J explained that a person must 
appreciate that they are ‘taking part in a marriage ceremony’, and ‘understand the nature of the 
marriage contract’. This means that they ‘must be mentally capable of understanding the duties 
and responsibilities that normally attach to marriage.’ The contract of marriage is, according to 
Munby J, ‘a simple one’49 and involves conferring on the parties, 
…the status of husband and wife, the essence of the contract being an agreement between 
a man and a woman to live together, and to love one another as husband and wife, to the 
exclusion of all others. It creates a relationship of mutual and reciprocal obligations, 
typically involving the sharing of a common home and a common domestic life and the 
right to enjoy each other’s society, comfort and assistance.50 
These comments about what a person needs to understand to consent to marriage suggest that 
a person need not appreciate the legal consequences, but rather they need to have an 
appreciation of the social understanding of marriage. As Chisholm J noted in the Australian 
context, the law does not require a person to have a ‘detailed and specific understanding of the 
legal consequences’ of marriage, and ‘if there were such a requirement, few if any marriages 
would be valid.’51 Taken together, this goes some way to negating the concerns of 
commentators who argue against function-based recognition because it imposes legal 
                                                          
44 (1982) 8 Fam LR 1. 
45 Quoting the words of Singleton J in In Re Park [1954] P 89, 127. 
46 As will be made clear in Chapter 6, a ‘de facto’ relationship is an informal marriage-like couple 
relationship. 
47 Brown v Brown (n44) 9. 
48 [2005] Fam 326. 
49 ibid [68]. 
50 ibid [132]. See also Luton BC v B [2015] EWHC 3534 (Fam), [27-30] (Mr Justice Hayden). 
51 AK v NC [2003] FamCA 1006, [21]. 
99 
 
consequences onto relationships; consenting to marriage does not require an understanding of 
the legal effects of marrying. 
3.2.1.3 Age requirements  
A marriage between persons where one or both are under the minimum age will be void 
in both England and Wales and Australia. The minimum age requirements have been subject to 
change, which suggests there is flexibility to amend the relationship type that marriage provides 
for when social norms change. In England and Wales, it was historically possible for females to 
marry at 12 and males at 14.52 The minimum age was increased to 16 for both sexes in 192953 
because of changes to the minimum age of consent to sexual relations. Lord Buckmaster in the 
House of Lords questioned the logic of the law that a female under 16 could not consent to 
sexual intercourse, yet could consent to sex ‘in perpetuity’ if she were to marry.54 The 
government agreed that the law was illogical, and referred to the situation as ‘indefensible’.55 
Today, persons aged 16 and 17 may marry if they have parental consent or the consent of the 
court.56 Similarly, in Australia prior to 1961, the minimum age of marriage in most of the 
Australian states and territories was that prescribed by common law, 12 for females and 14 for 
males.57 This was raised to 16 for females and 18 for males in 196158 partly because ‘various 
women’s organizations’ had petitioned to get the minimum age increased.59 This was later 
increased to 18 for females in 1991,60 because the then government felt that it was 
‘discriminatory’ to differentiate between males and females.61 Today in Australia, persons aged 
                                                          
52 JH Baker An Introduction to English Legal History (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1979), 403. 
53 Marriage Act 1929. See Baker (n52) 403.  
54 HL Deb 19 February 1929, Vol 72, Col 962. 
55 HL Deb 19 February 1929, Vol 72, Col 969 (The Lord Privy Seal, The Marquess of Salisbury). Additionally, 
Lord Buckmaster also argued that other countries, such as Norway, China and Sweden had also increased 
the minimum age for marriage: HL Deb 19 February 1929, Vol 72, Col 961-3. See also AH Manchester 
Modern History of England and Wales 1750-1950 (Butterworths, 1980), 367; and S Cretney Family Law in 
the Twentieth Century: A History (Oxford University Press, 2003), 57-62. 
56 Marriage Act 1949, s3. 
57 This was not the case in Tasmania, Western Australia and South Australia. Tasmania increased the 
minimum age to 18 for males and 16 for females following the Marriage Act 1942 (Tas), s18; Western 
Australia raised the minimum age in the same way with the Marriage Act Amendment Act 1956 (WA); 
South Australia followed suit with the Marriage Act Amendment Act 1957 (SA), s4. For discussion of the 
position in Australia prior to the federal reforms, see G Barwick ‘The Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961’ 
(1962) 3 Melbourne University Law Review 277, 284-288.  
58 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s11 (as originally enacted). 
59 Australian Senate Deb 23 March 1961, 371 (Senator Gorton, Minister for the Navy). 
60 Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1991 (Cth), s12, amending s11 of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). For 
discussion of how the minimum age of marriage may fail to take into account cultural differences see P 
Parkinson ‘Multiculturalism and the Regulation of Marital Status in Australia’ in N Lowe and G Douglas 
(eds) Families across Frontiers (Kluwer Law International, 1996), 315-8. 
61 See the Sex Discrimination Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) Explanatory Memoranda, [41].  
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16 or 17 may marry with the permission of the court if the circumstances are ‘exceptional and 
unusual.’62 This shows that changing social norms will change the legal structure of marriage. 
3.2.1.4 Prohibited degrees 
In England and Wales, two people related by consanguinity cannot marry. This includes 
relationships such as those between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren and 
aunts/uncles and nieces/nephews.63 Since 1949, the parent-child relationship created by 
adoption is also within the prohibited degrees, which shows development in the prohibited 
degrees requirements.64 Marriages between some relations of affinity, or those related by 
marriage, are also prohibited,65 and these too have been changed. For example, following B v 
UK,66 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that the prohibition on a former 
daughter-in-law marrying her former father-in-law while the ex-spouses were alive was found 
to violate Article 12, the right to marry. The ECHR found that despite the government’s reasoning 
that the prohibited degrees requirements were necessary to protect the ‘integrity of the family’, 
the government’s refusal to allow a former a parent-in-law to marry their former child-in-law 
did not prevent such a relationship from forming in the first place.67 The Court also referred to 
the fact that the ban on marriages between relatives of affinity was not absolute because they 
could petition for a personal act of parliament to allow them to marry.68 This suggests that there 
was always a degree of flexibility within this essential element of marriage for those willing and 
able to petition parliament.69 
The Australian ‘prohibited relationships’ have also been subject to considerable change.70 
Historically, the prohibited relationships requirements varied between the states. South 
Australia adopted English and Welsh law provisions relating to the prohibited degrees contained 
                                                          
62 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s12. For an illustration of a case where the circumstances were ‘exceptional 
and unusual’ see Ex Parte Willis (1997) 21 Fam LR 479. 
63 Marriage Act 1949. s1 and sch 1 part 1 as amended by the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) 
Act 1986, sch 1. 
64 Cretney (n55) 56-7. It must be remembered that other relationships created via adoption, such as those 
between an adopted brother and sister, are not prohibited from marrying which suggests that there is an 
incoherent rationale behind the way in which the prohibited relationships have been drawn up. 
65 Marriage Act 1949, sch 1 part 2. 
66 (2006) 42 EHRR 11. 
67 For example, these relationships were not contrary to the criminal law: B v UK (n66) [37-8]. 
68 ibid [40].  
69 See, ibid [35]: ‘This is an exceptional and relatively costly procedure which is at the total discretion of 
the legislative body and subject to no discernable rules or precedent.’ 
70 For a history of the changes made to the prohibited relationships requirement prior to 1976 in Australia, 
see HA Finlay ‘Farewell to Affinity and the Calculus of Kinship’ (1975-7) 5(1) University of Tasmania Law 
Review 16. 
101 
 
in the Marriage Act 1835, while Tasmania71 provided that marriages within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity and affinity were void, unless in the cases of affinity the court gave 
permission for the couple to marry.72 Following federal reforms in 1959 to standardize the 
capacity requirements across Australia, marriages between relations of consanguinity and 
affinity were prohibited and any such marriages would be void,73 unless, again, in the case of 
affinity, a judge granted permission for a couple to marry.74 This was later amended in 1976,75 
and today the only ‘prohibited relationships’ are those between a person and their ancestor or 
descendant, and those between brother and sister, whether the familial link is biological or 
created through adoption.76 This shows the flexibility of marriage, where an integral element of 
the capacity requirements now looks very different in both jurisdictions. 
3.2.1.4a A sexual relationship? 
In her discussion of the marriage model, Barker suggests that there are indications in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 that marriage is a sexual relationship, and that ‘sexuality forms an 
integral part of the structure of marriage.’77 These are that a marriage between those within the 
prohibited degrees is void, and the voidable grounds relating to consummation and venereal 
disease.78 It is submitted here that while marriage is often expected to be a sexual relationship,79 
and marriage has a history of being used as a tool to control sexual behaviours,80 the law does 
not require spouses to actually have a sexual relationship and so the legal structure of marriage 
does not require a sexual relationship. A sex-less marriage that complies with the capacity 
requirements will be a valid marriage in both England and Wales and Australia, and the spouses 
themselves may wish to bring the marriage to an end via divorce (i.e. bring a valid marriage to 
an end) if this situation is unsatisfactory. Additionally, in England and Wales, the consummation 
                                                          
71 Marriage Act 1942 (Tas). 
72 Barwick (n57) 282-4. 
73 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth), s18(1)(b). 
74 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth), s20: see sch 2 of the 1959 Act for a complete list of the then 
prohibited family relationships. 
75 By the Marriage Amendment Act 1976 (Cth), s12. No reasons were given by the then Attorney General 
to explain why this change had been made in the second reading speech: see Australian House of 
Representatives Deb 3 June 1976 (Mr Ellicott) (available from 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=HANSARD80;id=hansard80%2Fhansa
rdr80%2F1976-06-03%2F0128;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1976-06-03%2F0000%22 
– last accessed 17/03/2017. 
76 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s23B(2). 
77 Barker (n4) 24 (emphasis in original). 
78 ibid 24-5. 
79 See below, 3.4, for discussion of how the ideology of marriage is shifting and that the sexual aspect of 
the relationship is now less of a concern for some. 
80 For example, the Book of Common Prayer of 1662 stated that two of the purposes of marriage were 
the procreation of children and the avoidance of fornication: see Manchester (n55) 362. 
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grounds for nullity do not apply to the marriages of same-sex couples, which suggests that the 
idea of a sexual relationship is part of the ideology of marriage rather than a requirement of the 
legal structure, and, in any case, consummation is only a one-off optional event for opposite-sex 
couples. The presence of the prohibited degrees requirements in both jurisdictions are cogent 
suggestions that marriage is expected to be a sexual relationship that results in a couple having 
children, but the fact remains that an otherwise valid marriage will not be invalidated because 
the spouses do not have a sexual relationship with each other. This is one way in which the legal 
structure of marriage does not correspond with expectations as to the nature of the relationship. 
This point will become more significant later in the thesis in light of discussion about function-
based recognition of informal couple relationships, where the court will inquire into whether 
the relationship was a sexual one.81 
3.2.1.5 Same-sex marriage 
The change in England and Wales to allow marriage between couples of the same-sex is 
especially significant because it opens up marriage to a new type of relationship that has 
historically been excluded from marriage. Support for same-sex marriage has not been 
unanimous, and some opponents stated in the parliamentary debates on the Marriage (Same 
Sex Couples) Bill 2013 that the bill would ‘change the structure of society by changing the 
definition of marriage.’82 Similarly, Sir Tony Baldry, the Second Church Estates Commissioner, 
proclaimed that same-sex marriage would ‘end the concept of marriage as it has been 
understood by society in general and by almost all faith groups in particular for recorded time’.83  
While marriage law has finally been amended to become more inclusive of family diversity 
in England and Wales, the Australian legislature took steps to ensure that marriage remains the 
exclusive preserve of opposite-sex couples in 2004 by introducing an explicit84 heterosexual 
definition of marriage into the law.85 There have been several attempts at introducing same-sex 
                                                          
81 For discussion, see Chapter 6, 6.1.2.2. 
82 HL Deb 15 July 2013, Vol 747, Col 542 (Lord Cormack). 
83 HC Deb 05 February 2013, Vol 558, Col 143. For discussion of some of the arguments against same-sex 
marriage, see below, 3.4.1. 
84 Prior to 2004, there was no express provision in Australian legislation stating that a marriage between 
a couple of the same-sex was prohibited. Rather, the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s46(1) provided that the 
marriage celebrant should use words such as ‘marriage… is the union of a man and a woman’ during the 
wedding; and the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s43(a) calls for a need to preserve and protect ‘the institution 
of marriage as a union of a man and a woman.’ For comment, see Re Kevin: Validity of Marriage of 
Transsexual [2001] FamCA 1074, [7] (Chisholm J). 
85 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s5 as amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), sch 1. S5 provides 
that marriage in Australia is ‘the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life.’ Perhaps this is best thought of as a description rather than a definition, because 
while it is only possible to be married to one person at a time, being in an informal relationship while 
married will not invalidate the marriage, and additionally divorce is available in Australia. 
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marriage in Australia at both state86 and federal87 level, but the federal government continues 
to oppose such a reform because they believe that changing the type of relationship that 
marriage provides for changes the very essence of marriage. In 2004, the then Attorney General 
justified the decision to legislate to provide a heterosexual definition of marriage on the basis 
that it was necessary ‘to take steps to reinforce the basis of’ marriage and to protect the 
institution88 due to ‘significant community concern about the possible erosion of’ marriage,89 
partly as a result of developments in other jurisdictions that were legalising same-sex marriage.90 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) attempted to provide marriage equality in 2013,91 
but their attempt was swiftly struck down by the Australian High Court.92 The High Court held 
that, in accordance with the Australian constitution, only federal law can legislate to amend 
marriage and the states and territories cannot enact legislation that is incompatible with federal 
law.93 The Court made it clear however that the federal parliament does have the power to 
amend marriage in this way94 because ‘the status of marriage… and the rights and obligations 
which attach to that status never have been, and are not now, immutable.’95 As Parkinson notes, 
the ‘real effect’ of the High Court case, whilst not taking a position in the same-sex marriage 
                                                          
86 For example, Same Sex Marriage Bill 2005 (NSW); Same Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (Tas); Marriage Equality 
Bill 2012 (SA); Same Sex Marriage Bill 2013 (NSW). 
87 Marriage Equality Amendment Bills of 2009 and 2010 (Cth); Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2012 
(Cth); Marriage Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth); Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2013 (Cth); Recognition of 
Foreign Marriages Bill 2014 (Cth); Freedom to Marry Bill 2014 (Cth); Marriage Amendment (Marriage 
Equality) Bill 2015 (Cth); Marriage Legislation Amendment Bill 2015 (Cth). 
88 This need to protect marriage was also mentioned by Senator Coonan when summing up the second 
reading debates for the government in the Senate: Australian Senate Deb 12 August 2004, 26555. 
89 See also concerns by some that same-sex marriage would lead to the recognition of polygamy, and 
arguments that same-sex marriage would deny children a mother and a father: see, for example, 
Australian Senate Deb 12 August 2004, 26522 (Senator Harradine). 
90 Australian House of Representatives Deb 24 June 2004, 3149-50 (Mr Ruddock, Attorney General). 
Others however believe that the change in other countries makes the need for allowing same-sex 
marriage in Australia all the more pressing: see Australian House of Representatives Deb 08 February 
2016, 957 (Tanya Plisbersek, Deputy Leader of the Opposition); Australian Senate Deb 12 November 2015, 
8387 (Robert Simms). 
91 Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT). 
92 P Parkinson ‘The Territory of Marriage: Constitutional Law, Marriage and Family Policy in the ACT Same 
Sex Marriage Case’ (2014) 28(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 160, 161. The ACT’s Marriage Equality 
(Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) was passed on 22nd of October 2013, with the first marriages taking place on 
the 7th of December 2013. The High Court struck down the legislation on 12th December 2013.  
93 Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55, [4]. The marriage powers are contained in 
the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth), s51(xxi) and (xxii). The Australian Capital 
Territory cannot legislate inconsistently with federal law: Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) 
Act 1988 (Cth), s28.  
94 Commonwealth v ACT (n93) [56]. 
95 ibid [16]. Prior to the High Court decision in 2013, there was considerable uncertainty in Australia as to 
whether the federal parliament, or indeed the states and territories, could legislate for same-sex 
marriage. For discussion see, K Walker ‘The Same Sex Marriage Debate in Australia’ (2007) 11(1-2) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 109, 110-121. 
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debate, ‘is to say that the definition of marriage is an issue for the politicians’, because the legal 
structure of marriage can be adapted to allow same-sex couples to marry.96 
Allowing same-sex couples to marry arguably represents a change that is more 
fundamental than any other to the legal structure of marriage. Prior to the commencement of 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 a marriage between two people of the same sex 
would have been void. This change in England and Wales, and the potential for this change in 
Australia, demonstrates that even elements that have been historically considered central to 
marriage are adaptable and may be changed if there is the political will to do so, and shows that 
marriage is a highly flexible and adaptable institution. 
3.2.2 Ending a marriage 
Introducing divorce was a major change in the legal structure of marriage. Historically it 
was felt that marriage was an indissoluble union created by God, and so could only end following 
the death of one party.97 Spouses could only obtain a judicial separation that allowed them to 
live separately, but they could not re-marry.98 Prior to the introduction of the courts’ jurisdiction 
to grant divorces,99 there was some flexibility because it was possible for those with the means 
to do so to divorce via act of parliament.100 This shows that even those elements that were once 
fundamental to marriage were fairly flexible in practice, at least for the wealthy.101 
Up until the 1970s, the development of divorce law was similar in England and Wales and 
Australia and divorce was allowed when one party was at ‘fault’ for the breakdown of the 
marriage. For example, in England and Wales the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 permitted a 
husband to obtain a divorce if he could prove his wife’s adultery, or where a wife could prove a 
husband’s adultery as well as an aggravating factor such as cruelty or desertion.102 Equal access 
                                                          
96 Parkinson ‘The Territory of Marriage’ (n92) 162. 
97 For discussion see Baker (n52) 401-2.  
98 The ecclesiastical courts could grant a divorce a mensa et thoro which was an early form of judicial 
separation: for details see Baker (n52) 404. It is still possible for the courts to award judicial separation: 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s17-8. 
99 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. 
100 Parliament began to award divorces in 1670, almost 190 years before the courts were given the 
jurisdiction to grant divorces. For an analysis of the first parliamentary divorces see R Probert ‘The Roos 
Case and Modern Family Law’ in S Gilmore, J Herring and R Probert (eds) Landmark Cases in Family Law 
(Hart Publishing, 2011).  
101 Another example of how marriage was more flexible for the wealthy is given by Shanley, where she 
suggests that only the one court was set up in London in 1857 to put divorce out of the reach of the poor: 
ML Shanley Feminism, Marriage and the Law in Victorian England: 1850-1895 (Princeton University Press, 
1989), 41-2. 
102 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, sXXVII: a wife could obtain a divorce on the grounds of the husband’s 
‘incestuous Adultery, or of Bigamy with Adultery, or of Rape, or of Sodomy or Bestiality, or of Adultery 
coupled with… Cruelty… or of Adultery coupled with Desertion, without reasonable Excuse, for Two Years 
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to divorce was granted in 1923,103 and additional grounds for divorce were introduced in 1937, 
namely cruelty, desertion for three years and incurable insanity.104 Similar legislation to the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 was passed in the Australian colonies between 1858 and 1873.105 
The content of the divorce law varied between the jurisdictions,106 and divorce was possible 
based on grounds such as adultery; habitual drunkenness; frequent conviction for crime; 
insanity; and, separation for five years.107 The federal government passed the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959 to provide uniform divorce law across Australia,108 and this Act provided no 
fewer than 14 grounds for the dissolution of marriage, including adultery; cruelty; one party 
committing ‘rape, sodomy or bestiality’; or that one party had been convicted of the attempted 
murder of the other.109  
Following reforms in the 1970s, divorce law in both jurisdictions is very different. No-fault 
divorce was introduced in Australia by the Family Law Act 1975, so as ‘to eliminate as far as 
possible the high costs, the delays and indignities experienced by so many parties to divorce 
proceedings under’ the previous fault-based procedure.110 Divorce is possible after two years of 
marriage,111 on the sole ground that the relationship has irretrievably broken down. Breakdown 
is proved if the parties have lived separately and apart for 12 months,112 which suggests that 
                                                          
or upwards’. Shanley suggests that parliamentarians were eager to preserve unequal access to divorce as 
they did not want to change the nature of the marital relationship: see Shanley (n101) 44. 
103 Matrimonial Causes Act 1923, s1. 
104 Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, s2. See also Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, s1: divorce was available 
based on the respondent’s adultery, desertion for three years, or that the respondent was of incurably 
unsound mind. Wives could also obtain divorce on the additional grounds of the husband being found 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality. 
105 See K Enderby ‘The Family Law Act: Background to the Legislation’ (1975) 1(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 10, 11-2. 
106 ibid 12. 
107 See Australian House of Representatives Deb 14 May 1959, 2233 (Garfield Barwick, Attorney General) 
for a complete table. 
108 Australian House of Representatives Deb 14 May 1959, 2222 (Garfield Barwick, Attorney General). 
109 Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth), s28. The other grounds were desertion for two years; wilful refusal 
to consummate; one party has been habitually drunk or otherwise intoxicated for two years; the husband 
has been frequently convicted of crimes or habitually left the wife without ‘reasonable means of support’; 
the other spouse has been in prison for three years and continues to be imprisoned; one spouse has failed 
to pay maintenance to the other for two years; a failure to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal 
rights; that one party is of unsound mind; or, one party has been absent for so long it was reasonable to 
presume they were dead. 
110 Australian Senate Deb 1 August 1974, 758 (Senator Murphy, Attorney General). A Senate Standing 
Committee approved of the reform to introduce no-fault divorce: Senate Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs ‘Report on the Administration of Divorce and Related Matters and the 
Family Law Bill 1974’ (Paper No 133, 1974). 
111 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s44 
112 This must be a continuous period of 12 months preceding the date of the application to divorce: Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth), s48(2). During this separation period the legislation allows for parties to resume 
cohabitation for one period of up to three months, and does not discount the period spent living 
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cohabitation, which is not necessary for a valid marriage, is nonetheless viewed as an 
expectation for spouses. The court will determine whether the relationship has broken down on 
a case by case basis113 by examining the circumstances of the marriage both before and after 
separation.114  
Contemporary divorce law in England and Wales is found in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973. Divorce is possible after one year of marriage on the sole ground that the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down,115 but, fault has not been completely removed from the provision, 
and one of five facts must be proven to satisfy the sole ground, 
 The respondent committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with 
the respondent;116 
 The respondent has behaved in a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected 
to live with the respondent; 
 The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a period of at least two years; 
 The parties have lived apart for two years and both consent to the divorce;  
 The parties have lived apart for a period of five years.117 
The Matrimonial Causes Act requires the court ‘to inquire, so far as it reasonably can, into 
the facts alleged by the petitioner and into any facts alleged by the respondent.’118 In defended 
divorce cases, the party petitioning for divorce must submit evidence to prove the fact that they 
are relying on. If the court finds that evidence to be insufficient, the court will not grant a 
                                                          
separately and apart prior to that cohabitation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s50(1). For discussion on the 
meaning of living separately and apart see: In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259, 261-2 (Evatt CJ, 
Demack and Watson JJ); In the Marriage of Falk (1977) 15 ALR 189, 194-5 (Evatt CJ, Fogarty and Bulley JJ); 
In the Marriage of Caretti (1977) 30 FLR 257 (Murray J); Price v Underwood [2008] FamCAFC 46, [42] (May, 
Boland and Ryan JJ). 
113 See In the Marriage of Pavey (n112) 263 ((Evatt CJ, Demack and Watson JJ) agreeing with the comments 
of Watson J in Todd’s Case (No 2) (1976) 9 ALR 401, 403. See also In the Marriage of Falk (n112) 199 (Evatt 
CJ, Fogarty and Bulley JJ). 
114 In the Marriage of Pavey (n112) 265-6 (Evatt CJ, Demack and Watson JJ). 
115 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(1). 
116 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(6), as added by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, sch 4, Part 
3: ‘Only conduct between the respondent and a person of the opposite sex may constitute adultery for 
the purposes of this section.’ For a definition of adultery see Dennis v Dennis and Spillett [1953] P 153, 
160 (Singleton J): ‘I do not think that it can be said that adultery is proved unless there be some 
penetration. It is not necessary that the complete act of sexual intercourse should take place’; and 163 
(Hodson LJ): ‘…there must at least be partial penetration for the act of adultery to be proved… A man may 
commit adultery in his heart, but what the courts are dealing with is the physical act which has to be 
proved in order that a divorce be obtained… I think that the word has not been extended to include such 
a form of what may be described as lesser sexual gratification’. 
117 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(2). 
118 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(3). 
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divorce, even where it is apparent to the court that this means that an unhappy situation will 
subsist.119 
Since the extension of the special procedure to all undefended divorces in 1977120 it is not 
important in practical terms which fact is pleaded because divorces are rarely defended.121 This 
approach has been subject to criticism.122 For example, in the recent case of Owens v Owens,123 
involving a husband who successfully defended a divorce petition, Sir James Munby P was critical 
of the current divorce provisions: 
The simple fact, to speak plainly, is that in this respect the law which the judges have to 
apply and the procedures which they have to follow are based on hypocrisy and lack of 
intellectual honesty. The simple fact is that we have, and have for many years had, divorce 
by consent, not merely in accordance with [the separation for two years and consent to 
the divorce fact, and], for those unwilling or unable to wait for two years, by means of a 
consensual, collusive, manipulation of [the behaviour fact].124 
The current divorce provisions were criticised by Munby J for the inconsistency between the 
statutory provision and actual practice, where the statute claims that a fact must be proven but 
this usually does not happen. Additionally, it is submitted that it is possible to further criticise 
the provisions. In undefended cases, the different facts have symbolic significance. Firstly, many 
of these facts refer to the idea of the spouses no longer being able to live together. But, the duty 
on spouses to cohabit was abolished in 1970 and can no longer be enforced,125 which suggests 
                                                          
119 See Owens v Owens [2017] 4 WLR 74, [83] (Sir James Munby P), and [99], [102] (Hallett LJ). 
120 For discussion of the introduction of the special procedure see, Cretney (n55) 381-3. 
121 See Sir James Munby P’s comments in Owens v Owens (n119) [98]: ‘In the year to January 2017, there 
were 113,996 petitions for divorce. The details are not published, but I understand that, over the same 
period, notice of intention to defend was given in some 2,600 acknowledgements of service (some 2·28% 
of all petitions) while actual answers filed were about 760 (some 0·67% of all petitions). There are no 
available statistics, but one can safely assume that the number of petitions which proceed to a final 
contested hearing is minute, probably little more than a handful.’  
122 See for example: Law Commission The Ground for Divorce (Law Com No 192, 1990), [2.8-2.12]; Sir 
Nicholas Wall (Former President of the Family Division) – speech to the Annual Resolution Conference, 
(Annual Resolution Conference, The Queens Hotel, Leeds, 24 March 2012), [6], available from 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/pfd-speech-resolution-
annual-conference-240312.pdf> accessed 12/05/2017;  Resolution, an organisation of family lawyers and 
other professionals in England and Wales, also argues in favour of reforming divorce law to introduce a 
no-fault approach: see for example, 
<http://www.resolution.org.uk/editorial.asp?page_id=984&displayMode=preview> accessed 
12/05/2017. 
123 [2017] 4 WLR 74. 
124 Owens v Owens (n119) [94]; see also [99], [102] (Hallett LJ). 
125 By the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970, s20. cf also s18 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which 
states that the effect of a decree of judicial separation is that spouses are no longer obliged to cohabit. 
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that, as is the case in Australia, traditional views on the expectations of the nature of marriage 
continue to have a place in law. This shows incoherence within the legal structure of marriage, 
where factors irrelevant to validity become relevant on divorce, and is one way in which the 
ideology and legal structure of marriage are intertwined: the ideology becomes imprinted on 
the structure in inconsistent ways. This shows internal inconsistency within the provisions. The 
significance of this point will become more apparent later, in the context of informal cohabiting 
couple relationships where couples are required to cohabit.126 Secondly, as Diduck explains, the 
provisions of modern divorce law are a ‘compromise’ that reflect ‘both a traditional, obligation-
based and a modern, individualistic’ view of marriage.127 Adultery, unreasonable behaviour and 
desertion apportion blame to one party, representing continuity in the law and ideas relating to 
the traditional family, whereas the separation facts represent change in that they are not 
indicative of fault, and so reflect modern family values. This suggests that the development of 
divorce is constrained by the conflicting values of the traditional and modern families, and, 
significantly, points at the way in which the development of marriage (and divorce) is 
constrained by ideology. 
3.3 The legal consequences of marriage 
The discussion so far demonstrates that the legal structure of marriage is not immutable 
and has been subjected to considerable and continual change. But the evolving nature of 
marriage goes even further than this. As Maria Miller, the then Minister for Women and 
Equalities who introduced the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill into parliament in 2013, 
explained, the history of marriage is a history of change: 
Some say that the Bill redefines marriage, but marriage is an institution with a long history 
of adaptation and change. In the 19th century, Catholics, Baptists, atheists and many 
others were allowed to marry only if they did so in an Anglican Church, and in the 20th 
century, changes were made to recognise married men and married women as equal 
before law. Suggestions that the Bill changes something that has remained unchanged for 
centuries simply do not recognise the road that marriage has travelled as an institution.128 
In this quote, Miller is referring firstly to the reforms brought about by the Marriage Act 1836 
that introduced the option of a civil ceremony of marriage. Secondly, Miller refers to the changes 
in the legal consequences of marriage that took place during the 20th century. To refer to but a 
                                                          
126 See Chapter 6, 6.1.2.1. 
127 A Diduck Law’s Families (Lexis Nexis/Butterworths, 2003), 50 (emphasis in original text). 
128 HC Deb 05 February 2013, Vol 558, Col 126. 
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few of the legal consequences of marriage, historically husbands and wives were seen as one 
person, or ‘one flesh’ following marriage, which meant that women lost all legal identity129 and 
there was a common law duty to cohabit.130 Married women could not own property or create 
contracts in their own names,131 and any torts committed by a wife were the liability of the 
husband.132 Husbands had a right to their wives’ services, both domestic and sexual133 and could 
use force to consummate the marriage.134 This position gradually changed and by 1882 married 
women could own property and sue in their own names.135 By 1935 married women were liable 
for their own torts and could deal with property and contract as a single person.136 The duty to 
cohabit was abolished in 1970,137 and a House of Lords ruling in 1991 confirmed that a husband 
could be guilty of raping his wife.138 
It is the state that decides on the legal consequences of marriage, and the changes in the 
legal consequences of marriage are significant because, as Barker has noted, they indicate the 
type of relationship marriage is expected to be by the state.139 There are two areas of change in 
the legal consequences of marriage that are particularly important for the thesis and merit 
detailed examination. These are financial remedies on divorce and the position of pre-nuptial 
agreements. They are important because they highlight the tensions between family law’s 
protective function and a desire to respect individual autonomy, which are both factors that are 
significant in developing different frameworks of relationship recognition. In financial remedies, 
the courts recognise that spouses perform different roles that can leave one partner in a 
vulnerable economic position, which should be acknowledged on relationship breakdown, 
whereas pre-nuptial agreements are recognised to protect individual autonomy, which assumes 
that both parties are in equal bargaining positions.  
                                                          
129 See G Williams ’The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’ (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 16; S Bridge 
‘Marriage and Divorce: The Regulation of Intimacy’ in J Herring (ed) Family Law: Issues, Debates and Policy 
(Willan Publishing, 2001), 14; Cretney (n55) 90. 
130 If one party left the marital home, the other could apply to the ecclesiastical court for a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights. Refusal to comply with such a decree could result in imprisonment until the 
enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1884.  
131 Blake (n4) 22. 
132 O Kahn-Freud ‘Inconsistencies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife’ (1952) 15(2) Modern 
Law Review 133, 137. 
133 Bridge (n129) 15. 
134 See R v Clarke (James) (1949) 33 Cr App R 216, 218 (Mr Justice Byrne); Manchester (n55) 362. 
135 Married Women and Property Acts 1870 and 1882. 
136 Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, s1-3. 
137 Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970, s20. 
138 R v R [1992] 1 AC 599. 
139 Barker (n4) 22. 
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3.3.1 The development of financial remedies 
As Thompson explains, ‘[f]inancial provision [in England and Wales] previously depended 
on the good and moral behaviour of the spouses’.140 The purpose of maintenance was to give 
‘relief where a wrong had been done’.141 For example, in M v M,142 the wife was denied 
maintenance payments because she failed to disclose her adultery143 to either her husband or 
solicitors. Hewson J suggested that had the wife been forthcoming about her adultery, then the 
court may have granted her some limited award of maintenance.144  
Following changes in the divorce provisions in England and Wales,145 there was a 
corresponding change in the provision for financial remedies. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
gives the English and Welsh courts broad discretionary powers to award financial relief and 
property adjustment orders upon divorce.146 When exercising their discretion, the court must 
firstly have regard to the welfare of any minor child of the marriage, and then consider the 
appropriateness of a ‘clean break’, where the financial obligations of the spouses towards each 
other will be terminated if this is ‘just and reasonable’.147 Following this, the 1973 Act lists 
several factors for the court to consider, including, 
 The income, earning capacity, property and other resources of the parties;  
 The financial needs and obligations which the parties have or will have in the future; 
 And any contributions made, or which will be made, to the welfare of the family 
including any contribution made by looking after the home and children.148 
The 1973 Act fails to state an overriding objective for property and financial orders, and 
so these principles have been developed through case law.149 According to Douglas, the courts’ 
                                                          
140 S Thompson Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and 
Practice (Bloomsbury, 2015), 51. 
141 Law Commission The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic Policy (No. 103, 1980), [13]. 
142 [1962] 1 WLR 845. 
143 The adultery took place 11 years after she had separated from her husband. 
144 M v M (n142) 851. See also 851-2 where it was stated that the fact that the wife was not to blame for 
the breakdown of the marriage meant that the husband had to pay the costs of the hearing. See similar 
comments about the availability of maintenance for “guilty” wives in Sydenham v Sydenham and 
Illingworth [1949] 2 All ER 196, 198 (Lord Denning); Clear v Clear [1958] 1 WLR 467, 473 (Hodson LJ). 
145 For details see above, 3.2.2. 
146 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ss21, 23 and 24. This includes orders such as periodical or lump sum 
payments and orders to transfer property. Maintenance payments are rarely awarded in divorce 
settlements, and even though it is possible to impose life-long maintenance, this is rare in practice: see G 
Douglas ‘Towards an Understanding of the Basis of Obligation and Commitment in Family Law’ (2016) 
36(1) Legal Studies 1, 5, 7. 
147 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ss25 and 25A. 
148 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s25(2). 
149 Thompson (n140) 54. 
111 
 
approach can be categorised into three phases that reflect ‘a shift in our understanding of what 
marriage is fundamentally about’.150 In the first phase, the court felt that the objective of 
financial remedies was to ensure that the wife remained in the same position after divorce as 
she would have been in had the marriage not broken down. In practice this meant that the wife 
was awarded a 1/3 share of the assets. This took a traditional approach towards the marriage 
relationship as being that of a breadwinner-homemaker relationship.151 The second phase, from 
around 1984-1990, took a ‘view of marriage as a freely terminable and autonomous’ relationship 
that led to the court favouring clean break settlements. In practice, in ‘big money’ cases the wife 
would only get her “reasonable requirements” met.152 The third phase began in the late 1990s 
‘when married women’s increasing involvement in employment and other economic activity 
began to produce a new wifely model: the wife who played a significant part in generating the 
wealth enjoyed by the family.’153 This third phase views marriage as a partnership of equals, 
where both spouses have equally valuable, if different, contributions to make. As Lord Nicholls 
explained in White v White,154 fairness should be the guiding principle for the court in exercising 
its discretion,155 which involves ensuring that there is ‘no bias in favour of the money-earner and 
against the home-maker and the child-carer’.156 Lord Nicholls did not establish a presumption of 
equal division,157 but did suggest that there should be good reason for departing from equality 
and so in practice every judge should ‘check his tentative views against the yardstick of equality 
of division’.158 
In Miller; McFarlane159 the House of Lords elaborated on the fairness principle and 
explained that it consists of three strands: needs, compensation and sharing. Lord Nicholls 
explained that ‘needs’, 
                                                          
150 G Douglas ‘Women in English Family Law: When is Equality Equity?’ (2011) 1 Singapore Journal of Legal 
Studies 18, 22.  
151 ibid 2. 
152 ibid 22-3. 
153 ibid 23. 
154 [2001] 1 AC 596. 
155 ibid 605. 
156 ibid 605. 
157 ibid 606. 
158 ibid 605. 
159 Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane, [2006] 2 AC 618. 
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…reflects the fact that to a greater or lesser extent every relationship of marriage gives 
rise to a relationship of interdependence. The parties share the roles of money-earner, 
home-maker and child-carer. Mutual dependence begets mutual obligations of support.160 
The second strand, ‘compensation’ often overlaps with needs,161 and ‘is aimed at redressing any 
significant prospective economic disparity between the parties arising from the way they 
conducted their marriage’.162 For example, the compensation strand serves to compensate one 
partner who may have taken time out of the work force to look after children. The third strand, 
‘sharing’, requires the court to view marriage as a partnership of equals: 
The parties commit themselves to sharing their lives. They live and work together. When 
their partnership ends each is entitled to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, 
unless there is a good reason to the contrary. Fairness requires no less.163 
Monetary and non-monetary contributions are deemed of equal worth. The courts recognise 
that the parties to a marriage may be in unequal economic positions, and the economic 
disadvantage suffered by one partner should be acknowledged through any property or financial 
orders so that in theory at least, an economically vulnerable partner is protected.  
Historically, Australian law took the same approach grounded in blame towards financial 
remedies as did England and Wales.164 Changes were made following the commencement of the 
Family Law Act 1975 and the introduction of no-fault divorce. Similarly to the English and Welsh 
provisions, the 1975 Act provides the family court with wide discretionary powers to make 
                                                          
160 ibid [11]. See also [12], where Lord Nicholls makes the point that for most couples only this first strand 
is relevant as there will not be enough assets to ‘provide adequately for two homes’. 
161 ibid [15] (Lord Nicholls). 
162 ibid [13] (Lord Nicholls). 
163 ibid [16] (Lord Nicholls). 
164 See HA Finlay ‘Family Law, Family Courts and Federalism: An Opportunity for Reform’ (1974) 9(4) 
Melbourne University Law Review 567, 578. 
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property165 and maintenance orders.166 The Australian courts have a duty to bring an end to the 
financial relationship between the parties, as far as this is practicable.167 
The Australian courts follow three steps to determine whether to adjust property 
interests or award maintenance. The first is to identify the parties’ existing legal and equitable 
interests in property.168 The second is to consider whether it is ‘just and equitable’169 to adjust 
those interests.170 The third step is to assess the extent to which any property interests ought to 
be adjusted by considering the parties’ contributions to the marriage.171 This involves an 
assessment of the different factors listed in s79(4) of the 1975 Act, which include matters such 
as the financial and non-financial contributions made to property or towards the welfare of the 
family. The court may also consider factors listed in s75(2) where these are relevant, which 
include the parties’ future needs and consideration of their income, property and financial 
resources.172 The 1975 Act does not state the order in which these factors should be considered 
and so the court has the freedom to make decisions on a case by case basis.173 Although how 
parties live is irrelevant for the purposes of legal validity of a marriage, ‘how parties have 
organised and lived within the marriage are factors which may be relevant in the exercise of 
discretion pursuant to’ the provisions in the 1975 Act.174 
The initial approach of the Australian courts is summed up well by Evatt CJ in Rolfe,175 
where she explains that the parties’ financial and non-financial contributions were of equal 
worth:  
                                                          
165 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s79. ‘Property’ now includes superannuation - Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 
s90MC. The Family Law Legislation Amendment (Superannuation) Act 2001 (Cth) inserted a new Part VIIIB 
into the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
166 Maintenance is only awarded in limited circumstances such as where one party is unable to support 
themselves adequately due to their caring for a child under 18, and is only available for a limited time. 
See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s72. Oldham and Parkinson note that maintenance orders are uncommon 
in Australia: JT Oldham and P Parkinson ‘Evaluating Judicial Discretion – Family Property Law in Australia 
and the USA Compared’ (2016) 30(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 134, 146, referring to J Behrens and 
B Smyth ‘Spousal Support in Australia: A Study of Incidence and Attitudes’ (Working Paper No. 16, 
Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1999). 
167 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s81. 
168 Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52, [37]; Bevan v Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 [74]; Pilch v Pilch [2016] 
FamCA 740, [40] (Johns J). 
169 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s79(2). 
170 Stanford v Stanford (n168) [39]; Bevan v Bevan (n168) [80]; Pilch v Pilch (n168) [40] (Johns J). 
171 Stanford v Stanford (n168) [40]; Bevan v Bevan (n168) [81]; Pilch v Pilch (n168) [40] (Johns J). 
172 For the complete list of matters see s75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
173 See Mallett v Mallett [1984] HCA 21, [4] (Gibbs CJ). 
174 Pilch v Pilch [2016] FamCA 740, [41] (Johns J). 
175 Rolfe [1977] 34 FLR 518. 
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The purpose of s 79(4)(b), in my opinion, is to ensure just and equitable treatment of a wife 
who has not earned income during the marriage, but who has contributed as a 
homemaker and parent to the property... the Act clearly intends that her contribution 
should be recognized not in a token way but in a substantial way. While the parties reside 
together, the one earning and the other fulfilling responsibilities in the home, there is no 
reason to attach greater value to the contribution of one than to that of the other. This is 
the way they arrange their affairs and the contribution of each should be given equal 
value176. 
The High Court in Mallett177 explained that the 1975 Act does not allow for any assumptions that 
different contributions are of equal worth, or that the starting point should be an equal division 
of property.178 Parkinson explains that following Mallett, the courts’ approach was that ‘while it 
was forbidden to have a starting point of equality, there was no reason why equality of 
contribution during the course of the marriage should not be a conclusion in most cases.’179  
In light of the discussion in chapter two about the protective function of family law, and 
the focus of commentators who write in favour of moderate function-based reforms on 
protecting the economically vulnerable partner on relationship breakdown,180 the way the 
courts use their discretion in the area of financial remedies is significant. The courts in both 
jurisdictions use their discretionary powers to protect the economically weaker spouse on 
relationship breakdown, (at least to the extent that the other spouse has the funds so that 
property adjustment and/or maintenance are possible),181 by viewing financial and non-financial 
contributions as being of equal worth. This suggests that the courts in both jurisdictions 
acknowledge that when spouses make different (gendered) contributions to their marriage, and 
that relationship generated need occurs, this should be recognised on divorce. This shows that 
the protective function of family law has been influential in developing marriage. But, alongside 
this protective role, the courts also appear to try and achieve a conflicting goal, which is to 
respect individual autonomy by enforcing pre-nuptial agreements. 
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3.3.2 Recognising pre-nuptial agreements 
Traditionally in England and Wales, pre-nuptial agreements were considered void on the 
grounds of public policy,182 but following the decision of the Supreme Court in Radmacher v 
Granatino,183 while an agreement cannot oust the courts’ jurisdiction, a pre-nuptial agreement 
will be enforced in particular circumstances. Similarly, In Australia, pre-nuptial agreements could 
not historically oust the courts’ jurisdiction to redistribute property on divorce,184 but, since 
2000, following statutory reform, pre-nuptial agreements are enforceable by the court.185 The 
increasing weight attached to pre-nuptial agreements in England and Wales, and their 
enforceability in Australia, means that marriage, as a formalised relationship, is becoming more 
like its informal counterpart, because unmarried cohabitants, or de facto couples as they are 
known in Australia, can draw up legally enforceable contracts between themselves to determine 
the consequences of relationship breakdown.186 The developments in the recognition of pre-
nuptial agreements are significant because it appears that the notion of respecting individual 
autonomy takes precedence over protecting the economically weaker partner, which has been 
an influential theme in the area of financial remedies. 
According to the then Australian government, introducing binding financial agreements 
was necessary ‘to provide greater choice for parties in property settlements and to provide a 
more efficient and less costly means of dispute resolution… than that which is currently available 
through the Family Court.’187 Parties may enter into binding financial agreements188 before or 
during the marriage or following divorce,189 and the agreements may deal with property and/or 
maintenance issues as well as ‘incidental and ancillary matters’.190 Both parties must receive 
                                                          
182 See for example Cocksedge v Cocksedge (1844) 14 Sim 244; Cartwright v Cartwright (1853) 3 de GM & 
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independent legal advice prior to signing the agreement.191 Once created, an agreement cannot 
be varied, but can be terminated,192 or it will be set aside if obtained by fraud, if the agreement 
is void, voidable or unenforceable or if the parties engaged in unconscionable conduct when the 
agreement was made. The agreements may also be set aside if there is such a change in the 
circumstances of the parties that enforcement is ‘impracticable’ or if a ‘material change in the 
circumstances has occurred’ relating to the care, welfare and development of a child of the 
marriage which would lead to hardship if the agreement was not set aside.193 
In England and Wales, the majority of the Supreme Court in Radmacher identified three 
issues to be taken into account when determining the weight to attach to a pre-nuptial 
agreement. Firstly, the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement must be 
assessed to determine whether the parties entered the agreement of their own free will, 
without duress, and both spouses must be informed of the implications of the agreement.194 
Similarly to consent to marriage,195 being ‘informed’ in this context means having an 
appreciation of the implications of the agreement and not the ‘detailed particulars’. For 
example, knowing that your prospective spouse is wealthy is sufficient without knowing the full 
extent of their wealth.196 Secondly, the court should consider if there are any circumstances that 
mean that the agreement should be given enhanced weight, such as if the agreement was 
entered into in a country where pre-nuptial agreements are the norm.197 The third issue is to 
consider whether it is fair to enforce the agreement in light of the circumstances existing at the 
time of the proceedings. An agreement will be unfair where it leaves one of the parties in a 
situation of ‘real need’, which appears to mean that the parties cannot contract out of the ‘need’ 
and ‘compensation’ strands identified in Miller/McFarlane,198 but could contract out of the third 
strand of ‘sharing’.199 The majority suggested that ‘parties are unlikely to have intended that 
                                                          
191 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 90G. Fehlberg and Smyth (n184) 135-7 explain that lawyers were 
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their [pre-]nuptial agreement should result… in one partner being left in a predicament of real 
need, while the other enjoys a sufficiency or more’, and so such an agreement would not be 
enforced on the basis of unfairness.200 The majority did not explain what a situation of ‘real need’ 
means, but the fact that they mention this at all is important to show that there is some 
acknowledgment of the need to protect the economically weaker partner in this area. 
But, in determining the issue of fairness, the court must respect individual autonomy, 
The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should 
be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect to the decision of a 
married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs should be regulated. It 
would be paternalistic and patronising to override their agreement simply on the basis 
that the court knows best.201 
Thompson argues that power imbalances in personal relationships mean that the majority’s 
approach is problematic: while the majority implied that power imbalances ‘may differ 
depending on one’s perspective’, they felt ‘that in most cases “we must assume that each party… 
is able to look after him- or herself”.’202 Lady Hale on the other hand, in her powerful dissenting 
judgment, ‘recognises that there are economic, social and gendered dimensions to power in the 
context of prenups, which make these agreements collectively problematic, and the court 
should not lose sight of this.’203 Thompson’s analysis of case law following Radmacher suggests 
that ‘power inequalities, unless fairly extreme, do not appear to weigh heavily with the courts 
when considering whether a prenup should be considered unfair.’ She goes on to suggest that 
the rejection of ‘an approach based on protecting the interests of the non-moneyed spouse’ in 
favour of ‘the current autonomy-based stance might consequentially favour the party with the 
greater bargaining power.’204 This means that respect for autonomy is the prominent concern 
of the courts, and not the need to protect a vulnerable partner. 
The Law Commission have proposed that ‘qualifying nuptial agreements’ should be 
binding, as long as the parties’ needs are met. Although the Commission were building on the 
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existing law, rather than suggesting radical reform,205 the Commission did highlight some 
difficulties associated with the current focus on autonomy. The Commission accepted that 
within personal relationships, people may agree ‘to things that they would not otherwise 
contemplate’ and may feel pressured into signing an agreement,206 and so this presumably 
affects whether a party could be said to be exercising their autonomy when entering the 
agreement. To counteract some of this pressure, the Commission suggested that certain ‘pre-
conditions’ should be met, such as that parties must take independent legal advice following 
disclosure of assets and that the agreement should be signed at least 28 days prior to the 
wedding.207 The Commission did not recommend that a pre-nuptial agreement should oust the 
courts’ jurisdiction because ‘there may be pressure on one party to sign an agreement, and that 
that party may enter the agreement unwillingly or with unrealistic optimism’.208 Perhaps the 
Law Commission’s suggestion provides an alternative way forward in this area, which strikes a 
better balance between respecting autonomy and protecting the vulnerable partner.  
These developments in the context of pre-nuptial agreements show an increasing 
awareness from the judiciary in England and Wales and policymakers in Australia that people 
should be able to decide on some of the legal consequences of marriage for themselves. This 
suggests that modern family values of negotiation and autonomy are developing the legal 
structure of marriage, even when this may be detrimental to an economically weaker partner. 
Further, it suggests that the enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements demonstrates an 
acceptance that the legal consequences of marriage should not be accepted without question. 
The significance of this point will become clearer in the next chapter which challenges the 
appropriateness of transplanting the legal consequences of marriage onto other formalised 
relationships.209 
3.4 The ideologies of marriage 
The final element of the ‘marriage model’ as used by Barker is the ideology, which looks 
at social understandings of the ideal marriage and the functions that this relationship is expected 
to perform. The legal structure and the ideology of marriage are so intertwined that it can be 
difficult to separate them, but it is important to distinguish those elements that are necessary 
for a valid marriage, and which belong to the legal structure, and those elements that are part 
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of the ideal view of marriage, which form the ideology, because the ideology often extends 
beyond the requirements of the legal structure.  
An examination of the marriage ideology shows that it is highly adaptable; there is no 
fixed set of functions that marriage is assumed to perform, and developments in the ideology 
often lead to changes in the legal structure of marriage. In fact, the ‘ideology’ of marriage is best 
referred to as the ‘ideologies’ of marriage to highlight the fact that there is no single, universal 
set of meanings attached to marriage. To demonstrate the adaptability of the marriage 
ideologies, comments from policymakers will firstly be examined. This is useful because 
policymakers create and influence the law-making process and so their views on marriage affect 
the development of the legal structure. Secondly, a selection of judicial comments will be 
analysed. As Diduck explains, this is helpful because they not only represent ‘the judicial point 
of view, but [they] also [signpost] what is thought to be the legitimate public point of view.’210 
3.4.1 Policymakers 
The introduction of same-sex marriage was arguably the most controversial change made 
to the legal structure of marriage in recent times. In the parliamentary debates on the issue, 
policymakers have had to engage with the meaning of marriage for today’s society and consider 
what elements they believe are central to the relationship. Exploring the parliamentary debates 
on this issue in both jurisdictions shows how changes in the ideology can lead to changes in the 
legal structure of marriage. 
Maria Miller, the then Minister for Women and Equalities, began her second reading 
speech introducing the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill 2013 into parliament by stating: 
Mr Speaker, you and I know that every marriage is different… but what marriage offers us 
all is a lifelong partner to share our journey, a loving stable relationship to strengthen us 
and mutual support throughout our lives. I believe that that should be embraced by more 
couples. The depth of feeling, love and commitment between same-sex couples is no 
different from that depth of feeling between opposite-sex couples. The Bill enables society 
to recognise that commitment in the same way, too, through marriage.211  
She concluded by stating that she supported the bill because ‘marriage is one of the most 
important institutions we have; it binds families and society together,212 and it is a building block 
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that promotes stability.’213 Baroness Stowell, introducing the bill into the House of Lords, 
commented that by marrying, a couple ‘choose to declare their commitment publicly and 
permanently to the person they love’ and ‘commit to the kind of values that we associate with 
the special enterprise of shared endeavour—loyalty, trust, honesty and forgiveness’.214 Other 
supporters of the bill mentioned how ‘couples who love each other should be able to get 
married’215 and make a ‘long-term commitment’216 because the ‘happiness, fulfilment and 
status’ of marriage should not be denied to same-sex couples.217 For these politicians, marriage 
is a relationship characterised by stability, love and commitment between two people who seek 
to be in a long-term if not life-long relationship.218 
Similarly, in Australia, supporters of same-sex marriage also referred to the idea that 
marriages are loving relationships where partners support ‘each other financially and 
emotionally’219 as well as emphasising that ‘marriage is the best way to protect committed, 
monogamous relationships’220 that are intended to be life-long commitments.221 For many, 
‘marriage is a simple statement of love and commitment’222 that ‘strengthens families’.223 One 
Senator explains the significance of marriage as a ‘commitment offered by a couple to each other 
through which the value and dignity of a couple's love is formally recognised by their community.’224 
Opponents of same-sex marriage in England and Wales emphasised that for them 
marriage is ‘an enduring and exclusive union between one man and one woman, not least for 
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the raising and nurturing of children.’225 One MP stated that marriage ‘is not simply about love 
and commitment’, but rather is ‘about the union of a man and a woman for the creation and 
care of children’226 and many others stressed that marriage is a monogamous sexual relationship 
between heterosexuals.227 For some, the fact that non-consummation is not a ground for finding 
a same-sex marriage voidable, and that adultery has retained its heterosexual definition, means 
that same-sex couples would not be subject to these essential ‘criteria’ of marriage and so could 
not truly be regarded as married.228 For many opponents, marriage at its core is about sex and 
procreation. They could not comprehend that the ‘definition’ of marriage could be extended in 
such a way as to permit same-sex marriages,229 because, for them, the essence of marriage was 
a sexual relationship between a man and a woman.230 The same arguments have been expressed 
by opponents of same-sex marriage in Australia. They argue that marriage is not ‘only about 
love’, it is about ‘family’ and the ‘begetting of children’ otherwise any two related adults would 
be able to marry one another:231 
It is disingenuous to pretend that it is only about love. After all, consider what marriage, 
through history, has been. At its essence, it is about providing the woman, the mother of 
the children, with the security that the father will be there for the duration of the 
upbringing of the children.232 
Marriage for this group is confined to a union of a man and a woman233 who can naturally create 
a child234 and is the best environment in which to bring up children.235 For the opponents, 
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marriage is a relationship that performs the function of raising children within a stable 
heterosexual union, as well as being about love and commitment.  
The same-sex marriage debates show how the marriage ideologies are adaptable and how 
they can be used to influence, or resist, the development of the legal structure of marriage. Both 
supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage assume that marriage is a useful institution 
that should be wholeheartedly supported by the state: they agree that marriage is a form of 
public expression of the commitment between a loving couple who are in a stable life-long, 
monogamous relationship that provides a measure of personal fulfilment and support for the 
couple. The idea that marriage is a committed relationship is especially prevalent, although 
precisely what ‘commitment’ means in this context or how it is measured is not elaborated 
upon. Opponents of same-sex marriage go further and emphasize the expected sexual and 
procreative nature of the relationship by claiming that marriage has always been about 
procreation and raising children. The debates also show how the ideologies go beyond the legal 
structure. The policymakers fail to appreciate that many of the characteristics, or functions, they 
refer to, such as love, support and sex, are irrelevant for the purposes of legal validity of a 
marriage, because the legal structure of marriage, in England and Wales at least, only requires 
that the relationship be between two unrelated adults, who have given adequate consent to 
enter the marriage.236  
3.4.2 Judicial comments 
Sir James Hannen P in a judgment from 1885, in a case involving the mental capacity to 
marry, described marriage as, 
…an engagement between a man and woman to live together, and love one another as 
husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others. This is expanded in the promises of the 
marriage ceremony by words having reference to the natural relations which spring from 
that engagement, such as protection on the part of the man, and submission on the part 
of the woman.237 
Hannen P viewed marriage as a monogamous cohabiting union of a heterosexual couple who 
love each other in which the male and female had different ‘natural’ or gendered roles to fulfil: 
the meaning of ‘love one another’ is not elaborated upon, but may be a reference to a sexual 
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relationship. Karminski J’s comments in a 1954 case involving the capacity to marry echoes 
Hannen P’s comments, 
…the essence of the contract [of marriage] is an engagement between a man and a 
woman to live together and to love one another as husband and wife to the exclusion of 
all others. It may be in the present times that submission on the part of the woman is no 
longer, as it was in 1885, an essential part of the contract.238 
Continuity in the ideology of marriage is apparent, with another judge assuming that marriage 
is a monogamous, cohabiting relationship between a heterosexual couple who love each other, 
with the husband taking a ‘protective’ role, again with no elaboration of what loving one another 
as husband and wife means. There is also an element of change as Karminski J explains that 
submission on the part of the wife is no longer essential to marriage, which coincides with 
changes made to the legal consequences of marriage.239 Ormrod J in a 1971 case involving nullity 
proceedings where one party to the marriage was a transsexual, explained that marriage is 
characterised by ‘companionship and mutual support’, but that it is in essence a sexual 
relationship, because ‘the characteristics which distinguish it from all other relationships can 
only be met by two persons of opposite sex.’240  
These cases suggest that marriage was expected to be a monogamous, sexual, cohabiting 
relationship, with some unclear reference to the expectation that spouses should love each 
other ‘as husband and wife’. More recent cases suggest that the marriage ideologies have 
moved on, and that there is less of a focus on the sexual nature of the relationship and a shift 
towards other functions of marriage such as emotional support and interdependence. Lord 
Nicholls explained in a 2003 English case involving the validity of a marriage of a transsexual 
person that while marriage may have once been about procreation, ‘there is much more 
emphasis now on the "mutual society, help and comfort that the one [spouse] ought to have of 
the other".’241 Similarly, Baroness Hale in a 2004 case determining whether a same-sex couple 
could be living as spouses explained that marriage-like relationships are ones that exhibit 
'intimacy, stability, and social and financial interdependence’242 with no fixed gender-roles for 
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the couple,243 and she recognised that ‘the capacity to bear or beget children has never been a 
prerequisite of a valid marriage in English law.’244  
In stark contrast to Baroness Hale’s comments, Lord Millett in the same case claimed that 
marriage is a ‘gender specific’ relationship’ that can be defined as, 
…a legal relationship between persons of the opposite sex. A man’s spouse must be a 
woman; a woman’s spouse must be a man. This is of the very essence of the relationship, 
which need not be loving, sexual, stable, faithful, long-lasting or contented. Although it 
may be brought to an end as a legal relationship by death or an order of the court, its 
demise as a factual relationship will usually have ended long before it is ended by the 
court.245 
These comments are markedly different from others about marriage because they look at 
marriage as a purely legal arrangement. In the same way that opponents of same-sex marriage 
focussed on the sexual and procreative nature of marriage,246 Barker suggests that 
heterosexuality and procreation are often brought up by judges as the essential elements of 
marriage in cases involving the recognition of same-sex couples.247 This can be seen again in a 
2006 case involving a petition by a lesbian couple who had married in Canada and wished to 
have their marriage recognised as a marriage in England and Wales. Potter P noted that marriage 
is almost universally recognised as a heterosexual relationship248 which is a ‘means not only of 
encouraging monogamy but also the procreation of children and their development and nurture 
in a family unit’.249  
The Australian judiciary do not elaborate on the expected functions of marriage in the 
same way as the judiciary in England and Wales, and often their focus is on the requirements 
for legal validity. In a 1962 case involving legitimacy, the High Court stated that ‘the essence of 
marriage, from a legal point of view’ is ‘that it produces, or provides a pre-requisite for, the legal 
recognition of family relationships’.250 This treats marriage as a means of acquiring legal 
recognition of a relationship only. In a 2006 case concerning paternity, the High Court referred 
to the ideology of marriage by suggesting that marriage in Western society has developed to be 
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the exclusive, life-long, voluntary union of a man and a woman, ‘partly as a means of involving 
males in the nurture and protection of their offspring’ because ‘the structure of marriage and 
the family is intended to sustain responsibility and obligation’.251 But, following on from these 
comments, the Court acknowledges that ‘the status of marriage may exist even when the parties 
to it are completely at arm's length’ and that people may be ‘happily or unhappily’ married.252 
This is an acknowledgment that, although particular expectations may surround marriage, the 
reality of married life may not always live up to them – but this does not affect the validity of 
the relationship. The High Court in a case concerning the ACT’s attempt to legislate for same-sex 
marriage, explained that the concept of marriage should be understood as, 
…a consensual union formed between natural persons in accordance with legally 
prescribed requirements which is not only a union the law recognises as intended to 
endure and be terminable only in accordance with law but also a union to which the law 
accords a status affecting and defining mutual rights and obligations.253  
The court goes on to explain that the concept of marriage varies between cultures, 
The social institution of marriage differs from country to country. It is not now possible (if 
it ever was) to confine attention to jurisdictions whose law of marriage provides only for 
unions between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into 
for life. Marriage law is and must be recognised now to be more complex. Some 
jurisdictions outside Australia permit polygamy. Some jurisdictions outside Australia, in a 
variety of constitutional settings, now permit marriage between same sex couples.254 
The High Court recognises that marriage is flexible because it means different things in different 
cultures, and this suggests that identifying all the expected characteristics and functions of 
marriage is a difficult, if not impossible, task. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter has identified two conflicts embedded in the institution of marriage. The first 
is internal to the ideology, or ideologies, with competing versions of what marriage is for clashing 
at key points in the developments of the legal structure and legal consequences of marriage. 
The second is a conflict between the marriage ideology and the legal structure. The discussion 
has shown that the qualities that inform the competing ideologies of marriage are irrelevant 
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when it comes to the question of determining the legal validity of a marriage. In this sense, the 
ideology is superimposed on the institution rather than being an integral part of it. This does not 
mean that the ideologies are not important – on the contrary, it appears that the ideology is 
definitive of marriage for some. The fact that the precise content of the marriage ideology varies 
from one person to the next is significant because of the effect of the ideology on the 
development of the legal structure of marriage. The legal structure is malleable according to 
prevailing ideology, and as new versions of the ideology attract broad consensus, the legal 
structure (and legal consequences) of marriage can change. 
The discrepancies between the legal structure and the ideologies, and the different views 
of which elements comprise the ideologies, are not problematic for marriage: boundaries have 
to be drawn on who may form a marriage with whom, and the administrative efficiency of 
marriage is ensured via a system that does not concern itself with the actual functions 
performed within a marriage. But, the influence of the marriage ideology may be problematic 
for the development of other systems of recognition. For example, chapter two showed that 
supporters of a moderate function-based approach believe that married and unmarried 
cohabitants should be treated in the same way by law because their relationships function in 
the same way.255 If there is no agreement of the expected functions of marriage, then it may be 
difficult to determine whether an informal relationship is ‘marriage-like’. The next chapters will 
explore the influence of the marriage model on the development of other systems of 
relationship recognition to determine whether the inconsistencies between the ideologies and 
the legal structure pose difficulties in practical terms.
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Chapter 4 – Extending ‘form’ beyond marriage: registered couple relationships 
This chapter explores how formalised relationships can be extended beyond marriage by 
exploring England and Wales’ civil partnerships and the registration options for de facto couples 
in Australia. Different Australian states and territories have adopted different terminology to 
describe the registration options. Tasmania uses ‘significant relationships’; Victoria refers to 
‘domestic relationships’; New South Wales (NSW) calls them ‘registered relationships’; both 
Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have ‘civil partnerships’; and the ACT has 
an additional registration option called ‘civil unions’. The registration options will be collectively 
referred to here as ‘registered couple relationships’. It will be argued that, as predicted in 
chapter three, while formalised relationships are inherently flexible, the extent of this flexibility 
is restricted by the influence of marriage. As a result, attempts to create alternatives to marriage 
have instead created replicas that are often deemed inferior in symbolic terms.  
First, the chapter will explain why the registered couple relationships were introduced 
and the legal structure and legal consequences of these relationships. It will be demonstrated 
that functional arguments have been influential in developing form-based systems of 
relationship recognition, and that this may explain why the registered couple relationships are 
so like marriage in terms of legal structure and legal consequences. Secondly, it will be shown 
that marriage and the registration options share some benefits, namely respect for choice and 
autonomy and administrative efficiency, and that there is freedom to live as you choose 
following the formalising of a relationship because the quality of formalised relationships are 
irrelevant for the purposes of legal validity. Thirdly, it will be argued that not all the benefits of 
marriage attach to other form-based systems, and that the most significant difference is social 
rather than legal; registered couple relationships do not bestow the same social status as 
marriage. The conclusion will suggest that, without a willingness to think beyond the confines of 
the legal structure of marriage, form-based relationships will do little to address concerns about 
recognising a diversity of family relationships. 
4.1 The development of the registered couple relationships 
At first glance, the fact that registered couple relationships exist suggests that relationship 
recognition has moved away from marriage, albeit through the introduction of new form-based 
relationships. But, on closer examination, it becomes apparent that they are not that different 
from marriage and that the ideological pull of marriage is a key reason for the similarity. 
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4.1.1 Why introduce the registered couple relationships? 
In England and Wales, the introduction of civil partnership in 2004 provided an option for 
same-sex couples to gain legal recognition of their relationships. The creation of civil partnership 
meant that same-sex couples could gain access to a package of legal rights and responsibilities 
that previously only applied to (opposite-sex) married couples. One reason why civil 
partnerships were thought necessary was because same-sex couples’ relationships were 
assumed to function in the same way as opposite-sex couples’ relationships, and so same-sex 
couples should also have an option to formalise their relationships. 
The comments about the expected nature of same-sex relationships during the 
parliamentary debates about civil partnership were similar to those made about marriage by 
policy-makers during the 2013 same-sex marriage debates.1 For example, Jacqui Smith, then 
Deputy Minister for Women and Equalities, explained that the Civil Partnership Bill 2004 was 
necessary because, 
Across this country today thousands of same-sex couples have made the decision to share 
their lives, their home, their finances and the care of their children or of older relatives. 
They may have loved and cared for each other for many years, yet their relationship is 
invisible in the eyes of the law. The Bill sends a clear message about the importance of 
stable and committed same-sex relationships.2 
She further explained that the bill made ‘an important statement about this country's support 
for stable, long-term committed relationships’3 and ‘sends a clear and unequivocal message that 
same-sex couples deserve recognition and respect.’4 These are similar to Smith’s comments in 
the government’s consultation document, where she stated that same-sex relationships ‘span 
many years with couples looking after each other, caring for their loved ones and actively 
participating in society; in fact, living in exactly the same way as any other family.’5 Similarly, 
Baroness Smith, who was responsible for the passage of the bill through the House of Lords, 
explained that same-sex couples faced hardship and difficulties prior to the option to register a 
civil partnership because their ‘long-term, mutually supportive relationships are, at the moment, 
invisible in law.’6  
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The position in Australia was different from England and Wales because informal ‘de 
facto’ relationships, or marriage-like couple relationships, were already treated almost 
identically with marriage when the Australian registration options were created.7 Consequently, 
registration did not create access to legal rights and responsibilities for the first time as did 
England and Wales’ civil partnership.8 This different starting position means that different 
reasons were advanced as rationales for the creation of the different registered couple 
relationships in Australia. Pragmatic reasons were advanced in Australia that focussed on the 
benefits of formalised relationships over function-based recognition. These benefits will be 
discussed in detail below.9 This does not mean that functional arguments like those advanced in 
England and Wales were not important. Such arguments were apparent in the earlier Australian 
debates on the legal recognition of couples in informal de facto relationships, which were a 
precursor to the registration options. Arguments that couples whose relationships function in 
similar ways should be treated similarly by law were advanced to support treating de facto 
couples in informal relationships in the same way as married couples. For example, the fact that 
economic need could arise from a de facto relationship in the same way as a marriage was 
advanced as a reason why de facto couples should be treated in the same way as spouses upon 
relationship breakdown.10 These arguments will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.11  
To summarise, one reason why registered couple relationships were introduced in both 
jurisdictions is because unmarried couples’ relationships, especially same-sex couples, were 
assumed to perform similar functions to married relationships, namely that both married and 
unmarried couples’ relationships are expected to be loving, committed, long-term relationships 
where partners support each other. It is suggested here that this expectation of functional 
similarity between married and unmarried couples’ relationships is one reason why these 
registration options are so similar to marriage. 
4.1.2 What are the registered couple relationships? 
4.1.2.1 Relationship type: the legal structure 
Chapter three established that the legal structure of marriage is a relationship between 
two unrelated adults who have given adequate consent, and that same-sex couples are 
                                                          
7 For discussion of the position of informal de facto relationships, see Chapter 6, 6.3. 
8 Note that Tasmania legislated to change the definition of ‘significant’ relationship in 2003 to include 
same-sex couples. So, 2003 was the first time that same-sex couples, either in an informal or registered 
relationship, were legally recognised in Tasmania: Relationships Act 2003 (Tas).  
9 See below, 4.2. 
10 See New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report on De Facto Relationships (LRC 36, 1983). 
11 See Chapter 6, 6.2.1. 
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permitted to marry in England and Wales, but not in Australia.12 The type of relationship, or the 
legal structure of the registered couple relationships, is virtually identical to marriage, and as 
Stychin bluntly puts it in the English and Welsh context, civil partnership ‘should not be seen as 
an achievement of the legal imagination.’13 
In the same way that marriage is a dyadic relationship that is expected to be 
monogamous, the registered couple relationships in both jurisdictions are dyadic relationships 
and any person may only be in one formalised relationship at a time.14 The reasons for this 
dyadic requirement appear to be partly practical. The government in England and Wales 
explained that it is necessary to ensure that people ‘will not find themselves subject to various 
sets of competing legal obligations’.15 Similarly, the Victorian government in Australia explained 
that ‘legal and practical difficulties would arise if a person has more than one registered partner 
or both a registered partner and a spouse’.16 Another reason for this dyadic requirement may 
be symbolic, as Rundle suggests, to ‘reflect a desire to maintain the ideal of monogamy’ in the 
law.17 
Similar minimum age requirements apply for marriage,18 and the registered couple 
relationships. For a valid civil partnership in England and Wales, partners must be aged over 16,19 
with those aged 16 and 17 needing the consent of an appropriate person to enter a civil 
partnership.20 In Australia, couples wishing to register their relationships must be ‘adults’, which 
                                                          
12 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1. 
13 CF Stychin ‘Not (Quite) a Horse and Carriage: The Civil Partnership Act 2004’ (2006) 14(1) Feminist Legal 
Studies 79, 79. 
14 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s3(1)(b); Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s11(1); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), 
s6; Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), s5(3); Civil Partnership Act 2011 (Qld), s5; Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37C; Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s7(b). Additionally, in Australia, entering 
a marriage will automatically end a registered couple relationship, see: Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), 
s15(1)(b); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s11(1)(b); Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), s10(b); Civil 
Partnership Act 2011 (Qld), s14(1)(b); Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s11(1)(b); Domestic Relationships Act 
1994 (ACT), s37H(1)(b). 
15 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [3.5]. 
16 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 6 December 2007, 4390, (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). The Attorney 
General explained that a difficult situation may arise, for example ‘where a doctor needs to discuss a 
person’s medical treatment with the next of kin in an emergency situation’. Note however, as will be made 
clear in Chapter 6, that being married or in a registered couple relationship is not a barrier to a finding 
that a de facto relationship exists, and so in this way the Australian courts are already dealing with 
competing claims where there may be a spouse/registered partner and an informal de facto partner. 
17 O Rundle ‘An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 121, 139. 
18 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1.3. 
19 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s3. 
20 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s4. For details of the persons who may consent to the civil partnership for 
those aged 16 and 17 see schedule 2, part 1. 
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means they must be 18 or over.21 There is no provision, as there is with marriage,22 to allow 16 
and 17 year olds to register in exceptional and unusual circumstances. Additionally, it is not 
possible to enter a civil partnership or a registered couple relationship with a person who is 
within the prohibited degrees of family relationship. The list of the prohibited family 
relationships in the English and Welsh civil partnership legislation is identical to that of 
marriage,23 and the prohibited relationships in Australia also mirror those of marriage.24 
Additionally, just as consent is an important element of marriage, parties to registered couple 
relationships must also consent to registration. A civil partnership in England and Wales is 
voidable if either party does not give adequate consent to registration,25 and a lack of consent 
will make a registered couple relationship void in NSW26 and the ACT,27 while Tasmania, Victoria 
and Queensland require parties to make a statutory declaration that they are consenting to 
registration.28  
One area of difference between the various registered couple relationships is whether the 
registration option is available to both opposite- and same-sex couples. Currently in England and 
Wales, despite a judicial review challenge,29 civil partnerships are only an option for same-sex 
couples.30 This means that opposite-sex couples only have the option to marry to formalise their 
relationships. Similarly, the ACT’s ‘civil unions’ are only available for couples who cannot marry 
under federal law – in other words, same-sex couples.31 Opposite-sex couples in the ACT have 
the option to marry or register a civil partnership however, and all other registration options for 
                                                          
21 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), ss4, 11; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), ss5, 7; Relationships Register Act 
2010 (NSW), s5; Civil Partnership Act 2011 (Qld), ss4, 6; Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s7 and Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37E. 
22 See Chapter 3. 3.2.1.3. 
23 Civil Partnerships Act 2004, sch1, part 1. cf Marriage Act 1949, sch 1. 
24 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), ss4, 7; Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), s5. The other jurisdictions 
have a similar list, but omit relationships that can be traced through adoption: Civil Partnership Act 2011 
(Qld), s5; Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s7 and Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37C. This is not the 
case in Victoria where the legislation only specifies that a ‘domestic relationship’ is the relationship 
between a couple: Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s5. Note however that Victoria also recognises registered 
caring relationships, and the provision states that caring partners may be related by family (Relationships 
Act 2008 (Vic), s5) which suggests that the domestic relationship category is reserved for marriage-like 
relationships. Furthermore, under the corresponding laws provision, only registered relationships 
between partners who are not related by family may be considered as ‘domestic relationships’ in Victoria: 
see Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s33B. cf Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s23B. 
25 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s50(1)(a) and (b).  
26 Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), s14(1)(b) and (c).  
27 Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s21(b); Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37L(b). 
28 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s4(2)(a); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s7(a); Civil Partnerships Act 2011, 
s2(a). 
29 For discussion, see below, 4.3.2.2. 
30 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s1. 
31 Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s7(c). 
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couples in Australia are open to both same- and opposite-sex couples.32 The Australian 
registration options are more inclusive than England and Wales in that both opposite- and same-
sex couples may register, and provide the only option for same-sex couples in that jurisdiction 
to formalise their relationships. 
4.1.2.2 Ending a registered relationship: the legal structure 
Like marriage,33 registered couple relationships may only end in the way prescribed by 
law. Different approaches taken in England and Wales and Australia indicate that there is some 
flexibility in assigning the process by which a formalised relationship may end. However, both 
jurisdictions’ approaches to the breakdown of registered relationships nonetheless mimic their 
approach to ending a marriage.  
In England and Wales, a civil partnership ends34 by the death of one partner, by the 
dissolution or annulment procedure or, following the same-sex marriage reforms, where the 
civil partners choose to convert their civil partnership into a marriage.35 As Barker notes, 
dissolution orders, ‘in their likeness to divorce, clearly illustrate the similarity of civil partnership 
and marriage.'36 Application for dissolution is possible after 1 year,37 on the sole ground that the 
relationship has broken down irretrievably,38 which must be proven by reference to one of four 
facts, 
 The respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot be expected to 
live with the respondent;  
 The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a period of at least two years; 
 The parties have lived apart for two years and consent to the dissolution; 
 The parties have lived apart for a period of five years.39 
                                                          
32 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s4; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s5; Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW), 
s5(1); Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld), s4(1); Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37D. 
33 For discussion of the divorce provision in both jurisdictions, see Chapter 3, 3.2.2. 
34 It is also possible to obtain a separation order without having to prove the irretrievable breakdown of 
a relationship: Civil Partnership Act 2004, s56. This is similar to the provision under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, s17 for judicial separation. 
35 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s1. The conversion provisions were provided by the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013, s9. The Marriage of Same Sex Couples (Conversion of Civil Partnership) Regulations 
2014/3181 provided the details of the conversion procedure, and this became available on the 10th 
December 2014. 
36 N Barker ‘For Better or for Worse? The Civil Partnership Bill [HL] 2004’ (2004) 26(3) Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 313, 318.  
37 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s41(1). cf Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, s3.  
38 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s44(1). cf Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s1(1). 
39 Civil Partnership Act 2004, s44(5). 
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Adultery was not included in the civil partnership legislation because the government believed 
‘it would not be possible nor desirable to read across’ the heterosexual definition of adultery 
into dissolution law’ and that any infidelity could be considered under the behaviour ground.40 
In the same way as for marriage, the four facts for dissolution all refer to the civil partners either 
living together or living apart. This suggests that, in the same way as spouses, civil partners are 
expected to cohabit and, should that cohabitation cease, or should one party be at fault in 
making it intolerable for the other to live with them, then the relationship may end. The law is 
again used to send a message about the expected nature of formalised relationships, i.e. that 
they are cohabiting relationships, even though cohabitation, or a lack thereof, has no effect on 
the validity of the relationship. 
The process of ending a registered couple relationship in Australia is simpler than that in 
England and Wales, and does not require the parties to state any reasons as to why the 
relationship has ended, or indeed establish that they have lived separately and apart for 12 
months as is the case with divorce. This appears to protect party autonomy, as Rundle notes,  
…there is no scrutiny applied to the circumstances around the dissolution of a formalised 
relationship. It is sufficient that revocation is what one of the parties wants. The state and 
territory relationship registration systems require less factual investigation and provide 
more autonomy to the parties than marriage. Parties are free to decide both the beginning 
and end of their formalised relationship at will.41 
All registered couple relationships in Australia end following the death of one partner as well as 
when one partner chooses to marry,42 and a ‘civil partnership’ in the ACT will also end if the 
parties enter into a ‘civil union’ with each other.43 Parties to registered relationships may also 
choose to end the relationship at any time, and revocation takes place 90 days after making an 
application in most states,44 although it takes 12 months for a civil union or civil partnership to 
end in the ACT.45 Where one partner chooses to end the relationship unilaterally, they must 
                                                          
40 Women and Equality Unit ‘Responses to Civil Partnership: A Framework for the Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Couples’ (2003), 36. For a definition of adultery, see Chapter 3, 3.2.2, n116. 
41 Rundle (n17) 144. 
42 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s15; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s12; Relationships Register Act 2010 
(NSW), s10; Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld), s14; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37H; Civil 
Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s11. 
43 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37H(1)(c). 
44 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s15; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s15; Relationships Register Act 2010 
(NSW), s12; Civil Partnerships Act 2011 (Qld), s15. 
45 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37I; Civil Unions Act 2012 (ACT), s12(3). 
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serve notice of their intention to so do on the other party,46 although there is no corresponding 
provision to serve notice should one party decide to marry. 
4.1.2.3 The legal consequences 
Registered couple relationships attract broadly the same legal consequences as marriage 
both during and after the breakdown of the relationship in both jurisdictions.47 In England and 
Wales, the government felt that civil partners make a ‘strong commitment to each other’ and 
so they ‘should gain rights and responsibilities to reflect the roles they play in each other’s 
lives.’48 This identical treatment includes transplanting the financial remedies provision of 
divorce onto civil partners. The financial provisions for civil partnership and marriage are 
contained in different legislation, but this is of little importance, because, as the Court of Appeal 
made clear in Lawrence v Gallagher,49 ‘it is common ground that the language of schedule 5 of 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 is identical to the language of s25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973.’50 Similarly in Australia, the courts have jurisdiction to resolve the property and financial 
disputes of separating registered couples in the same way as for married couples. The actual 
principles for property and financial orders51 are the same for both married and the registered 
couple relationships,52 although they are dealt with in separate provisions of the Family Law 
Act.53 This separate but identical provision was thought necessary because the federal 
                                                          
46 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s16; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s13; Relationships Register Act 2010 
(NSW), s11; Civil Partnerships Act 2010 (Qld), s15; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s37I; Civil 
Unions Act 2012 (ACT) s12. 
47 See L Glennon ‘Strategizing for the Future through the Civil Partnership Act’ (2006) 33(2) Journal of Law 
and Society 244, 245; Rundle (n17) 123; N Witzleb ‘Marriage as the ‘Last Frontier’? Same-Sex Relationship 
Recognition in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) International Journal of Family Law 135, 135. 
48 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [6.1]. 
49 [2012] EWCA Civ 394. 
50 ibid, 2 (Thorpe LJ). For discussion of this decision see R George ‘Lawrence v Gallagher [2012] EWCA Civ 
394 – Playing a Straight Bat in Civil Partnership Appeals?’ (2012) 34(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 357. 
51 Property and financial provision for the breakdown of de facto relationships, including registered couple 
relationships, are dealt with under federal law provisions, and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, 
6.3.2.2. 
52 G Watts ‘De Facto Relationships Legislation’ (2009) 23(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 122, 122-3: 
there is one slight difference of treatment noted by Watts, parties to an intact marriage may apply for an 
order during the relationship, whereas de facto couples may only apply after the breakdown of the 
relationship. Maintenance orders during an intact marriage are rare, but Watts notes some examples (in 
fn2) such as Eliades and Eliades (1980) 6 Fam LR 916 where Nygh J ‘made a maintenance order in favour 
of a spouse where the couples had not separated.’ 
53 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Part VIII deals with property, spousal maintenance and maintenance 
agreements for married couples. As J Millbank ‘De Facto Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents: 
Exploring the Scope and Effects of the 2008 Federal Relationship Reforms’ (2009) 23(3) Australian Journal 
of Family Law 1, 9 notes they are ‘rather confusingly… placed’ in different parts of the 1975 Act, ‘and 
numbered in a way that does not reflect the numbering of the pre-existing provisions – so, for example, 
the s 79 factors appear for de facto couples under s 90SM, while s 75(2) is replicated in s 90SF(3).’ 
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government felt that there was ‘a pre-eminence accorded to marriage’ in Australia54 and so this 
separate treatment was indicative of a symbolic distinction between the different relationship 
types. 
This identical treatment on relationship breakdown suggests that the courts are using 
their discretionary powers to redistribute property to better protect the economically 
vulnerable partner on relationship breakdown, and thus performing family law’s protective 
function, in the same way as they do for spouses. But, additionally, in the same way as with 
marriage, partners to the registered couple relationships can opt-out of the legal consequences 
of relationship breakdown in a way that presumably respects party autonomy. Civil partners 
may create financial agreements to determine what happens on the breakdown of their 
relationship,55 and registered partners in Australia may create binding financial agreements56 
that can be drawn up before,57 during58 or after the breakdown of the registered relationship.59 
Even though the same formality requirements apply for both spouses and registered partners in 
relation to financial agreements, a financial agreement will cease to have effect if the parties 
marry each other.60 The same issues regarding power imbalances within personal relationships 
are thus of potentially equal concern in the context of the registered couple relationships as 
they are with marriage.61 
4.1.2.3a The problematic influence of the marriage model 
So far, it has been established that the registered couple relationships are essentially 
replicas of marriage in terms of both legal structure and legal consequences. Transferring the 
marriage model onto other form-based relationships, via different nomenclature, assumes that 
this model is unproblematic, and arguably undermines the whole point of legislating for 
alternatives if they are essentially replicas of marriage. But, the marriage model is problematic 
in a number of ways. 
                                                          
54 Australian Senate Deb 14 October 2008, 39 (Senator George Brandis). See also Australian House of 
Representatives Deb 28 August 2008, 6529 (Julie Bishop). 
55 See Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [131] where Baroness Hale notes that although the 
judgement refers to married couples, the ‘conclusions must apply to couples who have entered into a civil 
partnership.’ 
56 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Part VIIIAB, Division 4. 
57 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90UB. 
58 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90UC. 
59 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90UD. 
60 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90UJ(3). This is consistent with the clarification provided in the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Cth), s90SC that the de facto provisions no longer apply if the de facto partners marry each 
other. 
61 cf Chapter 3, 3.3.2. 
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Leckey is one author who has raised concerns about transplanting the marriage model 
onto same-sex relationships.62 He argues that the rights and responsibilities of marriage are 
most apparent upon separation and there is an absence of data looking at the post-separation 
arrangements of same-sex couples.63 This makes it difficult to assess whether current divorce 
law could provide an adequate remedy in the same-sex context,64 given that this provision has 
developed in the context of female economic dependency.65 Leckey refers to research by 
Giddings66 that points out that same-sex relationships range from ‘the purposefully egalitarian’ 
to those mirroring ‘the most unequal heterosexual stereotypes.’67 This illustrates that he is 
aware that not all same-sex relationships function in the same way. Nevertheless, Leckey 
concludes that same-sex couples are generally more egalitarian because they are more likely to 
keep finances separate and are less likely to have children than opposite-sex couples. These 
differences are relevant because the argument that same-sex couples are the same as opposite-
sex couples has been used to argue for equal legal rights for same-sex couples.68 
Perhaps Leckey is guilty of making generalisations: it is difficult to definitively determine 
the quality of any relationship based on the sexual orientation of the partners alone. As Lind 
explains, lived lives are more complicated than generalisations may suggest69 and as Auchmuty 
notes, relationships of ‘dominance and subordination can exist in any coupling’.70 This suggests 
that Leckey’s observations are not only a concern for same-sex couples because there is reason 
to question the application of the financial remedies provision for all couples; not all formalised 
                                                          
62 See also C Bendall ‘Some are more ‘Equal’ than Others: Heteronormativity in the Post-White era of 
Financial Remedies’ (2014) 36(3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 260, who argues that in 
financial remedies judgments, judges continue to be influenced by heteronormative ideas of the roles of 
husbands and wives. 
63 R Leckey ‘Marriage and the Data on Same-Sex Couples’ (2013) 35(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 179, 179. Since the publication of Leckey’s article, Auchmuty has conducted such a study looking at 
the experience of civil partners of the dissolution process. See R Auchmuty ‘The Experience of Civil 
Partnership Dissolution: Not ‘Just like Divorce’’ (2016) 38(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 152. 
64 Leckey (n63) 183. 
65 ibid 182. He refers to work by authors such as A Esmail ‘’Negotiating Fairness’: a Study on how Lesbian 
Family Members Evaluate, Construct and Maintain “fairness” with the Division of Household Labor’ (2010) 
57 Journal of Homosexuality 591; M Burns, C Burgoyne and V Clarke ‘Financial Affairs? Money 
Management in Same-Sex Relationships’ (2008) 37(2) Journal of Socio-Economics 481; LA Kurdek ‘The 
Allocation of Household Labor by Partners in Gay and Lesbian Couples’ (2007) 28 Journal of Family Issues 
132. 
66 LA Giddings ‘Political Economy and the Construction of Gender: The Example of Housework within 
Same-Sex Households’ (1998) 4 Feminist Economics 97. 
67 Leckey (n63) 182. 
68 ibid 188. 
69 C Lind ‘Sexuality and Same-Sex Relationships in Law’ in B Brooks-Gordon and others (eds) Sexuality 
Repositioned: Diversity and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2004), 117-8. 
70 R Auchmuty ‘What’s so Special about Marriage? The Impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ (2008) 20(4) Child 
and Family Law Quarterly 475, 492. 
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relationships will be identical in terms of the quality of the relationship. It should not be taken 
as a given that the legal consequences of marriage are suitable for marriage, let alone assume 
that they are also suitable for other relationships. Transplanting the legal consequences of 
marriage in their entirety onto other formalised relationships demonstrates a lack of willing to 
challenge the marriage model and a failure of imagination to conceive of the possibility of 
looking beyond the confines of that model. This is important for the thesis because it suggests 
that the influence of the marriage model is a factor that constrains the development of form-
based recognition. 
4.2 Shared benefits of formalised relationships 
An analysis of the registered couple relationships shows that there are three benefits that 
are common to both marriage and the registration options. Firstly, formalised relationships are 
administratively efficient, and part of the reason for this is that the quality of the relationship is 
irrelevant for the purposes of legal validity. This is significant because it highlights a difference 
between form-based and function-based recognition, namely that partners in informal 
relationships must prove that their relationships function in a particular way before that 
relationship will be legally recognised.71 Secondly, the supposed respect for choice and 
autonomy that is offered by form-based recognition is also a shared benefit of the formalised 
relationships that have been discussed so far.72 Thirdly, it is apparent that formalising a 
relationship performs the valuable function of allowing couples to attach a label to their 
relationship. 
4.2.1 Practical benefits: administrative efficiency  
The convenience and simplicity of form-based recognition as opposed to function-based 
recognition was a non-contentious issue in the parliamentary debates in Australia introducing 
the registered couple relationships. The administrative efficiency of form-based relationships 
was seen as a reason to introduce registration options because of the difficulties in identifying 
which relationships qualify for legal recognition under a function-based approach.73 In Tasmania, 
it was noted during consultation that registration allows the practical benefit of enabling 
partners to ‘voluntarily assume a range of legal rights and obligations’.74 In Victoria, the 
                                                          
71 This will be demonstrated fully in Chapters 6 and 7. 
72 The next chapter will explore whether the registered caring relationships also share these benefits. 
73 For comment on these difficulties, see Chapter 2, 2.3.2 and Chapter 6, 6.1.3. 
74 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 32 (Mrs Jackson, Attorney General, Minister for Justice 
and Industrial Relations). See also Tasmanian Legislative Council Deb 27 August 2003, (Mr Aird, Leader of 
the Government in the Council). See also Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 90, (Mr 
Rockliff); Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 111 (Mr Green, Minister for Primary Industries, 
Water and Environment) and Tasmanian Legislative Council Deb 27 August 2008, 10 (Mr Hall). 
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government went as far as to note that registration provides the practical benefit75 of ensuring 
that partners would not ‘be put to the indignity’76 of having to prove the existence of their 
relationship in court.77 The NSW government felt that registration allows easier access to 
existing ‘legal entitlements’.78 As noted in chapter two, the government in England and Wales 
explained that the administrative efficiency of civil partnership, offering ‘legal certainty about 
who had opted in and who had not, and when the legal relationship began and ended’,79 was a 
benefit of introducing this new formalised relationship.80 This suggests that administrative 
efficiency, due to the registration process providing a record of when a relationship began and 
the formal dissolution process providing a formal record of when a relationship ends, is common 
to marriage and the registered couple relationships. 
Another element of the administrative efficiency of formalised relationships lies in the 
fact that there is no need to prove the quality of the relationship for legal recognition; all that is 
necessary is that the required formalities are met and that the relationship is of a particular 
structure. There is no need, for example, for a couple to prove that they cohabit or that they 
have a sexual relationship in order for the registered relationship to be valid. So, in Victoria, the 
legislation provides an unnecessary description of a ‘registrable domestic relationship’ as,  
A relationship between two adult persons who are not married to each other but are a 
couple where one or each of the persons in the relationship provides personal or financial 
commitment and support of a domestic nature for the material benefit of the other, 
irrespective of their genders and whether or not they are living under the same roof.81 
As Rundle observes, this definition is ‘somewhat superfluous’ because any two adults who fulfil 
the eligibility criteria may register; there is no need to prove, for example, that either partner 
                                                          
75 Or a ‘practical mechanism’ as was said by Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 March 2008, 756 (Ms 
Marshall). 
76 This idea of ‘indignity’ was also expressed by others such as, Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 
March 2008, 762 (Mr Hudson). 
77 Relationships Bill 2007 – Explanatory Memorandum, 1. Note also the comments of the Attorney 
General, Mr Hulls, in the Statement of Compatibility with the Charter of Humans Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), in Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 6 December 2007, 4390 – 
‘Registration is conclusive proof of the relationship.’ 
78 NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 23 April 2010, 22240 (Mr Barry Collier, Parliamentary Secretary). Similar 
comments were made by others such as NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 11 May 2010, 22410 (Mr Gerard 
Martin); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 11 May 2010, 22412 (Mr Barry O’Farrell, Leader of the 
Opposition); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 12 May 2010, 22498 (John Robertson). 
79 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [2.3]. 
80 See Chapter 2, 2.2.1.1. 
81 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s5. 
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provides ‘personal or financial commitment to the other.82 Much opposition to the registration 
systems in Australia focussed on a perceived lack of ‘commitment’ involved in registering a 
relationship as opposed to the ‘commitment’ involved in marrying.83 What these opponents 
failed to see is that there is no prior test of ‘commitment’ when marrying or registering a couple 
relationship. The legislators may have intended the parties to be in a committed relationship, or 
to expect commitment following registration but, as Rundle notes, ‘the actual nature of the 
commitment between the couple is defined by the couple themselves and is not subject to any 
external test.’84 Similarly, Baroness Scotland in the Civil Partnership Bill debates noted that 
introducing a clause that civil partners must be in a ‘mutually committed’ relationship was 
unnecessary because, ‘all same-sex couples will make their own decision about how they choose 
to live out their obligations to one another. If we included the words "mutually committed"… 
there would be a real question as to how it would be possible to set a common standard to 
define what the phrase means.’85  
4.2.2 Respect for choice and autonomy 
Respect for a choice and autonomy was given as a reason to favour the creation of a 
registration system in both jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the government emphasised that 
the lack of choice for same-sex couples regarding an option to formalise their relationships in 
the same way as opposite-sex couples was problematic. An opt-in system, such as civil 
partnership, allowed couples choice over whether or not to register, so that responsibilities 
would not be imposed where the parties did not want them.86 This was made especially clear by 
Baroness Scotland, who introduced the Civil Partnership Bill into the House of Lords: ‘the 
important thing is that those people who have committed long-term relationships should have 
the choice to consolidate that relationship and have it formally recognised if they so choose.’87 
It seems that the government felt that an opt-in system was preferable to one where rights are 
imposed regardless of any choice on the part of the parties, and so supposedly would be seen 
as a benefit of a form-based system over one in which recognition is bestowed on the basis of 
the functions of the relationship.  
                                                          
82 Rundle (n17) 135. 
83 For example, Victorian House of Assembly Deb 12 March 2008, 739 (Mr Clark); Victorian House of 
Assembly Deb 12 March 2008, 762 (Mr Weller). 
84 Rundle (n17) 133. 
85 HL Deb 24 June 2004, Vol 662, Col 1358. 
86 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [2.2-2.3]. 
87 HL Deb 22 April 2004, Vol 660, Col 392 (Baroness Scotland of Asthal). See also HC Deb 12 October 2004, 
Vol 425, Col 179 (Jacqui Smith, Deputy Minister for Women and Equalities).  
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The benefit of respecting choice was also mentioned in the debates leading to the 
creation of the registration options in Australia, but the context of the arguments was different 
because as already explained, unmarried couples were already treated almost identically to 
married couples under Australian law. Respect for choice in England and Wales is about allowing 
couples to choose to be legally recognised, or to otherwise ‘choose’ not to be legally recognised. 
In Australia the respect for choice is different because registration allows couples to be certain 
that legal consequences will be bestowed on their relationship,88 as opposed to risking that their 
relationships would not be legally recognised under a function-based approach. In Victoria for 
example, the government made it clear that registration was a means to ‘recognise and dignify 
the free choice of human beings to order their own lives and relationships in freedom, and 
respects that choice in terms of equality’.89 But, it cannot be stressed enough that these ideas 
about form-based systems respecting choice are subject to the same concerns as those 
identified in chapter two: assuming that people know the legal consequences of their legal 
decisions and so will act accordingly to remedy any difficulties makes a ‘rationality mistake’.90  
In addition to this (misguided) idea that form-based relationships respect a couple’s choice to 
have legal consequences bestowed on their relationships, a couple could also be said to be 
choosing to attach a label to their relationship when they register. 
4.2.3 The symbolic importance of ‘recognition’ 
Form-based systems are well placed to perform family law’s symbolic function because 
the act of formalising a relationship attaches a label to that relationship, which allows both the 
state and third parties to understand the familial nature of that registered relationship. As the 
discussion of ‘family display’ in chapter one showed,91 legal recognition of a relationship helps 
validate the nature of that relationship as ‘family’. The government made it clear in the initial 
civil partnership consultation that the symbolic role of recognition was an important benefit of 
the reforms: 
It would provide for the legal recognition of same-sex partners and give legitimacy to those 
in, or wishing to enter into, interdependent, same-sex couple relationships that are 
intended to be permanent. Registration would provide a framework whereby same-sex 
                                                          
88 For discussion of the uncertainty of whether an informal relationship will be legally recognised or not 
under a function-based system, see Chapter 6, 6.1.3. 
89 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 6 December 2007, 4393 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
90 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.3. 
91 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2c. 
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couples could acknowledge their mutual responsibilities, manage their financial 
arrangements and achieve recognition as each other’s partner.92 
Similarly, the Tasmanian Attorney General explained that registration would provide ‘a 
framework in which couples can express their commitment to each other and can receive public 
recognition and support’ for their relationships.93 In Victoria, it was argued that registration 
would allow for the ‘dignity of formal recognition’ of a ‘loving’ and ‘committed’ relationship, 
ensuring that partners ‘have the security of knowing that their decision to commit to a shared 
life with each other is respected in Victoria.’94 
4.3 Distinguishing features: symbolism and social status 
While it’s clear that formalised relationships allow couples to attach a familial label to 
their relationship, what is not yet clear is how the alternative label of a registered couple 
relationship measures up against the label, or the social status, provided by marriage. The 
registered couple relationships, while generating a legal status,95 fail to generate the same social 
status as marriage, and this is partly because of the difficult balancing exercise faced by 
policymakers: they wanted to achieve a measure of equality between same- and opposite-sex 
couples without legislating for same-sex marriage. It will be argued here that the registration 
options do generate some social significance, and so a social status does attach to these 
relationships, although it is debatable whether this social status should be considered as inferior, 
akin or preferable to the social status of marriage. 
4.3.1 A symbolic intent: equal, but distinct? 
Alongside the functional arguments, outlined above, that were part of the rationale 
behind the introduction of the registered couple relationships96 were concerns about equality, 
or the desire to achieve symbolic equality between same- and opposite-sex couples. In England 
and Wales, the government made it clear in the consultation document for civil partnership that 
the reforms were ‘an important equality measure for same-sex couples… who cannot marry’.97 
                                                          
92 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [1.2]. 
93 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 32 (Mrs Jackson, Attorney General, Minister for Justice 
and Industrial Relations). See also Tasmanian Legislative Council Deb 27 August 2003, 4 (Mr Aird, Leader 
of the Government in the Council); Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 90 (Mr Rockliff); 
Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 111 (Mr Green, Minister for Primary Industries, Water 
and Environment) and Tasmanian Legislative Council Deb 27 August 2008, 10 (Mr Hall). 
94 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 6 December 2007, 4393 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). See also 
Victorian Legislative Council Deb 8 April 2008, 874 (Ms Lovell).  
95 For a discussion of the meaning of legal status, see Chapter 2, 2.2.1.3. 
96 See above, 4.1.1. 
97 Women and Equality Unit (n5) [1.2]. 
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The Victorian government emphasised their commitment to promoting ‘the values of equality, 
respect98 and dignity’ because registration ensures that a ‘decision to commit to a shared life’ is 
respected within the state.99 ‘Civil partnerships’ were necessary according to the Queensland 
government because this was ‘a step towards equality’ so same-sex couples could enjoy the 
‘same rights’ as heterosexual couples.100 Similarly, the ACT government stressed that ‘civil 
unions’ were necessary to provide equal treatment for same-sex couples in order to fulfil the 
government’s intention of providing a symbolic means of recognition for those couples.101  
Instead of opening up marriage to same-sex couples as a means of achieving equality, 
which of course the Australian states and territories are prohibited from doing because of 
constitutional limitations,102 both jurisdictions opted for creating new formalised relationships 
that were intended to be similar to, and distinct from, marriage. Jacqui Smith, then Deputy 
Minister for Women and Equality, explained that by introducing civil partnerships the 
government were attempting, 
…to create a parallel but different legal relationship that mirrors as fully as possible the 
rights and responsibilities enjoyed by those who can marry, and that uses civil marriage 
as a template for the processes, rights and responsibilities that go with civil partnership. 
We are doing this for reasons of equality and social justice… civil partnership is not civil 
marriage, for a variety of reasons, such as the traditions and history - religious and 
otherwise - that accompany marriage. It is not marriage, but it is, in many ways - dare I 
say it? - akin to marriage. We make no apology for that.103 
                                                          
98 Others also expressed that the Relationships Bill 2007 was about respect, see: Victorian Legislative 
Assembly Deb 12 March 2008, 760 (Ms Baillieu (Leader of the Opposition)) and Victorian Legislative 
Assembly Deb 12 March 2008, 769 (Ms Thompson). 
99 See also Victorian Legislative Council Deb 8 April 2008, 874 (Ms Lovell). Note the concerns of some who 
opposed the reforms on the grounds that the bill was ‘about symbolism’ such as Victorian Legislative 
Council Deb 8 April 2008, 863 (Mr Rich-Phillips). 
100 Queensland Parliament Deb 25 October 2011, 3363 (A.P Fraser, Deputy Premier, Treasurer and 
Minister for State Development and Trade). See also the comments of the then Premier of Queensland, 
A.M Bligh, Premier and Minister for Reconstruction, (Queensland Parliament Deb 11 November 2011, 
3977) that the bill is about removing discrimination and about ‘dignity and respect for relationships that 
are precious in their own right’. Equality arguments in favour of the legislation were also referred to by 
others such as: Queensland Parliament Deb 11 November 2011, 3980 (Ms Male). 
101 See ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 18 December 2011, 5913 (Mr Corbell, Attorney General, Minister for 
Police and Emergency Services and Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development). 
102 The Australian federal parliament has the constitutional power to legislate for marriage, divorce and 
matrimonial causes under Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s51(xxi) and (xxii). S109 of 
the Constitution declares that if a statute in a state is incompatible with federal law, then the state statute 
will be invalid. Additionally, the ACT Government did attempt to legislate for marriage equality in 2013, 
but the legislation was overturned by the High Court, see discussion in Chapter 3, 3.2.1.5. 
103 HC Deb 09 November 2004, Vol 436, Col 776. 
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The desire for equality meant that marriage was used as a model for civil partnership, because 
anything too different from marriage would not have been ‘equal’. But, there was also a desire 
to keep marriage and civil partnership distinct because of the value ascribed to marriage as a 
heterosexual institution and to placate opponents of same-sex relationship recognition reforms. 
While opponents of civil partnerships argued that the bill ‘undermined marriage’ because of the 
similarities between marriage and civil partnership,104 supporters argued that the two 
relationships were distinct. For example, Baroness Scotland, Minister of State, emphasised that 
the bill did not undermine marriage because it was only open to ‘same-sex couples who cannot 
marry’.105 As Glennon explains, the Civil Partnership Act had ‘a specific agenda’,  
As an equality-based initiative its purpose was to give same-sex couples the opportunity 
to formalise their relationship in law through a civil registration process… The underlying 
rationale was ‘relational equality’, that is, to equalize the status of opposite- and same-
sex couples in terms of choice over relationship formalisation, while at the same time 
preserving the heterosexual definition of marriage. This agenda is highly conformist in 
nature, designed to create a state-sanctioned relationship structure for same-sex 
relationships. Thus the obligations created by registration are modeled on marriage with 
provisions for financial relief on dissolution mirroring ancillary relief provisions.106 
The result of this balancing exercise between the desire to create something equal but distinct 
from marriage, was the creation of registered couple relationships that mirrored the legal 
structure and legal consequences of marriage but were symbolically different. One contentious 
area of difference, especially in Australia, related to the question of whether a ceremony akin 
to a marriage ceremony should be required to register a couple relationship. 
4.3.1.1 The symbolism of a ceremony 
A marriage is created following a ceremony in which a couple exchange vows in front of 
witnesses, followed by registration of the marriage.107 Rundle, writing in the Australian context, 
explains the significance of ceremonies in this way:  
                                                          
104 For example, see Baroness O’Cathain’s comments at HL Deb 22 April 2004 Vol 660, Col 404, that, ‘[t]he 
fact that marriage is so important is sufficient reason to oppose this Bill. The Bill sends out the message 
that marriage—as the fundamental foundation for raising children—can be equated to a homosexual 
relationship. Marriage is profoundly undermined by this Bill.’ 
105 HL Deb 22 April 2004 Vol 660, Col 388. 
106 L Glennon ‘Obligations between Adult Partners: Moving from Form to Function?’ (2008) 22(1) 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22, 27. 
107 See R Gaffney-Rhys ‘Same-Sex Marriage but not Mixed-Sex Partnership: Should the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004 be extended to Opposite-Sex Couples?’ (2014) 26(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 173, 175. 
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The marriage ceremony is a significant point of difference between the means of 
commencing a marriage and other formalised partnerships… There is symbolism in official 
recognition of a ceremony to celebrate the registration of a relationship whether it be 
marriage or a non-married registration form. It signifies that the relationship is valued by 
society.108 
The ceremony, or the wedding, itself is an important symbolic event, and, as identified in chapter 
one, is one possible means by which people display their family practices: family display is 
important because this is how we establish to ourselves and others that our relationship 
practices are familial in nature.109 While legal recognition of a relationship by the state is itself a 
means by which our family practices are legitimated, a ceremony to mark the formation of a 
registered couple relationship is important in a symbolic sense of allowing couples to display 
their family practices to other people – when there is no ceremony, couples miss out on an 
important opportunity of family display. 
In England and Wales, a civil partnership is formed when two people sign the civil 
partnership document in the presence of a registrar and two witnesses,110 and the process of 
signing the document must be a secular event, even though it is possible to hold the signing on 
religious premises.111 Although some MPs felt that a ceremony akin to a wedding was 
appropriate to mark the formation of a civil partnership,112 the government felt that one of the 
distinctions between marriage and civil partnership was that spoken words were not necessary 
to form a civil partnership and that the ‘administrative procedure’ was ‘simple, clear and all that 
[was] necessary.’ It was further noted that there is always an option for a couple to choose to 
hold their own ceremony or religious blessing to mark the occasion.113 
The issue of ceremonies proved to be more contentious in Australia. For example, in 
Victoria, there is no statutory requirement that a ceremony is held to mark the formation of a 
registered relationship, but there is also no prohibition on a couple choosing to hold their own 
ceremony. The Victorian government explained that it was appropriate to allow couples to 
decide for themselves whether to hold a ceremony and to decide on the nature and content of 
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that ceremony.114 It was suggested that ‘the precise definition of marriage’ includes reference 
to a ceremony,115 and so the Victorian government could not legislate for a ceremony because 
this would infringe on federal jurisdiction.116 In fact, the definition of marriage in the federal 
legislation is that of a ‘union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life’,117 which makes no reference at all to the need for a ceremony. 
The reluctance of the Victorian government to include provision for a ceremony is 
understandable when considering the context in which they were legislating. Two years prior to 
the Victorian reforms, the federal government overturned legislation in the ACT creating ‘civil 
unions’ for being too similar to marriage, partly because of a provision involving the making of 
a declaration, or in other words a ceremony, to mark the formation of a civil union.118 While the 
federal government opposed any system of registering a relationship that provided for a 
ceremony, because this was seen to mimic marriage,119 the ACT government believed that a 
legally prescribed ceremony was important because of the symbolism that attaches to such 
events. The comments of one ACT politician in the 2008 debates leading to the introduction of 
‘civil partnerships’,120 the ACT’s compromise solution before legislating again for ‘civil unions’ in 
2012,121 sum up the arguments in this way:  
There is no logic in opposing civil unions whilst encouraging registration. The federal 
government apparently does not object to gay couples or object to legally recognising 
them. It just objects to ceremonies. As one commentator has observed, apparently this is 
a problem with symbolism, not practicalities... The question I would ask is: why shouldn’t 
same-sex partners be able to stand up in front of their family and friends and receive the 
blessing of the state for their union? The federal government is effectively saying that 
some relationships are more legitimate than others and that some loving, committed, 
long-term relationships are, for some inexplicable reason, of lesser value.122 
                                                          
114 Victorian Legislative Council Deb 10 April 2008, 1055-6 (JM Madden). 
115 Victorian Legislative Council Deb 10 April 2008, 1056 (Mrs Peulich). 
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This picks up on the key reasons why ceremonies were such a contentious issue: holding a 
ceremony is a symbolic event of family display that marks the formation of a formal relationship. 
Any option to formalise a relationship which omits a ceremony can then be perceived as 
something ‘less’ than, or inferior to, marriage, in symbolic terms. 
These issues about the importance of symbolism and ceremonies can also be seen in 
Queensland’s journey from ‘civil partnerships’, to ‘registered relationships’ and back again. Their 
original civil partnerships could be entered into via a ceremony, and this was intended to 
enhance the symbolic aspects of the provision.123 Following a change of government in 2012 
however, this symbolic aspect was removed from the legislation, renaming ‘civil partnerships’ 
‘registered relationships’ and removing the option of a ceremony, so as to remove the symbolic 
elements of the legislation to ‘more accurately reflect the purpose and objectives of the Act, 
which [were] to provide for a legislative scheme to register relationships’.124 One MP 
commented that this meant couples could choose whether or not to hold a ceremony, ‘without 
unnecessary interference from the state.’125 The legislation was amended again in 2015126 
following another change of government to allow for an optional ceremony to mark the 
beginning of a ‘civil partnership’.127 The then Attorney General explained that,  
…for many people there is more to acknowledging a relationship than assigning it a 
particular legal status. It is about making a formal commitment to our significant other in 
front of our loved ones and celebrating the love and value we bring to each other’s lives… 
the bill provides couples who are not married with an opportunity to hold an official 
ceremony to acknowledge and celebrate their commitment.128 
This quote encapsulates the reason why ceremonies were such a contentious issue: when no 
ceremony is required to create a registered relationship, this sends out the message that these 
relationships are inferior to marriage in a symbolic sense. The ‘distinct but equal’ discourse of 
the registered couple relationships has created a situation where these relationships are 
identical to marriage in terms of legal structure and consequences, but are different in terms of 
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symbolism. This does not mean that the registered couple relationships generate no social 
status; rather it just means that the perceived value of this social status relative to the marriage 
status is open to debate. 
4.3.2 A different social status? 
Marriage has a long history of legal and social recognition and is ‘deeply embedded in the 
religious and social culture’ of both England and Wales129 and Australia. The relatively new 
registration options do not share this long history and do not generate the same social status. 
Rundle explains it this way, 
There is a raft of social understandings attached to marriage. This social status comes with 
a shared understanding of the terminology of relationships (husband, wife, mother-in-law, 
brother-in-law etc) and the exclusive committed nature of the relationship. Given that the 
legal rights and responsibilities attached to marriage, registered relationships and non-
formalised relationships are almost identical, it is this social status that differentiates 
marriage from other relationship recognition forms. By contrast, the alternative 
relationship registration options are not widely understood.130 
A long history of recognition has led to the development of common, if sometimes divergent,131 
understandings of the expected nature of marriage and an accompanying universally 
understood terminology. The registration options have not had centuries to generate these 
popular meanings. As Auchmuty explains, the ‘highest social status and approval’ that ‘marriage 
confers upon individuals’ is what makes the registered relationships qualitatively different from 
marriage, even if, legally speaking, they guarantee the same rights.132 While the law can 
generate a legal status by creating a new registration option and attaching legal consequences 
to it, the law cannot generate a social status and significance by itself. 
4.3.2.1 An inferior status? 
For some, the social status that attaches to the registration options will always be 
considered inferior to marriage, especially where same-sex couples are prevented from 
marrying. This sense of the inferiority of the civil partnership status was keenly felt by Wilkinson 
and Kitzinger, who, prior to the introduction of same sex marriages, unsuccessfully fought for 
their same-sex marriage conducted in British Columbia to be recognised as a marriage rather 
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than a civil partnership in England and Wales.133 They referred to civil partnership as a 
‘consolation prize’ that was ‘offensive and demeaning’ to same-sex couples and argued that 
there is a symbolic difference between civil partnership and marriage.134 While marriage 
‘represents the highest form of recognition for a committed relationship’, civil partnership paled 
in comparison:135 
This symbolic status of marriage as a fundamental social institution is, in many ways, as 
important as its formal legal status. It provides for social recognition of key relationships, 
and to have our relationship denied that symbolic status devalues it relative to the 
relationships of heterosexual couples.136 
Sir Mark Potter P, dismissing their case, referred to civil partnership as a status,137 but 
made clear that this status is different from that of marriage, as was the government’s intention 
when legislating.138 He claimed that the law does not view civil partnerships as inferior139 and 
that same-sex couples enjoy ‘all the rights, responsibilities, benefits and advantages of marriage 
save the name’.140 He also claimed that many same-sex couples were ‘content with the status 
of same-sex partnership’141 although he cited no evidence to prove this statement. This 
judgment can be criticised for blurring the boundaries between the legal concept of marriage 
and the marriage ideology. Potter P stated that marriage is an ‘age-old institution’ that is ‘valued 
and valuable, respectable and respected’142and that is it ‘primarily, though not exclusively,’143 
procreative in nature.144 As Auchmuty notes, this was a ‘case about the meaning of marriage in 
contemporary Britain’, and it was not necessary for the judge to ‘go beyond the legal definition 
of marriage in English law to dismiss the claim: if marriage is the union of a man and a woman, 
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then a union of two women cannot be “marriage” – end of story.’145 The outcome of the case 
was regrettable: it is somewhat ironic that the symbolic social status of marriage was expressly 
referred to by Potter P, yet somehow he concluded that a denial of this special status for same-
sex couples does not ‘devalue’ those relationships relative to the position of opposite-sex 
couples. 
The perception of civil partnerships as something inferior to marriage is not unique to 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger. A YouGov poll in 2013 found that only 1 in 20 Brits would like to be in a 
civil partnership, compared with ¾ who would like to be married.146 The greatest indicator that 
the substantive equality of civil partnerships was never enough is the fact that same-sex 
marriage has now been legalised147 on the basis of ensuring formal equality. The consultation 
documents issued by the government looking into the introduction of same-sex marriage not 
only had the word ‘equal’ in the titles (such as ‘Equal Civil Marriage: a Consultation), but also 
use phrases such as ‘equal opportunities’148 and ‘we are all equal’.149 As Fineman explains, ‘in its 
simplest form, equality demands sameness of treatment, and differentiation in any sphere may 
be considered a concession of inferiority.’150 The government perceived civil partnership as 
inferior to marriage because of the different social status. Maria Miller, the Minister for Women 
and Equalities, stated that the time had come for Parliament to ‘value people equally before the 
law’,151 and went on to note that, 
To those who argue that civil partnerships exist and contain very similar rights, that 
marriage is “just a word” and that this Bill is unnecessary, I say that that is not right. A 
legal partnership is not perceived in the same way and does not have the same promises 
of responsibility and commitment as marriage. All couples who enter a lifelong 
commitment together should be able to call it marriage.152 
The Minister does not appreciate that ‘responsibility’ and ‘commitment’ are not necessary 
components of a valid marriage, and rather are part of the ideologies that reflect popular 
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notions of the expected nature of marriage.153 Instead, what we see here is that despite the 
similarities between marriage and civil partnership in legal terms, the latter institution is 
perceived as a lesser form of ‘commitment’ due to the difference of nomenclature and 
consequently, the social status of civil partnership is assumed to be inferior to that of marriage. 
Similarly, in the Australian context, where the fight for same-sex marriage continues, a 
2010 study found that almost 55% of same-sex couples who had registered their relationships 
in a state or territory would prefer to be married.154 Witzleb notes that ‘the institution of 
marriage retains a special cultural and social significance’ for many and that the ‘partnership 
registration schemes… lack comparable symbolic value’. This in turn has led to demands for 
allowing same-sex marriage.155 Also, in the same way that civil partnerships have been deemed 
inferior to marriage by the government in England and Wales because of a lack of formal 
equality, the status of registered relationships in Australia is also viewed as inferior by the ACT 
government. The ACT legislated for same-sex marriage in 2013, and the then ACT government’s 
reasons for legislating highlight the perceived deficiencies of the registration options. The then 
ACT Attorney General explained that the 2013 reform was ‘about equality’, ‘which says people 
in a same-sex relationship are able to have their love and commitment to each other legally 
recognised in the same way that people in a heterosexual relationship are able to through a 
legally recognised marriage’.156 A representative of the Green party made the point that there 
is a different social status between marriage and registered relationships even more explicitly, 
The passage of the Marriage Equality Bill is a landmark moment for this Assembly, for the 
ACT community and, indeed, for all the people across the nation who have been waiting 
so long for equal recognition and equal legal status for same-sex attracted Australians. 
This is the beginning of governments in Australia saying no to the historical 
institutionalised discrimination that relegated same-sex couples to a second-class status. 
Denying equal marriage rights to same-sex couples is an affront to human rights that says, 
“You are not allowed to express of formalise your love in the same way as other couples 
in our society.”157 
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The reference to an ‘equal legal status’ is misguided, in that the registered couple relationships 
mirror marriage and attract identical legal consequences, and do generate an equal legal status; 
the difficulty with the registered relationships is that they fail to generate the same social status 
as marriage. But, the overall point made remains significant: while marriage remains out of 
reach for same-sex couples, the registration options will be viewed by many as inferior to 
marriage.  
4.3.2.2 A valuable status? 
Although for many the social status of the registered couple relationships is inferior to 
that generated by marriage, for some the alternative social status is preferable: not everyone 
views marriage in a positive light. Rundle is one commentator who has emphasised that the 
‘symbolic social recognition’ offered by the registered couple relationships is a means by which 
the ‘state sends a message to couples that “your relationship matters”’.158 The registration 
options in Australia are more socially inclusive than marriage in that jurisdiction because, with 
the exception of the ACT’s civil unions, they are open to both same- and opposite-sex couples. 
For opposite-sex couples in Australia there is a choice between marriage and the registered 
relationships, and many couples have chosen to register a relationship rather than marry. 
Rundle noted that in 2011, 330 same-sex couples and 211 opposite-sex couples had registered 
a relationship in Victoria, whereas 128 same-sex and 68 opposite-sex couples had registered 
their relationships in Tasmania. In NSW, 298 same-sex and, significantly, 719 opposite-sex 
couples had registered their relationships.159 As Rundle explains, considering that these 
opposite-sex couples could have married, ‘it is reasonable to deduce that those couples have 
chosen the alternatives in preference to marriage’, and so this suggests that there are ‘attractive 
features of the alternatives for many of the couples who have opted into them.’160 
Initial attempts at introducing civil partnership in England and Wales by two private 
members’ bills were open to both same- and opposite-sex couples,161 and a current bill before 
parliament by Tim Loughton MP attempts to open up civil partnership to opposite-sex 
couples.162 But, the government chose to legislate in 2004 for same-sex couples only because 
opposite-sex couples had the option of marriage.163 Furthermore, following the introduction of 
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same-sex marriage164 the government issued a consultation into the future of civil partnership. 
They found there was a lack of consensus as to the appropriate way forward regarding whether 
civil partnership should be retained, abolished or opened up to opposite-sex couples. As a result 
of the inconclusive consultation, the government has decided to wait, for an unspecified period 
of time, to see what effect same-sex marriage has on the number of same-sex couples who 
remain in and choose to form civil partnership.165  
Steinfeld and Keidan have challenged unsuccessfully the current ban on opposite-sex civil 
partnership in the courts. Steinfeld and Keidan are a heterosexual couple who, as the trial judge 
put it, are in a ‘committed long-term relationship’,166 who have ‘deep-rooted and genuine 
ideological objections to the institution of marriage, based upon what they consider to be its 
historically patriarchal nature’.167 While the couple acknowledge that there are no ‘substantial 
differences between civil marriage and civil partnerships in terms of the legal rights and 
responsibilities they accord’ and ‘that they could continue to conduct their relationship, once 
married, as equals’, the symbolic differences between marriage and civil partnership meant that, 
for them, civil partnership is a preferable status. As such, it is worth exploring their judicial 
review challenge further to determine why the case was unsuccessful.  
Steinfeld and Keidan claimed that having created civil partnership, and alternative 
institution to marriage, the UK government could not exclude opposite-sex couples from it 
because of their sexual orientation. They argued that following the introduction of same-sex 
marriage, the fact that opposite-sex couples are prohibited from entering a civil partnership is 
incompatible with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, taken in conjunction 
with Article 8, right to family life: opposite-sex couples are denied a choice, one that is available 
for same-sex couples, in how they formalise their relationships, and there is no legitimate aim 
for this difference of treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. 
Andrews J in the High Court recognised that ‘there will be many people who sympathise’ 
with the claimants168 but nevertheless dismissed the claim and found that the case did not fall 
within the ambit of Article 8. Denying the status of civil partners to the claimants did not 
‘interfere with their love, trust, confidence, or mutual dependence and has placed no constraints 
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on their social intercourse’ and so did not affect their ability to live as a family;169 they could 
marry to obtain formal recognition of their relationship. Andrews J stated that, 
The only obstacle to the claimants obtaining the equivalent legal recognition of their 
status and the same rights and benefits as a same-sex couple is their conscience… Whilst 
their views are of course to be afforded respect, it is their choice not to avail themselves 
of the means of state recognition that is open to them. The state has fulfilled its obligations 
under the Convention by making a means of formal recognition of their relationship 
available. The denial of a further means of formal recognition which is open to same-sex 
couples, does not amount to unlawful state interference with the claimants' right to family 
life or private life, any more than the denial of marriage to same-sex couples did prior to 
the enactment of the 2013 Act.170 
Steinfeld and Keidan’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on different reasoning 
to the High Court decision. Contrary to Andrews J’s judgment, all three judges agreed that the 
civil partnership regime does fall within the ambit of Article 8.171 Arden LJ explained that ‘couples 
in a stable relationship enjoy “family life”, and ‘states have a positive obligation to ensure 
respect for family life, and the registration of civil unions is a mean of, or modality for, promoting 
family life.’172 The ‘non-availability’ of civil partnerships to opposite-sex couples means that 
same- and opposite-sex couples are ‘treated differently in a relevant respect’ and so, ‘the 
availability of the option of civil or religious marriage is not a good answer to the appellants’ 
appeal.’173 Briggs LJ elaborated on this point and noted that the discrimination is not simply that 
same-sex couples have two options to formalise and opposite-sex couples only have one; but, 
that there is a group of people who object to marriage because of its ‘supposedly patriarchal 
origins’ and that same-sex couples belonging to this group may enter a civil partnership instead 
of a marriage while opposite-sex couples have no such choice.174 
The government argued that this was a case about legal rights and not ‘labels’, and so 
because the only difference between marriage and civil partnership was the nomenclature the 
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appellants had no complaint.175 Arden LJ convincingly dismissed this line of argument and 
acknowledged that even in questions about legal rights, ‘labels’ are important, 
The [Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013] gave same-sex couples the same rights as 
they could obtain by entering [civil partnerships] but through an institution with the name 
of “marriage”. To same-sex couples, the name “marriage” was important in removing the 
implication that their relationship was less worthy than that of opposite-sex couples. The 
appellants hold a view about the term “marriage” being patriarchal and inconsistent with 
equality between the sexes. The presence in Parliament of a proposal to extend [civil 
partnerships] to opposite-sex couples suggests that the appellants are not alone in their 
view. If the name of an institution for recognition of their relationship is treated by 
Parliament as significant for same-sex couples, the name of another institution for that 
purpose may have significance for other couples too.176 
This approach towards civil partnership is to be welcomed because it gives proper consideration 
to the issues of social status and symbolism that are so significant in this area, and which Potter 
P failed to acknowledge in Wilkinson v Kitzinger. In the same way that some will choose to marry 
because of the status of marriage, others will prefer an alternative option with an alternative 
status. 
The regrettable aspect of the case is that the majority felt that the discrimination was 
justified because it served a legitimate and proportionate aim. Beatson J explained that the 
difference in treatment of same- and opposite-sex couples was ‘justified by the Government’s 
legitimate aim of undertaking a proper assessment of the optimum way forward in light of the 
demand by couples (whether same-sex or different-sex) for civil partnerships as well as 
marriage, and inter alia avoiding unnecessary expenditure of taxpayers’ money as well as wasted 
time and effort in making a change that might have to be reversed.’177 Beatson LJ made it clear 
however that the government must make a decision about the future of civil partnerships within 
a ‘reasonable timescale’, but declined to offer a deadline because it is not ‘the function of the 
court’ to ‘micro-manage areas of social and economic policy.’178 It is submitted that Arden LJ’s 
dissent is more convincing. She argued that the government’s ‘wait and see’ policy, while initially 
serving a legitimate aim,179 was not a proportionate response, because the government had not 
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explained how long they would need to come to a decision about the future of civil partnerships, 
or what number of civil partnerships formations would be regarded as sufficient to constitute 
the ‘virtual disappearance’ of the formalised relationship.180 She further explained that 
gathering data on the number of same-sex couples who form civil partnerships gives information 
about that group only and not about the number of opposite-sex couples who may choose to 
enter a civil partnership,181 and that gathering data does not take into account the wider public 
policy issues relating to giving opposite-sex couples ‘the freedom to have a legal framework of 
their choice.’182  
Despite the regrettable outcome, the Court of Appeal judgement is significant in that it 
suggests that there is value in the alternative status of civil partnership. There are cogent 
reasons to extend civil partnership to opposite-sex couples because civil partnership offers an 
opportunity to display family practices and attach a label to the relationship, and the distinct 
social status is sometimes preferable to that of marriage. Formalised relationships are well-
placed to fulfil family law’s symbolic function, partly because of the malleable nature of the 
social status that attaches to these relationships. In the same way that chapter three showed 
that the marriage ideology means different things to different people, the social status of civil 
partnership carries different significance for different people. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Registered couple relationships are best thought of as quasi-marriages. The registration 
options and marriage are similar in terms of both legal structure and legal consequences, and it 
has been shown that both types of formalised relationship share many of the same benefits. 
But, it has also been shown that there is one important difference between marriage and the 
registered couple relationships, which is social rather than legal. The legal status generated by 
marriage and the registered couple relationships are much the same, but the social status 
appears to be different. It has been argued that, while some may idealise marriage and argue 
that the retention of other relationship registration options is unnecessary, these arguments fail 
to appreciate that the marriage ideology does not carry the same, positive, significance for 
everyone. The registration options can provide valuable marriage alternatives for some couples 
by allowing them to gain the protection of the law as well as attaching a familial label to their 
relationship by avoiding the negative connotations they attach to marriage. This suggests that 
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the social status of formalised relationships is malleable and is something that is judged 
subjectively with different people valuing different formalisation options. 
Other than the different social status, this chapter has shown that the registered couple 
relationships mimic marriage. Chapter two suggested that form-based systems have the 
potential to be used in innovative ways,183 but the potential flexibility of the registration options 
appears to have been restricted by the influence of marriage. This is understandable in the 
context of the couple relationships, because the registration options were intended to provide 
same-sex couples an option to formalise their relationships that was akin to marriage. But, 
without a willingness to move beyond the marriage model, form-based recognition does little 
to address the fact that family relationships are diverse, or to address the fact that many 
different types of family relationship may perform valuable functions akin to those expected to 
be performed by spouses and partners in registered couple relationships. The next chapter will 
explore attempts to expand on form-based recognition in ways that respond to family diversity.
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  Chapter 5 – Extending ‘form’ beyond couples: registered caring relationships 
This chapter will explore how form-based recognition can be used to respond to the 
increasing diversity of relationships formed by adults today by exploring attempts to extend civil 
partnerships to particular family relationships in England and Wales and the introduction of 
registered caring relationships in the Australian states of Tasmania and Victoria. It will be argued 
that the attempts at using form-based recognition to provide for relationship types other than 
marriage-like couples in both jurisdictions only hints at the potential of form-based recognition 
to be used in radical ways. The conservative nature of the registration options is partly due to 
the complex reasons behind the reforms, but is also attributable to a failure to challenge the 
dominance of the marriage model. In other words, the influence of marriage has constrained 
the development of attempts to introduce more radical form-based frameworks of relationship 
recognition, as well as the more moderate frameworks discussed in chapter four. 
Firstly, the attempts at reform in England and Wales will be discussed. While there are 
complex reasons at play, it will be argued that the real reason behind the attempts at reform 
was to distract from the opposition of same-sex relationship recognition. It will be shown that 
attempts at reform in England and Wales have focussed solely on the position of same-sex 
couples, and have not challenged the legal privileging of marriage. Secondly, the discussion will 
turn to the reforms in Tasmania and Victoria. It will be shown that similar arguments to those 
used unsuccessfully in England and Wales have been advanced successfully in Australia. But, the 
Australian reforms are not as radical as they may first appear because, upon inspection, the 
registered caring relationships are not that different from marriage. Additionally, the discussion 
will confirm the findings of the last chapter that there are some benefits common to all 
formalised relationships, and that generating a legal status does not automatically generate a 
social status. The chapter will conclude by suggesting that form-based recognition has the 
potential to be used in more radical ways, but this will only be possible with a willingness to 
move beyond the marriage model.  
5.1 Calls for reform in England and Wales 
In England and Wales, marriage and civil partnership are the only options to formalise a 
relationship, but there have been attempts to change this position. Firstly, there was an attempt 
to amend the Civil Partnership Bill 2004 to allow relationships between certain relatives to 
register as civil partners. Secondly, following the enactment of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, 
two unmarried sisters challenged the provision that prohibits those in certain family 
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relationships from entering a civil partnership in the European Court of Human Rights. These will 
be discussed in turn.  
5.1.1 Civil partnerships for (some) relations of consanguinity 
Some opponents of the Civil Partnership Bill claimed that the introduction of civil 
partnership would create more injustice than would be remedied because many family 
relationships would be excluded from the bill’s remit.1 Baroness O’Cathain introduced an 
ultimately unsuccessful amendment to the bill in the House of Lords. She claimed that if the 
government were not legislating for ‘gay marriage’, and were truly attempting to remedy 
injustices facing couples who cannot marry, then they should extend the recognition offered by 
civil partnerships beyond same-sex couples and onto other relationships.2 Baroness O’Cathain 
believed the bill did nothing to protect those friends and family members who lived together 
and faced the same hardship as same-sex couples. She gave the examples of two friends who 
‘share a rented house for 20 years’, and if one died, the other would face eviction because they 
would have ‘no right to inherit the tenancy’, or two widowed sisters who lived together, and on 
the death of one sister the survivor would have to pay inheritance tax.3 She further explained, 
The Bill sends out the message that long-term caring family relationships do not matter as 
much as same-sex relationships, irrespective of their duration. Ministers have argued that 
same-sex couples in long-term relationships—loving, committed, celibate and so on…were 
discriminated against in law and suffered serious hardship. However, the cases of 
hardship… applying to same-sex couples also apply for the most part to family members 
who live together.4 
The original amendment would have opened up civil partnerships to ‘families, friends who 
care for each other and elderly people who spend their twilight years looking after each other’.5 
O’Cathain later narrowed the ambit of the amendment so that only close relatives aged over 30 
who have lived together for 12 years6 were included because these were the ‘relationships 
where much of the real hardship arises’, and so relationships between carers and friends would 
not be included.7 Supporters of Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment claimed that the bill failed to 
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provide ‘for the significant number of close relatives’ who lived together and provided ‘mutual 
support’ and ‘care’ for one another.8 As Glennon sums up, the arguments of the amendments 
supporters focussed, 
…on the financial consequences on the death of a person who had been cared for by a 
relative and thus while it was recognised that relations currently have rights in relation to 
hospital visiting and on intestacy, the crux of the 'injustice' was their lack of exemption 
from inheritance and capital gains tax. It was the extension of these benefits to same-sex 
registered partners that was said to create new inequalities and which led critics to 
describe the Bill as 'cruel... suffused with unfair discrimination'.9 
The amendment was passed in the House of Lords at Report Stage by 148 votes to 130,10 but 
was later removed from the bill in the House of Commons. 
5.1.1.1 The difficulties with the amendment 
As Glennon explains, there are two possible interpretations of the motives behind 
Baroness O’Cathain’s amendment, 
On a generous construction one could say that advocates were opportunistic in their 
genuine attempt to address the issue of care-giving in the absence of the political will to 
do so directly. However, on a more cynical interpretation, the inclusion of family members 
was a tactic to disturb the passage of the legislation, or failing that, to make it easier to 
digest by displacing its central objective of extending the legal incidents of marriage to 
same-sex couples and, instead, making it about the value of care-giving responsibilities.11 
To adopt Glennon’s ‘generous construction’, it is possible that genuine concern about the 
position of people in long-term caring relationships were behind the amendments, and so in this 
way the desire to extend family law’s protection onto a more diverse range of relationship types 
may have been influential in the attempt at reform. Baroness O’Cathain and her supporters did 
refer to ideas of the committed loving relationships and mutual support12 provided by partners 
in caring relationships, which echo the ideas about the expected nature of same-sex 
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relationships in the same debates13 (and are similar to the ideas expressed about the expected 
nature of marriage in the later same-sex marriage debates.)14 It is logical to argue that if same-
sex couples should be treated in the same way as opposite-sex couples because both 
relationship types perform similar functions, then caring relationships that perform the same 
functions should also be treated in the same way. These arguments are often used to justify the 
need for a functional system of recognition,15 but here we see them employed to justify 
extending form-based recognition to different types of relationship.   
Arguably, however, it is Glennon’s ‘cynical interpretation’ that sheds light on the genuine 
rationale behind the amendment. The amendment was described by some members of 
parliament as a ‘wrecking amendment’16 because it would have made the bill unworkable. Civil 
partnerships are an inappropriate model to recognise a wider range of family relationships 
because the legal structure of civil partnership is modelled on marriage. For example, to legally 
dissolve a civil partnership, the irretrievable breakdown of a relationship by reference to one of 
four facts must be proved, and this is based on the divorce process, designed for couples.17 The 
grounds for finding a civil partnership void or voidable are also based on marriage. So, for 
example, a civil partnership may be found voidable if the ‘respondent was pregnant by some 
other person than the applicant’.18 It is doubtful whether such provisions are appropriate for 
relationships between close relatives, and they were certainly not created with such 
relationships in mind. Jacqui Smith, the Deputy Minister for Women and Equalities, noted that 
the amendment would lead to ‘myriad legal absurdities’ such as the fact that ‘a woman who 
formed a civil partnership with her grandfather would have her own mother as her 
stepdaughter. A grandfather could leave a survivor's pension to a civil-partner grandson.’19  
There are reasons to suppose that the apparent concern over the position of relatives was 
merely a smokescreen to distract from the fact that Baroness O’Cathain and her supporters were 
opposed to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. For example, O’Cathain commented 
that the bill would give ‘same-sex couples in a civil partnership… a higher status than family 
relationships’, that civil partners would ‘be able to obtain many more rights than those in family 
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relationships’, and that the difficulties faced by same-sex couples because they could not marry 
were the same as those affecting ‘ordinary families’, who ‘are no less deserving.’20 This suggests 
that Baroness O’Cathain did not view same-sex couples as ‘ordinary families’, or perhaps as 
family in any way (let alone in the same category as spouses), and that same-sex relationships 
are consequently not as worthy of legal recognition as ‘family’ relationships.21 In this way, the 
symbolic function of legal recognition in labelling a same-sex relationship as ‘family’ was 
unacceptable to O’Cathain and her supporters, and this is what they truly opposed.  
Additionally, it is only the extension of the legal consequences of marriage to same-sex 
couples that was a cause of concern, and not the historic legal privileging of spouses. Glennon 
notes that the ‘injustice’ that was apparently ‘created’ by the civil partnership legislation, was 
‘inherently bound with and, in fact, contingent upon the perceived benefits accorded to same-
sex civil partners’. Ensuring that same-sex couples were not placed above ‘”ordinary family 
members” in the newly aligned hierarchy of family’ was the real concern of O’Cathain and her 
supporters.22 This can be clearly discerned from some of O’Cathain’s comments. For example, 
If a daughter gives up her job to look after her elderly mother for 20 years, should she be 
denied the same rights, including the financial benefits, which the Bill gives to same-sex 
couples? If a niece goes to live with her disabled aunt and looks after her for 15 years, is 
her love and commitment for her close relation considered to be less important than that 
of a same-sex couple? The niece has to pay inheritance tax if she inherits her aunt's estate, 
but the survivor of a same-sex couple in a registered partnership would not. Is this situation 
fair and just? I think not.23 
Even if the amendment was partly motivated by a genuine concern that more family 
relationships should be recognised by the law, these relationships should not be legally 
recognised simply as an attempt to diminish the value of recognising same-sex relationships in 
a similar way to opposite-sex relationships. The amendment would have led to a situation where 
neither the concerns of same-sex couples nor relationships between close relatives would 
receive appropriate recognition.24 The amendment ultimately failed because it attempted to 
achieve a goal that there was no support for and was not in line with the reform that was being 
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sought. The government introduced civil partnership to give same-sex couples a measure of 
equality, and Baroness O’Cathain and her supporters attempted to hijack this reform to achieve 
a different aim, of legally recognising a broader variety of family relationships, without 
considering whether the marriage-model of relationships is suitable for transplanting onto other 
types of relationship. 
5.1.2 The Burden sisters’ case 
The second challenge to the scope of civil partnerships involved the Burden sisters in 
Burden and Burden v United Kingdom.25 The Burdens had lived together all their lives and jointly 
owned property. Each had made a will leaving all her property to the surviving sister. Their 
complaint was that when one sister died, the survivor would be faced with an inheritance tax 
bill that might cause her to have to sell the family home. The sisters felt that they were 
discriminated against: although they lived in an analogous position to same-sex couples, and 
‘had chosen to live together in a loving, committed and stable relationship for several decades, 
sharing their only home, to the exclusion of other partners’,26 they could not enter a civil 
partnership to take advantage of the inheritance tax exemption. Prima facie, this is an argument 
about the exclusion of some family relationships from family law’s protective function: were the 
sisters able to formalise their relationship, the surviving sister would have been protected on 
the other’s death by not having to sell their home. But, on closer examination, and similarly to 
the civil partnership debates discussed above, it seems that it was family law’s protection of 
same-sex couples that was the true issue for the sisters. For example, Joyce Burden was quoted 
in the media as saying that the ‘government is always going out of its way to give rights to people 
who have done nothing to deserve them. If we were lesbians we would have all the rights in the 
world. But we are sisters and it seems we have no rights at all.’27 
The sisters took their case to the European Court of Human Rights, and relied on Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol 
1.28 As Auchmuty puts it, the sisters’ argument was that, 
There was no sexual obligation in a civil partnership, unlike marriage, and that the only 
reason they did not bear the legal obligations of spouses and civil partners was that they 
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were prohibited from marrying or registering a civil partnership. If the aim of the [Civil 
Partnership Act] was to promote stable and committed relationships, there could be no 
legitimate reason to exclude the Burden sisters, since their relationship could equally be 
described in this way.29 
It should be made clear that in the same way there is no ‘sexual obligation’ for civil partnership, 
chapter three showed that there is also no ‘sexual obligation’ for marriage because the existence 
of a sexual relationship is not necessary for legal validity and is better thought of as part of the 
ideology of marriage.30 Perhaps acknowledging that sex is not a requirement of either civil 
partnership or marriage would have strengthened the sisters’ argument: their relationship 
functions in a similar way to those of spouses and civil partners, and so should be treated in a 
similar way. 
Auchmuty goes on to explain that following the creation of civil partnership, which 
extended many of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples,  
…it was inevitable that other groups would call for similar rights. The civil partnership was 
a useful legal tool for the Burdens precisely because it was a new status potentially 
susceptible to manipulation in a way that marriage, in this country, has proved not to be. 
It would have been inconceivable for the Burdens to have argued that they deserved to be 
counted as married under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in order to avail themselves 
of the inheritance tax exemption.31 
In fact, chapter three showed that marriage, as a form-based model of relationship recognition, 
is inherently flexible and that it has changed considerably over the past 100 years; even 
elements once considered fundamental to the institution, such as the prohibition on marriage 
between same-sex couples, have been subject to change.32 But, Auchmuty is correct insofar as 
she suggests that the Burden sisters would not have claimed that they should be allowed to 
marry. The marriage ideology is powerful and, despite the fact that different people focus on 
different elements of the ideology,33 the idea that two sisters could marry would be 
inconceivable as the ideologies surrounding marriage currently stand, and so the legal structure 
of marriage is highly unlikely to be changed in this way. In the same way that Baroness O’Cathain 
                                                          
29 Auchmuty (n28) 208. 
30 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1.4a. 
31 Auchmuty (n28) 211. 
32 See Chapter 3, 3.2. 
33 For example, Chapter 3, 3.4.1 showed that while supporters of same-sex marriage focus on the loving, 
supportive, caring nature of marriage, opponents focus on issues of sex and procreation. 
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and her supporters failed to challenge the privileged position of marriage in the civil partnership 
debates, the Burden’s case only challenged the extension of the legal consequences of marriage 
onto civil partners while the legal privileging of marriage remains unquestioned.  
5.1.2.1 The Lower Chamber’s decision: an objectively justifiable difference of treatment 
The decision of the Lower Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights was 
unanimous with respect to determining that the sisters’ case was admissible, but opinion was 
divided 4:3 about whether there had been a violation of article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 1 of Protocol 1. The majority found that the UK had not exceeded its margin of 
appreciation when extending the inheritance tax exemption to civil partners only. They accepted 
that marriage confers ‘a particular status on those who’ enter it and, therefore, the UK did not 
exceed its margin of appreciation because the different treatment ‘pursues a legitimate aim, 
namely to promote stable, committed heterosexual and homosexual relationships by providing 
the survivor with a measure of financial security’.34 The majority believed it was not possible to 
criticise the UK ‘for pursuing, through its taxation system, policies designed to promote 
marriage; nor can it be criticised for making available fiscal advantages attendant on marriage 
to committed homosexual couples.’35 The majority did not consider whether the sisters were in 
an analogous position with civil partners, as would be expected in a case involving 
discrimination,36 because even ‘if the applicants can be compared to such a couple, the 
difference in treatment is not incompatible with Article 14.’37  
Judge Pavlovschi disagreed, and thought that the majority decision was ‘legal, but unfair’38 
because they failed ‘to adduce a reason or argument’ as to why the UK had not exceeded its 
margin of appreciation.39  Judges Bonello and Garlicki in a joint dissenting judgment stated that 
the majority did not give sufficient reasons as ‘to why and how such injustice [could] be justified’ 
as a ‘mere reference to the margin of appreciation is not enough.’40 They argued that the tax 
exemption for spouses only was justifiable, but that when that exemption was extended to other 
                                                          
34 Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (n25) [59]. 
35 ibid [59]. 
36 N Barker ‘Rethinking Conjugality as the Basis for Family Recognition: A Feminist Rewriting of the 
Judgement in Burden v United Kingdom’ (2016) 6(6) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1249, 1257.  
37 Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (n25) [58]. 
38 ibid [O-II2-3]. 
39 ibid [O-II4]. See also [O-II8-9]: Judge Pavlovschi was concerned that the house was ‘not simply a piece 
of property’ but was ‘something with which they have a special emotional bond’ and it was ‘absolutely 
awful’ that the surviving sister might have to sell the home to pay the inheritance tax bill. Auchmuty (n28) 
212 and Baker (n28) 330 both point out that the surviving sister would not have needed to sell the home 
to pay the inheritance tax bill. 
40 Burden and Burden v United Kingdom (n25) [O-I1]. 
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groups, the state had to justify the extension of that privilege to only that group and not beyond 
them. Bonello and Garlicki in a similar vein to the Burden sisters and Baroness O’Cathain 
believed that the positions of ‘permanently cohabiting same-sex couples’ and ‘permanently 
cohabiting siblings’ were similar: 
The situation of permanently cohabiting siblings is in many respects – emotional as well 
as economical – not entirely different from the situation of other unions, particularly as 
regards old, or very old people. The bonds of mutual affection form the ethical basis for 
such unions and the bonds of mutual dependency form the social basis for them. It is very 
important to protect such unions, like any union of two persons, from financial disaster 
resulting from the death of one partner.41 
They go on to argue that the UK position meant that the sisters had no choice as to whether to 
formalise their relationship, 
The situation of permanently cohabiting siblings under the UK legislation has also been 
negatively affected by the fact that – being within prohibited degrees of relationship – 
they cannot form a civil partnership, In other words, they have been deprived of the 
possibility of choice offered to other couples.42 
According to the majority, the status of marriage allows the state to treat spouses 
differently so as to encourage ‘stable’ and ‘committed’ relationships. Presumably then, even 
though they do not make the point expressly, the majority feel that due to the way in which civil 
partnership is modelled on marriage, and generates a similar legal status, it is legitimate to 
extend this privilege to civil partners. The minority accept that privileging marriage is a legitimate 
aim but believe that extending the benefits of marriage to some relationships but not others 
requires justification. They made the point that the sisters’ relationship was one that exhibited 
emotional and financial interdependency in the same way as ‘other unions’, and so any 
difference of treatment between the relationship types required cogent justification. So, the 
starting point for all the judges was that privileging marriage is legitimate and acceptable.  
5.1.2.2 The Grand Chamber’s decision: a qualitative difference between couples and siblings 
The Burdens appealed to the Grand Chamber, which ruled against them with a majority 
decision of 15:2. The majority followed the lower court’s decision, although gave different 
reasons. Unlike the lower court, the Grand Chamber stated that the sisters were not in an 
                                                          
41 ibid [O-I3]. 
42 ibid [O-I3]. 
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analogous position with spouses and civil partners because ‘the relationship between siblings is 
qualitatively of a different nature to that between married couples and homosexual civil 
partners.’43 What made these relationships ‘qualitatively’ different was the fact that 
consanguinity bound the sisters together, and people related by consanguinity cannot marry or 
enter a civil partnership,44 whereas marriage is an institution that ‘confers a special status on 
those who enter into it’,45 and spouses and civil partners exercise a choice to formalise their 
relationship: 
Rather than the length or the supportive nature of the relationship, what is determinative 
is the existence of a public undertaking, carrying with it a body of rights and obligations of 
a contractual nature.46 
This legally binding agreement sets marriage and civil partnership apart from other forms of 
‘cohabitation’.47  
This reasoning was criticised by four judges, two of whom ultimately agreed with the 
majority’s decision48 while the other two dissented. Judge Bjorgvinsson’s concurring opinion 
employed functional arguments to establish that the sisters were in an analogous position with 
spouses and civil partners and that ‘for most practical purposes…’ the sisters’ relationship had 
‘more in common with the relationship between married or civil partnership couples, than there 
[were] differences between them’.49  He noted that it is for the government to decide whether 
to extend the benefits of marriage to other relationships and that the different treatment in this 
instance was ‘reasonably and objectively justified’50 because extending the benefits of marriage 
may ‘potentially’ have ‘important and far reaching consequences for the social structure of 
society’.51 Although Bjorgvinsson notes that those relationships that are similar by their nature 
should be treated similarly, he still concludes that there is something distinctive about marriage 
and civil partnership that makes different treatment legitimate. 
                                                          
43 Burden v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38, [62]. 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid [63]. 
46 ibid [65]. 
47 ibid. But, Chapter 3 explained that married couples do not have to live together for the purposes of 
validity of the relationship, and neither do civil partners as has been explained in Chapter 4. 
48 Judge Bratza also issued a concurring opinion and preferred the reasoning of the lower court: Burden v 
United Kingdom (n43) [O-I2]. 
49 ibid [O-II5]. 
50 ibid [O-II6]. 
51 ibid [O-II7]. 
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Judge Borrego Borrego in a dissenting judgment rightly criticises the majority’s reasoning 
for being ‘circular’: the sisters are related by family, which makes them different because they 
have not formalised their relationship, but they could not formalise because they are related. 
Similarly, Judge Zupancic’s believed the majority reasoning was ‘logically inconsistent’.52 
Zupancic accepted that giving tax benefits to spouses is legitimate,53 but that once this benefit 
has been given to other relationships, ‘the door is open for reconsideration of the question 
whether the denial of tax advantage to other modes of association is rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.’54 He asked,  
…why would consanguinity be any less important than the relationship between married 
and civil partners? Of course, the quality of consanguinity is different from sexual 
relationships but this has no inherent bearing on the proximity of the persons in question… 
So what does the qualitative difference referred to by the majority come to? Is it having 
sex with one another that provides the rational relationship to a legitimate government 
interest?55 
For Judge Zupanic, treating relationships differently because one is a sexual relationship and the 
other is a relationship between relatives is ‘simply arbitrary’.56 Perhaps one problem with the 
Burden case was that the focus on the inheritance tax exemption meant that the European Court 
of Human Rights was not required to address the broader issue of the rationale for formal 
recognition of some relationships but not others. Barker has explained that the Burden case,  
…highlights the need for a principled re-evaluation of the legal benefits associated with 
marriage: is there good reason why legal protections of various kinds must be sexually 
transmitted, or could they be disaggregated from the institution of marriage and 
distributed in a different way, or could they be abolished?57 
To take issue with some of what Barker says, it may be more accurate to say that the legal 
benefits associated with marriage are bestowed on that relationship because of its formal 
nature, rather than because of any requirement that marriage be a sexual relationship. But the 
point remains that despite the mixed reasons behind the Burden sisters’ case, and Baroness 
O’Cathain’s amendment to the Civil Partnership Bill, there is a case for considering why 
                                                          
52 ibid [O-III1]. 
53 ibid [O-III12]. 
54 ibid [O-III13]. 
55 ibid [O-III14-O-III15]. 
56 ibid [O-III20]. 
57 Barker (n17) 68. 
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relationships that function in similar ways are treated differently by the law. This is especially so 
in light of the discussion in the last chapter showing that functional arguments have been 
influential in the development of new registered couple relationships,58 and chapter one showed 
that it is often the functions that relationships perform that mean they are ‘family’ 
relationships.59 
Although these attempts to argue that the provisions of the Civil Partnership Act were 
discriminatory failed to change the structure of civil partnership they are important because 
they suggest that form-based recognition can be used in ways that provides for family diversity. 
Similar arguments to those advanced in England and Wales have been used successfully in 
Australia to create a new type of formalised relationship: the registered caring relationships. 
5.2 The Australian experience: ‘caring relationships’ 
Tasmania legislated for registered caring relationships in 2003,60 and Victoria followed suit 
in 2009.61 Although these reforms appear radical at first glance, a closer examination reveals 
that they are not particularly radical because they are based on the marriage model. To show 
this, it will be argued firstly that the main reason why the caring relationships were introduced 
was to placate opponents of same-sex relationship recognition. It will be suggested that the lack 
of genuine concern for those in caring relationships is a reason why the reforms are conservative 
in nature. Secondly, the legal structure and the legal consequences of these relationships will be 
explored to show that, although there are differences between the caring relationships and 
marriage, the reforms are not as radical as they could have been. Thirdly, and building on the 
arguments in the last chapter, it will be argued that while there are some benefits common to 
all formalised relationships, one of the most important differences between them is social rather 
than legal. 
5.2.1 Why were registered caring relationships introduced? 
According to Graycar and Millbank, there was no empirical evidence to suggest that legal 
recognition of non-couple relationships was necessary in Australia.62 Due to this lack of 
evidence, it is necessary to analyse the parliamentary debates to discern why this reform was 
                                                          
58 See Chapter 4, 4.1.1. 
59 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2b. 
60 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas). 
61 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), as amended by the Relationships Amendment (Caring Relationships) Act 
2009 (Vic). 
62 R Graycar and J Millbank ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to 
Relationship Recognition’ (2007) 24 Washington University’s Journal of Law and Policy 121, 153. 
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believed to be necessary. This is important because it gives insight into the rationales that are 
behind the development of new types of formalised relationship.  
On examination, it becomes apparent that the precise rationale for the introduction of 
the registered caring relationships is unclear. Like Glennon’s comments about the differing 
interpretations of Baroness O’Cathain’s attempt to amend the Civil Partnership Bill,63 a 
‘generous construction’ of the Australian debates hints at a need to recognise a diversity of 
families and recognise the value of caring relationships, and bring these relationships under 
family law’s protection. But, a more ‘cynical interpretation’ leads to the conclusion that the true 
purpose of the reforms was to undermine the significance of allowing same-sex couples to 
register their relationships and have their relationships recognised as ‘family’, by moving the 
focus away from same-sex couples and onto caring relationships.  
5.2.1.1 The generous interpretation: recognising diversity and valuing care 
The Tasmanian Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Community Development 
produced a report that formed the basis of the 2003 reforms and acknowledged that ‘the 
traditional family is but one of many different family types, all sharing similar values and 
confronting the same difficulties as traditional families’. These different types of family may live 
in ‘marriage-like’ or ‘non-sexual’ relationships where partners ‘share their lives in a mutually 
supportive relationship involving emotional and economic interdependence.’64 Partners to non-
sexual relationships were ‘disadvantaged in areas of property rights, intestacy and other 
entitlements’65 because their relationships were not recognised by law. This suggests that there 
were practical reasons behind the reforms relating to a need to access certain legal 
consequences that would benefit partners in non-sexual relationships, or in other words a need 
for more family relationships to enjoy family law’s protective function. 
The Tasmanian government did not give an explicit reason why caring relationships were 
included in the 2003 reforms and they were rarely mentioned in the parliamentary debates.66 
The focus of the debates was on the reforms to allow the recognition of same-sex couples as 
‘significant partners’, which meant that same- and opposite-sex couples would be treated 
                                                          
63 Discussed above, 5.1.1.1. 
64 Joint Standing Committee on Community Development ‘Report on the Legal Recognition of Significant 
Personal Relationships’ (Parliament of Tasmania, 2001), 22-3. 
65 ibid 25. 
66 Mr Jim Bacon (Premier) (Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 92) was an exception to this 
general observation however, as he emphasised that the reforms were ‘about relationships’ and ‘not 
specifically or only about same-sex relationships’ as was Mrs Smith (Tasmanian Legislative Council Deb 27 
August 2003, 19) who comments on the ‘very little cursory comment on caring relationships.’ 
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identically. The government did note, however, that they had a responsibility to recognise the 
changing nature of family relationships and this includes people who may live with a carer or a 
companion.67 The Attorney General gave the example of ‘two elderly companions who may have 
lived together for many years and who have supported each other in practical and emotional 
ways’ as a type of relationship that could benefit from legal recognition.68 This suggests that the 
government intended to recognise a wider variety of family relationships when those 
relationships performed particular functions that are reminiscent of those expected of marriage 
and the registered couple relationships.69 
Similarly, the Victorian government believed that creating registered caring relationships 
was necessary to provide a ‘broader concept of relationship’ that could ‘for example, include 
two adult companions, or two adult siblings’.70 The then government acknowledged ‘that people 
form a diverse range of relationships’ and so the option to register a caring relationship, or a 
couple relationship, allows individuals to ‘define which of their personal relationships is most 
important’ to them.71 ‘Caring relationships’ were to provide the legal recognition of a 
relationship between two adults ‘who have a mutual commitment to support each other in 
practical and emotional ways’,72 echoing the sentiments of the Tasmanian Attorney-General 
relating to the functions performed by caring partners that means that their relationships are 
worthy of legal recognition. 
In addition to notions of recognising different family relationships where they are 
characterised by care, it was also apparent from the Victorian debates that the function of caring 
itself was seen as particularly valuable for society.73 Mr Noonan in the Legislative Assembly 
Debates explained that the 2009 reforms, 
                                                          
67 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 29-32 (Mrs Jackson (Minister for Justice and Industrial 
Relations)). 
68 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 32 (Mrs Jackson, Minister for Justice and Industrial 
Relations). 
69 See Chapter 3, 3.4 and Chapter 4, 4.1.1. 
70 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4572 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). See also the 
comments of Ms Thomson (Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 4938) that as society 
ages, ‘recognising and understanding the significance of these relationships and what they mean to the 
individuals involved in them is important.’ See also Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 
4940 (Mr Noonan). 
71 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4574 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
72 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4572 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
73 The 2009 reforms saw very little opposition with all the parties supporting the legislation. Mr Finn 
(Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 40) did oppose the reforms, claiming that ‘this bill is not an 
immoral bill and it is not an unethical bill — it is just a very stupid bill… For years we have been told by 
various groups around the community that we should stay out of their lives, that we should stay out of 
their bedrooms, that we should leave them alone and that we should just let them live their lives. Now 
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…recognised that a valuable relationship can be based in the act of giving ongoing care 
and/or mutual support to another, regardless of whether the relationship has a sexual 
aspect to it… the bill recognises the inherent value to society in caring relationships. It 
acknowledges that despite the absence of a sexual element that is present in domestic 
relationships, caring relationships are similar in that either one person is reliant upon the 
other or both rely upon each other in the course of their day-to-day lives.74  
Similarly, Mr Kavanagh in the Legislative Council Debates noted that ‘caring relationships are 
extremely valuable; they are central to the quality of life of many people.’75 There were also 
references to the need to allow partners in caring relationships to ‘gain legal protection for each 
other’ by registering,76 and the selfless nature of a caring relationship where partners commit 
to caring for one another, not for ‘monetary return’, but simply because they love each other.77 
Taken together, this all suggests that prima facie, the caring relationships were thought 
necessary to allow relationships characterised by care and support to be legally recognised, and 
be protected by family law. But, on a closer examination of the context surrounding the reforms, 
it becomes apparent that the true rationale is rather more complicated. 
5.2.1.2 A cynical interpretation: mitigating the significance of equality for same-sex couples? 
A more cynical rationale cannot be ruled out,78 and arguably the reforms were introduced 
to placate opponents of same-sex relationship recognition. Tasmania created a registration 
option for partners in caring relationships in 2003 at the same time as they introduced a 
registration option for same- and opposite-sex couples,79 and Victoria legislated to provide for 
registered caring relationships in 200980 to fulfil a government promise when legislating to 
create a registration option for same- and opposite-sex couples in 2008.81 During the 2010 
parliamentary debates in New South Wales (NSW) to create an option to register a couple 
                                                          
we have a government that wants to register every relationship that anybody could ever have with 
anybody else.’ 
74 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 4940 (Mr Noonan). 
75 Victorian Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 36 (Mr Kavanagh). 
76 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 4941 (Mr Howard). See also Victorian Legislative 
Council Deb 3 February 2009, 37 (Ms Pulford); Victorian Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 38 (Mr 
Scheffer); Victorian Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 39 (Ms Darveniza). 
77 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 4938 (Ms Thomson). 
78 Chapter 7 will also explain that there was dubious reasoning behind the introduction of function-based 
recognition of informal caring relationships: see Chapter 7, 7.2.2. 
79 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas). 
80 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), as amended by the Relationships Amendment (Caring Relationships) Act 
2009 (Vic). There is no legal recognition of informal caring relationships in Victoria.  
81 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 6 December 2007, 4393 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General); Victorian 
Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4572 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
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relationship, an amendment was proposed in Committee to allow the registration of ‘carers’ 
relationships’.82 The NSW government would not support the amendment because the purpose 
of the relationships register was to allow de facto couples to register their relationships and gain 
easier access to legal rights and responsibilities under state and federal law and so the benefit 
of registering for carers was ‘zero’.83 The then NSW Attorney General made the following 
comments about the rationale behind the reforms in Tasmania and Victoria to create registered 
caring relationships, 
…the circumstances in which the Tasmanian and Victorian legislation led to having those 
provisions was very much as a result of political compromise in order to be able to secure 
the support of some MPs who otherwise would not have supported the legislation at the 
request of various stakeholders.84 
If this was the case, registered caring relationships were not truly introduced because of a need 
to recognise a broad variety of family relationships; rather, they were introduced to diminish 
the significance of granting a measure of equality to same-sex couples. In the same way as 
happened in England and Wales, the calls for protecting partners in caring relationships were 
merely a distraction from the opposition to the legal recognition of same-sex couples as family 
relationships. 
Graycar and Millbank explain that when LGBT groups began campaigning for the legal 
recognition of different types of family relationship in the early 1990s, they envisaged that the 
‘non-couple’ category would represent ‘a progressive gesture, to make a break from a 
hierarchical pattern of relationship rights with marriage at the top’.85 But, in recent years the 
non-couple category ‘has been, arguably, completely "captured" by conservative opponents of 
gay and lesbian equality movements who now promote it - in a very different light - as their own 
reform agenda.’86 Graycar and Millbank point out that the attempt to amend the civil 
partnership bill in England and Wales and the promotion of the non-couple category by 
opponents of same-sex recognition in Australia are both indicative of the same trend, 
                                                          
82 NSW Legislative Council Deb 12 May 2010, 22514-6 (Fred Nile). 
83 NSW Legislative Council Deb 12 May 2010, 22519 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). But, as will be explained 
in Chapter 7, 7.1.2, NSW does have function-based recognition of informal ‘close personal relationships’. 
The Attorney General did not mention why it was not beneficial for partners in close personal 
relationships to have easier access to the legal consequences of those relationships. 
84 NSW Legislative Council Deb 12 May 2010, 22518 (John Hatzistergos, Attorney General). 
85 Graycar and Millbank (n62) 150; cf Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service ‘The Bride wore Pink: The Legal 
Recognition of our Relationships (A Discussion Paper)’ (1993) 3 Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 
67.  
86 Graycar and Millbank (n62) 150. 
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What these debates reveal is the way in which the non-couple category has been co-opted 
by opponents of equality using formal equality rhetoric and false comparators (same-sex 
couples with same-sex non-couples) in order to position themselves as the ultimate 
equality seekers….what is remarkable about this particular strategy is that it reconfigures 
same-sex relationship reforms as actually worsening rather than alleviating inequality and 
discrimination, through the construction of another (more) deserving and unrecognized 
group, the "domestic co-dependants."87 
Even though it appears likely that expansion of form-based recognition to include 
registered caring relationships has come about for reasons not truly related to promoting 
inclusivity and evolving ideas about family relationships, they nonetheless provide an example 
of formalised relationships being used in new ways to recognise diverse relationships. As such, 
it is worth exploring the nature of the relationships in more depth. 
5.2.2 Australia’s registered caring relationships 
Upon examination, it is clear that the registered caring relationships only hint at the 
potential of form-based recognition to be used in radical ways because the legal structure and 
legal consequences of these relationships are very similar to those of marriage and the 
registered couple relationships. To show this, the legal structure of the relationships, in terms 
of entry and exit requirements, will be discussed, followed by a discussion of the legal 
consequences that are bestowed on the caring relationships. 
5.2.2.1 Relationship type – the legal structure of the caring relationships 
There is a statutory definition of caring relationships in both Tasmania and Victoria. The 
Tasmanian legislation defines a caring relationship as,  
…a relationship other than a marriage or significant relationship between two adult 
persons whether or not related by family, one or each of whom provides the other with 
domestic support and personal care.88 
Similarly, the Victorian legislation defines caring relationships as a relationship, 
…between two adult persons who are not a couple or married to each other and who may 
or may not otherwise be related by family where one or each of the persons in the 
                                                          
87 Graycar and Millbank (n62) 152-3. 
88 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5(1). 
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relationship provides personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature 
for the material benefit of the other, whether or not they are living under the same roof.89 
These definitions are in part superfluous, and could be viewed as statements of the intention of 
the governments when legislating that the relationships registered as caring relationships are 
those that exhibit the particular functions of ‘domestic support and personal care’ in Tasmania 
and ‘personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature’ in Victoria. As has 
been shown in previous chapters,90 while functional arguments relating to a desire to treat 
relationships that perform similar functions in similar ways are influential in the development 
and creation of form-based recognition, in questions about the legal validity of formalised 
relationships the state bypasses the actual functions performed by the relationship and focusses 
instead on whether the relationship complies with the legal structure and formalities. In this 
way, discussion of the expected functions of the relationship is irrelevant.  
The definitions are in part reflective of what is actually necessary for a valid registered 
caring relationship. Caring relationships in both jurisdictions may only be formed between two 
adults, regardless of whether they are related by family, who consent to enter the union and are 
unmarried, are not in another registered relationship, and are not party to another relationship 
that could be registered.91 Caring relationships are very similar to marriage and the registered 
couple relationships in that they are dyadic, monogamous unions between adults who consent 
to registration. The main differences in terms of legal structure are that a relationship cannot be 
registered where one partner provides care for a fee or on behalf of an organisation,92 and there 
is no prohibition on forming caring relationships between particular relatives. This is of course a 
significant difference in that it shows the flexibility of form-based recognition in its ability to 
provide a means of recognising various types of relationship, but other than this, caring 
relationships remain based on the marriage model.93 
5.2.2.2 Exit requirements  
Legislation prescribes the ways in which caring relationships may legally end, and these 
are identical to the formal processes for ending registered couple relationships in Tasmania and 
                                                          
89 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s5. 
90 See for example Chapter 4, 4.2.1. 
91 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s11; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s6-7. Note however that entering 
another relationship that could be registered following entering a caring relationship will not invalidate 
the caring relationship. 
92 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s5. 
93 cf Chapter 7 which looks at the extent to which the informal caring relationships also mimic the marriage 
model. 
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Victoria. Caring relationships are automatically revoked by the death of either party, or the 
marriage of either partner, whether to the caring partner or someone else,94 or may end by 
court order.95 They may also end following an application by one or both parties,96 and unlike 
marriage the relationship does not have to be of any minimum duration prior to making an 
application to revoke the relationship. Revocation usually takes place within 90 days unless the 
application is withdrawn.97 If a partner is unilaterally ending the relationship, they must serve 
notice of their intention on the other partner,98 although there is no similar requirement to give 
notice should one partner decide to marry. The fact that this process is identical to that to end 
a registered relationship is not problematic as was extending the civil partnership provision to 
particular family relationships in England and Wales.99 The Australian process is administratively 
simple and does not involve any questions about the nature of the relationship as would the 
process for dissolution of civil partnership where one of the four facts would need to be proven 
to establish the irretrievable breakdown of the relationship.100 As is the case with the registered 
couple relationships in Australia, the nature of the relationship is irrelevant when both 
registering and revoking a relationship. 
5.2.2.3 Legal consequences of a registered caring relationship 
The legal consequences attaching to caring relationships are far less numerous and far-
reaching than those which attach to marriage and the registered couple relationships. This 
shows that the legal consequences of marriage do not have to be transferred in their entirety 
onto new form-based relationships. The Tasmanian government intended caring relationships 
to be given wide recognition,101 and accordingly registered caring relationships were recognised 
in around 43 pieces of legislation.102 Legal consequences include, for example, that partners to 
registered caring relationships are recognised as ‘senior next of kin’ under both the Burial and 
                                                          
94 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s15(1); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s11. 
95 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s15(2); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s16. 
96 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s12(2); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s11(2), s12. 
97 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s17; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s15. 
98 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s16; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s13. 
99 See above, 5.1.1.1. 
100 For discussion of dissolution provisions for civil partnership, see Chapter 4 4.1.2.2. 
101 It was the intention of the then government that caring relationships in Tasmania were to be 
recognised in more areas than the non-couple relationships in other jurisdictions, such as ‘domestic 
relationships’ in the ACT and ‘close personal relationships’ in NSW - Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 
25 June 2003, 31-2 (Mrs Jackson, Attorney General, Minister for Justice and Industrial Relations). These 
non-formalised non-couple relationships and the legal consequences of such recognition will be discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
102 For a full list see the Social Development Committee ‘Statutes Amendment (Relationships) Bill 2005’ 
(Parliament of South Australia, Report No. 21, 2005), 127-8. 
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Cremation Regulations 2015103 and the Coroners Act 1995104 and are considered as a ‘related 
person’ under the Land Tax Act 2000.105 Caring partners are included as ‘members of the family’ 
under the Constitution Act 1934106 and the Witness Protection Act 2000.107 It is also noteworthy 
that registration of a caring relationship, in the same way as marrying or registering a ‘significant 
relationship’ in Tasmania, revokes any wills made prior to registration, unless that will was made 
in contemplation of registration.108 Registered caring partners are able to inherit on intestacy,109 
but they cannot apply for financial provision out of the estate where the deceased’s will fails to 
make adequate provision for their maintenance and support.110 
The Victorian government took a different approach, and rather than attempt to give 
caring relationships wide legal recognition they decided to only recognise caring relationships 
when this was deemed ‘appropriate’. For example, different treatment between caring partners 
and partners to ‘domestic relationships’, the Victorian registered couple relationships, in the 
areas of superannuation and judicial pensions was justified on the basis that recognising caring 
relationships in this area would be a ‘fundamental change’ in policy, and therefore was deemed 
inappropriate.111 The 2009 reforming legislation creating the option to register a caring 
relationship did not follow the Tasmanian approach to reform by amending several pieces of 
legislation at once to include caring relationships. Rather, the Victorian legislation amended 29 
Victorian statutes to expressly exclude caring relationships.112 Registered caring partners may 
apply for financial provision from the estate of their deceased partner where there is a will,113 
and following proposals by the Victorian Law Reform Commission,114 and subject to the 
amendments being passed in the Legislative Council, registered caring partners will succeed on 
                                                          
103 Burial and Cremation Regulations 2015 (Tas), s3. It is interesting to note however that the list of ‘senior 
next of kin’ provided for is hierarchical: a spouse, including a significant (de facto) partner, has priority, 
followed by a child over 18 years of age, followed by a registered caring partner. 
104 Coroners Act 1995 (Tas), s3A. 
105 Land Tax Act 2000 (Tas), s3. 
106 Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), s32. 
107 Witness Protection Act 2000 (Tas), s3. 
108 Wills Act 2008 (Tas), s16. 
109 Intestacy Act 2010 (Tas), s6(b) defines a ‘spouse’ as including a person in a registered personal 
relationship under the Relationships Act 2003. The Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s6, defines a personal 
relationship as being either a significant (de facto) relationship or a caring relationship. 
110 Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas), s3 limits application for financial provision to ‘spouses’ 
(and children and parents), and s2 defines spouse as including a partner to a significant relationship only. 
111 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4572 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
112 See, Relationships Amendment (Caring Relationships) Act 2009, sch 1. 
113 Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s90. 
114 Victorian Law Reform Commission Succession Laws: Report (2013), [5.53-5.56]. 
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intestacy in the same way as a spouse and both registered and unregistered ‘domestic’ 
partners.115  
5.2.2.3a Financial and property orders on relationship breakdown 
While the legal consequences attaching to the registered caring relationships are far 
fewer than those that are bestowed on marriage and the registered couple relationships, both 
Tasmania and Victoria have given the courts powers to make property and financial orders on 
the breakdown of a caring relationship116 in a similar way to that applying for the formalised 
couple relationships.117 Perhaps the concerns identified by Leckey, discussed in chapter four,118 
relating to the transferring of the provision for financial relief on divorce onto same-sex couples’ 
relationships are a greater concern in the context of caring relationships. Leckey argued that 
same-sex couples’ relationships are qualitatively different than opposite-sex couples because 
the former are more likely to be egalitarian relationships than the latter; for him, this means 
that the financial remedies provision may be unsuitable for same-sex relationships. The fact that 
caring relationships can be formed between any two adults means that the possible differences 
between the quality of the caring relationships and relationships between spouses is even 
greater, and so transferring the financial remedies provision, intended for couples, onto caring 
relationships may be inappropriate. A later chapter will question whether partners in caring 
relationships need financial remedies provision on relationship breakdown.119 For now it is 
sufficient to provide an overview of the legislative provision in Tasmania and Victoria. 
Partners to caring relationships must apply to the court within two years of the 
breakdown of the relationship for property and financial orders.120 The court has discretion to 
grant leave to apply after this period if refusing to do so would cause hardship.121 The court 
should, as far as is practicable, finally determine the financial relationship between the parties 
and avoid further proceedings between them.122 Partners can avoid the court’s jurisdiction and 
                                                          
115 Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s70B is, at the time of writing, in the process of being 
amended by the Administration and Probate and Other Acts Amendment (Succession and Related 
Matters) Bill 2017 (Vic).  
116 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s36; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s41. 
117 The provision for the caring relationships is most similar to that which applied in the states for de facto 
relationships prior to the 2009 federal reforms. For discussion of the state provision see Chapter 6, 
6.3.2.2c. 
118 See Chapter 4, 4.1.2.3a. 
119 See Chapter 7, 7.3.1. 
120 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s38(1); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s43(1). 
121 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s38(2): ‘A court… may grant leave to a partner to apply to the court for 
an order if greater hardship would be caused to the applicant if that leave were not granted than would 
be caused to the respondent if that leave were granted’; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s43(2) has similar 
wording. 
122 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s39; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s44. 
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make their own arrangements, in the same way as partners to registered couple relationships,123 
and can enter into ‘personal relationship agreements’ or ‘separation agreements’ in Tasmania, 
or ‘relationship agreements’ in Victoria. Independent legal advice is necessary for the creation 
of a valid agreement.124 
The factors that the court may take into account when determining property orders vary 
slightly between the jurisdictions. The Victorian legislation caters specifically for caring 
relationships separately from the couple relationships. This is appropriate as both formalised 
relationships are aimed at different types of family relationship, and the factors that the court 
may take into account for couple relationships include contributions made as parents.125 When 
deciding on a property adjustment order, the court must consider the financial and non-financial 
contributions of the partners towards property, as well as the contributions one partner has 
made towards the welfare of the other and the nature and duration of the caring relationship.126 
The court may also consider other matters when considering adjusting interests in property that 
apply for both caring and couple relationships in the same way, such as the financial needs and 
obligations of the partners and the responsibilities either partner has towards another person.127 
The court is able to take into account a broad range of factors when making property orders, 
similarly to the approach taken for couple relationships.128 
In Tasmania, the legislation does not deal with caring relationships separately from couple 
relationships, which suggests that caring relationships were not the main focus of the reforms. 
In Tasmania, the court may take into account a variety of factors including the financial and non-
financial contributions of either partner towards property; the financial resources of the parties; 
contributions made as homemaker or parent to the welfare of the family;129 as well as any 
relevant matter such as the ‘financial needs and obligations of each partner’ as well as ‘any other 
fact or circumstance the court considers relevant’.130  
Maintenance payments are available for partners to broken down caring relationships 
upon application to the court in both jurisdictions. In Tasmania, the court may consider granting 
                                                          
123 See Chapter 4, 4.1.2.3. 
124 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), ss60, 61, 62; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), ss35A(3), 59. 
125 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s45(1)(b). 
126 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s45(1A).  
127 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s51. 
128 For discussion of the position in the states prior to the federal reforms for de facto couples, see Chapter 
6, 6.3.2.2c. 
129 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s40. 
130 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s40(1)(e) allows the court to take into account any of the listed factors 
contained in s47. 
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maintenance orders where one partner is unable to support themselves adequately because 
their ‘earning capacity has been adversely affected by the circumstances of the personal 
relationship’, or because ‘of any other reason arising in whole or in part from the circumstances 
of the personal relationship.’131 The Victorian legislation takes a similar approach, and may grant 
maintenance payments if the ‘partner's earning capacity has been adversely affected by the 
circumstances of the domestic relationship or registered caring relationship’ or for ‘any other 
reason arising in whole or part from the circumstances of the… registered caring relationship.’132 
5.2.3 Shared and distinctive features of formalised relationships 
An analysis of the registered caring relationships confirms some of the findings of the last 
chapter that there are some features that are common to all formalised relationships, as well as 
confirming that there are some differences. Consideration of these findings is important at this 
point to give a clear picture of what formalised relationships have to offer, before moving on in 
the next two chapters to look at function-based frameworks for relationship recognition. 
5.2.3.1 Shared elements 
Administrative efficiency appears to be a shared benefit of all form-based models because 
the formal process of entering and exiting formalised relationships provides a simple means of 
knowing who is in a relationship with whom at any given time. The Tasmanian government 
highlighted that registration of a caring relationship will ‘be evidence of the relationship's 
existence for legal purposes’133 and the Relationships Act 2003 provides that registration is 
conclusive proof of the existence of the relationship.134 Administrative efficiency was referred 
to implicitly as a benefit of registration in Victoria, where the Attorney General said that the 
registration option for de facto couples gives them ‘easier access to existing entitlements 
without having to argue repeatedly that they are in a committed partnership, or to have to prove 
this in court’ and that the amendments to include caring relationships within the legislation were 
intended to ‘enhance’ this provision.135 
                                                          
131 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s47. 
132 Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s51. 
133 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 24 June 2003, 29 (Mrs Jackson, Minister for Justice and Industrial 
Relations). 
134 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5(4). 
135 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4572 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). See also 
Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4935 (Mr Clark): ‘Of course, those matters could 
already be dealt with under existing law through the making of a will or through a suitable authorisation 
such as one under the Guardianship and Administration Act in relation to making medical treatment and 
other health-care decisions. Nonetheless, this bill would enable that to be done in a range of different 
contexts by the single registration of the caring relationship.’ 
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Respect for choice and autonomy was also apparent as a supposed benefit of introducing 
the caring relationships in a similar way as for the other form-based models. In Tasmania, 
informal caring relationships are recognised on a functional basis136 alongside the registration 
option for caring relationships, and so the ‘choice’ here is whether to be certain that the 
relationship is legally recognised, or live with the uncertainty of function-based recognition of 
the relationship. The Tasmanian government137 and the report on which the reforms were 
based138 emphasised that a ‘positive aspect of registered relationship recognition is that it is up 
to the individuals involved to determine the status of their relationship, rather than having the 
law presume its significance based on arbitrary criteria.’139 In Victoria, it is only registered caring 
relationships that are legally recognised and so the choice here is about whether or not to have 
the relationship legally recognised, and so caring partners could be said to be ‘choosing’ the legal 
consequences when they register.140 The Victorian Attorney General explained that ‘only 
partners who have registered their caring relationship will be able to access rights and 
obligations under Victorian law’, and this ‘provides certainty about who Victorian law applies to 
and ensures that only people who intend to have their caring relationship legally recognised as 
their primary relationship are captured by the registration scheme.’141 Of course, the idea that 
formalised relationships respect choice and autonomy is subject to the same concerns as those 
expressed in earlier chapters;142 respecting choice in this context is only meaningful when people 
are aware of the legal consequences of their relationship choices. 
5.2.3.2 Distinguishing features 
5.2.3.2a The independent legal advice requirement and the respect for choice 
One difference between the formalities relating to entering a caring relationship 
compared with the other formal relationships is that partners to caring relationships must 
receive independent legal advice prior to applying to register. This advice should outline the 
effects, advantages and disadvantages of registration.143 No reason was given by the Tasmanian 
                                                          
136 These relationships will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
137 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 24 June 2003, 29 (Mrs Jackson, Minister for Justice and Industrial 
Relations). 
138 As mentioned by: Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 24 June 2003, 29 (Mrs Jackson, Minister for 
Justice and Industrial Relations). 
139 Joint Standing Committee on Community Development (n64) 47-8. 
140 In the parliamentary debates, some members of the Victorian parliament did refer however to the idea 
that registration meant that caring partners would not need to prove their relationships on a daily basis, 
such as next of kin decisions when one partner is critically ill in hospital. See for example, Victorian 
Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 39 (Ms Darveniza). 
141 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4573 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
142 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.3 and Chapter 3, 3.2.1.2a and Chapter 4, 4.1.2.3. 
143 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s11(3); Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s7(ba). 
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government as to why legal advice should be necessary prior to registration of a caring 
relationship, but the Victorian Attorney General gave two reasons for this requirement.  
One reason was that legal advice should operate as a safeguard to protect the vulnerable 
from the ‘unscrupulous’ who may seek to take advantage of registration.144 This provision was 
viewed as a positive aspect of the legislation because it would protect vulnerable people145 and 
was seen as an ‘important safeguard’.146 Rundle notes that the requirement of legal advice 
operates to ‘protect potentially vulnerable people from exploitation by being pressured or 
tricked into registering a caring relationship’.147 There is no requirement in the legislation that 
the caring partners have the capacity to understand the legal advice given to them, however, 
which may limit the utility of this requirement to protect vulnerable people from exploitation. 
The second reason given by the Attorney General was that caring relationships were a new 
concept introduced into Victorian law in 2009 and therefore partners to such relationships may 
not expect legal consequences to attach to this particular type of relationship.148 
5.2.3.2b The issue of social status?  
It is clear that the registered caring relationships do have a legal status, because they are 
treated as a distinct category by law and particular legal consequences attach to the 
relationship, and so in this way are similar to marriage and the registered couple relationships. 
But, this does not mean that the caring relationships also generate a social status akin to that of 
the other formalised relationships. While it’s clear that marriage and the registered couple 
relationships generate a (different) social status, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
registered caring relationships generate a social status. Rundle, writing in 2011, noted that there 
were only four registered caring relationships in Tasmania, and none in Victoria.149 Rundle 
argues that these low take-up rates are ‘not an adequate indicator of whether or not the system 
should be made available to people’. She refers to a Community Engagement Project150 in 
Tasmania about registered relationships, and states that audiences in that project 
‘demonstrated a keen interest in the legal scheme, little prior knowledge of its existence and a 
                                                          
144 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4573 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
145 See Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 4 December 2008, 4935 (Mr Clark); Victorian Legislative Council 
Deb 3 February 2009, 34 (Mr Rich Phillips). 
146 Victorian Legislative Council Deb 3 February 2009, 36 (Ms Pulford). 
147 O Rundle ‘An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 121, 140. 
148 Victorian Legislative Assembly Deb 12 November 2008, 4573 (Mr Hulls, Attorney General). 
149 Rundle (n147) 145. 
150 Rundle notes that the project was entitled ‘Legal Recognition of Relationships in Tasmania’, conducted 
by R Croome an O Rundle, in 2010: Rundle (n47) 147, fn154. 
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desire to learn about it.’151 This suggests that, with time, as people learn about the existence of 
the registered caring relationships, they may generate a social status. Perhaps this suggests that 
the further away we move from marriage in terms of relationship type, the less likely it is that a 
form-based relationship will generate a social status, at least until the time comes when people 
are aware of their existence. 
5.3 Conclusion 
While form-based recognition is flexible enough to provide for different relationship 
types, so far, England and Wales has not provided any recognition for caring relationships, and 
the reforms introducing registered caring relationships in Australia have not been particularly 
radical. The registered caring relationships do not demonstrate the full potential of form-based 
recognition to be used in innovative ways to respond to family diversity, and are nowhere near 
as radical as Brake’s ‘minimizing marriage’ proposal, discussed in chapter two.152 The 
conservative nature of the reforms may stem from the fact that, so far, there has been no 
genuine call for the legal recognition of caring relationships. Rather, the introduction of caring 
relationships was merely a smokescreen to distract from the significance of giving same-sex 
couples a registration option akin to marriage. While policymakers talked about an apparent 
need to treat similar relationships in similar ways, implicitly suggesting that relationship types 
other than couples should also be protected by family law, what appeared to concern them the 
most was the symbolic recognition of same-sex relationships as ‘family’. The reforms were not 
truly attempts at using form-based recognition to respond to family diversity, and the legal and 
social privileging of marriage remains unchallenged by policy makers in both jurisdictions. 
Perhaps the hold that marriage, or more specifically the marriage ideology, has is responsible 
for limiting the radical potential of the registered caring relationships reforms. Until the time 
there is a genuine call for legally recognising a wider variety of family relationships, it may be 
difficult for people to conceive of a new way of thinking about relationships that does not use 
marriage as the starting point. The next part of the thesis will explore function-based recognition 
of informal relationships to determine how they measure up against form-based recognition, 
and whether the influence of marriage and the marriage model influences their development in 
any way.
                                                          
151 Rundle (n147) 146-7. 
152 See Chapter 2, 2.2.2.1. 
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Chapter 6 – Informal couple relationships: the moderate function-based approach 
This chapter will focus on what chapter two described as ‘moderate’ function-based 
approaches1 and will discuss recognition of ‘cohabitants’ in England and Wales and ‘de facto’ 
relationships in Australia. The chapter will show that function-based recognition shares many 
benefits with form-based recognition, and has the additional benefit of acting as a safety net 
because function-based recognition does not require a couple to opt-into legal recognition. But, 
function-based recognition is not without difficulties: it is inherently uncertain and can be 
difficult to administer, which stands in sharp contrast with the administrative efficiency of form-
based systems.  
Firstly, an exploration of the definitions of the informal relationships shows that, as 
predicted in chapter two, defining relationships for function-based recognition is problematic, 
but that it is possible to create a flexible system that can overcome some of these issues. 
Secondly, the discussion will give an account of why recognition of these informal relationships 
was thought necessary to show that, as is the case with the development of form-based 
recognition,2 functional arguments have been influential, and additionally that function-based 
frameworks act as a safety-net that protects vulnerable partners. Thirdly, the legal 
consequences of these relationships will be discussed to show that function-based recognition 
can generate a legal status but that the social status attaching to these informal relationships is 
likely to be considered inferior to that generated by marriage. The conclusion will suggest that 
the moderate function-based approach only begins to hint at the possible flexibility of function-
based frameworks to respond to family diversity. 
6.1 What is a ‘cohabiting’ or a ‘de facto’ relationship? 
An analysis of the current definitions of ‘cohabiting’ and ‘de facto’ relationships shows 
that in practice, function-based recognition is uncertain and inquiries into the quality of a 
relationship are often intrusive. These difficulties are unavoidable because they stem from the 
way legal recognition is triggered under a function-based approach: unlike the position of 
formalised relationships, the characteristics and functions of a relationship must be proved 
before a relationship will be legally recognised.  
                                                          
1 See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.1. 
2 See Chapter 4, 4.1.1 and Chapter 5, 5.1; 5.2.1. 
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6.1.1 Difficulties of definition 
As Barlow and James point out, there is no one common definition of a cohabiting 
relationship in England and Wales,3 but there are some common elements between the 
definitions. They note that ‘broadly speaking’, legal recognition of cohabitation has been 
reserved ‘almost exclusively… for the most marriage-like relationships, where a man and woman 
are living together “as husband and wife” usually within a shared household, often for a 
minimum prescribed period and where there is or has been sexual intimacy.’4 Originally, 
recognition of informal relationships was limited to opposite-sex couples, but, the House of 
Lords in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza5 held that a same-sex couple can also live together ‘as 
husband and wife’6 and so can be cohabitants. Following the introduction of the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004, the definition of cohabitant was amended in many different statutory provisions to 
expressly include same-sex couples who may be living together ‘as civil partners’. In this way, 
the development of a new form-based system via statute also developed function-based 
recognition. Although there is ‘no universal definition’7 of cohabitation, an example of how it is 
currently defined in England and Wales is found in the Rent Act 1977: 
(a) a person who was living with the original tenant as his or her wife or husband… 
(b) a person who was living with the original tenant as if they were civil partners…8 
Similarly, Graycar and Millbank note that there is no one common definition of a ‘de facto’ 
relationship9 in Australia. But, originally, they were defined as being marriage-like. In NSW, for 
example, the first state in Australia to legislate for the financial consequences of relationship 
breakdown of informal relationships, they defined ‘de facto relationships’ as, 
…the relationship of living, or having lived together as husband and wife on a bona fide 
domestic basis although not married to each other.10 
                                                          
3 A Barlow and G James ‘Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation in 21st Century Britain’ (2004) 67(2) 
Modern Law Review 143, 147. 
4 ibid 145. 
5 [2004] 2 AC 557. 
6 ibid [20] (Lord Nicholls). 
7 Barlow and James (n3) 145. 
8 Rent Act 1977, sch 1 [2], as amended by the Civil Partnerships Act 2004, sch 8, para 13. 
9 See R Graycar and J Millbank ‘The Bride Wore Pink... to the Property (Relationships) Legislation 
Amendment Act 1999: Relationship Law Reform in New South Wales’ (2000) Canadian Journal of Family 
Law 227, 239-243. 
10 De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW), s3(1) (as originally enacted). 
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This marriage analogy was chosen because there was recognition ‘that any statutory definition 
of a de facto relationship necessarily involves a comparison with marriage’,11 presumably 
because they involve the same type of relationship, that of the unrelated adult couple. 
Although it seems logical to define cohabiting and de facto relationships as marriage-like 
because the moderate function-based approach is intended to provide for those couples who 
could, but, for whatever reason, do not marry, this definition is not without difficulties. As 
chapter three showed, there is no universally accepted list of the functions of marriage,12 and it 
is difficult to know what would be sufficient as evidence of the performance of some of these 
functions. For example, Ward LJ suggested that, 
…at its heart, marriage is a serious public commitment… in essence always to love and to 
cherish until death do us part. A married couple share their lives and make their home 
together… They offer each other love, commitment and support.13 
How would a couple evidence that they ‘love’ and ‘cherish’ one another, especially when Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim have suggested that it is impossible to define ‘love’?14 What is sufficient as 
evidence of ‘commitment’ and ‘support’? These difficulties are irrelevant for marriage, because 
all that is necessary for validity is that the spouses have the capacity to marry (and that they 
comply with the procedural requirements). But it is problematic for function-based recognition 
where a third party must assess the nature of the relationship to determine whether it ‘crosse[s] 
the invisible line’15 to become a legally recognised relationship.  
Neuberger J, as he then was, summed up the difficulties in this way: 
 …when considering whether two people are living together as husband and wife, it would 
be wrong to conclude that they do so simply because their relationship is one which a 
husband and wife could have. If the test were as wide as that, then, bearing in mind the 
enormous variety of relationships that can exist between husband and wife, virtually every 
relationship between a man and a woman living in the same household would fall within 
[the ambit of the legislation]…. the court should ask itself whether, in the opinion of a 
reasonable person with normal perceptions, it could be said that two people in question 
                                                          
11 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Report on De Facto Relationships (LRC 36, 1983), [1.10]. 
12 See Chapter 3, 3.4. 
13 Amicus Horizon Ltd v Estate of Judy Mabbott and Brand [2012] HLR 42, [16]. 
14 See Chapter 1, 1.3.1. 
15 Keaton v Aldridge [2009] FMCAfam 92, [112] (Pascoe CFM). See also Tyrer J in Kimber v Kimber 1 FLR 
383, 389: ‘a marriage certificate proves itself; cohabitation has to be inferred.’ 
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were living together as husband and wife; but, when considering that question, one should 
not ignore the multifarious nature of marital relationships.16 
This same ‘enormous variety of relationships’ exists between couples in informal relationships. 
Barlow and Smithson have helpfully categorised cohabitants into four groups, the ideologues, 
the romantics, the pragmatists and the uneven couples. One or both partners in the ideologue 
group have an ideological objection to marriage, and so purposefully avoid it, whereas the 
romantics view marriage as a ‘serious commitment’ and plan to marry eventually. The 
pragmatists make decisions based on pragmatic reasoning relating to the legal and factual 
situation. These groups share a characteristic of ‘mutual commitment’ to the relationship. The 
uneven couples are different in that one partner wishes to marry whilst the other does not, or 
one partner is more ‘committed’ to the relationship than the other.17 A moderate function-
based framework may attempt to recognise all four diverse groups of cohabitants. As 
highlighted in chapter two,18 drawing the parameters of a moderate function-based approach is 
challenging because there is a need to strike the right balance between not recognising all 
relationships between two unrelated adults, and thus being too inclusive, and not imposing 
overly stringent standards that are difficult to fulfil and risk requiring couples to assimilate with 
a particular view of family, which would make functional recognition too exclusive. 
6.1.2 The current definitions 
‘Cohabiting’ relationships in England and Wales are often defined as two people living 
together ‘as husband and wife’ or ‘as civil partners’. This suggests that a cohabiting relationship 
may only exist between two unrelated adults, as is the case with marriage and civil partnership.19 
To assist the decision-maker to determine whether a relationship between two unrelated adults 
is by its nature akin to that between spouses or civil partners, a list of indicia have been 
developed by the courts. In Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission,20 Woolf J recognised 
that there are many different reasons why two people may live together, such as when one 
person looks after another when they ‘are ill or incapable for some other reason of managing 
their affairs’, but merely living together is not enough21 without the relationship being of a 
particular quality. Woolf J identified six ‘admirable signposts’: 
                                                          
16 Re Watson [1999] 1 FLR 878, 883 (Neuberger J). 
17 A Barlow and J Smithson ‘Legal Assumptions, Cohabitants’ Talk and the Rocky Road to Reform’ (2010) 
22(3) Child and Family Law Quarterly 328, 335.  
18 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.2. 
19 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1 and Chapter 4, 4.1.2.1. 
20 [1982] 1 ALL ER 498. 
21 Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission (n20) 502. 
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…whether they are members of the same household; …stability; … the question of financial 
support; …the question of sexual relationship; the question of children; and public 
acknowledgment.22 
It is interesting to consider that these signposts are matters that can be proved, and are not 
focused on ideas such as ‘love’, which is often viewed as central to marriage but would be 
difficult to evidence.  
The signposts identified in Crake have proved influential and similar indicia have been 
applied in later cases, although they should not be viewed as criteria that must all be met prior 
to finding that a couple are living together as husband and wife. Mr Mark Rowland, Social 
Security Commissioner, made clear in Re J23 that,  
…the ‘admirable signposts’ place a wholly inadequate emphasis on the significance of the 
parties’ ‘general relationship’. Indeed, it is arguable that it is the parties’ ‘general 
relationship’ that is of paramount importance and that their sexual relationship and their 
financial relationship are only relevant for the light they throw upon the general 
relationship.24 
The dangers of a formulaic approach were also made clear in Kimber v Kimber,25 where Tyrer J 
cautioned against any ‘attempt to reduce to a judicial soundbite a comprehensive list of criteria’ 
for determining whether a relationship is marriage-like26 because it is ‘both foolish and 
impossible to offer any definition that will cover all circumstances’ considering the ‘modern 
complexities of inter-personal relationships’.27 He nevertheless sets out a list of eight ‘signposts’, 
similar to those identified in Crake, to determine the existence of a cohabiting relationship: 
 Living together in the same household; 
 A sharing of daily life; 
 Stability and a degree of permanence; 
 Financial arrangements; 
 Sexual relationship; 
 Care of children; 
 Intention and motivation of the parties; 
                                                          
22 ibid 504. 
23 [1995] 1 FLR 660. 
24 ibid 665. 
25 [2000] 1 FLR 383. 
26 ibid 391-3. 
27 ibid 388. 
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 Third party perceptions of the relationship. 
Tyrer J notes that ‘such factors cannot be complete nor comprehensive’, which suggests there 
is some flexibility as to whether all these criteria, or only these criteria, need to be proved to 
indicate the existence of a cohabiting relationship.  
The original Australian definition of a ‘de facto’ relationship was the same as that currently 
used in England and Wales because it focussed on the marriage-like nature of the relationship. 
This definition changed in NSW following reforms to allow same-sex couples to be recognised 
as de facto partners,28 and this served as a basis for the current federal family law provisions, 
which define a de facto relationship as a relationship between two people who,  
…are not legally married to each other; and… are not related by family… and having regard 
to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living 
together on a genuine domestic basis.29 
The requirements that the couple are not married to each other and are not related by family 
have been referred to as ‘statutory preconditions’ in some of the case law.30 This means that a 
couple must first establish that they meet these preconditions, and then prove that their 
relationship was that of ‘a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis’ before their 
relationship will be considered a de facto relationship. It is important to note that a de facto 
relationship can exist where one or both parties are married, or where one or both parties are 
also in another de facto relationship.31 
Graycar and Millbank argue that the changing definition in Australia may be indicative of 
a new way of thinking about relationships because marriage is displaced as the benchmark 
against which informal couple relationships must be compared.32 But, upon closer examination 
                                                          
28 This served as a ‘prototype’ for changes in other jurisdictions: D Kovacs ‘A Federal Law of De Facto 
Property Rights: The Dream and the Reality’ (2009) 23(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 104, 108. It is 
worth noting that both the Northern Territory (NT) and Western Australia (WA) chose to define a de facto 
relationship as a ‘marriage-like relationship’ following reforms to include same-sex couples as de facto 
partners. In the NT it was noted that this definition was chosen because it was ‘non-gender specific’: NT 
Legislative Assembly 15 October 2003, Parliamentary Record No. 15 (Dr Toyne, Justice and Attorney 
General). The differences are unlikely to be of any practical concern however because all the jurisdictions 
adopted a similar non-exhaustive list of circumstances for the court to consider. 
29 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s4AA. 
30 Jonah v White [2011] FamCA 221, [33]. 
31 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s4AA(5). 
32 R Graycar and J Millbank ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to 
Relationship Recognition’ (2007) 24 Washington University’s Journal of Law & Policy 121, 145-6: note that 
the authors mistakenly refer to a change in the terminology employed in NSW from ‘de facto spouses’ to 
‘de facto relationships’ following the 1999 reforms: the term ‘de facto spouse’ did not actually appear in 
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it becomes apparent than the ‘nature of the inquiry’33 undertaken by the court has not changed 
to a significant extent following the changing terminology. The new definition is accompanied 
by a list of circumstances to assist the court in determining the existence of a de facto 
relationship that derives from case law interpretations of the phrase ‘living together as husband 
and wife’ under the original NSW provisions.34 Master Macready has commented that the 
inclusion of this list of circumstances in the legislation ‘merely reflects the existing state of the 
law as it has been developed under the previous law’,35 which suggests that the expected 
functions of marriage remain central to the definition of a de facto relationship.  
According to the federal Family Law Act 1975, when determining whether a relationship 
is that of ‘a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis’, the court should consider ‘all of 
the circumstances of the relationship’, including the following non-exhaustive36 list:37 
a) The duration of the relationship; 
b) The nature and extent of common residence;  
c) Whether a sexual relationship exists; 
d) The degree of financial dependence or interdependence and any arrangements for 
financial support between them; 
e) The ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
f) The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
g) Whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed under a law of a state 
or territory; 
h) The care and support of children; 
i) The reputation and public aspects of the relationship.38 
                                                          
the De Facto Relationships Act 1984. See also, J Millbank and K Sant ‘A Bride in her Everyday Clothes: 
Same-sex Relationship Recognition in NSW’ (2000) 22(2) Sydney Law Review 181, 190. 
33 Millbank and Sant (n32) 190. 
34 D v McA (1986) 11 Fam LR 214, 227 (Powell J): there was one additional factor listed in the case which 
is absent from the legislation, ‘the procreation of children’. Campbell J in Sullman v Sullman [2002] NSWSC 
169, [46] presumes that this particular circumstance is now absent because of the inclusion of same-sex 
partners into the definition of de facto relationship. 
35 Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319, [12]; and in Jurd v Public Trustee [2001] NSWSC 632, [21]; and in 
Bogan v Macorig [2004] NSWSC 993, [18]. See also similar comments by Bryson AJ in Dion v Reiser [2010] 
NSWSC 50, [10]. 
36 Kovacs (n28), 107 describes the list as ‘unavoidably vague and open-ended’. 
37 This list is similar to those used in the states and territories: Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), 
s4(2); Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s169; Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s4; De Facto Relationships Act 1991 
(NT), s3A; Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s32DA; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s35(2); Family 
Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s11B.  
38 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s4AA(2). 
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To determine how the courts go about deciding whether a cohabiting or de facto 
relationship exists it is necessary to explore some case law. An exploration of the interpretations 
of the definitions shows that the courts must explore all aspects of a relationship which leads to 
intrusive inquiries, and this contrasts with the administrative efficiency of form-based systems 
where the functions performed within a relationship are effectively irrelevant. That said, it turns 
out that the flexible approach adopted by the courts means that the concerns identified in 
chapter two about the prevailing ideologies of traditional views about family limiting the 
inclusivity of function-based recognition39 are somewhat alleviated. The Australian approach has 
proven to be particularly flexible, and is consequently more inclusive of family diversity than the 
English and Welsh approach.  
6.1.2.1 A requirement of ‘living together’? 
Chapter three showed that cohabitation is not a necessary requirement for a valid 
marriage, and so forms part of the ideologies of marriage as opposed to the legal structure.40 
But, for informal relationships, the issue of ‘living together’ is significant in proving the nature 
of the relationship. The jurisdictions take different approaches towards the idea of ‘living 
together’. It stands to reason that when a type of relationship is commonly referred to as 
‘cohabitants’, there is an expectation that the parties cohabit. As Wall J puts it in G v F,41 ‘if the 
applicant and the respondent had never lived in the same household, they could not be former 
cohabitants.’42 There is limited flexibility to take into account time spent apart due to ‘illness, 
holidays, work and other periodical absences apart’.43 For example, in Re Dix44 a three month 
period of a 27 year relationship where the couple lived apart was seen to be an ‘abnormal 
situation’, and so was not fatal to an inheritance claim.45 Ward LJ commented in Re Dix that a 
couple who are living apart temporarily will be deemed to continue sharing a household, as long 
as they regard their relationship as subsisting.46 A relationship where parties are unable to live 
together due to work and other commitments, such as in Kotke v Saffarini,47 will not be regarded 
as a relationship where the couple live together as husband and wife. It is clear that spending 
only weekends in the same household is insufficient to amount to cohabitation,48 but it is unclear 
                                                          
39 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.2. 
40 See Chapter 3, 3.2.2. 
41 [2000] Fam 186. 
42 ibid 197. 
43 Kimber v Kimber (n15) 391. 
44 [2004] 1 WLR 1399. 
45 ibid [16] (Ward LJ). 
46 ibid [24] (Ward LJ). See also Baynes v Hedger [2008] EWHC 1587 (Ch), [121] (Lewison J). 
47 [2005] EWCA Civ 221. 
48 Baynes v Hedger (n46) [149] (Lewison J). See also Kotke v Saffarini (n47). 
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what the minimum duration of the cohabitation should be. The position of living-apart-together, 
or LAT, couples is precarious in England and Wales because a couple who have never shared a 
household are highly unlikely to be recognised as cohabitants, regardless of how marriage-like 
their relationship may be in other respects.49 
Some of the earlier Australian cases took the view that sharing residence at some point 
was vital to a finding of the existence of a de facto relationship. In the 1989 case of Hibberson v 
George,50 it was noted that sharing a common residence was an essential component of being 
in a de facto relationship.51 Following the change in definition from ‘living as husband and wife’ 
to ‘living as a couple’, with a non-exhaustive statutory list of indicia, the judges started taking a 
more flexible approach. The ‘nature and extent of common residence’ is only one circumstance 
that the court may consider, and Burchett AJ explained in Greenwood v Merkel52 that ‘living 
together’ is not confined to ‘common residence’, and that couples may live together in a way 
‘that suited them’.53 De facto relationships were established in S v B,54 where the couple chose 
to reside in their own parts of the house and in Houston v Butler,55 where the couple lived apart 
for fear of social disapproval of their relationship. Sharing a common residence is a ‘strong 
indicator’ of the existence of a de facto relationship,56 but although it may be a ‘relevant’ and 
‘significant factor’,57 and a ‘good starting point in [the] endeavour’ of establishing a de facto 
relationship,58 it is not vital.59 This means that LAT couples may be included within the de facto 
provisions, because the courts have taken a flexible view towards the meaning of ‘living 
together’ and are increasingly willing to consider a variety of living arrangements.60 The 
                                                          
49 There is a growing body of literature highlighting a need to consider the legal position of couples in LAT 
relationships. See, for example: S Duncan and M Phillips ‘People who Live Apart Together (LATs) – How 
Different are they?’ (2010) 58(1) Sociological Review 112; S Duncan and others ‘Legal Rights for People 
who ‘Live Apart Together’’ (2012) 34(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 443. 
50 (1989) 12 Fam LR 725. 
51 ibid 740 (Mahoney JA) 
52 [2004] NSWSC 43. 
53 ibid [15] (Burchett AJ). See also Powell JA’s comments in Lipman v Lipman (1989) 13 Fam LR 1 that ‘the 
concept of a “de facto relationship” does not involve the notion that the parties to it must always be 
together under the same roof’, as quoted in Dridi v Fillmore (n35) [23] (Master Macready), and similar 
comments by McDougall J in Przewoznik v Scott [2005] NSWSC 74, [15]. 
54 [2004] QSC 80, [41] (Philippides J). 
55 [2007] QSC 284, [72-3]. 
56 FO v HAF [2006] QCA 555, [25] and see [26] (Keane JA). 
57 PY v CY [2005] QCA 247, [7], [22]: de Jersey CJ goes on here to explain that ‘in the particular 
circumstances of this case, the separate residency of the parties did not mean that their de facto 
commitment had ceased’. 
58 Keaton v Aldridge (n15) [67] (Pascoe CFM). 
59 See Jonah v White (n30) [39-40]. 
60 See J Millbank ‘The Changing Meaning of De Facto Relationships’ (2006) 12 Current Family Law 82, 
available from <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=910137> accessed 20/12/2016. 
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Australian provision is more inclusive of a diversity of family forms than the current approach in 
England and Wales. 
6.1.2.2 Confined to sexual relationships? 
While chapter three showed that the legal structure of marriage does not require the 
spouses to have a sexual relationship,61 it appears that without a sexual relationship at some 
point, it is unlikely that a relationship will fulfil the definition of ‘living as husband and wife’ or 
‘living as a couple’. In the English case of Re Watson,62 Neuberger J, as he then was, commented 
that ‘it is not unusual for a happily married husband and wife in their mid-fifties… not merely to 
have separate bedrooms, but to abstain from sexual relations.’63 Similarly, Mr Rowland 
explained in Re J that ‘the absence of [a sexual] relationship suggests that the parties may be 
living together for reasons other than a particularly strong personal relationship’, and so ‘strong 
alternative grounds’ would need to be presented to evidence that a couple were living together 
as husband and wife.64 He suggested that one such rare case may be where the parties have 
shared a bed for many years, without having had a sexual relationship.65 Similarly, in the 
Australian case of Sharpless v McKibbin,66 Brereton J recognised that the existence of a sexual 
relationship is merely one circumstance to be considered, and ‘is no longer an essential 
element’, but ‘it must be a rare case in which there could be a de facto relationship without 
there having been, at some stage, a sexual relationship.’67 The Australian approach is that a 
sexual relationship is only indicative, and not determinative, of the nature of the relationship.68  
6.1.2.3 Day-to-day sharing of life 
The courts in both jurisdictions will examine the day-to-day life of the parties to determine 
the nature of the relationship, and they take flexible approaches as to what level of sharing is 
necessary for a cohabiting or de facto relationship. In England and Wales, there appears to be 
an expectation that cohabitants should share daily tasks and duties, but this does not mean that 
                                                          
61 See Chapter 3, 3.2.1.4a. 
62 [1999] 1 FLR 878. 
63 ibid 884. 
64 Re J (n23) 666 (Mr M Rowland). 
65 ibid 668 (Mr M Rowland). 
66 [2007] NSWSC 1498. 
67 ibid [38]: Brereton J did not give any examples as to when a de facto relationship may be found where 
the parties have never had a sexual relationship. 
68 See further, Locke v Norton [2014] FamCa 811, [100] (Rees J); Barry v Dalrymple [2009] FamCA 1271, 
[257]. The fact that a sexual relationship has ended is not sufficient evidence that a de facto relationship 
has broken down. See Vine v Carey [2009] FMCAfam 1017, [30] (Slack FM): the sexual relationship ended 
in 2008, but the de facto relationship continued for another year because the parties continued to live 
together with their existing financial arrangements, they still socialised together and continued to support 
one another both ‘inside and outside the household’.  
193 
 
everything must be shared. For example, some intermingling of finances is indicative of a 
relationship akin to that between husband and wife, but it was suggested in Amicus69 that 
remaining financially independent is not fatal to a finding that a couple are living together as if 
they were husband and wife. In this case, however, Ward LJ found that, ‘[i]t is not so much a 
case of her cherishing financial independence as it is of her failure to commit herself to accept 
[the defendant] wholeheartedly as her partner with whom she was prepared to share her life’70 
that meant the relationship was not akin to that between husband and wife.  
Financial independence is not fatal to a finding of a de facto relationship71 in Australia 
because the courts recognise that many couples, including spouses, choose to remain financially 
independent.72 But the way that couples manage their finances, and how they jointly use 
property, whilst not determinative, is indicative of the nature of the relationship. In Moby v 
Schulter73 for example, a de facto relationship was found partly on the basis that the couple 
shared finances and property; they both made financial contributions towards furnishing the 
respondent’s property, which they both used, and the applicant sold some of her personal items 
in order to help the respondent pay for repairs to his car.74 Similarly, in Dakin v Sansbury75 a de 
facto relationship was found partly on the basis that there was evidence of financial dependency 
during the relationship as well as the shared use of property. In this case, the respondent had 
paid the applicant’s rent for roughly seven years as well as contributing to the applicant’s living 
expenses and supporting her son.76 
Another aspect of the day-to-day life of couples that is examined is the care of children. 
In the English case of Kimber the relationship between the petitioner’s child and the petitioner’s 
partner was indicative of a cohabiting relationship: the partner was involved with parents’ 
evenings, entered a ‘father and son’ golf tournament and helped the child learn to play the 
keyboard. Tyrer J believed it was ‘inconceivable’ that the petitioner would allow a bond to 
develop with a man she did not intend to ‘become a second father-figure’, or for a man to make 
‘laudable efforts if he were not like-minded’.77 Similarly, in the Australian case of Baker v 
                                                          
69 [2012] HLR 42. 
70 ibid [25]. 
71 Barry v Dalrymple (n68) (Coleman J). 
72 Aldridge v Delamarre [2013] FamCA 214 [75] (Cleary J). The Full Court of the Family Court agreed with 
these observations in Delamarre v Aldridge [2014] FamCAFC 218, [19] (Faulks DCJ, Finn and Strickland JJ). 
73 [2010] FamCA 748. 
74 ibid [149-152]. 
75 [2010] FMCAfam 628. 
76 ibid [167], (Bender FM). See too similarly, Gissing v Sheffield [2012] FMCAfam 628, [168], [173] 
(O’Sullivan FM). 
77 Kimber v Kimber (n15) 392. 
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Landon,78 a de facto relationship was found partly on the basis that the ‘applicant had a 
relationship with, and commitment to, the respondent’s first child’ and that the applicant 
treated this child ‘like a son’.79 The applicant bought the child a quad bike, and spent time with 
him playing video games and so on, and told the court that the child ‘rarely saw his father and 
that he has taken a role in the nature of a parent with’ the child.80 
6.1.2.4 Commitment and intention towards the relationship 
While chapter three showed that many people assume that marriage is a relationship 
between a committed couple who intend to stay together for life,81 couples in informal 
relationships must be able to evidence a similar commitment and intention. The parties’ 
intention and commitment towards the relationship is an important factor and may prevent 
those relationships categorised by Barlow and Smithson as ‘uneven couples’ from being legally 
recognised. More weight seems to attach to the parties’ commitment and intention towards the 
relationship than some of the other factors such as a sexual relationship or sharing of property. 
Perhaps this is because the level of commitment shown towards the relationship is a cogent 
suggestion that the relationship between the parties is a relationship that they themselves view 
as significant, rather than merely a casual relationship.82 
In Crake, there was no relationship of living together as husband and wife because it was 
not the intention of the parties to have that kind of relationship. Although one party was caring 
for the other following an accident, in a way which a husband and wife may care for one another 
in those circumstances, they did not intend to live together as husband and wife and were living 
together solely for the purpose of helping the applicant get back on her feet.83 Likewise in Kimber 
the court focussed on the intention of the parties to maintain their relationship, with the 
American partner seeking permission to stay in the country and continue the relationship with 
the applicant proving significant.84 In Nutting85 it was suggested that ‘without a lifetime 
commitment at least at some point in the relationship there is no sufficient similarity to 
marriage’.86 The ‘emotional’ and ‘mutual lifetime commitment’ must be ‘objectively assessed by 
                                                          
78 [2010] FMCAfam 280. 
79 ibid [121]. 
80 ibid [58]. 
81 See Chapter 3, 3.4.1. 
82 See Ricci v Jones [2010] FMCAfam 1425, [55] where Riley FM commented that there is ‘a difference 
between presenting as people who are going out together, people who are in a romantic relationship and 
people who are in a de facto relationship.’  
83 Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission (n20) 504 (Woolf J). 
84 Kimber v Kimber (n15) 392-3. 
85 [2005] HLR 25. 
86 ibid [17] (Evans-Lombe J). 
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reference to what the outside world can see’ as well as ‘by reference to the viewpoint of the 
parties themselves’. This requirement of ‘commitment’ is deemed important because this is 
what would differentiate a relationship of a couple living as husband and wife with a relationship 
‘of convenience, friendship, companionship or the living together of lovers’.87 In Amicus, it was 
found that the couple were not living together as husband and wife because the deceased had 
deliberately decided to remain ‘independent’. The deceased has failed ‘to commit herself… 
wholeheartedly’ to the relationship, which was taken as an indication that she was ‘not prepared 
to commit herself in a way which characterises the commitment made by husband and wife.’88 
The Australian case law provides some examples of how ‘commitment’ can be 
demonstrated. In Baker v Landon, for example, the parties’ plans to marry, the applicant’s 
involvement in the life of the respondent’s child and their statements to the IVF programme of 
their ‘significant commitment to each other and a life together raising children’ indicated ‘a 
significant commitment to a shared life’.89 There were also signs of emotional commitment as 
the applicant had tattooed the names of the applicant and her child on his arms.90 In Spencer v 
Speight91 it was suggested that the applicant’s involvement in the lives of the respondent’s 
children was indicative of commitment, as was the fact that the applicant’s dog was left at the 
respondent’s home.92 In Australia, the commitment between the partners must be mutual, but 
‘does not need to be an absolute nor possibly a wholehearted commitment’,93 which appears to 
be a lower threshold than that which the English court required in Nutting. In Locke v Norton94 
the judge decided there was no degree of mutual commitment because both parties were 
committed to different types of relationship: the applicant saw the respondent as her de facto 
partner and future husband, whereas the respondent viewed the applicant as his ‘girlfriend’.95 
Similarly in McMaster v Wyhler96 the fact that the respondent had treated the applicant in the 
same manner as all her other friends throughout the relationship, and that the parties made no 
plans for a future together suggested that there was no mutual commitment, which was 
                                                          
87 ibid [36-7]. 
88 Amicus Horizon (n13) [25-6]. 
89 Baker v Landon (n78) [117-8] (Riethmuller FM). 
90 ibid [119] (Riethmuller FM). 
91 [2014] FamCA 436. 
92 ibid [137], [138] (Benjamin J). 
93 Smyth v Pappas [2011] FamCA 434, [114] (Cronin J). 
94 [2014] FamCA 811. 
95 ibid [163], [165], [205-7] (Rees J). See also McMaster v Wyhler [2013] FamCA 989, [109-111] (Tree J), 
where there was no de facto relationship as the respondent had treated the applicant in the same manner 
as all her other friends throughout the relationship, and the parties made no plans for a future together. 
96 [2013] FamCA 989. 
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indicative of a friendship and not a de facto relationship.97 This suggests that while ‘uneven 
couples’ may be more likely to be legally recognised in Australia than England and Wales, they 
are in a precarious position and so may not be able to avail themselves of family law’s protection. 
6.1.2.5 Third party perceptions of the relationship 
The views of third parties are given substantial weight in some cases. In the English case 
of Nutting, Evans-Lombe J emphasised that whether the relationship is ‘openly and 
unequivocally displayed to the outside world’ so that it appears as a lifelong commitment is ‘an 
entirely adequate test’ for determining the existence of a cohabiting relationship.98 This may be 
difficult for some couples in some communities, especially same-sex couples, who may not feel 
able to present their relationship as a couple to the outside world. This poses a risk that partners 
to such a relationship would be left outside the law’s protection. For example, in Baynes v 
Hedger99 a same-sex couple were found to not be living ‘as civil partners’ because many of their 
family and friends did not know about the true nature of their relationship. As a civil partnership, 
in the same way as marriage, is a public relationship, such a private arrangement meant that the 
couple could not be seen to be living in the same household as civil partners.100 Similarly, in the 
Australian case of Jonah v White101 a 17 year relationship between an opposite-sex couple was 
held not to be a de facto relationship, partly because of the ‘clandestine’ nature of the 
relationship, which was necessary because the respondent was married throughout the 17 
years.102 In Jonah, the claimant was left without the option of any financial provision, even 
though she had been financially dependent upon the respondent for many years.103 These 
decisions suggest that couples who keep their relationship secret may face difficulty proving that 
their relationship is akin to a relationship between husband and wife, or that they are living 
together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis, and so will be left without protection. 
In some instances, one or both parties to the relationship will have claimed to a 
government agency that they are single so that their claim for benefits is not affected. In England 
and Wales, it appears that making representations of being single to a government agency 
suggests that the couple are not living together as husband and wife. For example, in Amicus, 
both parties had been careful to claim benefits as single people, which according to the court 
                                                          
97 ibid [109-111] (Tree J). 
98 Nutting (n85) [17] (Evans-Lombe J). 
99 [2008] EWHC 1587 (Ch). 
100 ibid [150]. 
101 [2011] FamCA 221. 
102 ibid [69] (Murphy J).  
103 M Fernando and O Rundle ‘Love ‘em, Keep ‘em, Leave ‘em – (Non)Application of De Facto Relationship 
Laws to Clandestine Intimate Relationships’ (2016) 41(1) Alternative Law Journal 93, 96. 
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‘was not a public affirmation of the unity which characterises husband and wife’.104 Similarly, in 
G v F the court said that a person cannot ‘be permitted to say to a court that she is living with 
the respondent as husband and wife… whilst maintaining to the Department of Social Security 
that she is not.’105 The Australian courts take a different approach, and focus on the purpose of 
the legislation that they are dealing with. As Behrens explains, ‘while social security provides 
support for basic living expenses, the [financial remedies provision] is in part concerned to 
recognise the contributions (financial and non-financial) which a party has made to the benefit 
of the other party.’106 In Baker v Landon, the couples’ families ‘understood them to be in a de 
facto relationship and intending to marry’, and they had represented themselves as a couple to 
obtain IVF treatment,107 but the respondent ‘continued to claim a single person’s benefit from 
the Department of Social Security’.108 Despite the fact that the respondent made claims that she 
was single, a de facto relationship was found because of the other circumstances present such 
as cohabitation, financial interdependence and their plans to marry and have another child.109 
Similarly in Hayes v Marquis,110 McColl J stated that it ‘was understandable’ that the respondent 
claimed to be single to claim benefits, ‘because she was bearing all the expenses of the appellant 
residing at her house.’111 This again shows the flexibility of the Australian provision, where 
judges are able and willing to explore all aspects of the relationship before determining whether 
a de facto relationship exists. 
6.1.3 The challenges of a function-based approach 
The courts in both jurisdictions take a similar approach to determining the existence of an 
informal couple relationship and examine all of the circumstances before taking a ‘step back’, to 
‘consider the matter as a whole.’112 In Barry v Dalrymple,113 Coleman J stated that ‘no gendered 
assumptions or stereotyping can impact upon the [court’s] determination’ on the existence of a 
relationship.114 This suggests a willingness to accept that couples arrange their lives together in 
                                                          
104 Amicus Horizon (n13) [25]. 
105 G v F (n41) 195 (Wall J). 
106 J Behrens ‘’De Facto Relationship?’ Some Early Case Law Under the Family Law Act’ (2010) 24(3) 
Australian Journal of Family Law 350, 353. 
107 Baker v Landon (n78) [123]. 
108 ibid [124]. 
109 ibid [111], [114], [117], [121-1]. cf Locke v Norton (n68) where the applicant had represented herself 
as single to Centrelink without the respondent’s knowledge, and it was found that there was no de facto 
relationship (because the parties were committed to different types of relationship).  
110 [2008] NSWCA 10. 
111 ibid [99] (McColl J). See also, Barlevy v Nadolski [2011] NSWSC 129, [113] (Slattery J); C, K v O, J [2014] 
SADC 87, [108] (Cole J); Brady v Harris [2012] FamCA 420, [83] (Faulks DCJ). 
112 Baker v Landon (n78) [126]. 
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different ways. The courts examine both public and private aspects of a relationship, and look 
for ‘a continuing course of conduct and behaviour, not an event at a fixed point of time.’115 As 
Murphy J noted in the Australian case of Jonah v White, while none of the statutory indicia are 
necessary for a finding of a de facto relationship, what is needed is an exploration of, 
…the nature of the union rather than how it manifests itself in quantities of joint time. It is 
the nature of the union – the merger of two individual lives into life as a couple – that lies 
at the heart of the statutory considerations and the non-exhaustive nature of them and, 
in turn, a finding that there is a “de facto relationship”.116 
This flexible approach is commendable because it allows judges the freedom to assess each case 
on its individual facts, and alleviates the concerns discussed in chapter two that function-based 
recognition would focus on a narrow vision of family only. But, as predicted in chapter two,117 
this is not entirely unproblematic. 
As Pascoe CFM noted in Keaton v Aldridge,118 determining when a de facto relationship 
begins and ends is difficult because these relationships ‘are fluid in the sense that it is difficult… 
to discern’ when they begin or end.119 Determining when a relationship began and ended can 
be a challenging and time consuming task,120 and it can be difficult for lawyers to advise clients 
as to whether their relationship will be legally recognised.121 In Gissing v Sheffield,122 excluding 
the evidence that the parties themselves gave in court, the parties relied on eleven affidavits 
from witnesses and 24 exhibits to evidence the nature of their relationship.123 Determining 
whether facts alleged by either party to the relationship are true can also lead to intrusive 
inquiries. For example, in S v B, there was some dispute between the parties as to when a sexual 
relationship ended. Dutney J commented that,  
In the second half of 1999 the appellant began to make remarks that the respondent was 
“fat”. In the early years of their relationship the respondent alleged that she and the 
appellant had had an active sex life. By 1999, however, the appellant was experiencing 
erection dysfunction. The appellant initially tried injections to sustain an erection but 
                                                          
115 Thompson v The Public Trustee of New South Wales [2010] NSSC 1137, [78] (Hallen AsJ). 
116 Jonah v White (n30) [66]. 
117 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2. 
118 [2009] FMCAfam 92. 
119 ibid [121]. 
120 See J Millbank ‘If Australian Law Opened Its Eyes to Lesbian and Gay Families, what would it see?’ 
(1998) 12(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 1, 33. 
121 Behrens (n106) 360. 
122 [2012] FMCAfam 1111. 
123 ibid [9-11]. 
199 
 
ultimately sexual activity ceased. The appellant blamed his failure to obtain and sustain 
an erection on the respondent being fat.124 
Dutney J then went on to remark that when the sexual relationship ceased was not ‘particularly 
relevant to whether the relationship continued in this case’.125 If the issue of when, or why, the 
sexual relationship ceased was not relevant to a determination of when the de facto relationship 
ceased, it is questionable why the judge needed to refer to these personal details at all. Behrens 
comments that the ‘intrusive’ nature of the inquiries ‘takes us back to the days before no-fault 
divorce, when the details of parties’ private lives were laid bare in court,’ but that ‘there is 
probably no alternative’ under a function-based system. She explains that lawyers will need to 
advise clients of ‘the kind of evidence which will need to be brought if the question of the nature 
of the relationship is to be litigated, and to the costs, both financial and emotional of such 
evidence.’126 These intrusive inquiries have been referred to as ‘undignified’ in the parliamentary 
debates on the introduction of registered couple relationships in Australia127 and this was 
proffered as a reason to prefer form-based recognition over function-based recognition. The 
intrusive inquiries and the inherent uncertainty of function-based frameworks of relationship 
recognition, appear to be unavoidable. But this is not a reason to favour form-based recognition 
because there is a benefit that applies only to function-based recognition, as can be seen by 
exploring the rationales behind the moderate function-based reforms. 
6.2 Rationales for the moderate function-based approach 
There are two reasons why the legal recognition of cohabitants and de facto relationships 
under a function-based framework was thought necessary in both jurisdictions under 
consideration. Firstly, parliamentary debates have focussed on the functional similarities 
between the nature of married and unmarried relationships, which lead policymakers to 
conclude that unmarried partners should be similarly protected by family law. This is important 
because it shows that a desire to protect the economically vulnerable partner has influenced 
the development of both form-based and function-based recognition. Secondly, function-based 
systems are best placed to protect the economically vulnerable partner because there is no need 
to opt-in for legal recognition of the relationship as is the case with form-based recognition. 
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6.2.1 Functional arguments: protecting the vulnerable 
Recognition of informal marriage-like relationships has developed ad hoc in both England 
and Wales and Australia. These ad hoc changes have been largely justified because unmarried 
couples’ relationships are assumed to perform similar functions to marriage, and so unmarried 
couples require similar legal protection. For example, in England and Wales the Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975128 originally provided that a person who was 
dependant on the deceased could claim financial provision. This was intended to include, as the 
then Solicitor-General put it, ‘common law wives’. The purpose of the provision was to cater for 
those ‘tragic cases’ where a cohabiting partner has ‘devoted years to the deceased and, perhaps, 
helped him to build up a business and who then finds that she is deprived of any benefit or 
redress because she cannot produce a marriage certificate.’129 The focus was on the dependency 
and vulnerability of the selfless cohabiting (female) partner who had made sacrifices for the 
deceased, and this was used as a justification for allowing her to make a claim for provision in a 
similar way to a wife. The 1975 Act was amended in 1995130 to specifically include a partner who 
lived in the same household as the deceased as their ‘husband or wife’, to allow a non-
dependant long-term cohabiting partner to make a claim.131 The then Lord Chancellor explained 
that this was necessary because it was unfair to leave a ‘long-term cohabitant who contributed 
fully to the household without provision and unable to even use [the] safety net’ of the 
dependant provision. Significantly, the change was intended to reflect the contribution made by 
the female cohabitant, but cohabitants and spouses were not treated identically to ‘preserve 
the distinction between the respective claims of married and unmarried partners.’132  
Similarly, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 was amended in 1983133 to include a cohabitant 
who lived as the husband or wife of the deceased. This was necessary because of the increase 
in the number of cohabitants and changing social attitudes towards unmarried relationships.134 
The focus again was on the role of the dependant female who had ‘acted as a wife for perhaps 
very many years’.135 These arguments about the need to recognise the vulnerability of a selfless 
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female cohabitant are functional arguments: they recognise that relationship-generated need 
can occur in both cohabiting and married relationships because they function in similar ways, 
and consequently they should be treated similarly by law. The same arguments relating to 
economic vulnerability have been advanced in England and Wales in support of a legislative 
scheme dealing with the financial consequences of the breakdown of cohabiting relationships. 
For example, the Law Commission in its 2007 report on the financial consequences of the 
breakdown of cohabitating relationships referred to ‘the findings of recent empirical research’136 
that reinforces ‘the view that the current law can produce unfair outcomes for cohabitants, in 
particular for the primary carer of children who may experience significant economic 
disadvantage following separation.’137 These arguments have so far been unsuccessful in 
convincing successive governments that they should legislate in England and Wales to give 
unmarried couples divorce-like provision on relationship breakdown, but similar arguments 
have been successful in Australia.  
Three reasons were advanced by the then New South Wales (NSW) government and NSW 
Law Reform Commission to justify the introduction of a legislative system dealing with the 
property and financial consequences of the breakdown of de facto relationships. These were 1) 
the deficiencies of the current law; 2) the increasing number of de facto partners;138 and 3) the 
general acceptance of the need for change within the legal profession.139 Property law provisions 
did not consider the nature of the relationship between the parties and the non-financial 
contributions that are made in relationships. This situation was unsatisfactory, because as the 
then Attorney General explained,  
The Law Reform Commission found that as the range of financial arrangements made by 
de facto partners is similar to the range of arrangements made by married couples, 
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analogous legal principles ought to be applied to the resolution of financial affairs of de 
facto partners.140 
The increasing number of de facto relationships meant that these difficulties were becoming 
problems for a wider section of society and so some legal remedy, which stopped short of 
identical treatment with marriage,141 was necessary. Similarly, the 2008 federal reforms dealing 
with the breakdown of de facto relationships were thought necessary partly142 because of 
equality arguments. The reforms achieved equality of treatment on relationship breakdown 
between married and unmarried couples, as well as achieving substantive equality between 
same- and opposite-sex couples by amending the definition of ‘de facto’ to include same-sex 
couples.143 Similarly to the protection argument, the substantive equality arguments can also be 
considered functional arguments because they are concerned with treating relationships that 
function similarly in a similar way. In this way, it is apparent that function-based recognition of 
informal couples has developed in both jurisdictions on the basis that the functional similarity 
between marriage and the informal couples means that both types of relationship need family 
law’s protection. 
6.2.2 Function as a ‘safety net’  
Another reason advanced to support the introduction of function-based recognition is 
that there is no need to opt-in to a scheme to gain legal recognition and so function-based 
frameworks operate as a safeguard or a safety net. The Law Commission specifically rejected 
the creation of an opt-in scheme for cohabitants in England and Wales because ‘it would do 
nothing for those who, for whatever reason, failed to opt in’. This would undermine the 
objective of the consultation process, which was to ‘[alleviate] the financial hardship of those 
who have not married or registered a civil partnership’.144 Similarly, the Tasmanian government 
felt that introducing function-based recognition alongside registration options, ‘provide[s] the 
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safety net required to deliver equitable treatment under the law’ to particular eligible 
relationships.145 A report that formed the basis of the 2003 Tasmanian reforms found that a 
function-based system ‘will not only provide a safety net for all parties to significant 
relationships, but will also ensure that the more vulnerable partners in such relationships are 
protected.’146 The efficiency of function-based recognition as a safeguard will depend on the 
interpretation of the definitions of cohabiting and de facto relationships: if the standards are 
overly stringent there is the potential that vulnerable partners will be left without legal 
protection, and this undermines the rationales advanced for recognising these relationships in 
the first place. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this safety net benefit is not shared 
with formalised relationships, and for formalised relationships to protect partners, steps must 
be taken to opt-in. 
6.3 The consequences of a moderate function-based reform 
So far, it has been shown that legal recognition of informal couple relationships is based 
on a desire to treat functionally similar relationships alike, and consequently to ensure that 
informal couple relationships are protected by law. It is necessary next to explore the legal 
consequences that attach to these relationships to discover in what ways they are being 
protected. Following a brief overview of the general legal consequences, the discussion will 
focus on the provision for relationship breakdown in both jurisdictions because this is an area 
that has been subject to much debate in both jurisdictions and continues to be the focus of 
reform efforts in England and Wales.147 The discussion will conclude with some observations on 
the value of the social status of these relationships compared with that of marriage. 
6.3.1 General legal consequences 
The legal position of cohabitants in England and Wales is complicated. Barlow and others 
note that ‘sometimes the law treats cohabitants as married, sometimes ignores the relationship 
altogether and treats them as individuals, and in other instances treats them as a couple, but a 
couple which is inferior to their married counterparts.’148 For example, a cohabiting partner is 
included among those who can claim a tenancy on the tenant’s death under the Housing Acts of 
1985 and 1988 in the same way as spouses.149 The Family Law Act 1996 allows for occupation or 
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non-molestation orders to be made for cohabitants,150 although occupation rights in the family 
home are not automatically extended to cohabitants in the same way as for spouses.151 
Cohabitants are entitled to certain social security benefits in the same way as spouses, although, 
importantly, cohabitants do not have a right to redress should one partner fail to share this 
income with the other.152  A person who has lived in the same household as the deceased for 
two years as ‘the husband or wife’ or ‘the civil partner’ of the deceased can apply for financial 
provision from the deceased’s estate in a similar way to a spouse.153  
Legal recognition of de facto relationships in Australia developed ad hoc under both state 
and federal law during the twentieth century. For example, the Australian Soldiers’ Repatriation 
Act 1920 ‘provided a pension to the wife of a deceased or incapacitated member of the Armed 
Forces’, including a woman who cohabited with and was dependent upon that person.154 ‘De 
facto widows’ were provided for under the Widows’ Pensions Act 1942 if they cohabited with 
the deceased for at least three years and were maintained by him.155  In New South Wales the 
Crimes (Domestic Violence) Amendment Act 1982156 gave de facto partners and married couples 
who were victims of domestic violence access to similar remedies157 and the Workers 
Compensation Act 1987 also recognised de facto partners in a similar way to spouses where the 
partner was dependant on the worker.158 In South Australia, the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 
and the Housing Improvement Act 1940 gave opposite-sex de facto partners the same rights as 
married couples in relation to some issues regarding housing.159 De facto partners are exempt 
from paying stamp duty in Victoria in the same way as spouses,160 and de facto partners in 
Victoria will inherit their partners’ property in the same way as spouses.161 This ad hoc 
recognition developed into comprehensive recognition, and today, de facto couples, which 
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include couples of the same- and opposite-sex, are treated almost identically to spouses under 
Australian law.162  
6.3.2 Relationship breakdown provisions for informal couple relationships 
In Australia, de facto couples are subject to a discretionary statutory scheme that gives 
the courts powers to adjust property interests and award maintenance payments in the same 
way as for married couples. There is no ‘divorce law equivalent’163 in England and Wales, and so 
separating cohabitants are subject to the ordinary provisions of property and trusts law. This 
means there is no possibility of maintenance payments between former cohabitants,164 and the 
court cannot adjust property interests as they can for married couples.165 This position has been 
criticised by the Law Commission for being uncertain, illogical and complex.166 An exploration of 
the current law proves that the Law Commission’s claims are not unfounded. It will be argued 
that the judiciary have developed function-based recognition of cohabitants as far as they are 
able without statutory intervention, and this has been done because, similarly to what has 
happened with financial remedies for spouses,167 the courts recognise that relationship 
generated need arises in cohabiting relationships and that an economically vulnerable partner 
needs family law’s protection on relationship breakdown. 
6.3.2.1 Relationship breakdown in England and Wales 
6.3.2.1a Developing trusts law 
The common intention constructive trust has been developed by the courts ‘in response 
to changing social and economic conditions’168 where an increasing number of couples choose 
to live together without marrying. It also responds to the inadequacies of the presumed resulting 
trust as a vehicle for dealing with property interests, such as its failure to consider contributions 
other than direct financial contributions to the purchase price. The common intention 
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constructive trust effectively originated169 in the House of Lords decisions in Pettit v Pettit170 and 
Gissing v Gissing.171 The current law is found in Stack v Dowden172 and Jones v Kernott.173 
Whereas the starting point in marriage is equal division,174 the starting point for 
cohabitants is to determine the parties’ common intention in relation to the beneficial interests 
in property. Baroness Hale explained in Stack that ‘the starting point where there is sole legal 
ownership is sole beneficial ownership’ and ‘the starting point where there is joint legal 
ownership is joint beneficial ownership.’175 As Gardner and Davidson summarise, there are two 
questions for the court to ask.176 In sole ownership cases, the first question is whether the 
claimant should have any beneficial interest in the property, which means that the claimant 
must be able to adduce evidence that it was the parties’ common intention that they have a 
beneficial interest.177 The claimant can rely on express agreement about the beneficial 
ownership to establish they have a beneficial interest,178 or otherwise they can show that they 
made direct financial contributions to the purchase price or to the mortgage payments.179 In 
joint legal ownership cases, there is a presumption that ‘the parties intended a joint tenancy 
both in law and in equity’.180 So for spouses, the court has the jurisdiction to adjust property 
interests; for cohabitants the court can only declare already existing interests in property on the 
basis of the parties’ common intention. 
If a common intention to share the beneficial interest is established, the court must then 
ask a second question, which is to determine in what shares the beneficial interest should be 
divided.181 This should be answered by reference to the parties’ actual intention, but if this is 
not possible then the court may impute an intention to achieve a fair outcome. This concept of 
imputing an intent to the parties has proved controversial,182 but, Lord Walker and Baroness 
Hale explained in Jones v Kernott that ‘the court has a duty to come to a conclusion on the 
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dispute put before it’.183 When determining the beneficial interests, the court may consider ‘all 
manner of relevant evidence’ that relates to the parties’ ‘whole course of conduct’,184 including, 
…any advice or discussions at the time of the transfer which cast light upon their intentions 
then; the reasons why the home was acquired in their joint names; the reasons why (if it 
be the case) the survivor was authorised to give a receipt for the capital moneys; the 
purpose for which the home was acquired; the nature of the parties' relationship; whether 
they had children for whom they both had responsibility to provide a home; how the 
purchase was financed, both initially and subsequently; how the parties arranged their 
finances, whether separately or together or a bit of both; how they discharged the 
outgoings on the property and their other household expenses.185 
6.3.2.1b The limitations of property law and the case for statutory reform 
The courts have developed the common intention constructive trust because the judiciary 
recognise that cohabiting relationships are qualitatively different from commercial relationships 
and so benefit from different treatment.186 As Lord Hope notes in Stack, ‘where the parties have 
dealt with each other at arms length it makes sense to start from the position that there is a 
resulting trust according to how much each party contributed’,187 but this is not an appropriate 
outcome for cohabitants because,188  
 …cohabiting couples are in a different kind of relationship. The place where they live 
together is their home. Living together is an exercise in give and take, mutual co-operation 
and compromise. Who pays for what in regard to the home has to be seen in the wider 
context of their overall relationship. A more practical, down-to-earth, fact-based approach 
is called for in their case. The framework which the law provides should be simple, and it 
should be accessible.189 
This process of developing trusts law to take into account the distinctive nature of family 
as opposed to commercial relationships has been referred to by Hayward, building on the earlier 
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arguments of Dewar,190 as ‘familialisation’; the ‘process by which’ judges ‘have modified general 
principles of land law or trusts to accommodate the specific needs of family members’.191 
Hayward explains that the decisions in Stack and Jones are significant because they ‘illustrate 
the judiciary intensifying their use of “familialisation”.’ Stack was significant because the courts’ 
recognised for the first time the cogent presumption that beneficial ownership should follow 
legal ownership,192 and Jones explained that the rationale behind this presumption ‘was not the 
equitable maxim of ‘equity follows the law’, but rather recognition that a joint purchase of 
residential property was ‘a strong indication of emotional and economic commitment to a joint 
enterprise.’193 Hayward argues that the development of the common intention constructive 
trust shows how ‘the courts are utilising the creativity of equity to further develop the trusts 
framework’ in a way that takes into account the nature of family relationships.194 Moreover, 
there are indications in the Stack judgment, as pointed out by George, that future cases may be 
able to move further and that indirect financial contributions to property may be sufficient to 
establish beneficial ownership in sole legal owner cases.195 This suggests that the process of 
familialisation of property law is ongoing. 
 Despite these developments, the law following Stack and Jones has been subject to 
criticism from academics, and it appears to be anything but ‘simple’ as Lord Hope explained it 
should be in Stack. For example, George notes that although Jones has given guidance as to ‘how 
the quantification process works’ in terms of deciding on the beneficial shares, it remains 
uncertain precisely when beneficial ownership will be different from legal title.196 Mee believes 
that the discussion of imputed intent in Jones has ‘confused matters greatly without bringing 
any greater theoretical coherence to the common intention doctrine.’197 The accessibility and 
affordability of the current system is also in doubt. Baroness Hale in Stack made the point that 
‘the costs of pursuing the argument to [the House of Lords] will have been quite 
disproportionate’ to the worth of the property in question.198 
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Arguably, statutory intervention is necessary for a principled reform.199 Baroness Hale 
in Gow v Grant200 called for statutory reform because this ‘would be less costly and more 
productive of settlements as well as achieving fairer results than the present law.’201 Baroness 
Hale felt that a statutory scheme would ‘not impose upon unmarried couples the responsibilities 
of marriage but [would redress] the gains and losses flowing from their relationship.’202 This 
suggests that the contributions made by the economically weaker partner should be 
acknowledged on relationship breakdown. Lord Neuberger’s dissenting judgement in Stack 
cautioned against the courts developing specific property law principles for particular types of 
relationship because the courts develop the law on a case by case basis, whereas parliamentary 
reform benefits from a consultation period and ‘input from the democratically elected 
legislature.’203 Similarly, the Law Commission noted that the courts can only develop the law as 
it relates to the facts of the case before them.204 The Commission also criticised the current 
system because, ‘since the parties’ shares are to be determined by reference to their intentions, 
the court cannot substitute its own view of what is the fair outcome on separation.205 
6.3.2.1c The Law Commission proposals 
Due to the inadequacies of the current law, the Law Commission has recommended the 
introduction of a statutory scheme dealing with the financial consequences of relationship 
breakdown as an alternative to the current property provisions. They did not feel that 
cohabitants should be treated in the same way as spouses, because cohabitants ‘have not given 
each other the legal commitment, or accepted the status, of marriage’,206 and such a scheme 
was likely to be ‘politically unattainable’.207 Instead, they proposed the creation of a scheme that 
would give the courts discretion to adjust the property interests of cohabitants, but this 
discretion would be more limited than that available for spouses and civil partners.208 The 
Commission felt that such an approach was necessary because,  
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…hardship following separation often arises because the gains and losses arising from the 
parties’ contributions to the relationship have not been shared fairly.209 Decisions taken 
during the relationship about the allocation of the parties’ resources or of their respective 
roles may leave one party in need on separation, or, if not actually in need, at least bearing 
an unequal share of the costs of the relationship. Equally, one party may be left with an 
economic gain from the relationship. 210 
The Law Commission’s proposals recognise that personal relationships can generate economic 
disadvantage for one partner and economic gain for another, and so this should be remedied by 
law.211  
The Commission’s scheme would only apply to eligible cohabitants. The Commission 
decided against a statutory checklist of indicia, akin to that in place in Australia, because their 
preferred definition of a ‘living as a couple in a joint household’ was, apparently, easily 
‘understood as a matter of plain English’.212 To be eligible, the couple would need to have a child, 
or alternatively, must have lived together for a period of 2-5 years, to be determined by 
statute.213 The Commission’s recommendation, similarly to Baroness Hale’s comments above 
about redressing gains and losses, was that relief would only be granted based on the economic 
impact of the relationship on the applicant: an eligible cohabitant would need to prove that 
‘qualifying contributions’ made by the applicant have the effect that either, i) ‘the respondent 
has retained a benefit’, or ii) that the ‘applicant has an economic disadvantage’.214 A qualifying 
contribution is defined broadly to include non-financial contributions.215 It was recommended 
that the court should not be able to make periodical payment orders, but should be able to 
award lump sum payments, property transfers, orders for sale and pension sharing.216 An 
applicant would need to bring a case within two years of the breakdown of the relationship, 
unless there were exceptional circumstances that led the court to believe that an extension to 
this period was necessary.217 The Commission recommended that an opt-out provision would 
                                                          
209 For further discussion, see Law Commission A Consultation Paper (n166) Chapter 4. 
210 Law Commission Cohabitation (n137) [4.26]. 
211 See the discussion above, at 6.2.1, relating to the functional arguments advanced as reasons to 
recognise unmarried couples in different areas. 
212 Law Commission Cohabitation (n137) [3.17]. cf however where it is argued that determining whether 
two people are ‘living as a couple’ or ‘living together as husband and wife’ is not always straightforward; 
see above, 6.1.2. 
213 ibid [3.63]. 
214 ibid [4.33], [8.10]. 
215 ibid [4.34]. 
216 ibid [4.40]. 
217 ibid [4.151], [4.155]. 
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preserve the freedom of cohabitants to make their own decisions, but that the court would have 
discretion to set aside the agreement if enforcing it would cause unfairness.218 
Legislating for the Law Commission’s proposals would be a considerable change in 
England and Wales because it would create a scheme applicable for the breakdown of informal 
relationships that is similar but more limited than that applying on divorce. Arguably, legislating 
for such a scheme is a logical move because cohabitants are already recognised in many areas 
of law because of a desire to protect the economically vulnerable partner. Providing a scheme 
for financial remedies, akin to the Law Commission’s, could better protect that vulnerable 
partner on relationship breakdown than current property law provision. Implementation of the 
Commission’s scheme however, would still leave England and Wales some way behind the well-
developed Australian system. 
6.3.2.2 Financial and property provisions on the breakdown of de facto relationships 
6.3.2.2a Recognising the deficiencies of property law 
It has already been mentioned that NSW was the first Australian jurisdiction to legislate 
for a divorce-like scheme applicable on the breakdown of de facto relationships. Several reasons 
were given by the NSW Law Reform Commission and the then NSW Government for legislating 
to provide property and financial provisions for de facto partners that were akin to those 
available for spouses.219 They believed that ordinary principles of trust and property law were 
inadequate in dealing with disputes between de facto partners,220 which are the same concerns 
as those expressed in England and Wales.221 Property law could not fully take into account the 
nature of the relationship between the parties, because the focus of property law was only on 
the legal title to property. The only way of adjusting interests in property was if direct financial 
contributions to the purchase price had been made by the non-owning partner and so a resulting 
trust would arise, or if it was possible to establish the ‘common intention’ of the partners that 
both should have a share in the property.222 The law did not fully take into account non-financial 
contributions, such as caregiving and homemaking, which could lead to injustices.223 Similarly to 
the calls for reform by the English judiciary, the NSW Law Reform Commission noted that the 
                                                          
218 ibid [5.15], [5.17], [5.61]. 
219 See also above, 6.1.1. 
220 NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 17 October 1984, 2001 (David Paul Landa, Attorney General). See also 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission (n11) [8.5]; M Evans ‘De Facto Property Disputes: The Drama 
Continues’ (1987) 1(3) Australian Journal of Family Law 234, 234-248. 
221 See above, 6.3.2.1a and 6.3.2.1b. See also R Chisholm ‘De Facto Relationships in New South Wales’ 
(1986) 1(1) Australian Journal of Family Law 87, 88. 
222 See New South Wales Law Reform Commission (n11) Part 7. 
223 ibid [5.9], [7.31].  
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deficiencies of the law in this area ‘prompted sustained judicial criticism of a kind which [was] 
unusual in Australia.’224 For example, Hope JA in Muschinski v Dodds225 noted that there was ‘a 
need for reform of the law… along the lines adopted in the family law legislation upon the 
breakdown of the marriage,’ because the problem was ‘a growing one’ which ‘the courts [would] 
not be able to solve by themselves’.226  
Additionally, and unlike the Law Commission’s limited proposals, extending some 
provision for maintenance akin to that available for married couples was also seen as necessary. 
Chisholm notes that this was controversial because, on the one hand, there were ‘arguments to 
the effect that such a law perpetuates the dependent status of women’, and, on the other there 
were arguments that maintenance could protect the (female) economically weaker partner and 
protect her from exploitation.227 The NSW Law Reform Commission felt that limited 
maintenance payments should be available for de facto partners upon relationship breakdown, 
because failing to do so could cause ‘serious injustice by failing to provide a means, even on a 
temporary basis, of alleviating financial hardship caused by the breakdown of a de facto 
relationship.’ The NSW Commission focussed on the situation where financial needs arise that 
‘are attributable to the relationship’ such as in a case ‘where a woman cannot support herself 
adequately because of her responsibilities to care for children’.228 The NSW Commission’s 
proposals were implemented in NSW in 1984229 and provided a basis for reforms in the other 
states and territories. These state laws then provided a template for the federal law provisions 
that have now superseded state law in all states and territories except Western Australia. 
6.3.2.2b The preliminary requirements 
Before a court will consider granting property or financial orders, there are several hurdles 
to pass. Firstly, the applicant must prove that a de facto relationship existed between the parties, 
and that it has broken down,230 and as shown above, this is not always an easy task. Next, there 
                                                          
224 ibid [5.10]. 
225 Muschinski v Dodds (1982) 8 Fam LR 622. 
226 ibid 629. See also New South Wales Law Reform Commission (n11) [5.11]. 
227 Chisholm (n221) 90. 
228 New South Wales Law Reform Commission (n11) [8.5]. 
229 De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) (later renamed the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW) by 
the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW), sch 1[2]). 
230 The onus of proving the existence of a de facto relationship rests with the party who applies to the 
court for property and maintenance orders: Locke v Norton (n68) [13] (Rees J). 
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are certain geographical requirements to satisfy,231 and additionally, one of four gateway 
requirements232 must be met:233 
 The ‘period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years’ 
(this does not have to be a continuous two year period);234 
 There is a child of the de facto relationship; 235 
 The applicant has made ‘substantial contributions’, and a failure to make an order 
‘would result in serious injustice’: this includes financial or non-financial contributions 
made directly or indirectly to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of property, 
or contributions made to the welfare of the family, including as a homemaker or 
parent;236 
 The relationship is, or was, registered in one of the states or territories.237 
It is argued here that the fact that ‘substantial contributions’ (that one partner has made a gain 
at the others’ expense) is sufficient reason for the court to consider granting property or 
financial orders suggests that the need to protect a partner and prevent exploitation is a central 
objective of the legislation.  
                                                          
231 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SD (financial provision) and s90SK (property provision): a couple must 
be ‘ordinarily resident’ in a ‘participating jurisdiction’, that is a territory or a referring state, at the time 
the application is made to the court. They must also have resided in a participating jurisdiction for at least 
one-third of the relationship, or alternatively that the party applying for an order has made substantial 
contributions to property, or substantial contributions as a homemaker or parent whilst residing in a 
participating jurisdiction. 
232 This is a term borrowed from the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other 
Measures) Bill 2008 – Explanatory Memorandum, [121]. See also G Watts ‘De facto relationships 
legislation’ (2009) 23(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 122, 126-7. 
233 The situation is similar in Western Australia, although whether the relationship is registered is 
irrelevant in that jurisdictions: Family Courts Act 1997 (WA), s205Z. 
234 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SB(1). It need not be a continuous two year period – see Kovacs 
(n28) 107; see also Hamblin v Dahl [2010] FMCAfam 514. 
235 A child of the de facto relationship is defined in s90RB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth): ‘a child is a 
child of a de facto relationship if the child is the child of both of the parties to the de facto relationship.’ 
236 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SM(4). For an example see Spencer v Speight (n91) [172-4] (Benjamin J), 
where the applicant had made ‘substantial contributions’ in the form of financial arrangements to 
contribute money to the respondent’s mortgage account, despite the relationship being of 17 months 
duration. 
237 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SB(d). The definition of de facto relationships is not uniform in all areas 
of Australian law. Under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), registration of a relationship is to be taken into 
account when assessing whether a relationship is a de facto relationship; and then if a de facto 
relationship is found there are no other gateway requirements that need to be met. In other areas of 
federal law however registration of a de facto relationship is conclusive proof of the existence of the 
relationship: see Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s2D-2E. 
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6.3.2.2c Property and maintenance orders 
The court will only grant an order if it is ‘just and equitable’ to do so.238 The court can 
adjust interest in any property owned by either de facto partner, including the possibility of 
superannuation (or pension) splitting:239 this is in sharp contrast to the approach in England and 
Wales where a cohabitant must prove ownership of an asset, because all the courts are able to 
do is declare already existing interests in the property of unmarried couples.240 Applications 
should be made within two years of the breakdown of the relationship,241 but there is flexibility 
to grant leave to apply after this period if the court is satisfied that hardship would be caused to 
the party or to a child if no orders were made; or in maintenance issues, if the party would be 
unable to support themselves without the aid of ‘an income tested pension, allowance or 
benefit.’242 This again suggests that the need to protect an economically weaker partner is an 
objective of the provision. 
The original provisions of some states and territories took a similar approach to that of 
the Law Commission in England and Wales by purposively differentiating between de facto and 
married couples. For example, in NSW and the Northern Territory, the courts could only consider 
the past contributions of the parties and could not consider their future needs when 
determining property interests. Maintenance payments were not available in Queensland or 
South Australia, and the maintenance provisions elsewhere were more limited than those for 
spouses. So, in NSW and the Australian Capital Territory, maintenance orders were only granted 
if there was a child under 12 that the applicant cared for, or, if the applicant was unable to 
support themselves because their ‘earning capacity has been adversely affected by the 
circumstances of the relationship’ and that maintenance would enable them to undertake 
                                                          
238 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SM(3). The same is true in Western Australia: Family Courts Act 1997 
(WA), s205ZG(3). 
239 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), Part VIIIB. Property does not include superannuation in Western Australia. 
240 This is pointed out by George (n188) 58. 
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see Watts (n232) 135. 
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1997 (WA), s205ZB-205ZC. 
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training. Maintenance was intended to be a short-term measure, coming to an end either when 
the child reached 12 years of age,243 or within 3-4 years of the order being made.244  
Following the federal reforms, the provision for the breakdown of de facto relationships 
is identical to that for married couples. In determining whether to adjust interests in property, 
the courts may consider the future needs and financial capacity of the parties, as well as their 
past contributions to the relationship.245 Maintenance orders are now available in the same way 
as for spouses where a partner is unable to support themselves adequately due to the care and 
control of a child under 18, if they are unable to work due to ‘age or physical or mental 
incapacity’, or for ‘any other adequate reason.’246 Theoretically, it is possible that a maintenance 
order could impose a life-long obligation to support a former de facto partner.247 The changes 
made under the federal provisions ensure that the law can better protect an economically 
vulnerable partner on relationship breakdown because of the possibility of considering the 
future needs of the parties as well as the changes made to the maintenance provision, at least 
where the other partner is able to support them following relationship breakdown, and are 
consistent with the federal government’s intention to treat de facto and married relationships 
equally.248  
To respect individual autonomy and choice, the Australian system allows de facto couples 
to opt-out of the courts’ jurisdiction on relationship breakdown.249 For these financial 
agreements to be valid in Australia, both parties must obtain independent legal advice, so that 
they understand the effect, advantages and disadvantages of entering into such an 
agreement.250 An opt-out provision has the benefit of allowing legally aware de facto couples to 
opt-out of the legislative system and make their own arrangements; but function-based 
                                                          
243 According to Barrie John Unsworth (Minister for Transport and the Vice-President of the Executive 
Council) the decision was made to cease maintenance payments after a child turned 12 because this was 
the age at which a child would attend secondary school, and the ‘impact of child care responsibilities 
diminishes’ and it becomes easier for the parent to enter the workforce: NSW Legislative Council Deb 31 
October 1984, 2888. 
244 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s27, s30; Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s22. 
245 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s79, s90SM: this section also allows the court to take into account any 
matters which are listed in s90SF relating to maintenance where they are relevant. This is the same in 
Western Australia: Family Courts Act 1997 (WA), s205ZG. 
246 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s90SF. The same is true in Western Australia: Family Courts Act 1997 (WA), 
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247 Kovacs (n28) 111. 
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the provision for spouses see s90G. State and territory provision also allowed for an opt-out provision. 
For a rationale for this, see for example, NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 17 October 1984, 2003 (David 
Paul Landa, Attorney General); New South Wales Law Reform Commission (n11) [5.57]. 
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recognition remains as a safety net for those people who are not aware of the legal 
consequences of their relationship practices but may benefit from legal recognition on the 
breakdown of the relationship.  
6.3.3 A social status for informal couple relationships? 
Whilst function-based recognition generates a legal status,251 because the law treats 
cohabiting and de facto relationships as a particular class and bestows legal consequences on 
the relationships, it is less clear whether a social status is created. Perhaps there is a recognised 
social status of cohabitant in England and Wales, even if it is based on the mistaken belief in a 
status of a common law marriage.252 But, arguably, any social status of cohabitant is going to be 
viewed as inferior to the social status of marriage: chapter one noted that although cohabitation 
is becoming an acceptable and valued family form in England and Wales, with 66% of people 
seeing little difference between being married and cohabiting, 59% of people believed that 
marriage is the best kind of relationship.253 The development of relationship recognition in 
Australia suggests that even though there is a distinct legal status of de facto relationship, and 
that, according to Graycar and Millbank, a de facto relationship is an accepted social concept,254 
there is something lacking about function-based recognition when compared with form-based 
recognition in a symbolic sense. Despite the substantive equality between de facto and married 
relationships (in that they are treated in virtually identical ways by the law), the form-based 
registration options were introduced partly on the basis of symbolic reasons,255 and the fight for 
marriage equality continues.256 Formal recognition of a relationship is significant because it 
allows couples to attach a label to the relationship that enables other people to understand that 
it is a significant family relationship.257 While function-based frameworks of recognition can 
generate a social status, there is something symbolically significant about formalised 
relationships, especially marriage, relating to family display which, it seems, function-based 
recognition cannot replicate. 
                                                          
251 Legal status was defined in Chapter 2, 2.2.1.3 as a ‘condition of belonging to a class in society to which 
the law ascribes peculiar rights and duties, capacities and incapacities. Such, for example, are the status 
of married persons’. 
252 cf Chapter 1, 1.2.1. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of the common law marriage myth see Barlow 
and others (n148) Chapter 3. 
253 Chapter 1, 1.2.1. 
254 Graycar and Millbank ‘The Bride Wore Pink’ (n9) 233; and Graycar and Millbank ‘From Functional 
Family’ (n32) 128. 
255 Chapter 4, 4.3.1. 
256 Chapter 3, 3.2.1.5. 
257 See Chapter 4, 4.3.1. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has confirmed the suggestions in chapter two258 that form- and function-
based recognition are similar in some ways, namely that both approaches generate a legal status 
and respect choice and autonomy. But, the chapter has also showed that function-based 
recognition is not without its challenges. Function-based recognition is inherently uncertain 
because it must be demonstrated to a third party that a relationship is of a certain quality and 
performs particular functions before it will be legally recognised, which stands in sharp contrast 
to the administrative efficiency of form-based recognition. But, an analysis of case law 
interpretations of the Australian de facto relationships suggests that a flexible (uncertain) 
system reduces the chance of function-based recognition becoming overly exclusive, because 
there is flexibility for the courts to take into account a variety of living arrangements. It has also 
been suggested that a different, inferior, social status attaches to the informal relationships than 
that which attaches to marriage. 
But, the administrative efficiency and symbolism of form-based relationships is not a 
reason to abandon further consideration of function-based recognition. It has also been made 
clear that function-based recognition offers the benefit of operating as a safety net because 
there is no need to opt-in for legal recognition of the relationship, which potentially means that 
function-based recognition is best placed to protect the economically weaker partner on 
relationship breakdown. The desire to bring functionally similar relationships under family law’s 
protection has so far proved influential in developing marriage as well as the registered couple 
and caring relationships, and the moderate function-based system. As such, it is necessary to 
further explore the potential of function-based frameworks to be used in ways that respond to 
family diversity that could bring more family relationships under family law’s protection. No such 
reforms have taken place in England and Wales, and so the Australian attempt at a radical 
function-based reform will be the subject of the next chapter.
                                                          
258 For a summary, see Chapter 2, 2.4 
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Chapter 7 – Informal caring relationships: the “radical” function-based approach 
This chapter explores what is referred to in the thesis as radical function-based 
recognition.1 England and Wales has not developed such a system,2 and so the focus of this 
chapter will be on the provision for what will be collectively referred to as the ‘informal caring 
relationships’ in New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), Tasmania and 
South Australia (SA). The chapter will argue that the informal caring relationships are, 
paradoxically, best described as a conservative attempt at a radical reform. An analysis of the 
caring relationships and the rationales advanced to justify their introduction suggests that there 
is a reluctance to move beyond the marriage model and a reluctance to think about family in 
non-traditional ways.  
The discussion will be divided into three sections. Firstly, a discussion of the legal structure 
of the caring relationships will show that function-based recognition is flexible because it can 
provide for family diversity, but that the structure of the caring relationships is not that different 
from the structure of marriage. It will also confirm the findings of the last chapter that function-
based recognition is uncertain, and will suggest that this uncertainty is exacerbated when 
recognition moves beyond the most marriage-like of relationships. Secondly, the rationales 
behind the caring relationships will be analysed. This will show that, similarly to the findings of 
chapter five, mixed reasoning lay behind the reforms, but it is likely that the true rationale was 
to appease opponents of same-sex relationship recognition reforms. Thirdly, the discussion will 
show that while the caring relationships generate a legal status, there is no evidence that they 
generate a social status. The conclusion suggests that the lack of principled reasoning behind 
the reforms means that the reforms have not been particularly radical, and therefore only hint 
at the potential of function-based recognition to be used in radical ways to respond to family 
diversity. 
7.1 What are the ‘caring relationships’? 
The last chapter showed that function-based recognition is inherently uncertain, and 
that defining marriage-like relationships is no easy task. In light of this, it is necessary to explore 
                                                          
1 See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.2. 
2 For a discussion of the position of those in ‘carer’ relationships under private law, see B Sloan Informal 
Carers and Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2013). Sloan, p3, uses the UK Government’s definition of ’carer 
from the Department of Health ‘Carers at the heart of 21st Century Families and Communities: ‘A Caring 
System on your Side. A Life of your Own’ (Department of Health, 2008), 19: ‘A carer spends a significant 
proportion of their life providing unpaid support to family or potentially friends. This could be caring for 
a relative, partner or friend who is ill, frail, disabled or has mental health or substance misuse problems’. 
As will be made clear, the ‘caring relationships’ under discussion in this chapter are not necessarily 
confined to ‘carer’ relationships as used by Sloan. 
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how the Australian jurisdictions have defined the caring relationships through legislation, and 
how judges have interpreted these definitions. This will show that the uncertainty of function-
based frameworks is exacerbated when the ‘type’ of relationship under question is different 
from the marriage-like couple, because the caring relationships are a new legal creation. This is 
important for the thesis because one of the main differences between form-based and function-
based approaches is the way legal recognition is triggered: as long as the legal structure (and 
particular formalities) is complied with, a formalised relationship will be valid, whereas the 
structure and quality of a relationship must be proved for legal recognition under a function-
based system.  
7.1.1 The difficulties of definition 
One reason why only four Australian jurisdictions have created radical function-based 
frameworks of relationship recognition is the difficulties associated with defining informal 
relationships. For example, at one point, the Queensland Law Reform Commission felt that 
reforms were necessary in the area of property division upon relationship breakdown to cater 
for relationships between unmarried ‘home sharers’ because of the inadequacies and 
complexities of property law.3 They gave some examples to illustrate when such difficulties may 
arise, such as the case of the ‘spinster daughter’ who has lived with and cared for her elderly 
mother for 20 years, and gave up her job to commit to her caring responsibilities, but will later 
face hardship when the mother ‘orders her to leave the house’. Another example was of a 
grandmother who contributed towards the purchase price of a property with her son and 
daughter-in-law and who cared for the grandchildren, but the relationship later breaks down 
and she is not reimbursed for her contributions.4 The significance of this point will become 
clearer throughout the chapter, but for now it should be noted that the Commission’s focus was 
on traditional family relationships between blood relatives and relations created through 
marriage, and not on any broader concept of family. The Commission, however, encountered 
difficulties defining ‘sharer’ in a way that would allow deserving claims while preventing 
‘frivolous or unmeritorious’ ones.5 The subsequent consultation provided no appropriate 
                                                          
3 Queensland Law Reform Commission Shared Property: Resolving Property Disputes between People Who 
Live Together and Share Property (WP No 36, 1991), 1-3. cf Law Commission Sharing Homes: A Discussion 
Paper (2002), [1.2]. 
4 Queensland Law Reform Commission Shared Property (n3) 14. 
5 ibid 15. 
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solution to this difficulty, and consequently the proposals for reform were limited to 
consideration of informal de facto relationships.6  
The task of defining caring relationships may be even more difficult than defining 
cohabiting and de facto relationships, because whilst legislators and judges had popular ideas 
of what constitutes a marriage-like relationship to draw from to define a de facto relationship, 
a caring relationship has no such template to follow. As predicted in chapter two, careful 
deliberation of how to draw the boundaries is important: function can be too exclusive if the 
parameters are so tightly drawn that not many relationships would qualify, and can also be too 
inclusive if the parameters are so wide as to grant legal recognition in inappropriate situations. 
Willmott, Mathews and Shoebridge offer the hypothetical scenario of a woman who aids her 
elderly neighbour by cleaning his house and doing his weekly shopping without payment. Prior 
to this, the neighbour assisted the woman by mowing her lawn free of charge. The authors 
suggest that this relationship may be considered a caring relationship in some jurisdictions, but, 
that there are no ‘compelling social justice arguments’ to suggest that this neighbour 
relationship should be legally recognised.7 This suggests that it is not the mere performance of 
a function that is important, but rather the motivation behind it. As the then ACT Attorney 
General put it, 
…the essential element we are looking for to make a relationship a real domestic 
relationship… is either deep personal affection or love. But it is, of course, extraordinarily 
difficult to put those sorts of terms into legislation.8 
To think of it in another way, it is the ‘family’ in ‘family practices’ that gives those practices 
significance, or, as Smart says, it is the motivation behind our actions that makes them 
meaningful.9 This suggests that policymakers face a difficult task of ensuring that only those 
                                                          
6 Queensland Law Reform Commission De Facto Relationships (WP No 40, 1992), 4, 14. The final report 
(Queensland Law Reform Commission De Facto Relationships (No 44, 1993)) only discussed proposals for 
reform for both opposite- and same-sex de facto couples, and did not include any other form of domestic 
relationship. 
7 L Wilmott, B Mathews and G Shoebridge ‘Defacto Relationships Property Adjustment Law – A National 
Direction’ (2003) 17(1) Australian Journal of Family Law 1, 21. 
8 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 19 May 1994, 1803 (Mr Humphries). See also the comments of Stone J in 
McKenzie v Storer [2007] ACTSC 88, [66]: ‘Having regard to the Attorney-General’s comment to the 
Assembly that you “look for the motivation” when determining whether a relationship qualifies as a 
domestic relationship, I am satisfied that the defendant was motivated by feelings of friendship, sympathy 
and charity. I am also satisfied that, initially at least, the plaintiff was grateful to the defendant, and… felt 
that the defendant’s act was that “of a true friend”. It is notable that, the defendant’s closing submissions 
assert that the parties entered into their arrangements “as friends, or almost as family”. 
9 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2a. 
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relationships that are intended to be captured by the provision are legally recognised to ensure 
that legal recognition does not become overly intrusive. 
7.1.2 The legal structure of the caring relationships 
Prima facie, the caring relationships are indicative of a radical change in Australian 
frameworks of relationship recognition. Summerfield claims in the ACT context that creating 
‘domestic relationships’, the ACT term for a caring relationship, was a radical move because it 
‘mark[ed] a departure from’ a focus on relationship type ‘in favour of a consideration of 
character.’10 Similarly, Millbank and Sant in the NSW context suggest that one way to view the 
reforms was that they have radically transformed family law because, 
…the concept of a domestic relationship is in some senses a radical departure from 
traditional laws about the family, because it redefines family obligations around love, 
interdependence and choice, rather than blood and marriage or ‘marriage-like’ 
relationships. In doing this it arguably destabilises heterosexuality and the hetero-nuclear 
family.11 
The reforms should not, however, be viewed as particularly radical because, as will become 
apparent, an attempt to legislate for something different has led to the creation of a revised 
marriage model of relationship.  
There are many similarities between the definitions adopted in the different jurisdictions. 
They all focus on the same relationship type, or relationship structure, that of the relationship 
between two adults, regardless of whether they are related, subject to evidence that the 
relationship exhibits particular characteristics. The focus remains on dyadic relationships, which 
follows the legal structure of marriage. The rationale behind this focus on dyadic relationships 
rather than networks of care is unclear. Nicholson J in the SA case of Taddeo v Taddeo12 
questioned this requirement, and asked why an unemployed son who remains living with his 
mother or father could be found to have formed a caring relationship with that parent; but, if 
the adult son had remained living with both parents then there would be no caring relationship 
between all three of them.13 Perhaps the reason for this limitation is practical, to reduce the 
number of relationships that may be considered as caring relationships. Alternatively, it may be 
                                                          
10 T Summerfield ‘Understanding the Law of the Family: A Question of Practice not Interpretation’ (2002) 
11(1) Griffiths Law Review 44, 47. 
11 J Millbank and K Sant ‘A Bride in her Every-Day Clothes: Same Sex Relationship Recognition in NSW’ 
(2000) 22(2) Sydney Law Review 181, 203. 
12 [2010] SADC 61. 
13 ibid [69]. 
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a result of the complex rationales behind the reforms, which will be discussed below,14 and 
signify a reluctance to move away from the marriage model and to think about family in non-
traditional ways. 
Another similarity in the legal structure of the caring relationships is that relationships in 
which care and support are provided for a fee, as a part of an employment relationship or on 
behalf of a government organization, will not be recognised as a caring relationship.15 This 
operates as a way of limiting the number of relationships that may be recognised, and means 
that the motivation behind the giving of care and support is central: performing functions 
because you are paid to do so is qualitatively different from the performance of a function 
motivated by love, commitment or a sense of obligation.  
The caring relationships must fit a particular structure – a relationship between two 
adults, regardless of whether they are related, and that care is not provided for a fee. But, with 
function-based recognition this is only part of what the parties must establish before the 
relationship will be legally recognised, because they must also go on to prove that the 
relationship performs particular functions. The following table shows that the jurisdictions have 
defined their caring relationship category in slightly different ways: 
Table 3 –  
Jurisdiction Nomenclature Definition 
ACT 
 
Domestic 
relationship 
‘a personal relationship between two adult persons in 
which one provides personal or financial commitment 
and support of a domestic nature for the material 
benefit of the other’16 
NSW Close personal 
relationships 
‘…between two adult persons, whether or not related 
by family, who are living together, one or each of whom 
provides the other with domestic support and personal 
care’17 
                                                          
14 For discussion, see below 7.2. 
15 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s3(2); Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s5(2); 
Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5(2); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s11. 
16 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s3(1). 
17 Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s5(1)(b), as amended by the Property (Relationships) 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW), sch 1 [9]. 
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Tasmania Caring relationships ‘…a relationship… between two adult persons whether 
or not related by family, one or each of whom provides 
the other with domestic support and personal care’18 
SA Domestic partners19 ‘…a person is… a domestic partner if he or she is… living 
with that person in a close personal relationship’20 
‘…a close personal relationship means the relationship 
between two adult persons (whether or not related by 
family and irrespective of their gender) who live 
together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis…’21 
 
Chapter six showed that function-based recognition is inherently uncertain. But, it is submitted 
that a uniform approach towards defining the informal caring relationships may help reduce the 
inherent uncertainty of function-based recognition, and would be valuable because the courts 
could benefit from case law interpretations of caring relationships from other jurisdictions.22 
To get an understanding of the types of activities that are sufficient to fulfil these 
definitions and prove that a caring relationship exists, it is necessary to further explore the 
different definitions. 
7.1.3 An overview of the caring relationships 
The ACT was the first jurisdiction in Australia to legally recognise caring relationships by 
creating the legal status of ‘domestic relationship’, which includes both opposite- and same-sex 
de facto relationships, and caring relationships within the same provision.23 The ACT provision 
does not require parties to live together, but does require the presence of two other elements: 
‘personal or financial commitment’ must be provided as well as ‘support of a domestic nature 
for the material benefit of the other’. Financial commitment is straightforward and refers to 
                                                          
18 Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5(1). 
19 It is worth noting that the South Australia ‘Law Handbook’ refers to domestic partners as ‘companion 
relationships’, further adding to the complexity of the current position: 
<http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ch21s05s07.php> accessed 4/10/16. 
20 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s11A, as amended by Statutes Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 
2006 (SA), s5. 
21 ibid. 
22 See, Taddeo v Taddeo (n12) [72] (Nicholson J): ‘However, each of the interstate Acts is in terms quite 
different from those of the South Australian legislation and therefore the interstate authorities can only 
be of limited assistance.’ 
23 For discussion of the ACT’s ‘domestic relationships’ see J Millbank ’Domestic Rifts: Who is using the 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT)?’ (2000) 14(3) Australian Journal of Family Law 163. 
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financial matters such as a joint mortgage.24 Personal commitment refers to non-financial 
contributions such as caring for an ill partner, completing household tasks25 or where one party 
helps the other to renovate property or aiding with business matters.26 Domestic support 
includes matters such as homemaking and having a relationship with a partner’s children27 
whereas for the ‘material benefit’ of another simply means that the contributions are ‘significant 
or important’ to the recipient.28 Neither the personal or financial commitment nor the domestic 
support need be reciprocal; it is sufficient that only one party provides them for the benefit of 
the other.29 
The NSW provision is narrower than that of the ACT, because NSW requires the parties to 
live together and one or the other must provide both ‘domestic support’ and ‘personal care’. 
During the parliamentary debates the then Attorney General suggested that domestic support 
consists of ‘household shopping, cleaning, laundry and like activities’ while personal care 
consists of ‘assistance with mobility, personal hygiene and generally ensuring the physical and 
emotional comfort of one or both parties for the other.’30 This suggests that financial 
contributions sufficient to prove ‘financial commitment’ in the ACT would not be considered as 
relevant circumstances in NSW. The Tasmanian approach is similar to that of NSW, in that one 
or both of the parties need to prove that ‘domestic support and personal care’ were provided, 
although partners to caring relationships in Tasmania, in the same way as partners to domestic 
relationships in the ACT, do not have to live together to be legally recognised. Some of the 
differences between the three jurisdictions, such as whether financial contributions are 
sufficient evidence of a caring relationship, may be attributable to the fact that the jurisdictions 
focus on different relationship types: the NSW and Tasmanian provisions focus on the provision 
of care between non-sexual partners, whereas the ACT focusses on interdependency within any 
unmarried relationship, including both caring and de facto relationships in the one provision.  
The SA provision is noticeably different and narrower than the others because the parties 
must ‘live together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis’.31 This is similar to the provision for 
                                                          
24 McKenzie v Storer (n8) [55] (Stone J). 
25 Brady v Harris [2012] FamCA 420, [100] (Faulks DCJ). 
26 Bullivant v Holt [2012] FamCA 134, [21-37] (Faulks DCJ). 
27 ibid [38-53] (Faulks DCJ). 
28 ibid [70, 73] (Faulks DCJ). 
29 ibid [16] (Faulks DCJ).  
30 NSW Legislative Council Deb 13 May 1999, 229 (JW Shaw, Attorney General and Minister for Industrial 
Relations). 
31 In Taddeo v Taddeo (n12) [72] Judge Nicholson pointed out that the authorities from the other 
jurisdictions which concerned the informal caring relationships were ‘in terms quite different from those 
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de facto relationships,32 but the requirement of living ‘as a couple’ for SA’s ‘domestic partners’ 
does not require a sexual relationship.33 Living ‘as a couple’ has been interpreted by Judge 
Nicholson in Taddeo to mean that two people ‘voluntarily join together… to form a new 
relationship of mutual support and dependence’,34 and that this requirement may operate to 
prevent unmeritorious claims.35 The finding of a domestic partnership is to be determined on a 
‘case by case basis’,36 which does little to provide certainty in this function-based system. A 
‘domestic partnership’ is ‘intended to be closer in concept to that of a de facto relationship 
(albeit, absent the need for any “romantic” element)’ than the similar provisions in the other 
jurisdictions.37 
In addition to the definitions, and similarly to the approach under the de facto 
legislation,38 the Tasmanian and SA provision provide a list of circumstances for the court to 
consider in determining the existence of a caring relationship.39 Both jurisdictions provide similar 
lists, which include the following non-exhaustive indicia: 
 The duration of the relationship; 
 The nature and extent of common residence; 
 The degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for 
financial support; 
 The ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
 The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
 The performance of household duties; 
                                                          
of the South Australian legislation and therefore the interstate authorities can only be of limited 
assistance.’ 
32 Chapter 6, 6.1.2. 
33 See Taddeo v Taddeo (n12) [64]. 
34 ibid [67]. 
35 ibid [69-71]. 
36 ibid [73]. 
37 ibid [79]. 
38 See Chapter 6, 6.1.2. 
39 The NSW Law Reform Commission recommended in 2006 that the NSW legislation be amended to 
contain a similar list of indicia to that used in Tasmania, and later in SA. The Commission felt this step 
would act ‘as a safeguard against trivial claims being brought’, presumably because the lists provides 
signposts as to the relevant characteristics a relationship needs to possess to be classified as a caring 
relationship. These recommendations were not acted upon by the NSW government who chose to create 
a ‘relationships register’ for de facto relationships and did not take forward any of the other 
recommendations made by the Commission. See New South Wales Law Reform Commission Relationships 
(Report No 113, 2006), [3.23], Recommendation 12. A Head ‘The Legal Recognition of Close Personal 
Relationships in New South Wales’ (2011) 13 Flinders Law Journal 53, 60 notes incorrectly that the 
Commission recommended not amending the definition of a ‘close personal relationship’.  
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 The reputation and public aspects of the relationship.40 
The SA list additionally includes the indicia of the ‘care and support of children’, which suggests 
that the reforms were lacking in principle as this seems to be a factor relevant for de facto 
relationships.  
Further analysis of the caring relationships is necessary to show how a radical function-
based approach works in practice and how the different elements of the definitions have been 
interpreted by judges. This is difficult in the ACT, Tasmania and SA however as there are so few 
cases involving caring relationships, and this makes it difficult to ascertain which functions and 
characteristics of a relationship will be sufficient to satisfy the definitions. NSW is the jurisdiction 
that has the most case law interpreting the meaning of ‘close personal relationships’, and so 
these cases will be explored to see how this category is used and how the definitions are 
interpreted in practice. This will show that the courts have gradually expanded on the definition 
of a ‘close personal relationship’, which, in turn, has expanded on the type of relationship that 
can be included under the provisions.  
7.1.3.1 NSW’s ‘close personal relationships’ 
Close personal relationships (CPR) require parties to prove that their relationship meets 
three indicia: 1) that they were living together; and that one or both parties provided the other 
with both 2) domestic support; and 3) personal care. This definition has been subject to criticism 
from academics. For example, Millbank and Sant were critical of the requirement that parties to 
a CPR must live together because this means that the legislation would not be able to ‘achieve 
its objectives, for example, passing an intestate’s estate to those whom the intestate would 
most likely wished it passed to, or a deceased workers’ entitlements on to their dependants - 
because the law is constrained by categories that are not flexible or purposive in their 
operation.’41 These concerns have not played out in practice, because the NSW judiciary have 
taken a flexible approach towards interpreting the legislative provision: the issue in NSW is that 
the category of CPR has been expanded in such a way as to exacerbate the uncertainty that is 
already inherent in function-based frameworks of relationship recognition.  
                                                          
40 See Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s5(5); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s11B. 
41 Millbank and Sant (n11) 212. 
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7.1.3.1a The first case: Dridi v Fillmore 
In Dridi v Fillmore in 200142 the parties had met through an escort agency and commenced 
a sexual relationship, and later lived together in the defendant’s home.43 Master Macready, as 
he then was, noted that there were no difficulties establishing that the parties ‘lived together’ 
in this case because all that was necessary was for them to have ‘shared accommodation 
together’. Living together for a CPR does not require ‘a sharing of food or eating arrangements’ 
as would be the case for de facto partners who would need to ‘live together as a couple’.44 
‘Domestic support’ was also easily established with factors such as providing ‘free 
accommodation and meals’ being sufficient. Master Macready also gave other examples of what 
may constitute domestic support that were not present in Dridi, which were ‘shopping for both 
parties’ and ‘washing clothes.’45 There was no evidence in this case that either party had 
provided ‘personal support’: 
…I would not have thought that matters such as “emotional support” would by themselves 
have fallen within the composite expression. The expression seems to be directed to a 
different level of reality such as assistance with mobility, personal hygiene, and physical 
comfort. Such activities obviously however will include an element of emotional support.46 
Head notes that this approach is consistent with ‘the broad intentions of Parliament’ to limit 
‘the scope of the legislation to relationships characterised as a live-in unpaid carer.’47 However, 
later cases have expanded on this initial interpretation of the necessary characteristics of a CPR 
in such a way that the ‘type’ of relationship included within the ambit of the provision is now 
much wider than that advanced by Master Macready in 2001. 
7.1.3.1b Living together in the same household 
Initially, cases adopted a similar approach to the requirement of ‘living together’ as that 
taken in Dridi. For example, in Richardson v Kidd,48 it was noted that deciding whether the parties 
were living together in a CPR was easier than determining whether they are living together as a 
couple in a de facto relationship,49 because living together merely amounts to ‘the physical fact’ 
                                                          
42 [2001] NSWSC 319. 
43 ibid [5]. 
44 ibid [103]. For the de facto provision, see Chapter 6, 6.1.2. 
45 ibid [104]. 
46 ibid [108]. 
47 Head (n39) 64. 
48 [2002] NSWSC 306. 
49 In Sharpless v McKibbin [2007] NSWSC 1498, [46] (Brereton J) it was suggested that a de facto 
relationship became a close personal relationship when the parties continued sharing accommodation 
but ceased sharing a bedroom. 
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of sharing accommodation. Consequently, in Richardson, no CPR was found because the parties 
did not live together on a full-time basis.50  
Later cases have taken an approach that is, arguably, inconsistent with Dridi and 
Richardson. In Przewosnik v Scott51 a CPR was found even though the parties had only cohabited 
intermittently. The fact that they kept personal possessions, such as cars and clothing, at each 
other’s houses appears to have been indicative of them ‘living together’,52 even though this was 
not on a full-time basis. Similarly, in Hayes v Marquis53 McColl JA commented that there was no 
need for parties to a CPR to live together on a ‘fulltime’ basis to satisfy the living together 
requirement,54 and so the fact that the appellant only stayed with the respondent for several 
nights a week was sufficient. Einstein J in the same case stated that living together means ‘to 
cohabit/to dwell together’ and the test is to consider objectively the ‘nature and extent’ of the 
common residence: 
To live together requires that the two adult persons be seen as regarding the place or 
places in which they live as ‘their home’. Both of them may not always be found in that 
home because from time to time family or business requirements or similar may require 
one or both to spend some time elsewhere… But the dominant parameter will be whether 
or not the individuals concerned may be discerned to regard the premises in question as 
their home and in so doing to be acting reasonably.55 
This broad approach has been followed in later cases. In Skarika v Toska56 Lindsay J found that 
the ‘living together’ requirement for a CPR ‘is no less adaptable to the reality of domestic life’ 
than that for de facto couples.57 Consequently, there is no need for a single residence because 
‘people can live together in a place which can be said to be their home, and, at the same time, 
jointly or severally have more than one home which, from time to time they separately 
occupy.’58 Lindsay J stressed that living together is about ‘the quality and nature of the 
relationship rather than mere physical proximity’,59 which is markedly different from the 
comments made in Richardson. 
                                                          
50 Richardson v Kidd (n48) [55] (Master Macready). 
51 [2005] NSWSC 74. 
52 ibid [22]. 
53 [2008] NSWCA 10. 
54 ibid [78]. 
55 ibid [166]. 
56 [2014] NSWSC 34. 
57 For discussion of the meaning of ‘living together’ for de facto couples, see Chapter 6, 6.1.2.1. 
58 Skarika v Toska (n56) [39-40]. 
59 ibid [43]. 
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7.1.3.1c Domestic support and personal care 
The requirement for ‘domestic support’ has been relatively straightforward, although 
there are indications that this element is also being expanded upon.  In Jurd v Public Trustee,60 
the fact that the plaintiff cooked for the deceased was evidence of domestic support.61 In Bogan 
v Macorig,62 the plaintiff did all the housework, including ‘washing, ironing and cleaning’, which 
was sufficient,63 as was the ‘modest domestic support’ of ‘taking the dogs for a walk’, buying 
groceries and performing ‘errands’ in Geoghegan v Szelid.64 Inconsistently with the comments 
made in Dridi, providing free accommodation was found to be insufficient for domestic support 
in Popescu v Borun.65 The decision in Ak-Tankiz v Ak66 appears to extend the concept of domestic 
support beyond that envisaged in the first case to include the making of various financial 
payments.67 
The requirement for ‘personal care’ has also been expanded upon. Some of the earlier 
cases followed the approach in Dridi and limited ‘personal care’ to physical acts.68 For example, 
in Jurd, assisting with bathing was proof of personal care69 and in Richardson, personal care was 
provided in the form of assistance with showering and aiding the deceased to use the toilet.70 In 
Bogan v Macorig there was no CPR because the plaintiff had not ‘attended to the deceased’s 
personal needs’: there was no evidence of her having assisted with matters such as ‘feeding, 
clothing or showering’, assisting with ‘personal mobility’ or assisting with medication.71 Similarly 
in Blyth v Spencer72 it was found that personal care is limited to meeting someone’s ‘personal 
needs’ by performing tasks such as ‘bathing, dressing, cooking meals and all the matters of 
personal hygiene’.73 Saravinosvka v Saravinovski74 suggests that the personal care performed 
need not be for the entire duration of the relationship, and as long as there are ‘some acts of 
personal care which are more than de minimis, the definition will be satisfied.’75 
                                                          
60 [2001] NSWSC 632. 
61 ibid [30] (Master Macready). 
62 [2004] NSWSC 93. 
63 ibid [52] (Master Macready). 
64 Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 1440, [161]. 
65 [2011] NSWSC 1532, [78]. 
66 [2014] NSWSC 1044. 
67 ibid [168]. 
68 See also Nedijokovic v Orozovic [2005] NSWSC 755, [26] (Macready AsJ). 
69 Jurd v Public Trustee (n60) [30] (Master Macready). 
70 Richardson v Kidd (n48) [54] (Master Macready). 
71 Bogan v Macorig (n62) [55] (Master Macready). 
72 [2005] NSWSC 653. 
73 ibid [20] (Macready AsJ). See also Ye v Fung [2006] NSWSC 243, [24], [26]. 
74 [2016] NSWSC 964. 
75 ibid [349] (Kunc J). 
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The NSW Court of Appeal decision in Hayes v Marquis has expanded on the interpretation 
of personal care in a way that is inconsistent with earlier cases, and, as Head notes, ‘has, to a 
significant extent, widened the scope of the types of relationships that can now be classified’ as 
a CPR.76 Einstein J agreed with the comments of Master Macready in Dridi that personal care 
involves ‘matters such as assistance with mobility, personal hygiene’ and ‘physical comfort’. 
Significantly, Einstein J also stated that this list should not be considered exhaustive, and that 
emotional support may be sufficient in some cases.77 McColl JA went further and stated that 
emotional support is relevant because ‘society recognises the importance emotional support 
can play in an individual’s well being’, and that ‘personal care’ ‘should not be confined to matters 
relating to physicality’. McColl JA also acknowledged that the NSW government ‘contemplated 
that personal care services may encompass ensuring the physical and emotional support of one 
or both parties for the other.’78 This suggest that the expansion of ‘personal care’ to include 
‘emotional support’ is consistent with the aims of the government, but was inconsistent with 
the comments from the early case law. This broader approach to personal care has been 
followed in later cases such as Drury v Smith79 and Saravinosvka v Saravinovski,80 and even 
Macready AsJ himself has supported this wide meaning of ‘personal care’ in Hughes v Charlton.81   
7.1.3.1d The uncertainty of the boundaries of a CPR 
To further add to these expansions on the requirements of a CPR, an examination of the 
case law shows that not all the judgments explain clearly what is meant by ‘domestic support’ 
or ‘personal care’. In both Przewoznik v Scott and Sharpless v McKibbin,82 the judgments merely 
state that a CPR existed without any elaboration as to which functions have been performed 
that satisfy the statutory criteria.83 Some cases, such as McCarthy v Tye84 and Przewoznik found 
a CPR without reference to any authorities.85 A few cases bypass the actual statutory 
requirement of proving ‘domestic support and ‘personal care’ and refer to other indicia 
altogether. In Hughes v Charlton, Macready AsJ refers to the ‘domestic assistance’86 that the 
plaintiff provided the deceased as being an important factor in determining the existence of a 
                                                          
76 Head (n39)73. See also Sloan (n2) 171 who makes the same point. 
77 Hayes v Marquis (n63) [168]. 
78 ibid [86-7]. For the second reading speech, see NSW Legislative Council Deb 13 May 1999, 229 (JW 
Shaw, Attorney General and Minister for Industrial Relations). 
79 [2012] NSWSC 1067, [133] (Hallen AsJ). 
80 Saravinosvka v Saravinovski (n74) [337] (Kunc J). 
81 [2008] NSWSC 467, [20]. 
82 [2007] NSWSC 1498. 
83 For criticism see Head (n39) 67-9. 
84 [2015] NSWSC 1947. 
85 ibid [38-43]; Przewoznik v Scott (n48) [18-25]. 
86 Hughes v Charlton (n81) [55]. 
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CPR. ‘Domestic assistance’ appears to include matters such as cooking87 and caring for the 
deceased’s personal hygiene and clothing,88 although this is not made clear in the judgment. 
This is consistent with the authorities on what constitutes domestic support and personal care, 
but the different terminology, referring to ‘domestic assistance’, adds uncertainty. Other cases 
invent new indicia. For example, in Smith v Daniels, Slattery J found that ‘the necessary 
companionship89 and living together and mutual support for a’ CPR were present. As Head notes, 
this is ‘quite surprising’ because the legislative requirements of ‘domestic support and personal 
care’ are not the same as ‘companionship’ and ‘mutual support’. These latter indicia suggest an 
element of reciprocity that is not necessary under the statutory provision, as well as having 
‘somewhat different and far broader connotations than the existing indicia.’90 Head gives the 
example of companionship implying a need for friendship, which is unnecessary under the 
current definition.91 Judgements such as that in Smith v Daniels are unhelpful because they 
aggravate the uncertainty that is inherently a part of a function-based system.  
7.1.4 Caring relationships – increasing litigation? 
An analysis of the case law shows that the informal caring relationships are often used as 
one possible claim of many, such as being an alternative claim should the primary claim to being 
in a de facto relationship fail.92 One reason for this may be the inherent uncertainty of function-
based recognition: it is difficult to ascertain with certainty whether an informal relationship will 
meet the threshold to be a legally recognised relationship, and perhaps it is prudent to cover all 
bases to ensure that the relationship is legally recognised.  
So, for example, in Taddeo v Taddeo,93 a SA case involving a mother making a claim on her 
daughter’s home, the mother claimed that either the daughter held the property on trust for 
her, or alternatively that they were ‘domestic partners’ and so the mother was entitled to a 
property adjustment order in her favour. This suggests that introducing the caring relationship 
category has not reduced the need for people to rely on property law principles when their 
relationship is found not to be a caring relationship. In cases involving claims against the 
deceased’s estate, a claim to be in a caring relationship will be one of multiple claims. For 
                                                          
87 ibid [49]. 
88 ibid [50]. 
89 See similar comments by Hallen AsJ in Thompson v The Public Trustee of New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 
1137, [100] referring to the ‘necessary companionship’ found in a close personal relationship. 
90 Head (n39) 79. 
91 ibid. 
92 This was also noted by the NSW Law Reform Commission. See New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission (n39) [3.7]. 
93 [2010] SADC 61. 
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example, in the NSW cases of McCarthy v Tye94 and Marsh-Johnson v Hillcoat95 the applicants 
claimed to be in a de facto relationship with the deceased; or in a close personal relationship 
with the deceased; or otherwise entitled to make a claim because they had been ‘wholly or 
partly dependant on the deceased.’96  
This all suggests that introducing the caring relationship categories has given additional 
opportunity for individuals to make claims, and has not reduced the need for litigation or 
reduced costs. But this does not mean that the radical function-based approach is unnecessary. 
As Sloan argues, the fact that a caring relationship may only be pleaded as an alternative should 
not be taken as a reason to reject the introduction of caring relationships in England and Wales. 
This is because the caring relationship categories have ‘proved vital in cases where an applicant 
has been unable to bring himself within one of the other categories’.97 Providing various routes 
to relief is beneficial because it means that where relationship generated need has arisen, there 
is an increased chance that an applicant will be protected by family law, when the courts feel 
that such relief is appropriate. For example, as will be made clear below,98 in the SA case of 
Taddeo, the fact that the applicant could make a claim on the basis of being in a caring 
relationship did not mean that she was successful, because the court assessed all of the 
circumstances and concluded that only a limited financial reward was ‘just an equitable’ in this 
instance. The caring relationships provide a possibility of relief, but this will only be granted 
where the court decides it is appropriate. 
7.2 The rationale behind the reforms 
To understand what factors have influenced the development of function-based 
recognition in Australia, it is necessary to explore the reasons behind the reforms. Prima facie, 
functional arguments, that relationships that perform similar functions should be treated 
similarly by law, have been influential in the development of function-based recognition of 
informal caring relationships. But, it will be argued that, as was the case with the registered 
couple relationships,99 the real rationale was to placate opponents of same-sex relationship 
recognition by making the reforms appear as if they were about care and interdependency 
                                                          
94 McCarthy v Tye (n84) [1]. 
95 [2008] NSWSC 1337, [14] 
96 Succession Act 2006 (NSW), s57 (previously Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW), s6). 
97 Sloan (n2) 173. 
98 See below, 7.3.1. 
99 See Chapter 5, 5.2.1.2. 
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rather than sexual relationships.100 It will be suggested that this lack of genuine concern for the 
position of those in caring relationships is a reason why the reforms are so similar to marriage 
in terms of the legal structure of the relationship. 
7.2.1 The functional arguments: treating like (family) relationships alike 
The ACT became the first jurisdiction in Australia to legislate for non-couple relationships. 
The perceived need to recognise a diversity of relationships, and for fairness, or the need to 
grant substantive equality, between functionally similar relationships dominated the debates on 
the Domestic Relationships Bill 1994 in the ACT Assembly. The creation of the ‘domestic 
relationships’ category was intended to acknowledge a diversity of families, with the then 
Attorney General stating that the reforms recognized ‘that families may take other forms than 
the traditional nuclear family of a married couple and their children’.101 The opposition stressed 
that the bill was about the duty of the ACT Assembly to ‘promote and support the institution of 
the family’.102 It was believed that from a ‘social justice perspective, it is most equitable to define 
personal domestic relationships on the basis of financial arrangements rather than sexual 
relationships’103 because financial contributions and interdependencies can occur in any 
relationship, regardless of its type.104 
The arguments advanced in the ACT were similar to those advanced in NSW when they 
first legislated for the financial consequences of the breakdown of de facto relationships, which 
were discussed in chapter six.105 The ACT government emphasised that the law governing 
property division on relationship breakdown for unmarried relationships was unsatisfactory 
because it was ‘obscure, costly and rather uncertain’,106 which contrasted with the relatively 
certain and ‘fairly comprehensive’ position of married couples under federal legislation.107 
                                                          
100 See the same arguments also advanced during the parliamentary debates on the Civil Partnership Bill, 
see Chapter 5, 5.1.1.1, and in the debates leading up to the registered caring relationships, see Chapter 
5, 5.2.1. 
101 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 21 April 1994, 1119 (Mr Connolly, Attorney General and Minister for 
Health). See also, Mr de Domenico (ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 19 May 1994, 1808) who described the 
reforms as recognising ‘that some people do wish to live in situations that do not reflect the traditional 
family model.’  
102 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 19 May 1994, 1805 (Mr Humphries). 
103 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3343 (Ms Follett, Chief Minister and Treasurer). See 
also ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3347 (Mr Connolly, Attorney General, Minister for 
Housing and Community Services and Minister for Urban Services). 
104 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3346 (Ms Follett, Chief Minister and Treasurer). 
105 See Chapter 6, 6.1 and 6.3.2.2a. 
106 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3346 (Ms Ellis). See also M Wallace ‘Domestic 
Relationships Legislation’ (1994) 1(1) Canberra Law Review 124, 124 who describes the common law as 
‘inadequate’, ‘complex and costly, and yields unpredictable results.’ 
107 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3339 (Mr Humphries). cf Chapter 3, 3.3.1 which 
discusses the financial remedies provision for spouses under federal law. 
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Property law could not take into account non-financial contributions, such as ‘unpaid labour in 
the home’, to adjust property interests on the breakdown of an unmarried relationship. This 
could lead to situations ‘where it would be unconscionable’ for one partner to gain a benefit and 
deny the other ‘a share in those benefits.’108 The rationale for the reforms was summed up in 
this way: 
It is not just de factos in the conventional sense who miss out in this situation. There are 
many other personal relationships which evoke the personal interdependence of a 
marriage and which also, arguably, should be protected by the law; for example, an adult 
child who resides in a house or a flat with their parent, a companion to an aged person, a 
parent living in a granny flat.109 The question, I think, is a worthy one. Should, for example, 
a child who has made financial commitments on behalf of a parent have fewer rights than 
a wife who has made such commitments for her husband? Should a strict commercially 
framed law of contracts define the entitlements of people who are adopting an 
increasingly diverse range of lifestyles in our community?110 
The ACT reforms were thought necessary because relationships that perform similar functions 
face the same relationship generated need, especially on relationship breakdown, and so these 
relationships should be recognised and protected by the law in the same way. 
NSW legislated in 1999 to recognise ‘close personal relationships’. As Willmott, Mathews 
and Shoebridge note, ‘there was little explanation about why the scope of the legislation needed 
to be broadened’ to caring relationships.111 According to the then NSW Attorney General, the 
‘close personal relationship’ category was intended to provide for relationships such as those 
that ‘might exist between a daughter and [an] elderly parent residing together for the purpose 
of obtaining and giving domestic support and personal care’, but not relationships where people 
were ‘sharing accommodation as a matter of convenience, in the way that flatmates might.’112 
The intention was for the ‘close personal relationship’ category to protect those in ‘carer’ 
                                                          
108 Wallace (n106) 124. 
109 Similar examples were also given by others, see: ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3343, 
3345 (Ms Follett, Chief Minister and Treasurer); ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3346-7 
(Ms Ellis). 
110 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3340 (Mr Humphries). See also similar comments: ACT 
Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3346 (Ms Ellis); ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 
1993, 3348 (Mr Connolly, Attorney General, Minister for Housing and Community Services and Minister 
for Urban Services); ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 19 May 1994, 1800-1 (Mr Humphries); ACT Legislative 
Assembly Deb 19 May 1994, 1805 (Ms Szuty). 
111 Wilmott, Mathews and Shoebridge (n7) 21. 
112 NSW Legislative Council Deb 13 May 1999, 229 (JW Shaw, Attorney General and Minister for Industrial 
Relations). 
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relationships, specifically it seems traditional family relationships such as adult children, 
primarily daughters, caring for elderly parents.113  
Tasmania legislated in 2003 to create a legally recognised category of ‘caring relationship’. 
The Tasmanian government, in a similar way to the ACT, emphasised the importance of 
recognising the changing nature of family relationships in contemporary society and that the 
legal protection given to heterosexual couples should be extended to non-couple relationships. 
It was said that the government had a responsibility to recognise and support the relationship 
choices that people make.114 Reminiscent of the Burden sisters’ case and the debates about the 
Civil Partnership Bill,115 one form of relationship intended to benefit was that of ‘two elderly 
companions who may have lived together for many years and who have supported each other 
in practical and emotional ways’.116 The government did not give specific reasons as to why 
partners to ‘caring relationships’ such as these two elderly companions would benefit from legal 
recognition in any particular areas of law, but a report by the Tasmanian Joint Standing 
Committee in 2001, which acted as a basis for the reforms, suggests that functional arguments 
were important. The Committee noted that partners to caring relationships shared ‘similar 
values’ and faced ‘the same difficulties as traditional families’, and that non-couple relationships 
were especially ‘disadvantaged in areas of property rights, intestacy and other entitlements’ and 
so would benefit from legal recognition.117 
The SA reforms were intended to recognise relationships between ‘two adults who live 
together in an enduring personal relationship of mutual affection and support, whether or not 
the relationship is sexual.’118 The then SA Attorney General gave a similar example as that given 
in Tasmania, of ‘two elderly ladies’ who cohabit ‘in a supportive personal relationship’ as being 
those who may benefit from legal recognition because their relationship may share many of the 
characteristics of a ‘couple’ relationship: 
                                                          
113 For example, see NSW Legislative Council Deb 25 May 1999, 294, 295 (JM Samios); NSW Legislative 
Council Deb 25 May 1999, 296 (I Cohen); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 1 June 1999, 736 (Ms Nori, 
Minister for Small Business, and Minister for Tourism); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 1 June 1999, 739 
(RH Smith); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 1 June 1999, 740 (RW Turner). 
114 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 29-32 (Mrs Jackson, Attorney General and Minister 
for Justice and Industrial Relations). 
115 Discussed in Chapter 5, 5.1. 
116 Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 32 (Mrs Jackson, Attorney General and Minister for 
Justice and Industrial Relations). 
117 Joint Standing Committee on Community Development Report on the Legal Recognition of Significant 
Personal Relationships (Parliament of Tasmania, 2001), 22-24, 25. 
118 South Australia House of Assembly Deb 14 November 2006, 1207 (MJ Atkinson, Attorney General). 
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Perhaps they pool their income to pay for the needs of both. Perhaps they divide household 
tasks between them according to skills or preferences, so that one does the shopping for 
both and the other the gardening. Perhaps they provide practical help to each other. For 
example, one might be able to drive and the other not, so the driver takes the other to 
medical appointments. Perhaps they share a social life so that they entertain mutual 
friends at their home and go out together to visit friends or take part in family occasions. 
In many respects, they lead the same sort of shared life that couples lead but they may not 
have any sexual relationship.119 
So again, the argument that relationships that function in similar ways should be treated 
similarly was advanced as a rationale for recognising a broader variety of relationships.  
The introduction of the caring relationships could be viewed as attempts to shift the focus 
of law from sex to caring, by suggesting that it is the care provided within family relationships 
that deserves legal recognition and protection. In a similar way in which Morgan advocates a 
move to thinking about defining family by its practices and not its ‘form’, and Smart advocates 
a ‘personal life’ approach that recognises the diversity and fluidity of the family we live with,120 
the Australian reforms broadened the category of relationships that the law views as ‘family’ on 
a functional basis. As Goodie and Summerfield note in the ACT context, the ‘legislation replaces 
consideration of “family” form with characteristics of the relationship’ and therefore, ‘family is 
defined by reference to its practices, rather than on the basis of whether it is headed by a couple, 
or whether they cohabit, or the question of sexuality.121 Of course, the caring relationships are 
still a focus on a particular type of relationship, because they must first be dyadic relationships 
between adults before the characteristics of the relationship bear any relevance. But the shift 
away from a focus on the sexual couple is significant in illustrating the potential of function-
based recognition to respond to family diversity.  
7.2.2 Disingenuous reasoning? 
Arguably, the functional arguments and this focus on care is merely a smokescreen to 
distract from the real purpose of the reforms. When the reforms are set in context, an 
alternative, perhaps cynical, interpretation becomes apparent. The real rationale may have been 
to avoid opposition to the changing definition of de facto relationships to include same-sex 
                                                          
119 South Australia House of Assembly Deb 14 November 2006, 1207 (MJ Atkinson, Attorney General). 
120 cf Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2a. 
121 J Goodie and T Summerfield ‘What’s in a name? Family, identity and social obligation’ (2002) 6 
University of Western Sydney Law Review 209, available from 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWSLawRw/2002/9.html> accessed July 23, 2015. 
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couples by moving the focus away from the similarities between same- and opposite-sex 
couples, and focussing instead on broader notions of family based on care. In the same way as 
happened in the debates for the registered caring relationships,122 the Australian policymakers 
presented the caring relationship reforms as being about expanding the types of relationship 
protected by family law, but the real reason for this focus on care is to lessen the symbolic 
significance of legally recognising same-sex couples as family relationships. 
In the ACT, framing the legislation in terms of functions as opposed to sexual relationships 
ensured that same-sex couples were included within an ‘unsexed’ category.123 This allowed 
legislators to recognise same-sex relationships in law, as a type of family relationship, without 
acknowledging them as sexual relationships akin to de facto and marriage relationships. For 
example, the then Attorney General noted that similar proposals had failed in other Australian 
jurisdictions because they were ‘obsessed with homosexual relationship[s]’, and implied that 
the ACT’s focus on care and financial commitment was the appropriate way forward,124 
presumably because this would enable the bill to reach the statute book. The Attorney General 
was careful to ensure that the bill was presented as one remedying injustices caused by ordinary 
principles of property law for a broad variety of family relationships rather than anything that 
was intended to specifically benefit same-sex couples, or to recognise same-sex couples as 
family. 
Similarly,125 the NSW reforms were packaged as ones that merely remedied deficiencies 
in property law by extending the protection already given to opposite-sex de facto partners126 
to other unmarried relationships, rather than reforms benefitting same-sex couples.127 In SA, it 
was clear that the government’s priority was to remove discrimination against same-sex 
                                                          
122 See Chapter 5, 5.2.1. 
123 This term is used by Millbank and Sant (n11) 185. 
124 ACT Legislative Assembly Deb 12 October 1993, 3348 (Mr Connolly, Attorney General, Minister for 
Housing and Community Services and Minister for Urban Services). 
125 It is unclear why the Tasmanian government chose to legislate for caring relationships, as most of the 
discussion in the Tasmanian Parliament focussed on the reforms relating to same-sex relationship 
recognition. See, for example, the long speech of Mr Hiddings (Leader of the Opposition) which focusses 
on, as he sees it, the three main deficiencies of the reforms – 1) allowing same-sex couples to adopt; 2) 
the registration provision for significant relationships devaluing marriage; and 3) issues regarding 
presumption of parenthood for same-sex couples (Tasmanian House of Assembly Deb 25 June 2003, 33-
44). 
126 See for example, NSW Legislative Council Deb 13 May 1999, 230 (JW Shaw, Attorney General and 
Minister for Industrial Relations): ‘I remind honourable members that the primary purpose of the De Facto 
Relationships Act is to provide for the redistribution of property of a relationship on its breakdown.’ See 
also - NSW Legislative Council Deb 25 May 1999, 295 (JM Samios); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 1 June 
1999, 709 (Mr Hartcher); NSW Legislative Assembly Deb 1 June 1999, 712-3 (Ms Moore); NSW Legislative 
Assembly Deb 1 June 1999, 738 (Mr O’Doherty). 
127 For discussion see, for example, Millbank and Sant (n11) 201-3. 
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couples, but some parliamentarians were eager for a broader variety of relationships to be 
recognised,128 which led the government to legislate for a broad, non-sexual, definition of 
‘domestic partners’. Some members of the SA parliament applauded the measures for their 
recognition of non-sexual relationships,129 while others believed that they were only included in 
the reforms to placate those that opposed the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.130 
This all suggests that there was a careful attempt to package the reforms in such a way as to 
reduce opposition. Additionally, the focus in the debates in all four jurisdictions on family 
relationships such as daughters caring for elderly parents could be seen as a very traditional 
approach to thinking of family relationships and the functions they perform. As Millbank and 
Sant put it, ‘the debates express fundamentally conservative propositions about what families 
ought to be. In such a context a radical re-envisioning of the family appears unlikely.’131 The 
caring relationships are not intended to provide for family diversity per se, rather they are 
intended as a means to promote ideas about traditional families to distract from the legal 
recognition of same-sex couples. 
The complex reasoning behind the informal caring relationship reforms are important 
because they show that there was a lack of principled reasoning behind the reforms. A genuine 
concern over the difficulties encountered by those in caring relationships because of a lack of 
legal status may have led to a more radical reform, and the arguably disingenuous reasoning 
may go some way towards explaining why the caring relationships are modelled on marriage 
and are limited to dyadic relationships. This suggests that there needs to be a real call for reform, 
such as was the case with financial provision for separating de facto couples or for the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships, before any truly radical change can take place.  
7.3 The effect of legal recognition of caring relationships 
Exploring the consequences of the legal recognition of caring relationships adds further 
support to the argument that there was a lack of principled reasoning, and a lack of genuine 
concern for the position of people in non-couple relationships, behind the reforms. The package 
of legal consequences bestowed on the caring relationships lacks clear principle, and although 
it seems that the caring relationships generate a legal status, because the law treats them as a 
                                                          
128 South Australia House of Assembly Deb 14 November 2006, 1206-7 (MJ Atkinson, Attorney General). 
129 See, for example, South Australian Legislative Council Deb 6 December 2006, 1282-3 (AL Evans) – ‘Sex 
is a poor public test for the validity of domestic partnerships because sexual relationships are generally a 
private matter.’  
130 South Australian House of Assembly Deb 22 November 2006, 1384 (Mr Pisoni). 
131 Millbank and Sant (n11) 205. 
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‘particular class in society to which the law ascribes peculiar rights and duties’,132 it appears that 
they do not generate a social status. 
7.3.1 The legal consequences 
The legal consequences of an informal caring relationship are far more limited than those 
bestowed on marriage, the registered ‘couple’ relationships and informal de facto relationships, 
and are more limited than those bestowed on the registered caring relationships. Arguably, this 
more limited recognition is peculiar in light of the functional arguments advanced as a rationale 
for the introduction of caring relationships: if partners to caring relationships face the same 
difficulties as partners to de facto relationships, or more specifically, same-sex couples, then 
why are the legal consequences bestowed on the relationships so significantly different? This 
again suggests that the introduction of the caring relationships was not motivated solely by 
concerns that relationships that function similarly should be treated similarly by law and that 
more complex reasons were at play. 
The package of legal consequences bestowed on the caring relationship varies between 
jurisdictions. For example, partners to ‘domestic relationships’ in the ACT ‘enjoy protection 
mainly in the context of criminal law, health-related legislation as well as business and consumer 
legislation’,133 and are also eligible to make a claim for provision out of the estate of the 
deceased domestic partner.134 They are excluded from the Administration and Probate Act 1929 
however which deals with intestacy because this provision is limited to those in de facto 
relationships.135 In NSW, apart from the financial remedies available on relationship breakdown, 
very few legal consequences are bestowed upon close personal relationships and they are only 
recognised in around five pieces of legislation,136 which includes rights to make claims under the 
family provision legislation where a claimant can prove that there are ‘factors which warrant the 
making of the application.’137 Similarly in South Australia, ‘domestic partnerships’ attract few 
legal consequences and have limited rights such as the right to claim provision on the death of 
                                                          
132 See Chapter 2, 2.2.1.3. 
133 N Witzleb ‘Marriage as the ‘Last Frontier’? Same-Sex Relationship Recognition in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) 
International Journal of Law Policy & the Family 135, 142. 
134 Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT), s7(b). 
135 Administration and Probate Act 1929 (ACT), s44. 
136 See J Millbank ‘Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Families in Australian Law – Part 1’ (2006) 34(1) Federal 
Law Review 1, 12, n52. See also Social Development Committee Statutes Amendment (Relationships) Bill 
2005 (Parliament of South Australia, Report 21, 2005), Appendix 5.2; New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission (n39) [3.35]. 
137 Succession Act 2006 (NSW), s57(1)(f); s59(1)(b).  
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a partner138 and an exemption from stamp duty.139 The situation is different in Tasmania where 
partners in informal caring relationships are recognised in around 34 pieces of legislation. This 
includes being considered a ‘relative’ under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968, as a 
‘partner’ under both the Cooperatives Act 1999 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 and as a 
’member of the family’ under the Witness Protection Act 2000.140 Significantly however, 
informal caring relationships are not included within Tasmania’s intestacy or family provision 
rules.141 
Perhaps the most significant legal consequence bestowed on the caring relationships is 
that the courts have the jurisdiction to make property and maintenance orders upon the 
breakdown of a caring relationship in the same way as they could for a de facto relationship 
under state and territory law. Firstly, an applicant would need to prove the existence of the 
caring relationship; and secondly, would only be granted an order if they met certain 
jurisdictional requirements;142 that the relationship is of a particular duration; or that the 
applicant has made ‘substantial contributions’ to the relationship;143 and thirdly, that it is 
considered just and equitable to grant an order.144 Additionally, respect for autonomy and 
choice has been built into the property and maintenance provisions for caring relationships by 
allowing parties to make binding financial agreements that set out their property and financial 
arrangements upon relationship breakdown. Both parties must have received independent legal 
advice about the effects, advantages and disadvantages of such an agreement for it to be 
valid.145 This shows that function-based recognition can respect autonomy and choice in the 
                                                          
138 Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA); Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA); Victims of 
Crime Act 2001 (SA); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). 
139 Stamp Duties Act 1923 (SA). 
140 In addition, see Social Development Committee (n136) Appendix 5.2 for a complete list of the legal 
consequences of the Tasmanian informal caring relationships. 
141 See the Intestacy Act 2010 (Tas), s6(b). 
142 Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s11; Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW), s15; Domestic 
Partners Property Act 1996 (SA), s9(2). These do not appear in the Tasmanian legislation. 
143 ACT – 2 years: Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s12; NSW – 2 years: Property (Relationships) Act 
1984, s17; Tasmania – 2 years: Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s37; SA – 3 years: Domestic Partners Property 
Act 1996 (SA), s9(2). 
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Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), Part 6; Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA), Part 2. 
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same way as form-based recognition by allowing partners to opt-out of some legal 
consequences. 
Millbank believes that there was no need to include caring partners in the financial 
remedies provision and was highly critical of the decision to include ‘non-couples’ and ‘non-
cohabitees’ because ‘such groups are simply less likely [than couples] to jointly own or 
contribute to property’. Millbank believed that the focus in the parliamentary debates on adult 
children caring for their elderly parents was ‘misguided’146 because the likelihood of such a claim 
being made while the elderly parent was still alive was unlikely, ‘and the court ordering the sale 
of a property from under an incapacitated and/or elderly person in order to pay a share to the 
carer seems… to be yet more unlikely.’147  
Cases between parents and their adult children claiming property adjustment orders are 
rare,148 but such facts did occur in the SA case of Taddeo v Taddeo. In Taddeo, however, it was 
the elderly mother who was claiming a share in her daughter’s home, and not the daughter 
claiming against the mother as foreseen by Millbank. Here, the parties had lived together in a 
domestic relationship for over 24 years, and despite the mother’s non-financial contributions in 
the form of ‘gardening and housekeeping’149 and financial contributions towards utility bills and 
purchasing shopping, furniture and household appliances,150 she did not obtain a share in the 
daughter’s home. The ‘just and equitable’ result in this instance was that the mother received a 
lump sum payment of $4,000.151 Nicholson J reasoned that the daughter was aged 55 and 
receiving an ‘invalid pension’, and although she owned her own home she would need to 
support herself for many years to come, whereas the mother had moved in with another 
daughter and continued to enjoy the same lifestyle.152 The requirement that a court may only 
make such an order as is ‘just and equitable’ in the circumstances of the case should prevent 
unmeritorious claims from succeeding, but this does not establish whether partners to caring 
relationships need access to financial remedies in the first place. Millbank argues that partners 
to caring relationships will benefit from legal recognition in some areas, but not in the area of 
financial remedies on relationship breakdown because, 
                                                          
146 Millbank ‘Domestic Rifts’ (n23) 181. 
147 ibid. 
148 Taddeo v Taddeo (n12) [72] (Nicholson J). 
149 ibid [131]. 
150 ibid [132]. 
151 ibid [143]. 
152 ibid [141-2]. 
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‘Carers’, particularly those related by blood, appear to me to be a class of constituents 
unlikely to require property division regimes during life and who already have them 
available after death – their existence in the debate therefore says much about the desire 
of politicians to reinforce traditional notions of family and de-sex or de-radicalise this law 
reform in the public eye.153 
This reiterates the point that the motivations behind the caring relationships category may not 
stem in their entirety from a genuine concern for the injustices faced by people in caring 
relationships, but rather that there was a need to lessen the significance of recognising same-
sex couples as de facto partners. 
7.3.2 A lack of a social status 
Whilst the last chapter argued that de facto relationships generate a social status, albeit 
an inferior one to marriage,154 there is no evidence to suggest that the caring relationships 
generate a social status. The failure to generate a social status should not be taken as an 
indication that there is no purpose to recognising such relationships, because this failure to 
generate a social status is partly due to a lack of knowledge about the existence of these 
relationships as well as the role of social and cultural norms in this area. It was noted above that 
there is a dearth of case law on the caring relationships, which may suggest there is a lack of 
knowledge about their existence. Millbank found that the lack of use of the Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 in the ACT was partly because of a lack of knowledge amongst the public 
about the provision, and suggested that ‘the legal profession itself was not well versed on the 
coverage and operation of the [provision]’.155 If no one is aware of the existence of the caring 
relationships, then there is no opportunity for a social status to be generated. Additionally, 
caring relationships do not have a long history of recognition as is the case with marriage, or to 
a lesser extent de facto relationships. Caring relationships are a new creation, and as such it is 
likely that many people would be surprised to find themselves in a legally recognised caring 
relationship. This is especially the case when the caring partners are already related, such as in 
the case of an elderly parent and an adult child: they are likely to see their relationship in those 
terms, as parent and child, and not in some other, caring, category. As Nicholson J noted in 
Taddeo, 
                                                          
153 Millbank ‘Domestic Rifts’ (n23) 181-2. See also Millbank and Sant (n11) 204. 
154 See Chapter 6, 6.3.3. 
155 Millbank ‘Domestic Rifts’ (n23) 171. See also O Rundle ‘An Examination of Relationship Registration 
Schemes in Australia’ (2011) 25(2) Australian Journal of Family Law 121, 146-7 who discusses the 
correlation between low take-up rates of registered caring relationships and lack of knowledge about 
their existence. 
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It would come as a surprise to the participants in many domestic living arrangements 
involving family members if they were to be characterised as being parties to a “close 
personal relationship” thus giving rise to an entitlement to a property division order under 
the [legislation].156 
Summerfield has suggested, in the context of recognition of same-sex relationships, that 
there are cultural reasons behind a reluctance to utilise property provisions in the ACT.157 Same-
sex couples had a history of being excluded ‘from “easy” law regimes for resolving economic 
problems’ because these provisions were reserved for heterosexuals; this means that same-sex 
couples were historically used to finding alternative means of resolving their disputes.158 The 
same arguments could be extended to partners in caring relationships who may not consider 
their relationship a ‘caring relationship’ at all, and would therefore not expect a legal status to 
attach to the relationship, and may be used to finding alternative means of resolving any 
disputes or difficulties that may arise. Perhaps it takes time to generate a social status, and that 
the further relationship recognition moves away from marriage, the less likely it is that a social 
status will attach to a relationship. 
7.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter shows that the Australian reforms are, paradoxically, conservative 
attempts at radical reform because the move towards recognising caring relationships is not 
indicative of a new way of thinking about family. The fact that the parliamentary debates 
introducing the caring relationships focussed on relationships such as those between 
(unmarried) adult children and their elderly (widowed) parents159 suggests that the reforms 
were not intended as a radical re-thinking of ‘family’. Perhaps one reason for the conservative 
nature of the reforms is that even though policymakers have been prepared to think of new 
forms of relationship recognition (for whatever reason), there have been no corresponding calls 
for change from wider society. The fact that legislators have legislated in a vacuum, in the sense 
that they have attempted to create a new type of relationship in law without reference to any 
demands or proposals from wider society, may have limited the potential for any truly radical 
change to take place. Perhaps this all infers that, for the purposes of this thesis, there are some 
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159 See for example Queensland Law Reform Commission Shared Property (n3) 14, discussed above at 
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difficulties with Fineman’s proposals for radical function-based reforms160 that would abolish 
marriage and focus instead on the caretaker-dependant dyad. Fineman’s proposals suggest 
reimagining the way we recognise relationships as a top-down endeavour. But the Australian 
experience suggests that change needs to be driven by wider society before anything radical 
takes place, or in other words that organic bottom-up change is necessary; perhaps there needs 
to be both a social and a political call for a new way of thinking about relationships before 
anything truly radical can happen.
                                                          
160 See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.2. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the desirability and viability of a function-based, as opposed to a 
form-based, approach to the legal recognition of adult relationships by comparing the English 
and Welsh system with that of Australia. In part one, two rationales were advanced to explain 
why it is necessary to consider reforming the current (primarily)1 form-based approach to 
relationship recognition in England and Wales. Firstly, chapter one explained that reform is 
necessary because the current approach is too exclusive and ignores many of the relationships 
that are formed between adults. Secondly, chapter two explained that there is a consensus that 
family law performs two functions that are relevant to the thesis. The first is the protective 
function, and the second is the symbolic function. It was suggested that the current form-based 
system does not protect those people who do not formalise their relationships, and so a 
function-based system that applies without a requirement to opt-in may provide a better 
alternative in this respect. Further, it was suggested that the symbolic function of family law has 
already been an influential factor in developing form-based recognition in England and Wales. 
This conclusion will discuss the main findings of the thesis by reference to the research 
questions set out in the introduction, namely: 
1. How do the theoretical similarities and differences between form-based and function-
based approaches to relationship recognition play out in practice? 
2. What factors have supported and constrained the development of form-based and 
function-based approaches to relationship recognition? 
The discussion will show that, while the theoretical findings highlighted in chapter two,2 which 
we will return to now, are valid, they only begin to reveal the complex relationship between 
form-based and function-based recognition. 
Research question 1: the similarities and differences between form-based and function-based 
recognition 
Chapter two explained that in theoretical terms, form-based and function-based 
approaches are similar in many ways, but that they are distinct in others. The following figure 
was presented to depict the relationship between form-based and function-based recognition 
in terms of the similarities and differences between them: 
                                                          
1 Although the English and Welsh approach is often referred to as ‘form-based’, Chapter 6, 6.3 explained 
that cohabiting relationships acquire a substantial package of legal consequences which shows that 
England and Wales does recognise cohabiting relationships on a functional basis. 
2 For a summary of the findings, see Chapter 2, 2.4. 
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Figure 1  
 
 
The literature examined suggested that both approaches can generate a ‘status’, although it was 
unclear whether a function-based approach could generate both a legal and a social status. It 
was also apparent that, whilst form-based systems respect individual choice and autonomy by 
only recognising those relationships that have been registered through the deliberate actions of 
the parties, function-based systems can similarly respect choice and autonomy by making 
provision for couples to opt-out of some legal consequences. Moreover, it was suggested that 
both form-based and function-based approaches can be used flexibly, in ways that inclusively 
provide for relationship types other than the most marriage-like of couples. The literature also 
suggested that there are some differences between the approaches that mainly relate to the 
way in which legal recognition is triggered. Form-based recognition was found to be 
administratively efficient because there was a formal record of the existence of the relationship, 
whereas function-based recognition appeared to be uncertain because of the difficulties of 
proving the existence of informal relationships. 
 A second figure was also presented as a visual representation of the circularity relating 
to arguments about the respective advantages and disadvantages of form-based and function-
based approaches: 
Figure 2 
 
Form Function
FUNCTION 
FORM 
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The administrative efficiency of form-based approaches is advantageous, but in order to benefit 
from legal recognition steps must be taken to opt-in. This apparent disadvantage of form-based 
systems in failing to protect those who have not opted-in may lead us to think that function-
based systems are preferable. But, the uncertainty of function-based systems makes the 
administrative efficiency of form-based systems seem attractive, and so we find that both 
approaches have disadvantages. 
Similarities between form-based and function-based recognition 
 The comparative research confirmed that, at least in theory, both form-based and 
function-based systems can generate a legal status, because a formal relationship and an eligible 
informal relationship are treated as a special category by law and a package of legal 
consequences is bestowed upon them.3 Additionally, it has been found that the desire to respect 
individual autonomy and choice has been a significant theme when developing relationship 
recognition systems. For example, pre-nuptial agreements are now enforceable in England and 
Wales because of a perceived need to protect individual autonomy,4 which shows how marriage 
- a form-based system of recognition - has been developed to better protect autonomy. Also, 
the desire to respect autonomy and choice has been influential in developing function-based 
recognition. The Law Commission’s proposals for reforming the financial consequences of 
relationship breakdown for cohabitants in England and Wales emphasised a need to protect 
autonomy via provision for an enforceable opt-out agreement, and the Australian function-
based recognition of de facto and caring relationships allows partners to opt-out via financial 
agreement.5 The thesis has also argued that ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’ are complex concepts, and 
that the arguments of those opposed to function-based recognition because it does not respect 
autonomy and choice are too simplistic.6 The research has also confirmed that both form-based 
and function-based frameworks of relationship recognition can be used to respond to the 
diversity of family relationships that are formed, as evidenced by the existence of the registered 
and informal caring relationships in Australia.  
Differences between form- and function-based recognition 
An exploration of the way in which form-based and function-based recognition have been 
used in England and Wales and Australia has confirmed an important difference between the 
two approaches: form-based relationships are administratively efficient and, as confirmed by 
                                                          
3 For a discussion of ‘status’, see Chapter 2, 2.2.1.3. 
4 See Chapter 3, 3.3.2. 
5 See Chapter 6.3.2.2c, Chapter 7, 7.3.1. 
6 See Chapter 2, 2.3.2.3; in relation to consent to marriage, see Chapter 3, 3.2.1.2a. 
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chapter six, function-based systems are characterised by uncertainty. The administrative 
efficiency of form-based systems, and the relative ease of proving the existence of form-based 
relationships as opposed to the difficulty of proving the existence of a relationship under 
function-based recognition, was put forward as a rationale in favour of creating new form-based 
options to register a relationship in both England and Wales and Australia. For example, the 
Victorian government asserted that an option to formalise a relationship is preferable to 
function-based recognition, because this allows partners to avoid having to suffer the ‘indignity’ 
of proving the existence of their relationship on a functional basis in court.7  
Additionally, it has become clear that function-based recognition has a particular 
advantage over form-based systems, which has been an important factor in creating and 
developing function-based recognition in both jurisdictions. Function-based systems operate as 
a safety-net because there is legal recognition of a relationship without the need to take any 
steps to register the relationship. For example, the Tasmanian government highlighted this 
safety-net benefit as a reason for introducing function-based systems rather than only having 
form-based relationships, as did the Law Commission of England and Wales in their proposals 
for reforming the law on the financial consequences of the breakdown of cohabiting 
relationships.8 This is another example of the circularity of discussing the benefits and difficulties 
of form-based and function-based approaches as depicted in Figure 2. The uncertainty of 
functional systems make form-based systems appear more appealing. But, the need to opt-in to 
form-based systems means that the safety-net of a functional approach is appealing for those 
who wish to protect the vulnerable partner. This suggests that function-based recognition may 
be more effective at fulfilling family law’s protective function than form-based recognition.  
Two other differences between form-based and function-based recognition, which were 
not readily apparent from the literature discussed in chapter two have been highlighted while 
exploring the development and creation of form-based and function-based systems in both 
jurisdictions. Firstly, the way in which a social status is not automatically generated following 
the creation of a legal status, and secondly, the different meanings of ‘form’ and the consequent 
complex interaction between ‘form’ and function-based recognition.  
Social status and symbolism 
The findings of the thesis, based on an examination of sources such as Hansard, policy 
documents, case law and secondary sources, suggests that one difference between marriage 
                                                          
7 See Chapter 4, 4.2.1. 
8 See Chapter 6, 6.2.2. 
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and the other formalised relationships considered in the thesis appears to be social rather than 
legal. An exploration of different formalised relationships showed that they all generate a legal 
status, but there is evidence to suggest that the social status of marriage is unique. Despite the 
fact that the registered couple relationships in Australia attract an almost identical package of 
legal consequences as marriage, there is a continuing push for same-sex marriage in that 
jurisdiction, which suggests that the registration options are lacking symbolically. In England and 
Wales, there is evidence to show that some people, such as Wilkinson and Kitzinger, believe that 
civil partnership is a lesser status than marriage, while others, such as Steinfeld and Keidan, see 
it as a different status that is valuable and preferable to the social status of marriage.9 Chapter 
four explained that the different social status of these registered relationships may be 
attributable to the fact that they mimic marriage because they provide for the same, or similar,10 
type of relationship and provide almost identical legal consequences. The end result is that the 
registered couple relationships are measured, and sometimes found wanting, against marriage 
in a symbolic sense, and so generate a different social status. Arguably, the registered caring 
relationships in Tasmania and Victoria fail to generate any social status, and this is partly due to 
a lack of knowledge about their existence. Social and cultural norms are important in generating 
a social status: a relationship between a parent and a child, for example, is viewed socially and 
by the partners themselves in those terms and not as a ‘caring’ relationship.11 Marriage has had 
centuries to generate a social significance, and the registered couple relationships may generate 
a social status because they mimic the legal structure of marriage. But, the caring relationships 
are a new creation that few people appear to know about, and so at this point it seems they fail 
to generate a social status. 
An examination of the sources used in the thesis suggests that function-based systems do 
not generate a social status akin to that of marriage and it appears that there is something 
symbolically significant about formalised relationships that function-based systems cannot 
replicate. Despite the substantive equality of treatment between married and de facto couples 
in Australia, the creation of the registration options and the continuing fight for same-sex 
marriage suggest that functional recognition is lacking in symbolic terms. One reason why 
function-based recognition fails to generate the same social significance as marriage is because 
people value being able to attach a label to their relationship and the opportunity to ‘display’ 
                                                          
9 See Chapter 4, 4.3.2. 
10 Same-sex marriage is not recognised in Australia, and that civil partnership is only available for opposite-
sex couple in England and Wales. 
11 For discussion, see Chapter 5, 5.2.3.2b. 
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their family practices.12 Being recognised as ‘family’ by the law in a formal sense, particularly 
following a ceremony that is required by the state,13 appears to carry greater symbolic 
significance than being considered ‘family’ on a functional basis. This confirms the suggestion in 
chapter two that form-based recognition may be best placed to serve family law’s symbolic 
function because formal recognition of a relationship by the state helps partners demonstrate 
to other people that their relationship is a significant family relationship. 
The relationship between ‘form’ and function 
Chapter two highlighted that the term ‘form’, or ‘form-based’, is often used ambiguously 
in the existing literature, and can refer to two distinct concepts of ‘formalised relationship’ and 
‘relationship type’.14 The thesis has also confirmed that function-based systems can be 
categorised into ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ approaches because the parameters of function-based 
recognition are drawn with reference to relationship type: the law continues to favour some 
types of relationship over others. For example, the Australian de facto relationships are limited 
to relationships between two unrelated adults, and the caring relationships, whether formal or 
informal, are limited to relationships between two adults whether related or not. In this way, 
formalised relationships and function-based systems are similar because they are both limited 
by reference to relationship type.  
But, the thesis shows that the way in which both formalised relationships and function-
based approaches are limited by ‘type’ is different. In the same way that ‘form’ has two distinct 
meanings, it is submitted that relationship ‘type’ can also be divided into two different elements, 
of ‘structure’ and ‘quality’: 
                                                          
12 For discussion of Finch’s concept of ‘family display’, see Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2c. 
13 For discussion of the importance of ceremonies, see Chapter 4, 4.3.1.1. 
14 See Chapter 2, 2.2. 
251 
 
Figure 3 
 
‘Structure’ refers to the model or the framework of the relationship, for example, that there is 
a relationship between two unrelated adults. Type as ‘quality’ is distinct because it refers to the 
nature of the relationship, or to the qualitative characteristics of a relationship, such as whether 
the parties share a common residence, whether there is financial interdependency or third party 
perceptions of the relationship. 
The true interaction between ‘form’ (in all three senses) and function, is represented by 
the following figure: 
Figure 4 
 
The broken line between ‘formalised relationships’ and ‘function’ signifies that both approaches 
share many of the same benefits and effects. The fact that the arrows point towards both 
‘formalised relationships’ and ‘function’ signifies the circularity of discussion relating to the 
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. More specifically in relation to ‘type’, the 
figure shows that although both form-based and function-based systems of recognition are 
limited to particular types of relationship, the ‘type’ with which they are concerned is different. 
Formalised relationships assume that relationships that ‘fit’ a particular structure are also of a 
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particular quality, and no inquiry is undertaken to determine the quality of the relationship for 
the purposes of legal validity. For example, chapter three showed that policymakers value 
marriage because they assume it is a supportive, loving and committed relationship,15 even 
though all that is necessary to form a valid marriage is that the relationship fits a particular 
structure (and that the required formalities are complied with). Function-based recognition is 
different because for a valid relationship under a functional system the parties must prove that 
the relationship both fits a particular structure and prove the quality of the relationship. So to 
prove the existence of an informal caring relationship in NSW, for example, chapter seven 
showed that the relationship must fit a particular structure (two adults, whether or not they are 
related) and provide sufficient evidence that the partners lived together, and one or both 
provided domestic support and personal care.16 As such, function-based systems impose more 
stringent standards on parties than form-based systems because of the need to fit a structure 
and prove the quality of the relationship. In light of the fact that the sociological literature 
discussed in chapter one suggested that the defining feature that characterises a relationship as 
‘family’ for many is the functions that the relationship performs,17 perhaps function-based 
recognition provides a more principled way forward than form-based recognition, because 
function-based frameworks focus on the quality of a relationship, and this better corresponds 
with the way people think about family. 
Research question 2: factors which affect the development of relationship recognition systems 
There are many factors that have informed the development of form-based and function-
based frameworks of relationship recognition, some of which were already identified or hinted 
at in the literature discussed in chapter two,18 and others that were discovered by exploring the 
development of frameworks of recognition in both jurisdictions. 
Competing effects: administrative efficiency vs safety-net provision 
Confirming the findings of chapter two, practical concerns were often cited in 
parliamentary debates, especially in Australia, as reasons to prefer form-based over function-
based systems, and so in this way practical concerns have supported the development of form-
based systems. One reason why the registered couple relationships were thought necessary in 
Australia was to provide easier access to legal remedies for de facto couples because form-based 
systems are administratively efficient. This is a benefit that all form-based frameworks share, 
                                                          
15 See Chapter 3, 3.4.1. 
16 See Chapter 7, 7.1.3.1. 
17 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2a and 1.3.2.2b. 
18 For a summary of those findings, see Chapter 2, 2.4. 
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regardless of the relationship type that they legally recognise, because all formalised 
relationships have a formal record of when the relationship began (and ended). But, function-
based recognition acts as a safety-net that protects people without them needing to register the 
relationship. In Tasmania, this benefit was a reason to preserve function-based recognition of 
de facto couples, and to extend it to caring relationships, at the same time as creating the 
registration options for both couple and caring relationships. The differences between form-
based and function-based recognition have been acknowledged by policymakers, and the 
response in many jurisdictions, such as Tasmania, has been to utilise both form-based and 
function-based recognition alongside each other so as to take advantage of the benefits of both 
approaches.   
The significance of functional arguments and family law’s protective function 
As predicted in chapter two in relation to the literature advocating the introduction of a 
moderate function-based system in England and Wales,19 functional arguments that 
relationships that function similarly should be treated similarly by law have been influential in 
developing function-based recognition. For example, chapter six showed that the Australian de 
facto relationships were assumed to perform the same functions as marriage, and therefore 
should be treated similarly by law.20 Likewise, one reason to support the recognition of informal 
caring partners in Australia was that caring relationships were assumed to perform similar 
functions to same-sex relationships, which in turn were assumed to be functionally similar to 
spouses, and therefore the different types of relationship should be treated in a similar way by 
law.21 
Significantly, the research also found that functional arguments have been employed to 
develop formalised relationships, even though the quality of a relationship is irrelevant under 
form-based recognition. There is no universal agreement as to the expected functions of 
marriage, but nevertheless the marriage ideologies ensure that marriage is put on a pedestal 
both socially and legally because of the functions it is assumed or expected to perform. The 
evolving ideologies of marriage, with a shift in focus on the functions marriage is expected to 
perform has led to developments in the legal structure such as allowing same-sex couples to 
marry.22 Similarly, civil partnerships in England and Wales and the Australian registered couple 
relationships were introduced because same-sex couples, and opposite-sex de facto couples in 
                                                          
19 See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.1. 
20 See Chapter 6, 6.2.1. 
21 See Chapter 7, 7.2.1. 
22 See Chapter 3, 3.4.1. 
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Australia, were assumed to be functionally similar to married couples. Due to this functional 
similarity, it was thought that unmarried couples should have the same option to formalise their 
relationship and gain access to the same legal consequences as spouses.23 Functional arguments 
were also advanced successfully to introduce the registered caring relationships in Tasmania and 
Victoria. It was assumed that a relationship between caring partners would function similarly to 
a de facto relationship, who in turn are assumed to be functionally similar to spouses, and so 
they too, it was said, should be treated similarly by law.  
The functional arguments used to develop and create both form-based and function-
based recognition are in essence concerns about the types of family relationship that are subject 
to family law’s protective function. The need to protect an economically vulnerable unmarried 
partner, in both couple and caring relationships, has been viewed as equivalent to the perceived 
need to protect an economically vulnerable spouse. So, in this way, the desire to bring more 
people under family law’s protection has been an influential supporting factor in developing 
both form-based and function-based frameworks of relationship recognition. 
The influence of the marriage model 
The last 30 years or so has seen considerable development in relationship recognition 
frameworks in both jurisdictions. In England and Wales, a new form-based relationship has been 
created for same-sex couples with civil partnership; marriage has been opened up to same-sex 
couples; and there is increasing legal recognition of unmarried cohabiting relationships, which 
includes same- and opposite-sex couples, under a developing function-based approach. The 
change in Australia is even more striking. While marriage remains unavailable for same-sex 
couples, the position of de facto couples, both same- and opposite-sex, has been transformed 
into a position of almost identical legal treatment with spouses; many states and territories have 
introduced options to register a couple relationship; two states allow registration of caring 
relationships; and four states legally recognise informal caring relationships on a functional 
basis. 
Upon closer examination, however, it is apparent that there is one factor that has 
constrained the development of these frameworks of relationship recognition: the influence of 
the marriage model. For example, the registered couple relationships in both England and Wales 
and Australia are closely modelled on marriage and Australia’s registered caring relationships 
are not far removed from marriage because they too focus on dyadic relationships. Form-based 
recognition could be used in more innovative ways to better provide for diverse family 
                                                          
23 See Chapter 4, 4.1.1.  
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relationships that may not be dyadic in structure, as per Brake’s suggestion to ‘minimize 
marriage’.24 Even the moderate function-based approach focusses on the same relationship 
structure as marriage and assumes that both informal and married relationships function in the 
same way. Despite the fact that they provide for a different relationship structure, the informal 
caring relationships are also modelled on marriage because the focus continues to be on dyadic 
adult relationships that perform similar caring and supportive functions to those expected of 
marriage. The recognition of the informal caring relationships is a far more conservative reform 
than that called for by either Fineman or Polikoff.25 Neither the form-based nor the function-
based approaches in Australia are radically different from marriage. There have been 
considerable developments in the area of the legal recognition of adult relationships, especially 
in the recognition of same-sex couples as being family relationships, but, there appears to be an 
unwillingness by policymakers to move beyond the confines of the marriage model and to 
explore radical new ways of utilising form-based and function-based frameworks. 
The implications of the research for policymaking 
The marriage-centric, primarily form-based system, in England and Wales is in need of 
reform. The diversity of relationship practices today, in terms of both a diversity of types of 
relationship considered as family by those involved, and the fact that people may experience 
multiple relationships types in a lifetime, shows that the current framework does not correspond 
with contemporary family practices. The thesis has shown that, theoretically at least, form-
based and function-based frameworks of relationship recognition are similar in many ways, and 
neither approach is clearly better than the other at responding to family diversity. Function-
based recognition is flexible enough to provide for different types of family relationship, but it 
is not a failsafe system for responding to diversity because of the difficulties with defining 
relationships and the inherent uncertainty of function-based systems. Form-based recognition 
is also flexible in terms of the types of relationships that could be formalised, but to benefit from 
legal recognition people must take steps to register their relationship, and not everyone does 
so. Both form-based and function-based systems have the potential to be used in radical ways 
as envisaged by the commentators discussed in chapter two, but this potential has been limited 
                                                          
24 Brake suggested that marriage could be ‘minimized’ i.e. that the capacity requirements of marriage be 
modified to allow any caring relationship, whether it be a sexual relationship or otherwise, or a 
relationship between two or more people, to ‘marry’. See Chapter 2, 2.2.2.1. 
25 Fineman proposes abolishing marriage and focussing instead on the caretaker-dependant dyad, 
whereas Polikoff suggests the ‘valuing all families approach’ which consists of re-naming marriage as civil 
partnership; a registration system of designated family relationships; and a function-based system that 
legally recognises relationships when they would benefit from legal protection. See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.2. 
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by a lack of political will and a lack of imagination, on the part of both policy makers and society 
in general, to think beyond marriage and marriage-like relationships. 
In light of the similarities between both frameworks, there needs to be a principled 
discussion about the purpose of relationship recognition, akin to that advocated by Glennon and 
Polikoff, discussed in chapter two.26 Policymakers need to consider why some relationships are 
recognised while others are ignored and consider what legal consequences should follow legal 
recognition of a relationship, so that the framework of relationship recognition utilised responds 
to the needs of the ‘family we live with’.27 A good starting point is consideration of the functions 
of family law. The thesis has accepted that, while there is debate as to the functions of family 
law, there is consensus that it has both a protective and a symbolic function.28 Arguably, 
policymakers need to decide which of these functions is most important when considering any 
reforms to the current framework of relationship recognition in England and Wales, and, 
deciding which function should guide reforms could lead to the creation of a framework of legal 
recognition of relationships that responds to family diversity and the needs of real families. 
The Australian caring relationships provide an example of what can happen when there is 
no principled discussion prior to legally recognising a new type of relationship. The Australian 
policymakers failed to distinguish between the symbolic and protective functions when 
explaining why the legal recognition of ‘caring relationships,’ under both a form-based and a 
function-based approach, was necessary. Australian policymakers have attempted to attach a 
label to some family relationships and called them ‘caring relationships’, hence fulfilling the 
symbolic function, at the same time as claiming that people in these relationships require family 
law’s protection.29 The difficulty with attempting to attach a label to ‘caring relationships’ is that 
people do not feel a need to have their relationship recognised as a ‘caring relationship’ because 
this is not a familiar concept. They might not see the provision of care and support as generating 
a familial tie, and may instead conceive of themselves as family because of the structure of the 
relationship, such as it being a relationship between a parent and child or between siblings or 
friends. While for same-sex couples it was apparent that by being ignored by the law they were 
missing out on a family identity and the legal protection offered to opposite-sex couples by 
marriage or being recognised as couples under a function-based system, this was not the case 
for ‘caring relationships’.  
                                                          
26 See Chapter 2, 2.3.3.1 2.3.3.2. 
27 See Chapter 1, 1.3.2.2. 
28 For a discussion of the functions of family law, see Chapter 2, 2.1. 
29 See Chapter 5, 5.2.1 and Chapter 7, 7.2. 
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Perhaps part of the problem in Australia is the fact that there is no empirical evidence 
suggesting that people need or want legal recognition of caring relationships,30 and so there was 
no call for reform to tell policymakers what people in caring relationships actually need. Such a 
call for reform would bring with it clarity and could generate a legal response that is tailored to 
the need and desire of people in caring relationships. The fact that caring relationships were 
introduced to distract from the legal recognition of same-sex couples coupled with and absence 
of a genuine call for reform has led to a situation where policymakers have fallen back on familiar 
models of relationship recognition rather than think of new ways of utilising form-based and 
function-based frameworks. But, people in family relationships that are characterised by 
caregiving require a legal response that departs from traditional models of relationship 
recognition, and as such, there is no template to follow as there was for same-sex couples. This 
all suggests that a bottom-up approach, that is an approach based in a call for reform from 
society, is necessary before any radical reforms will take place. 
But, the fact that people do not see themselves as requiring an identity of a caring 
relationship, does not mean that different types of relationship would not benefit from family 
law’s protection: there may still be relationship generated need that it is appropriate for the law 
to remedy. While this thesis has taken issue with the way Australian policymakers used the 
protective rationale to distract from the symbolism of legally recognising same-sex couples as 
family, it is accepted that the protective function of family law is a convincing rationale for 
changing the framework of relationship recognition to be more inclusive of family diversity. If 
the fact that married couples and unmarried couples’ relationships are assumed to function in 
the same way leads to them being protected in the same way by law, then there is no cogent 
reason to suppose that other types of relationship, performing the same or similar functions, 
would not also benefit from similar legal protection. The legal recognition of caring relationships 
on the basis that they require family law’s protection, may begin a process of making them 
intelligible as relationship types and as such could precipitate calls for a more radical and far-
reaching reform in the future. 
Concluding comments 
 In conclusion, this thesis has explored whether function-based recognition provides a 
desirable and viable alternative to form-based recognition. The findings of the thesis suggest 
that while on balance, function-based recognition provides a more principled way forward, 
                                                          
30 See R Graycar and J Millbank ‘From Functional Family to Spinster Sisters: Australia’s Distinctive Path to 
Relationship Recognition’ (2007) 24 Washington University’s Journal of Law and Policy 121, 153. 
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formalised relationships have their own benefits, and as such it seems that we need to utilise 
both frameworks of relationship recognition to provide for family diversity. On the one hand, 
function-based recognition is best placed to fulfil family law’s protective function, and this 
framework is more reflective of what we value about our personal relationships because 
function-based recognition focusses on the quality of relationships, and so provides a more 
principled way forward. On the other hand, formalised relationships appear best placed to fulfil 
family law’s symbolic function. Formalised relationships allow people to attach a family label to 
their relationship and have the relationship recognised as an important family relationship by 
other people, and this has proven to be significant for same-sex couples in particular. But, not 
all relationships require both the protective and symbolic functions of family law. As such, the 
circularity of discussing the benefits and disadvantages of form-based and function-based 
recognition, as depicted in figure 2, might not indicate that either approach is redundant or 
inadequate, and rather, signifies that both approaches are needed because they serve similar, 
but not identical, purposes. 
This all suggests that theorists and policymakers need to focus on how best to utilise both 
approaches to relationship recognition, with an emphasis on carefully selecting the approach 
that is most appropriate in the circumstances. Combining both approaches to exploit their 
particular advantages is logical, considering that recognising a diversity of types of family 
relationship involves recognising that they may all have different needs, and as such it would be 
possible to pick the approach that is most suitable in the circumstances. Taken together, this 
suggests that commentators such as Fineman who advocate a radical overhaul of relationship 
recognition are acting prematurely. It appears that a bottom-up approach, in which calls for new 
frameworks of recognition emerge from those involved in different types of relationship, will be 
required if any truly radical reform, successfully tailored to the needs and desires of the family 
we live with, is to take place.
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